Wilson v. State, 661 S.E.2d 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · Go Syfert
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Wilson v. State, 661 S.E.2d 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
23 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lambert v. State (gactapp, 2014-01-24)
Treatment trajectory · 2009 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2009 2017 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lambert v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mullins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 368, 371-372 (2) ( 680 SE2d 474 ) (2009) (witness’s testimony that she overheard defendant threaten victim provided sufficient corroboration); Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008) (testimony that gun was recovered from presence of defendant minutes after the incident constituted some evidence corroborating the victim’s testimony about the threat). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles Lambert v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mullins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 368, 371-372 (2) ( 680 SE2d 474 ) (2009) (witness’s testimony that she overheard defendant threaten victim provided sufficient corroboration); Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008) (testimony that gun was recovered from presence of defendant minutes after the incident constituted some evidence corroborating the victim’s testimony about the threat). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnny L. Brown v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Brown also contends that trial counsel was ineffective. 11 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Schneider v. State, 312 Ga. App. 504, 506 (1) ( 718 SE2d 833 ) (2011). 12 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008) (testimony that a gun was recovered from the area corroborated victim’s testimony of threats). 13 Id. 9 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,14 [Brown] must prove (1) that h[is] trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that counsel’s deficiency so prejudiced h[is] defense that a reasonable proba…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murrell v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
While only slight evidence maybe sufficient for corroboration, Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 939 (1) ( 274 SE2d 49 ) (1980); Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008), in this case R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Billy Murrell v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
While only slight evidence may be sufficient for corroboration, Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 939 (1) ( 274 SE2d 49 ) (1980); Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008), in this case R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schneider v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Blackburn, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 OCGA § 16-11-37 (d) (2). 2 OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). 3 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 660) (1979). 4 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Cornette v. State, 295 Ga. App. 877, 880-881 (3) ( 673 SE2d 531 ) (2009). 5 (Citation omitted.) Burton v. State, 293 Ga. App. 822, 823 ( 668 SE2d 306 ) (2008). 6 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Sims v. State, 296 Ga. App. 461, 462 (1) ( 675 SE2d 241 ) (2009). 7 See Greene v. State, 295 Ga. App. 803, 806-807 (2) ( 673 SE2d 292 ) (2009) (citing Hooker v. State, 278 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) ( 629 SE2d 74 ) (2006), …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hobby v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
J., 294 Ga. App. 155, 156 ( 668 SE2d 775 ) (2008). 5 Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 939 (2) ( 274 SE2d 49 ) (1980). 6 Stephens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 509, 510 ( 610 SE2d 143 ) (2005). 7 Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008). 8 Maskivish v. State, 276 Ga. App. 701, 703 (2) ( 624 SE2d 160 ) (2005). 9 Drew v. State, 256 Ga. App. 391, 393 (1) ( 568 SE2d 506 ) (2002). 10 Stone v. State, 210 Ga. App. 198, 199 ( 435 SE2d 527 ) (1993). 11 Lawhorn v. State, 200 Ga. App. 451, 453 (1) ( 408 SE2d 425 ) (1991).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Julio Ramos (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson, 661 S.E.2d at 634–35; U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cmt. (backg’d).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brown v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 264 (1) ( 661 SE2d 634 ) (2008) (testimony that a gun was recovered from the area corroborated victim’s testimony of threats).
Wilson
v.
the State
A08A0531.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Apr 23, 2008.
661 S.E.2d 634
Jason R. Hasty, for appellant., Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Mlkell, Smith, Adams.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
MlKELL, Judge.

A Richmond County jury convicted Kevin Wilson of terroristic threats, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court sentenced Wilson to ten years, with five to be served in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, Wilson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of terroristic threats and that, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for[*264] possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. We affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to support the jury’s verdict, the record reflects that on March 4, 2005, at approximately 2:45 a.m., Tobian Norris was leaving the drive-thru lane at McDonald’s on Washington Road when he narrowly missed colliding with a car in the parking lot. The driver of the vehicle became agitated. Norris pulled up next to her car and told her to “chill the F out[,]” and Wilson, a passenger in the vehicle, pulled out a black and silver handgun, cocked it, and started to open the car door. Norris drove to a gas station across the street and called police. At trial, Norris identified Wilson as the man who threatened him with a gun.

Deputy Ryan Brockman of the Richmond County Sheriff’s Office responded to the gas station, where Norris described the incident and told him that Wilson and his companion were still in the drive-thru line waiting for their order. Brockman went over to the restaurant, searched the vehicle pointed out by Norris, and discovered a loaded silver handgun in a purse behind the driver’s seat. Wilson told Brockman that his name was Kevin Epps.

1. Wilson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of making terroristic threats because Norris’s testimony was uncorroborated. We disagree.

OCGA § 16-11-37 (a) provides that no person shall be convicted of committing the offense of making terroristic threats on the uncorroborated testimony of the party to whom the threat is communicated. It is well established that “[t]he quantum of corroboration need not in itself be sufficient to convict, but need only be that amount of independent evidence which tends to prove that the incident occurred as alleged.” [1] “Slight circumstances may be sufficient for corroboration and the question of corroboration is one solely for the jury. If there is any evidence of corroboration, this court will not go behind the jury verdict and pass on its probative value.” [2] Although the threat was only witnessed by Norris, Brockman’s testimony that he recovered a gun from Wilson’s presence minutes after the incident constitutes some evidence corroborating Norris’s testimony about the threat. [3]

[*265] Decided April 23, 2008. Jason R. Hasty, for appellant. Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

2. Wilson contends that since Norris’s testimony was uncorroborated, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, which was based on the act of making terroristic threats. Given our finding in Division 1, this claim lacks merit.

Judgment affirmed.

Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur.
1

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Nelson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 92, 97 (1) (c) (625 SE2d 465) (2005). See also Mendoza v. State, 274 Ga. App. 662, 663 (1) (618 SE2d 712) (2005).

2

(Footnote omitted.) Pringle v. State, 281 Ga. App. 235, 237-238 (1) (a) (635 SE2d 839) (2006).

3

See, e.g., In the Interest of M. V. H., 281 Ga. App. 486, 488-489 (1) (636 SE2d 168) (2006) (evidence that officer found broken pencil at scene corroborated victim’s testimony that defendant committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon); Stone v. State, 210 Ga. App. 198, 199 (435 SE2d 527) (1993) (defendant’s aggressive and hostile behavior prior to arrest was sufficient to corroborate officer’s testimony that defendant threatened him); Sampson v. State, [*265] 209 Ga. App. 213, 215 (1) (433 SE2d 136) (1993) (evidence of defendant’s presence on the scene, his reaction to victim, and victim’s demeanor was sufficient to corroborate victim’s testimony).