Quinn v. State, 485 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. 1997). · Go Syfert
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Quinn v. State, 485 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
59 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Keith Shumate v. State (gactapp, 2024-09-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keith Shumate v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
I fully concur with the majority’s analysis and conclusion that the initial interaction between the law enforcement officers and Shumate constituted a first-tier encounter in the context of the Fourth Amendment. “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions; and ask to examine the individual’s identification,;—as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997) (cleaned up).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gonzalez v. the State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Lockheart v. State, 284 Ga. 78, 80 (3) ( 663 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (where motion to suppress evidence would have been meritless, counsel’s failure to file such a motion did not amount to ineffective assistance); Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997) (where suppression motion would not have been meritorious, defendant was not prejudiced under the second prong of test for ineffectiveness of counsel).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Solano-Rodriguez v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
“Not all encounters between police officers and citizens involve seizures which implicate Fourth Amendment protections.” (Citation omitted.) Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brown
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions ... as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Higdon v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Cerbone, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 Sanders v. State, 247 Ga. App. 170 -171 ( 543 SE2d 452 ) (2000). 2 See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (under Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (116 SC 1769, 135 LE2d 89) (1996), officer’s subjective basis for search or arrest irrelevant when the totality of circumstances demonstrates probable cause to support the officer’s actions); Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 131 (5) (a) ( 475 SE2d 637 ) (1996) (same). 3 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 699 (116 SC 1657, 134 LE2d 911) (1996). 4 Id. at 699-7…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Sirianni
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2002 · confidence medium
App.1998); Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70 , 485 S.E. 2d 483, 485 (1997); State v. Tsukiyama, 56 Haw. 8 , 525 P. 2d 1099, 1100-01 (1974); State v. Reason, 263 Kan. 405 , 951 P. 2d 538, 543-44 (1997); State v. Johnston, 85 Ohio App. 3d 475 , 620 N.E. 2d 128, 130 (1993); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W. 3d 420, 427 (Tenn.2000); State v. Jackson, 805 P. 2d 765, 768 (Utah Ct.App.1990), cert. denied, 815 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1991); State v. Arneson, 2001 WL 1658939 , at *2 (Wis.Ct.App.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Daniel (2×)
Tenn. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435 , 111 S.Ct. at 2386 ; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 , 104 S.Ct. at 1762 ; Royer, 460 U.S. at 501 , 103 S.Ct. at 1326 ; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 556, 100 S.Ct. at 1878; Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 30 ; Moore, 776 S.W.2d at 938 ; Wilhoit, 962 S.W.2d at 486 ; Butler, 795 S.W.2d at 685 ; see also Hammons v. State, 327 Ark. 520 , 940 S.W.2d 424, 428 (1997); Thompson v. State, 724 So.2d 62, 64 (Ala.Crim.App.1998); People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 73 (Colo.1998); Cha mbers v. State, 700 So.2d 68 (Fla.Dist.Cl.App.1997); Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70 , 485 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1997); People v.…
discussed Cited "see" John Coney v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997) (the totality of circumstances, including the discovery of a large sum of money, the presence of a pistol on the seat of defendant’s car, and alerting by narcotics dog, provided probable cause to search; because a motion to suppress “would not have been meritorious,” no further proceedings were required on the motion or an ineffectiveness claim concerning it); compare Suluki v. State, 302 Ga. App. 735, 738 (1) ( 691 SE2d 626 ) (2010) (reversing conviction where defendant showed a 11 “reasonable probability . . . that the outcom…
discussed Cited "see" Coney v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997) (the totality of circumstances, including the discovery of a large sum of money, the presence of a pistol on the seat of defendant’s car, and alerting by narcotics dog, provided probable cause to search; because a motion to suppress “would not have been meritorious,” no further proceedings were required on the motion or an ineffectiveness claim concerning it); compare Suluki v. State, 302 Ga. App. 735, 738 (1) ( 691 SE2d 626 ) (2010) (reversing conviction where defendant showed a “reasonable probability ... that the outcome [of…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Fitzgerald (2×)
Kan. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 71 , 485 S.E.2d 483 (1997) (discovery of a large, unexplained sum of money, standing alone, does not constitute articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying seizure of individual); Polke v. State, 203 Ga.App. 306, 308 , 417 S.E.2d 22 (1992) (possession of large sums of money may be suspicious but not itself criminal, does not provide probable cause for immediate warrantless arrest); Gebremedhin v. State, 202 Ga.App. 811 , 415 S.E.2d 529 (1992) (large sum contributing factor to establish probable cause for a drug arrest); Brown v. State, 191 Ga.App. 779,…
discussed Cited "see" Jones v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997) (while approaching suspects, deputy noticed one placing something under seat of car).
examined Cited "see" Smith v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 ( 485 SE2d 483 ) (1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." The State v. Walker. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
Accord Rose v. State , 263 Ga.App. 263 , 264 (1), 587 S.E.2d 326 (2003). 26 State v. Preston , 348 Ga.App. 662 , 664-665, 824 S.E.2d 582 (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). 27 See Preston , 348 Ga.App. at 665 , 824 S.E.2d 582 ; see also Quinn v. State , 268 Ga. 70 , 72, 485 S.E.2d 483 (1997) (An officer was authorized to approach the appellant and his companion to inquire of their conduct and obtain identification.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Evans v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 (Citation omitted.) State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535, 536 (1) ( 207 SE2d 459 ) (1974). 2 (Citation and footnote omitted.) State v. Wilson, 257 Ga. App. 120 ( 570 SE2d 409 ) (2002). 3 (Citation omitted.) Parker v. State, 233 Ga. App. 616, 617-618 (1) ( 504 SE2d 774 ) (1998); Padron v. State, 254 Ga. App. 265, 268 (1) ( 562 SE2d 244 ) (2002). 4 (Emphasis in original.) Padron v. State, supra at 268; accord State v. Jones, 252 Ga. App. 404, 406-407 (1) ( 556 SE2d 495 ) (2001); State v. Sims, 248 Ga. App. 277, 278 ( 546 SE2d 47 ) (2001). 5 (Citation and punctuat…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Lops v. Lops (4×)
11th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Quinn v. State, 221 Ga.App. 399, 400 , 471 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1996), aff'd, 268 Ga. 70 , 485 S.E.2d 483 (1997); Greene v. Transp.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lops v. Lops (2×)
11th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Quinn v. State, 221 Ga.App. 399, 400 , 471 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1996), aff’d, 268 Ga. 70 , 485 S.E.2d 483 (1997); Greene v. Transp. 59 Ins.
Quinn
v.
the State
S96G1456.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jun 2, 1997.
485 S.E.2d 483
Nina M. Svoren, Timothy P. Healy, for appellant., David McDade, District Attorney, William H. McClain, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Thompson, Benham.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
Thompson, Justice.

In Quinn v. State, 221 Ga. App. 399 (471 SE2d 337) (1996), a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine and methamphetamine, the Court of Appeals examined Quinn’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress items seized from two vehicles and from his person. The Court of Appeals agreed that counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard; however, it concluded that Quinn was not prejudiced under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), because the motion to suppress would have had little chance of success. In so ruling the court stated, “the trial court would also be authorized to find that, upon discovery of the large sum of money in the bag, a seizure of the person of defendant was proper.” Quinn, supra at 403. We granted certiorari to review that statement. [1]

A Douglas County deputy sheriff on patrol during the Christmas holiday season was instructed to “check people walking, [and] check people sitting in parking lots,” because there had been an unusual amount of crime reported in the area. The officer came upon two vehicles parked side by side in a shopping center parking lot after dark. A Trans Am, later identified as belonging to Quinn, was parked next to a Jaguar. A man who occupied the driver’s seat of the Jaguar was leaning over toward the passenger side. The front passenger door was open and Quinn was seen kneeling down on the ground and leaning into the Jaguar. The deputy parked behind both cars, and he exited his vehicle. As he approached the men, the deputy observed[*71] Quinn “putting something up under the seat” of the Jaguar, and then standing up. The driver sat upright in the Jaguar. When the officer asked the two men what they were doing, Quinn responded that he was interested in buying the Jaguar. Both men were asked for identification and both produced driver’s licenses, which appeared to be in order. (It was later learned that Quinn’s license had been issued in a false name.) The officer noticed a bag on the front passenger seat and, thinking that it might be the item which Quinn had attempted to conceal, he asked what it contained. Both men replied that they did not know what was in the bag, but both gave the officer permission to inspect its contents. The bag contained $11,500 in cash. The officer testified at trial that upon discovering the contents of the bag, he called for backup. And, based on the information known to the officer, Quinn was no longer free to leave.

Quinn was then asked if he had a weapon. He responded that he had a pistol on the driver’s seat of the Trans Am, and he gave his permission for the officer to retrieve it. Another officer arrived two minutes later. That officer opened the driver’s door of the Jaguar and asked the driver to turn off the engine, whereupon he observed another paper bag, partially beneath the passenger seat. The officer picked it up and asked the driver what was in the bag; he responded that he did not know. However, the officer suspected that the bag contained contraband because the contents felt “powdery and crunchy.” The officer requested but was denied permission to search the vehicle. He then replaced the paper bag in its original location.

Both men were secured in the back seat of the patrol car and Miranda warnings were administered while a narcotics detecting dog alerted on the passenger side of the Jaguar. A search warrant was obtained and quantities of cocaine and methamphetamine were from the Jaguar. Quinn denied that the money and drugs belonged to him. The driver testified as a state’s witness at trial that the meeting in the parking lot had been prearranged to “exchange money for dope.”

We hold, and the State concedes, that discovery of a large, unexplained sum of money, standing alone, does not constitute articulable suspicion of criminal activity which would justify seizure of an individual. The Court of Appeals erred to the extent that its opinion may suggest such a result. Accord Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306 (1) (417 SE2d 22) (1992) (possession of large sums of money may be suspicious, but it is not itself a crime and does not provide probable cause for immediate warrantless arrest); Gebremedhin v. State, 202 Ga. App. 811 (415 SE2d 529) (1992) (a large sum of money was a contributing factor to establish probable cause for a drug arrest); Brown v. State, 191 Ga. App. 779, 780 (383 SE2d 170) (1989) (large sum of money discovered following consensual search, with no other articul[*72] able reasons for suspicion, did not provide probable cause for seizure of property). Thus, while the presence of the currency is insufficient by itself to demonstrate a connection to illegal activity, such evidence, together with other evidence of criminal activity, may provide a reasonable basis for the belief that the currency is substantially connected to an illegal exchange of drugs.

Decided June 2, 1997. Nina M. Svoren, Timothy P. Healy, for appellant. David McDade, District Attorney, William H. McClain, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Not all encounters between police officers and citizens involve seizures which implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Devier v. State, 253 Ga. 604, 614 (7) (a) (323 SE2d 150) (1984). “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions . . . ; [and] ask to examine the individual’s identification, [cits.];. . . — as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (111 SC 2382, 115 LE2d 389) (1991). A seizure within the context of the Fourth Amendment occurs only when “by means of physical force or a show of authority ... a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 553-554 (100 SC 1870, 64 LE2d 497) (1980). The first officer was authorized to approach Quinn and his companion to inquire of their conduct and obtain identification. At that point, a reasonable person in Quinn’s circumstances would believe that he was free to leave, and the Fourth Amendment was not implicated.

The discovery of the large sum of currency (pursuant to a consent search), combined with the totality of the other circumstances then known to the officers, authorized Quinn’s brief detention at the scene. The events which followed, i.e., the presence of the pistol on the seat of his vehicle, the hidden bag which appeared to contain contraband, and the alerting by the narcotics dog, provided the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant. Accordingly, we agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the suppression motion would not have been meritorious and Quinn was not prejudiced under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, supra.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., who concurs in the judgment only.
1

We assume for purposes of this appeal that Quinn had standing to contest the seizure of the contraband.