Happoldt v. State, 475 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Happoldt v. State, 475 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
65 citation events (39 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Darnell Craw v. State (gactapp, 2023-09-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Darnell Craw v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, questions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve, and the jury “may reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and accept evidence that a shooting was not done in self-defense.”12 Given these circumstances, the evidence presented during the trial was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty 12 Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 ( 847 SE2d 156 ) (2020) (punctuation omitted); accord Goodson v. State, 305 Ga. 246, 248 (1) (b) ( 824 SE2d 371 ) (2019). 13 verdict on the offenses of voluntary manslaughter13 and aggravated assault.14 According…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. State
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
Under the doctrine of transferred intent, “when an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.” [Cit.] Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boatright v. State
Ga. · 2011 · confidence medium
In three related enumerations, appellant challenges the giving *601 of a charge on transferred intent 4 and asserts trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object both to the transferred intent charge and to the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding transferred intent. 5 Under the doctrine of transferred intent, “(w)hen an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actu…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Watkins v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Birt v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
But it is black-letter law that “[u]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, when an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Ga. · 2005 · confidence medium
Furthermore, “(w)hen an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.” [Cit.] Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Culler v. State
Ga. · 2004 · confidence medium
We note that by statute, the State was obligated to make available to the defense those photographs it intended to use as evidence at trial, and there is no indication in the record (nor do appellants claim) that the State intended to use the undeveloped negatives as evidence. 5 OCGA § 17-16-6. 6 Watts v. State, 265 Ga. 888 ( 463 SE2d 696 ) (1995). 7 Carruthers v. State, 272 Ga. 306, 314 ( 528 SE2d 217 ) (2000). 8 OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). 9 See Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 611-612 ( 533 SE2d 379 ) (2000); Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 592-593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998). 10 Happoldt v. State,…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pierce v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Pope, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 Willingham v. State, 242 Ga. App. 472 -473 ( 530 SE2d 224 ) (2000). 3 Barnes v. State, 168 Ga. App. 925, 926 (2) ( 310 SE2d 777 ) (1983). 4 Mathis v. State, 238 Ga. App. 218, 221 (4) ( 517 SE2d 578 ) (1999). 5 Redding v. State, 239 Ga. App. 718, 722 ( 521 SE2d 840 ) (1999). 6 Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 128 (2) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996). 7 Roundtree v. State, 270 Ga. 504, 505 ( 511 SE2d 190 ) (1999). 8 McWhorter v. State, 271 Ga. 461, 462 ( 519 SE2d 903 ) (1999). 9 Cameron v. State, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eckman v. State
Ga. · 2001 · confidence medium
The trial court has the discretion to grant a change of venue and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. [Cit.] “In a motion for a change of venue, the petitioner must show (1) that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or (2) that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible. [Cit.]” Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 128 (2) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robertson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Osborne and Jordan were expressly overruled by Dunagan . 4 Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996). 5 Pace v. State, 239 Ga. App. 506 ( 521 SE2d 444 ) (1999). 6 Dunagan, supra at 593-594 . 7 Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 12, 13 ( 430 SE2d 157 ) (1993). 8 Id. 9 (Citation omitted.) Trzepacz v. State, 240 Ga. App. 410, 411 (1) ( 523 SE2d 599 ) (1999). 10 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 11 Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3) ( 404 SE2d 598 ) (1991). 12 Zant v. Moon, 264 Ga. 93, 97 (2) ( 440 SE2d 657 ) (1994). 13 Pace, supra at 510 . 14…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Veal v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127-128 (1) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dunn v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
(Punctuation omitted.) Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Roundtree v. State
Ga. · 1999 · confidence medium
Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 128 (2) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dixson v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1998 · confidence medium
Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 128 (2) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robertson v. State
Ga. · 1997 · confidence medium
Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 128 (2) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited "see" Rodney Miles v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996) (“[u]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, when an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
discussed Cited "see" Courson v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 128 ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996); Gibson v. State, 261 Ga. 313, 314 ( 404 SE2d 781 ) (1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hubbard v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126 (2) ( 475 SE2d 627 ) (1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Taylor v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur. 1 Garcia v. State, 290 Ga. App. 164 ( 658 SE2d 904 ) (2008). 2 Id. 3 OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (4). 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Garcia, supra at 165 (2). 5 See Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372, 375 (5) ( 477 SE2d 827 ) (1996) (jury authorized to find defendant who willingly engaged in gunfight on public street responsible for death of innocent bystander, even though another man fired bullet that struck victim; “the death was directly caused by the gunfight, in which the jury was authorized to find [the defendant] was a willing participant”); Steele v. State, …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eady v. Capitol Indemnity Corp. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127 (1) (b) ( 475 SE2d 627 ).
Happoldt
v.
the State
S96A1006.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Sep 23, 1996.
475 S.E.2d 627
Buafo & Associates, Althea L. Buafo, for appellant., Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Thomas R. McBerry, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Hines.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published
Hines, Justice.

James Milton Happoldt was found guilty of the malice murder and felony murder of his ex-wife Janice Buice, of aggravated assault on his son Jackson Happoldt, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. We affirm Happoldt’s convictions. *

[*127] The evidence, considered in a light most favorable to the verdict, showed that on March 3, 1994, Happoldt and Buice had an argument on the telephone about child support. That afternoon, Happoldt went to his ex-wife’s residence and waited for her to arrive. As Buice and Jackson approached the garage, Happoldt fired three shots into Buice’s side of the automobile, killing her and injuring his son. Jackson testified that his father told him, after the shooting, “[t]his is what happens when people screw me,” and that as he was entering the house he heard an additional gunshot in the garage. The medical examiner, who performed the autopsy, testified that Buice had been shot three times from a distance and once in the head from within two inches. The evidence demonstrated that the last gunshot Jackson heard, while entering the house, caused the wound to Buice’s head. There was also testimony from Happoldt’s girl friend, Clemons, that three weeks before the crimes Happoldt told her that he would kill his ex-wife for what she had done to him and his family.

1. Happoldt contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of malice murder and aggravated assault. We disagree.

(a) The jury, assessing the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, chose not to believe Happoldt’s testimony that shooting Buice was a split second decision and the result of an uncontrollable feeling. Roker v. State, 262 Ga. 220 (416 SE2d 281) (1992). The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Happoldt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of his ex-wife. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

(b) The State was not required to prove that Happoldt intended to shoot his son, Jackson, in order to establish the crime of aggravated assault in this case. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, “[wjhen an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.” Fussell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 134, 136 (4) (369 SE2d 511) (1988). Testimony at trial established that Happoldt shot into the car intending to kill his ex-wife and that one of the bullets struck his son in the side. The evidence was sufficient to enable a[*128] rational trier of fact to find Happoldt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault on his son. Jackson v. Virginia, supra.

Decided September 23, 1996. Buafo & Associates, Althea L. Buafo, for appellant. Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Thomas R. McBerry, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

2. Happoldt asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for change of venue. We disagree.

The trial court has the discretion to grant a change of venue and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 429 (5) (349 SE2d 717) (1986). “In a motion for a change of venue, the petitioner must show (1) that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or (2) that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible. [Cit.]” Grace v. State, 210 Ga. App. 718, 720 (3) (437 SE2d 485) (1993).

Considering the record, we cannot say that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial as a result of the pretrial publicity or that there was actual prejudice in the jury selection process rendering a fair trial impossible. Happoldt made no showing that the publicity contained information that was factually incorrect or that the publicity was inflammatory or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility. [2] Compare Tyree v. State, 262 Ga. 395 (418 SE2d 16) (1992). Additionally, Happoldt used only nine of his peremptory challenges during the jury selection, and failed to demonstrate that the jury panel had a fixed opinion concerning his guilt because of exposure to the pretrial publicity. See Davis v. State, 241 Ga. 376, 382 (5) (247 SE2d 45) (1978). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue.

Judgments affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
*

The crimes occurred on IMarch 3, 1994. Happoldt was indicted on May 16, 1994, for the malice murder and felony murder of Janice Buice, of aggravated assault on his son Jackson Happoldt, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was tried on August 18, 1994, and was found guilty of all charges. On August 18, 1994, Happoldt was sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder, twenty years imprisonment to be served consecutively for aggravated assault, and five years to be served consecutively to the twenty years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The felony murder con[*127] viction stood vacated by operation of law, OCGA § 16-1-7. His motion for a new trial, filed on September 12, 1994, and amended on November 14, 1995, was denied on December 15, 1995. A motion for an out-of-time appeal was granted on February 28, 1996. The notice of appeal was filed on February 28, 1996, and the appeal was docketed with this Court on March 20, 1996. The case was submitted for decision without oral argument on May 22, 1996.

2

The publicity in question amounted to seven articles run in three newspapers from March 4, 1994 to July 6, 1994, as well as one television broadcast about the upcoming trial which was shown on August 12, 1994. The statements made by the police in the articles detailed the nature of the events leading to the shooting and included a statement that “[t]here was no way she could get away. He [Happoldt] waited there on her. And then when she showed up, he ambushed her ... he opened fire.” Another statement was made by the Sheriff, who said that “every indication we got is that he [Happoldt] planned to come there and kill her.” One article stated that Happoldt had been questioned by police in regard to two unsolved five-year-old murders. Another article stated that Happoldt had moved for a change of venue.