Lajara v. State, 435 S.E.2d 600 (Ga. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Lajara v. State, 435 S.E.2d 600 (Ga. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“(b)oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact”
280 citation events (202 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Suggs v. State (ga, 2000-02-14)
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Suggs v. State
Ga. · 2000 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
(b)oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CALDWELL, WARDEN v. EDENFIELD; And Vice Versa (2×)
Ga. · 2023 · confidence medium
See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV) (noting that a court need not address counsel’s performance if an ineffective assistance claim can be denied based on a lack of prejudice alone); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) (435 SE2d 600) (1993) (same).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Lewis Terrance Williams v. State (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Even if the jury charge as to aggravated assault was error, the Appellant has failed to show that it affected his substantial rights inasmuch as the trial court entered a sentence as to armed robbery.35 34 Lajara, 263 Ga. at 440 (3) (citations and footnote omitted). 35 See Lajara, 263 Ga. at 440 (3). 18 (e) The Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s instruction on armed robbery.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Tyrone Carmichael v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
As a general rule, matters of reasonable tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.”19 In other words, “hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel, and a lawyer second-guessing his own performance with the benefit of hindsight has no significance for an ineffective assistance of counsel 17 Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 75-76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003) (citations and punctuation omitted). 18 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (“Although the Supreme Court in Strickland discussed…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FORD v. TATE (And Vice Versa) (2×)
Ga. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV) (noting that an appellate court need not address counsel’s performance if the claim can be rejected based on a lack of prejudice); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (same). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vincent Lamont Easley, Jr. v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a criminal defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced the client that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.[22] The criminal defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. [As the appellate court, we] accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly err…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Otis Robert Tripp, Jr. v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
We reversed both of those conclusions in our previous opinion. 4 outcome of the trial would have been different.[14] The criminal defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. [As the appellate court, we] accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.15 Both prongs of the Strickland test need not be proven if the defendant fails to prove either one.16 To meet the burden of proving tri…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jasper Anthony v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a criminal defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced the client that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.[15] The criminal defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. [As the appellate court, we] accept the trial court’s factual findings and 13 Green, 295 Ga. at 112 (2) (citation and pu…
cited Cited as authority (rule) BRYSON v. JACKSON
Ga. · 2016 · confidence medium
Strickland v. Washington, supra[, 466 U. S.] at 698; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Seabolt v. Norris
Ga. · 2016 · confidence medium
Strickland v. Washington, supra[, 466 U. S.] at 698; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Rudolph
Ga. · 2015 · confidence medium
Strickland v. Washington, supra[, 466 U. S.] at 698; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Humphrey v. Riley
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811-812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (noting that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be resolved based solely on a lack of prejudice without addressing the separate question of whether trial counsel actually performed deficiently).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Humphrey v. Lewis
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 ; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (stating that a court may deny an ineffective assistance claim based solely on the absence of prejudice arising from counsel’s alleged deficiencies).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patterson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Bruce v. State, 252 Ga. App. 494, 498 (2) ( 555 SE2d 819 ) (2001). “[A] court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to . . . address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.” Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Humphrey v. Morrow (2×)
Ga. · 2011 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (noting that an appellate court need not address whether counsel was deficient if the claim can be rejected based on a lack of prejudice). *867 To show sufficient prejudice to warrant relief, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different [cit.].” Smith, 253 Ga. at 783 (1).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Askew v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cuzzort v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Baskin
Ga. · 2010 · confidence medium
Strickland v. Washington, supra at 698; Bajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Accord Cleveland I, supra at 145-146; Port v. State, 295 Ga. App. 109, 113 (2) (b) ( 671 SE2d 200 ) (2008); Carson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 763, 765 ( 592 SE2d 161 ) (2003) (whole court). 10 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Santibanez v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
With respect to his conviction for methamphetamine trafficking, Santibanez was sentenced to thirty years, to serve twenty in prison and ten on. probation; he was fined $300,000. 11 See Yarbrough v. State, 264 Ga. App. 848, 849 (1) ( 592 SE2d 681 ) (2003) (sustaining conviction for methamphetamine trafficking, where suspected substances tested positive for methamphetamine; substances contained traces of the vitamin B supplement, which drug dealers often add to methamphetamine, thereby reducing the purity of their drug product but increasing the amount of product for sale; and the total weight o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Johnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 (Citations omitted.) Glover v. State, 285 Ga. 461, 464 (5) ( 678 SE2d 476 ) (2009). 2 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Pringle v. State, 281 Ga. App. 230, 234 (2) ( 635 SE2d 843 ) (2006). 3 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Reed v. State, 285 Ga. 64, 66 (6) ( 673 SE2d 246 ) (2009). 4 See Clements v. State, 299 Ga. App. 561 (1) ( 683 SE2d 127 ) (2009) (noting- that crimes involving dishonesty or false statement include, inter alia, “criminal fraud ... or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ADEM v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Smith, P J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). 2 OCGA § 16-5-24. 3 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 4 Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108 ) (2003). 5 Williams v. State, 265 Ga. 681, 682 (1) ( 461 SE2d 530 ) (1995) (citations and punctuation omitted). 6 Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 87 (4) ( 526 SE2d 347 ) (2000). 7 Id. at 88 (4). 8 See Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 357 (2) ( 676 SE2d 196 ) (2009) (when ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance, this court does not evaluate counsel’s trial tactics and strategic decisions in hindsight); Smith v.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mahoney v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) We find no merit in Mahoney’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to reserve objections to the total charge because Mahoney has not demonstrated that any prejudice resulted.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Brannan
Ga. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s professional deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be decided based solely on the absence of prejudice of constitutional proportions).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whatley v. Terry
Ga. · 2008 · confidence medium
Ind. 2001); Williams v. State, 706 NE2d 149, 161 (II) (Ind. 1999). 17 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 174-175 (III) (122 SC 1237, 152 LE2d 291) (2002). 18 Id. at 168 (II) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (98 SC 1173, 55 LE2d 426) (1978)). 19 Id. at 168 (II) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335,348-349 (100 SC 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980)). 20 Id. at 168 (II). 21 Id. at 172-173 (II). 22 Osborne, 466 F3d at 1315, n. 3 . 23 Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687 (III); Smith, 253 Ga. at 783-784 (1). 24 Smith, 253 Ga. at 783 (1). 25 Strickland, 466 U. S. at 698 ; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Schofield v. Cook
Ga. · 2008 · confidence medium
Strickland, 466 U. S. at 698 ; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) We find no merit in Williams’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial because his counsel failed to move to exclude the victim’s identification of him at trial based on a suggestive photo lineup. 2 In order to prevail on this claim, Williams must make a “strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had [a] motion been filed.” (Citations and footnote omitted.) Millsap v. State, 275 Ga. App. 732, 736 (3) (c) ( 621 SE2d 837 ) (2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reynolds v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). 1.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Bass v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
See Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2), 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). [5] (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Worthy v. State, 286 Ga.App. 77, 79 (2), 648 S.E.2d 682 (2007). [6] (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App. 339, 345 (4), 638 S.E.2d 791 (2006). [7] Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3), 435 S.E.2d 600 (1993). [8] Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 88 (4), 526 S.E.2d 347 (2000). [9] 379 U.S. 466 , 85 S.Ct. 546 , 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965). [10] 263 Ga. 47 , 426 S.E.2d 868 (1993). [11] 268 Ga. 286 , 486 S.E.2d 887 (1997). [12] (Punctuation omitted.) Radford, supra at 48 (1),…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Francis v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Bajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dixon v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457 ( 588 SE2d 691 ) (2003). 2 Panzner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 868 ( 616 SE2d 201 ) (2005). 3 Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 195 (2) ( 625 SE2d 397 ) (2006). 4 Short v. State, 234 Ga. App. 633, 634 (1) ( 507 SE2d 514 ) (1998). 5 Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 840 (2) ( 561 SE2d 109 ) (2002), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781,61 LE2d 560) (1979); see OCGA§ 16-10-24; Gordon v. State, 199 Ga. App. 704, 705 (2) ( 406 SE2d 110 ) (1991). 6 See generally Whitner v. State, 276 Ga. 742, 744 (3) ( 584 SE2d 247 ) (2003); J…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simmons v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Smith, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur. 1 “Personal Mail Box.” 2 Simmons was later assigned mailbox 143. 3 Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 131 (3) ( 475 SE2d 637 ) (1996) (citation and. punctuation omitted). 4 Turner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 747, 747-748 (1) ( 500 SE2d 628 ) (1998) (punctuation and footnotes omitted). 5 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 6 See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (a) (1), (c) (3) (i). 7 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 8 See Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108 ) (2003). 9 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schofield v. Holsey (2×)
Ga. · 2007 · confidence medium
Strickland, 466 U. S. at 698 ; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Espinosa v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Tom Durden, District Attorney, Henry P. Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 Ruiz v. State, 277 Ga. App. 178 ( 626 SE2d 136 ) (2006) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 Brown v. State, 267 Ga. App. 642, 645 (1) ( 600 SE2d 731 ) (2004) (footnote omitted). 3 Terrell v. State, 268 Ga. App. 173, 174 (2) ( 601 SE2d 500 ) (2004) (punctuation omitted). 4 See OCGA§ 24-4-6. 5 See Lee v. State, 281 Ga. App. 479, 479-482 (1) ( 636 SE2d 547 ) (2006); Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 423 (1) ( 636 SE2d 151 ) (20…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ford v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Smith, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur. 1 See Kennedy v. State, 279 Ga. App. 415, 416 (1) ( 631 SE2d 462 ) (2006). 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Revere v. State, 277 Ga. App. 393, 394 (1) (a) ( 626 SE2d 585 ) (2006). 3 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 4 See Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108 ) (2003). 5 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). 6 Id. 7 Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 87-88 (4) ( 526 SE2d 347 ) (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Feaster v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Katz, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 Martinez v. State, 278 Ga. App. 500 ( 629 SE2d 485 ) (2006) (citations omitted). 2 See OCGA §§ 16-8-41 (a) (armed robbery); 16-11-106 (b) (possession of a firearm during commission of a felony); see generally Marlin v. State, 273 Ga. App. 856, 858-859 (2) ( 616 SE2d 176 ) (2005) (circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the use of a gun during an armed robbery). 3 Elliott v. State, 253 Ga. 417, 420 (2) (a) ( 320 SE2d 361 ) (1984) (citations omitted). 4 See id.; Williams v. State, 262 Ga. App. 864, 866 (2) ( 586 SE2d 751 ) (2003). 5…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buckholts v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Smith, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur. 1 See generally Totino v. State, 266 Ga. App. 265, 265-266 (1) (a) ( 596 SE2d 749 ) (2004). 2 Collins v. State, 273 Ga. 93, 94 (2) ( 538 SE2d 47 ) (2000), citing Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2) (b) ( 409 SE2d 649 ) (1991). 3 See Collins, supra; Stinson v. State, 254 Ga. App. 810, 813 (3) ( 564 SE2d 39 ) (2002). 4 Ledford v. State, 275 Ga. App. 107, 110 ( 620 SE2d 187 ) (2005) (citation omitted); compare *258 Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 799 (1) (b) ( 410 SE2d 423 ) (1991) (incident 31 years in the past was too remote). 5 See Fielding v. State, 2…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Head v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paige v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Paige contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial after the victim began crying on the witness stand, requiring a recess to be taken.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilburn v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Wilburn claims his counsel should have objected to Barnes’s testimony that she did not believe Price assaulted the victim because she had “been familiar with Mr. Price for over about seven, eight years and I know him as a very non-violent person, and I was like concerned.” At the motion for new trial hearing, Wilburn’s trial counsel testified that he did not object to this testimony because it was not responsive to the question, “was buried in beneath testimony about other things,” and he did not want to draw the ju…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mayo v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Mayo claims that his trial counsel’s too short and infrequent meetings with him require a new trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrews v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) We find no merit in Andrews’ claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the evidence about the Fulton County incidents.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duvall v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Williams v. State, 217 Ga. App. 636, 638 (3) ( 458 SE2d 671 ) (1995) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2 OCGA§ 16-6-4 (a) (“Aperson commits the offense of child molestation whenhe or she does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.”). 3 Howard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 558, 559-560 ( 602 SE2d 295 ) (2004) (citation omitted). 4 Id. 5 Strong v. State, 265 Ga. App. 257, 258 ( 593 SE2d 719 ) (2004) (citatio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horne v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Horne appeals from this ruling. 2 Bruce v. State, 252 Ga. App. 494, 498 (2) ( 555 SE2d 819 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 3 Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385 ) (1992) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 Bajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). 5 Brower v. State, 230 Ga. App. 125, 126 (2) ( 495 SE2d 600 ) (1998); Randolph v. State, 225 Ga. App. 324 ( 484 SE2d 1 ) (1997). 6 See Noble v. State, 220 Ga. App. 155, 157 (1) ( 469 SE2d 307 ) (1996). 7 Horne, supra, 262 Ga. App. at 606 (1). 8 Bruce, supra, 252 Ga. App. at 498 (2). 9 Horne, supra, 262 Ga. App. at…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
And, applying the plain error rule, we find that none of the comments “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of [the] proceedings.” (Punctuation omitted.) Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58 ) (2000). 5 See Barrett v. State, 275 Ga. 669, 670-671 (3) ( 571 SE2d 803 ) (2002). 6 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). 7 Id. 8 See Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 472 (4) ( 500 SE2d 329 ) (1998). 9 Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 397, 400-401 (e) ( 603 SE2d 228 ) (2004). 10 See id.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fennell v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Fennell argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to present his entrapment defense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buckley v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Buckley contends his counsel was ineffective for abandoning the claim that the indictment was defective for failing to “describe or name the item for which the Appellant was convicted.” The indictment in this case described the stolen property as “a Kruggerand [sic] gold coin pendant that belonged to [the victim] ” As this indictment sufficiently described the stolen property, we find no merit in this enumeration.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leonard v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
J., and Johnson, P. J., concur. 1 (Footnote omitted.) Faulkner v. State, 260 Ga. App. 794 ( 581 SE2d 365 ) (2003). 2 See Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197,198 (1) ( 581 SE2d 279 ) (2003); Slater v. State, 209 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 434 SE2d 547 ) (1993). 3 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 4 Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108 ) (2003). 5 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). 6 Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 87-88 (4) ( 526 SE2d 347 ) (2000). 7 Mack v. State, 242 Ga. App. 256, 258 (2) (c) ( 529 SE2d 393 ) (2000). 8 Id. 9 See Roberts v. Stat…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bruce v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [2] See Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2), 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). [3] Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3), 435 S.E.2d 600 (1993). [4] Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 87-88 (4), 526 S.E.2d 347 (2000). [5] See Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 807, 808 (2)(b), 439 S.E.2d 911 (1994). [6] See Washington v. State, 276 Ga. 655, 659 (3)(c), 581 S.E.2d 518 (2003). [7] (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 476, 482 (4)(i), 480 S.E.2d 32 (1997). [8] Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 239 (12)(b), 497 S.E.2d 216 (1998). [9…
Lajara
v.
the State
S93A0652.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Oct 18, 1993.
435 S.E.2d 600
Garland B. Cook, Jr., for appellant., Michael H. Crawford, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Matthew P. Stone, Staff Attorney, for appellee.
Fletcher.
Cited by 126 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 74%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Georgia (1)
Fletcher, Justice.

Luis Añado Lajara was convicted of felony murder in the death[*439] of David Alley and sentenced to life imprisonment. [1] He appeals and we affirm.

1. The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution are sufficient to prove that Lajara became involved in an altercation with the victim outside a bar and fatally stabbed the victim in the abdomen during the course of that altercation. After reviewing the record, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Lajara guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Lajara claims that he was prejudiced by the court’s charge concerning the method the jury should follow in considering the offenses of felony murder and voluntary manslaughter. Lajara maintains that the court’s charge was sequential in that it required the jury to first acquit him of felony murder before it could consider the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.

In Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992) we adopted a modified version of the merger rule to ensure that persons would not be convicted of felony murder in cases where the facts otherwise warrant a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. To ensure that juries consider the offense of voluntary manslaughter during their deliberations, we expressly disapproved of sequential charges in the felony murder, voluntary manslaughter context. Sequential charges concerning these two offenses allow the jury to stop deliberation once they have reached a guilty verdict on the felony murder charge without first considering the mitigating factors of provocation and passion which are present in cases of voluntary manslaughter. See Head v. State, 262 Ga. 795 (426 SE2d 547) (1993) (Hunt, P. J., concurring). Having reviewed the charge, we conclude that the trial court did give a sequential charge as Lajara contends. [2]

Our holding in Edge was designed to preclude juries from automatically finding defendants guilty of felony murder without any consideration of voluntary manslaughter. See Shaw v. State, 263 Ga. 88 (428 SE2d 566) (1993). Although the trial court did not follow Edge in giving its charge, the facts show that the jury did consider voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, the jury entered the words “not[*440] guilty” next to the offense of voluntary manslaughter on the verdict form they returned to the court. Moreover, during jury deliberations, the jury asked for and received a recharge from the court solely on the issue of voluntary manslaughter. We find that the jury’s verdict form and request for a recharge on voluntary manslaughter prove that the jury did, in fact, consider the charge of voluntary manslaughter and that the purpose of Edge was achieved despite the sequential charge given by the court. This enumeration is therefore without merit. [3]

3. Lajara’s co-defendant, Boterf, testified at the trial after a grant of testimonial immunity by the court. Lajara argues that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request charges from the court concerning the meaning and effect of testimonial immunity.

In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, Lajara must show that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for the alleged ineffective act, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459 (396 SE2d 891) (1990). [4] “[B]oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 698.

Although the Supreme Court in Strickland discussed the performance component prior to the prejudice component, it acknowledged that a court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to approach the inquiry in that order or even to address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.

In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.
[*441] Decided October 18, 1993. Garland B. Cook, Jr., for appellant. Michael H. Crawford, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Matthew P. Stone, Staff Attorney, for appellee.

Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697.

Here, we have first directed our inquiry to the prejudice component and, after reviewing the entire record, we find nothing to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of Lajara’s trial would have been different had counsel asked for the charges concerning the meaning and effect of testimonial immunity. Therefore, Lajara’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail since he has shown no prejudice.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
1

The crime was committed on October 6,1991 and Lajara was indicted on December 10, 1991. His trial commenced on May 11, 1992 and on May 13, 1992, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a motion for new trial on June 10, 1992, which was denied on November 2, 1992. On November 25, 1992, new defense counsel filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and for an extension of time for the filing of a notice of appeal. The motion was granted and following an evidentiary hearing on January 20, 1993, the trial court entered its order finding that Lajara was not denied effective assistance of counsel. The case was docketed in this court on January 26, 1993 and was orally argued on April 12, 1993.

2

To avoid error trial courts should modify the charge on felony murder and voluntary manslaughter in the manner discussed by this court in Edge.

3

Our determination in Div. 2 renders moot defendant’s enumerations concerning whether counsel preserved the right to object to the charge and whether counsel was ineffective if the right was not preserved.

4

We do not reach the question of whether the failure to request such a charge shows that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by the other component of Strickland.