Rogers v. Norris, 586 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · Go Syfert
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Rogers v. Norris, 586 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“even presuming the evidence supported the trial court's actions, we must first have the 13 required findings of fact for review so that we know that the court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion.”
34 citation events (34 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Technology Square, LLC v. Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors (gactapp, 2021-06-30)
Treatment trajectory · 2010 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Technology Square, LLC v. Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
even presuming the evidence supported the trial court's actions, we must first have the 13 required findings of fact for review so that we know that the court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) CALLAWAY Et Al. v. GARNER Et Al. (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
failure to make mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case with the direction that findings of fact be entered on these issues.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SELITA BOYD v. FRONTIER ADJUSTERS, INC.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
See Postell, 327 Ga. App. at 196 (vacating order dismissing notice of appeal where trial court did not make findings of fact in written order); Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857-858 (1) ( 586 SE2d 747 ) (2003) (same). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crandall Postell v. Alfa Insurance Corporation
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Even if so, “the trial court did not make the findings of fact necessary to vest it with discretion to dismiss the appeal.”3 Because “the trial court ascertain the reasonableness and excusableness of the delay mandates a reversal of the order and a remand with instruction that findings be made on these issues.”) (citations omitted). 3 Dalton v. Vo, 224 Ga. App. 382, 382-83 ( 480 SE2d 377 ) (1997) (vacating the dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court, where the trial court failed to make the requisite findings) (citation omitted); see Gruner, supra (“[A] trial court …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Postell v. Alfa Insurance
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Dalton v. Vo, 224 Ga. App. 382, 382-383 ( 480 SE2d 377 ) (1997) (vacating the dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court, where the trial court failed to make the requisite findings) (citation omitted); see Gruner, supra (“[A] trial court errs by not engaging in the analysis outlined by the Supreme Court [in Propst, supra] and making the requisite findings of fact when addressing a motion to dismiss an appeal [pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-48 (c)].”) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied); Rogers, supra at 858 (1) (“Even presuming the evidence supported the trial court’s actio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Melanie Howton Gruner v. Melody Thacker
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“Failure to make these findings mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case with the direction that findings of fact be entered on these issues.” (Citations omitted.) Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gruner v. Thacker
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“Failure to make these findings mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case with the direction that findings of fact be entered on these issues.” (Citations omitted.) Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grant v. KOOBY (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Corp., 260 Ga. App. 276, 277 ( 581 SE2d 308 ) (2003); see also Langdale Co. v. Langdale, 295 Ga. App. 372, 374 ( 671 SE2d 863 ) (2008) (holding that evidence that a party’s delay in paying costs was caused by a miscommunication was not sufficient to rebut inference); Dye v. U. S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 273 Ga. App. 652, 654 ( 616 SE2d 476 ) (2005) (holding that inference was not rebutted when a party failed to produce evidence “beyond their own ignorance”); Stone v. Boyne, 245 Ga. App. 868, 869 ( 539 SE2d 209 ) (2000) (holding that a *486 party’s explanation that the delay in paying cos…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spurlock v. Department of Human Resources (2×)
Ga. · 2010 · confidence medium
"Even presuming the evidence supported the trial court's actions, we must first have the required findings of fact for review so that we know that the court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion." Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga.App. 857, 858 (1), 586 S.E.2d 747 (2003).
discussed Cited "see" Tyler Brienza v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
To do otherwise would be to elevate form over substance, and that is not something OCGA § 5-6-48 (c) requires.” (footnote omitted)); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App. 663, 664 ( 428 SE2d 671 ) (1992) (“Although the trial court did not use the specific terminology delineated in the statute, the trial court’s order indicates that the court considered those factors in concluding that the dismissal of the appellants’ appeal was proper.”). 12 We have previously explained that the “threshold question of whether a delay in filing a transcript is unreasonable is a separate matter …
discussed Cited "see" State v. Brienza (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Burger v. Krueger , 224 Ga. App. 179 , 179-80, 480 S.E.2d 230 (1996) ; see Rogers v. Norris , 262 Ga. App. 857 , 857 (1), 586 S.E.2d 747 (2003) ("[Appellee] argues that the absence of the motion to dismiss hearing transcript in the appellate record makes the error harmless, in that we must presume the evidence supported the trial court's actions.
ROGERS
v.
NORRIS
A03A1180.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Aug 22, 2003.
586 S.E.2d 747
Dreger, McClelland & Pieschel, Troy R. McClelland III, for appellants., Harper, Waldon & Craig, Russell D. Waldon, James A. Neuherger, Cooper & Makarenko, Gary M. Cooper, William Z. Meadows, for appellee.
Miller.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 67%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (2)
Miller, Judge.

Ginger Rogers (individually and on behalf of her minor child) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Jody Lee Norris’s motion to dismiss her appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-48 (c) for an unreasonable delay in paying to the trial court the bill of costs to prepare the record for appeal.

1. The trial court simply granted the motion without elaboration and failed to make the necessary findings as to whether the delay was unreasonable, inexcusable, and caused by Rogers. See Cody v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp., 248 Ga. App. 180 (546 SE2d 299) (2001); Dalton v. Vo, 224 Ga. App. 382, 383 (480 SE2d 377) (1997). Although we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, “the trial court must make findings on these issues before we may determine whether its discretion was abused. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Patillo, 194 Ga. App. 279 (390 SE2d 431) (1990).” Wood v. Notte, 238 Ga. App. 748, 749 (1) (519 SE2d 923) (1999). Failure to make these findings mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case with the direction[*858] that findings of fact be entered on these issues. Cody, supra, 248 Ga. App. at 181; Dalton, supra, 224 Ga. App. at 383.

Decided August 22, 2003. Dreger, McClelland & Pieschel, Troy R. McClelland III, for appellants. Harper, Waldon & Craig, Russell D. Waldon, James A. Neuherger, Cooper & Makarenko, Gary M. Cooper, William Z. Meadows, for appellee.

Norris argues that the absence of the motion to dismiss hearing transcript in the appellate record makes the error harmless, in that we must presume the evidence supported the trial court’s actions. Even presuming the evidence supported the trial court’s actions, we must first have the required findings of fact for review so that we know that the court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion. In Wood, supra, 238 Ga. App. at 748, the same hearing was not transcribed and remand was nevertheless required. Norris’s reliance on Carson v. Carson, 226 Ga. App. 659, 660-661 (3) (487 SE2d 447) (1997), is unavailing, as Carson does not involve a motion to dismiss an appeal under OCGA § 5-6-48 (c).

2. Rogers’s remaining enumeration of error addresses the grant of Norris’s motion to dismiss the underlying negligence action for failure to serve Norris with process. “But that appeal was dismissed by the trial court, and we cannot address the issues in the underlying action unless and until [Rogers’s] appeal is reinstated, either by the trial court upon remand, or upon appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the appeal after making findings [of fact] upon remand.” Wood, supra, 238 Ga. App. at 749 (2).

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

Smith, C. J., and Ruffin, P. J., concur.