Stone v. Williams Gen. Corp., 642 S.E.2d 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · Go Syfert
Stone v. Williams Gen. Corp., 642 S.E.2d 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Mitchell v. State (gactapp, 2013-04-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See Clark, supra at 875-876 (1) (a) (there was some evidence to support trial court’s factual conclusion that purpose of roadblock was legitimate, where sergeant testified that a primary purpose was DUI detection); Kellogg, supra at 269 (l) (b) (affirming trial court’s ruling that roadblock was authorized for a legitimate primary purpose; officer’s testimony that the primary purpose of the roadblock was to check for driver’s licenses and insurance cards, coupled with presence of DUI countermeasures team, supported the conclusion that the roadblock was constitutional); Bennett v. State,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark Mitchell v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
After a hearing, the court denied Mitchell’s motion to suppress, finding that the primary purpose of the roadblock was to check driver’s licenses, that such was a proper 4 purpose, and that other purposes stated in the authorization form were secondary to that purpose. “[W]hen a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts”5 and, as set out above, the appellate court “has an obligation to construe the evidence most favorably to support [the trial court’s] finding and judgment.” 6 As to the issue raised in this appeal (whether the roadblock…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joseph Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Here, unlike in Thomas, the evidence shows that [Sergeant Martin’s] decision to implement the roadblock was not a spur of the moment decision and that [he] had authority to order such checkpoint. 4 (Citations omitted.) Bennett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 581, 583 ( 642 SE2d 212 ) (2007).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(Citations omitted.) Bennett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 581, 583 ( 642 SE2d 212 ) (2007).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brown (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 308 Ga. App. 117, 120 ( 706 SE2d 737 ) (2011) (officer’s testimony that she was authorized to plan and implement roadblocks was sufficient to establish that fact); Gonzalez v. State, 289 Ga. App. 549, 551 ( 657 SE2d 617 ) (2008) (roadblock valid where uncontradicted testimony established that sergeant alone made decision to implement roadblock and evidence showed he had authority to do so; fact that sergeant participated in roadblock did not transform him from a supervisor into a field officer); Bennett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 581, 583 ( 642 SE2d 212 ) (2007) (pre-…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Owens v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
State, 294 Ga. App. 142, 143-145 (1) (a) (i), (ii) ( 668 SE2d 461 ) (2008) (A roadblock was implemented at the programmatic level for a legitimate primary purpose because the evidence showed that the roadblock was established by supervisory *378 personnel, as opposed to officers in the field, and that its purpose was to perform a driver’s license and sobriety check.); Gonzalez v. State, 289 Ga. App. at 550-551 (A roadblock was implemented at the programmatic level where the deciding officer was authorized to implement the roadblock pursuant to a policy promulgated by the police chiefs office…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rappley v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
See McGlon, 296 Ga. App. at 77 ; Bennett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 581, 582-583 ( 642 SE2d 212 ) (2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kellogg v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Bennett, supra, 283 Ga. App. at 581-582. *267 In order to pass constitutional muster, a roadblock must: (1) have been implemented for a legitimate primary purpose by supervisory personnel; (2) involve stopping all vehicles; (3) result in minimal delay to motorists; (4) be clearly identified as a police checkpoint; and (5) be manned by officers sufficiently trained to determine whether motorists should be given field sobriety tests.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yingst v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 See Slayton v. State, 281 Ga. App. 650 (1) ( 637 SE2d 67 ) (2006). 2 Id. at 651 . 3 Lieutenant Ferguson was in Iraq at the time of the hearing. 4 See Gamble v. State, 283 Ga. App. 326, 327 (3) ( 641 SE2d 556 ) (2007). 5 Morris v. State, 265 Ga. App. 186, 187 ( 593 SE2d 360 ) (2004). 6 See id. at 187-188 ; Blackburn v. State, 256 Ga. App. 800, 801 ( 570 SE2d 36 ) (2002); Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 695, 699 (1) ( 556 SE2d 892 ) (2001). 7 See OCGA § 24-3-14 (b); Tubbs v. State, 283 Ga. App. 578, 580 ( 642 SE2d 205 ) (2007). 8 (Punctuation omitted.) B…
cited Cited "see" Joseph Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bennett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 581, 583 ( 642 SE2d 212 ) (2007) (supervisor’s decision to implement roadblock not a spur-of-the-moment decision in the field).
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bennett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 581, 583 ( 642 SE2d 212 ) (2007) (supervisor’s decision to implement roadblock not a spur-of-the-moment decision in the field).
STONE
v.
WILLIAMS GENERAL CORPORATION
A03A1813.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Feb 14, 2007.
642 S.E.2d 211
Dwyer & White, William W. White, for appellants., Andrew, Merritt, Reilly & Smith, Paul E. Andrew, for appellee. Boone & Stone, William S. Stone, Antoinette D. Johnson, Arthur W. Leach, amici curiae.
Ruffin.
Published
Ruffin, Judge.

In Stone v. Williams Gen. Corp.,1 we reversed the trial court, concluding that a RICO conspiracy cannot exist between a corporation and its officer because a corporation is not a “person” within the meaning of the Georgia RICO statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that “a corporation is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Georgia civil RICO act.”[2] Accordingly, we vacate our earlier opinion and adopt the judgment of the Supreme Court as our own. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

Judgment vacated and case remanded.

Smith, P. J., and Miller, J., concur.
2

See Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 280 Ga. 631 (632 SE2d 376) (2006).