Hall v. State, 422 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Hall v. State, 422 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Stephens v. State (ga, 1995-04-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Stephens v. State (5×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Hailey v. State, 263 Ga. 210, 211 ( 429 SE2d 917 ) (1993); Hall v. State, 262 Ga. 596, 597 ( 422 SE2d 533 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hancock v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
OCGA § 16-1-6 (1) provides that an offense can be a lesser included offense, as a matter of fact, when: "(1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime charged." "That portion of OCGA § 16-1-6 (1) pertaining to a proof of the same facts test is but a variant application of the `uses up all the evidence' test, cited in Fredrick [ v. State, 181 Ga. App. 600, 602 (2) ( 353 SE2d 41 )] and established in Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119, 120 (2) ( 288 SE2d 185 )." Sallie, supra at 734 . (b…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hailey v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1993 · confidence medium
However, as we did in Hall v. State, 262 Ga. 596, 597 (1) (b) ( 422 SE2d 533 ) (1992), we find that Hailey's evidence "fails to meet the standard of intentional discrimination." Id. 2.
Hall
v.
the State
S92A0548.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Oct 29, 1992.
422 S.E.2d 533
Zion, Tarleton & Siskin, Jonathan J. Wade, for appellant., Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Carl P. Greenberg, Charles W. Smegal, Joseph F. Burford, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Clarke, Bell, Hunt, Benham, Fletcher, Sears-Collins.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Clarke, Chief Justice.

Hall was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 2.2 grams of cocaine and sentenced to life imprisonment under the mandatory sentencing provision of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), as this was a second conviction.[1] On appeal, Hall challenges the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) and (d).

1. Hall challenges the constitutionality of provisions (b) and (d) of OCGA § 16-13-30, on their face, and as applied.

(a) We have upheld the constitutionality of the statute against various challenges. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 261 Ga. 739 (410 SE2d 422) (1991) (OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) — concerning marijuana — not vague and uncertain and violative of due process); Isom v. State, 261[*597] Ga. 596 (408 SE2d 701) (1991) (OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) not violative of equal protection and due process guarantees of United States and Georgia constitutions); Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 468 (405 SE2d 483) (1991) (OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Georgia Constitution); Tillman v. State, 260 Ga. 801 (400 SE2d 632) (1991) (OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) is not irrational because sentence for second offense of possession of cocaine is greater than that for trafficking in cocaine, OCGA § 16-13-31 (a) (f)); Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299 (368 SE2d 737) (1988) (OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution).

Decided October 29, 1992 Reconsideration denied December 3, 1992. Zion, Tarleton & Siskin, Jonathan J. Wade, for appellant.

(b) The evidence of selective enforcement against young and impoverished blacks fails to meet the standard of intentional discrimination announced in State v. Causey, 246 Ga. 735 (2) (273 SE2d 6) (1980); State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 546-549 (6) (384 SE2d 863) (1989); and State v. Russell, _ Minn. _ (477 NW2d 886) (1991). In State v. Agan we said “proof of selective prosecution . . . requires evidence that his prosecution represents an ‘intentional or purposeful discrimination which is deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard . . . or arbitrary classification.’ ”

2. The trial court’s determination that Hall did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel was not error under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

3. We have reviewed Hall’s remaining claims of error. We hold that the evidence is sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); and there was no error in the trial of the case that warrants a new trial, or other substantial relief.

Judgment affirmed.

Bell, P. J., Hunt, Benham, Fletcher and Sears-Collins, JJ, concur.
1

The crime was committed on November 20, 1990, and Hall was indicted on December 28, 1990. He was convicted and sentenced on May 10, 1991. His motion for new trial was filed on June 6, 1991, amended on October 23, 1991, and denied on December 2, 1991. The notice of appeal was filed on January 2, 1992, and docketed in this court on February 6, 1992. The appeal was argued on April 13, 1992.

Concurrence

Benham, Justice,

concurring.

I concur separately to point out that while there is some evidence to support appellant’s allegation of selective prosecution, that evidence is insufficient under both the intentional discrimination standard adopted by this court in State v. Causey, 246 Ga. 735 (2) (273 SE2d 6) (1980), and the disparate treatment standard utilized in State v. Russell, __ Minn __ (477 NW2d 886) (1991). Accordingly, I join the majority in affirming the trial court’s judgment.

[*598] Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Carl P. Greenberg, Charles W. Smegal, Joseph F. Burford, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.