State v. Alvarez, 790 S.E.2d 66 (Ga. 2016). · Go Syfert
State v. Alvarez, 790 S.E.2d 66 (Ga. 2016). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Williams v. State (ga, 2025-04-08)
Treatment trajectory · 2017 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2017 2021 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State (5×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. · 2025 · confidence medium
Williams said he was aware of Gooden’s prior involvement in violence and gang activity, including seeing in a at trial and implied that the defendant had a duty to present this testimony if it would have supported the justification defense. 299 Ga. at 215 (1).
cited Cited as authority (rule) John Aubrey Pinkston v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214 (1) ( 790 SE2d 66 ) (2016).
discussed Cited "see" Williams v. State
Ga. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See State 12 v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214 (2016) (applying plain error review to trial court’s decision not to give a requested jury charge when defense counsel failed to object to trial court’s decision not to include that charge).
discussed Cited "see" Shalynda Perry v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 215 (1) ( 790 SE2d 66 ) (2016) (holding that trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the State’s burden of proof on justification likely affected the outcome of proceeding and 9 rejecting State’s challenge to credibility of defendant’s justification defense where sufficient evidence supported the defense, and only defense raised at trial was justification based on self-defense); Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291, 291-292 (2) ( 519 SE2d 206 ) (1999).
discussed Cited "see" STROUD v. the STATE. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Alvarez , 299 Ga. 213 , 215, 790 S.E.2d 66 (2016) (the trial court's "failure to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of disproving [defendant's] justification defense" likely affected the outcome and fairness of the trial); Stanbury , 299 Ga. at 131 (2), 786 S.E.2d 672 (where only evidence of defendant's involvement in the crime was accomplice testimony, trial court's failure to give an accomplice corroboration instruction "seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the [trial]," as the absence of such a charge meant that "an accused would have…
discussed Cited "see" Reid v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ga. L. 2015, pp. 1050, 1051, § 1. 24 Haas v. State, 146 Ga. App. 729, 732 (5) ( 247 SE2d 507 ) (1978) (citation omitted). 25 See Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 348 (3) ( 751 SE2d 408 ) (2013). 26 Marryott v. State, 263 Ga.App. 65, 69 (5) ( 587 SE2d 217 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted). 27 See Marryott, 263 Ga. App. at 69 (5) (a jury charge must be adjusted to the evidence presented). 28 See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214-215 (1) ( 790 SE2d 66 ) (2016) (The Court affirmed the grant of a new trial based on plain error in the court’s failure to give a requested jury instru…
discussed Cited "see" Stanley v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213 (1) ( 790 SE2d 66 ) (2016).
discussed Cited "see" Stanley v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213 (1) ( 790 SE2d 66 ) (2016).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Rana v. State (4×)
Ga. · 2024 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Everett v. State, 318 Ga. 697, 700-701 (899 SE2d 699) (2024) (even assuming that a portion of the jury charge on justification could have misled the jury to think that there was an exception to the availability of self-defense for the defendant, the error was harmless because “the only testimony supporting [the defendant’s] justification defense was his own testimony” and other evidence presented at trial “significantly undermined his credibility and showed that his version of events was untenable”), and Reese v. State, 317 Ga. 189, 196 (891 SE2d 835) (2023) (reviewing for pl…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Tucker Hamlette v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
But OCGA § 17-8-58 requires that “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”2 And the failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”3 In such cases, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was erroneo…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dimauro v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also supra notes 18-20 & accompanying text. 46 490 U. S. 386, 396 ( 109 SCt 1865 , 104 LE2d 443) (1989) (explaining that, in analyzing a civil rights claim based on excessive force, the “ ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene”). 47 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 48 OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); see also Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 614 (5) ( 724 SE2d 377 ) (2012) (holding that OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) requires an appellate court to revie w for plain error an alleged jury-instruction error to which no objection was raised at …
examined Cited "see, e.g." The State v. Crist (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 State v. James, 292 Ga. 440, 441 (1) ( 738 SE2d 601 ) (2013); see OCGA § 5-5-50 (“The first grant of a new trial shall not be disturbed by an appellate court unless the appellant shows that the judge abused his discretion in granting it and that the law and facts require the verdict notwithstanding the judgment of the presiding judge.”). 6 James, 292 Ga. at 441 (1); accord State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 30-31 (1) ( 718 SE2d 232 ) (2011); see OCGA § 5-5-25 (“In all motions for a new trial…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Issa v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 522 (1) (a) ( 696 SE2d 471 ) (2010); Harp v. State, 302 Ga. App. 17, 18 ( 690 SE2d 424 ) (2010). 18 Ham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 232, 237 (1) (b) ( 692 SE2d 828 ) (2010) (punctuationomitted); see McKisic v. State, 238 Ga. 644, 646 (2) ( 234 SE2d 908 ) (1977) (“[T]he identity of the person *332 alleged to have been robbed is not an essential element of the crime and need not be proved by direct evidence.”); Ward, 304 Ga. App. at 522 (1) (a) (same). 19 Harp, 302 Ga. App. at 18 (punctuation omitted); see Green v. State, 265 Ga. App. 126, 128-29 (2) ( 592 SE2d 901 ) (200…
The State
v.
Alvarez
S16A0397.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jun 6, 2016.
790 S.E.2d 66
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Joshua D. Morrison, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant., Eric J. Taylor, for appellee.
Benham.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
BENHAM, Justice.

Appellee Pedro Alvarez was tried by a jury and convicted of malice murder and other offenses arising out of the shooting death of Ainsley Jackson. [1] Immediately before the shooting, appellee observed[*214] Jackson and appellee’s brother, known as “Nunu” Alvarez, engage in a fist fight over the sale of cocaine to a person they both claimed as a customer. After appellee’s brother lost the fight, appellee retrieved a shotgun from a nearby apartment, went back outside, and fired two shots at Jackson. Although the brother was subpoenaed to testify at trial, he failed to appear. In both its opening statement and closing argument, the State referenced the statement the brother made to police shortly after the incident. Because the brother did not appear as a witness and his out-of-court statements were not entered into evidence, appellee objected to the reference made during the closing argument, and the trial court sustained the objection. In his motion for new trial, appellee claimed the State nevertheless continued to reference the inadmissible statement. In granting the motion for new trial, the trial court found the State’s conduct in referencing the brother’s statement in its closing even after the court sustained appellee’s objection, and in implying that the statement incriminated appellee, was improper and prejudiced appellee’s right to a fair trial. The court also found it had committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellee’s conduct was not justified despite being requested to do so in appellee’s written requests to charge. The State filed this appeal, and we affirm.

1. We agree that appellee is entitled to a new trial as a result of plain error in the jury instruction regarding the appellee’s defense of justification. Appellee’s sole defense was justification, and evidence was presented to support this defense. Appellee requested a charge instructing the jury that the State had the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellee was justified in his conduct. When the trial court failed to give the requested charge, trial counsel failed to object to this omission. Consequently, the claimed error must be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). [2]

[*215] In considering whether plain error is shown, this Court has stated:

Reversal is authorized if all four prongs of the standard adopted in [State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29 (718 SE2d 232) (2011)] are met: the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) (727 SE2d 109) (2012). The failure to give the requested instruction on appellee’s affirmative defense of justification was erroneous in this case because evidence was presented to support the defense and the charge requested is a correct statement of the law. See Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291 (2) (519 SE2d 206) (1999). Given the longstanding rule regarding the State’s burden of disproving a defendant’s affirmative defense in these circumstances, the error was obvious. The failure to give this instruction was all the more harmful in this case since, during the State’s closing argument, the prosecuting attorney referenced the brother’s absence as a trial witness and implied appellee had a duty to present this testimony if it would have confirmed appellee’s justification defense.

We reject the State’s assertion that the outcome of the proceedings was not likely to have been affected by the instruction because the evidence of justification was not credible. Sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could find justification, and in fact, justification was the critical disputed issue at trial. In these circumstances, the failure to instruct the jury on the State’s burden to disprove that defense likely affected the outcome and fairness of the proceeding, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding this failure to instruct was plain error. Cf. Johnson v. State, 295 Ga. 615 (759 SE2d 837) (2014) (appellant failed to show that the trial court’s failure to give the requested instruction affected the outcome of the proceedings where the undisputed evidence established that the instruction was not applicable). We also reject the State’s argument that because the instruction, taken as a whole, properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof and that appellee had a right to use force in a reasonable manner to defend himself, then plain error was not established. See Bishop, supra, 271 Ga. at 291 (2) (rejecting this argument by overruling Bruce v. State, 259 Ga. 798, 799 (3) (387 SE2d 886) (1990)). The trial court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for new trial on the ground that plain error was created by the court’s failure to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of disproving appellee’s justification defense.

[*216] Decided June 6, 2016. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Joshua D. Morrison, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant. Eric J. Taylor, for appellee.

2. We do not reach the remaining grounds for appeal, relating to rulings on the State’s references in its opening statement and closing argument to Nunu Alvarez’s statement to the police, because those alleged errors are unlikely to recur at retrial. See Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125, 131 (3) (786 SE2d 672) (2016).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
1

The crimes occurred on January 21, 2010. On April 23, 2010, a Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment against appellee charging him with malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Appellee was tried June 20-June 27, 2011, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on[*214] all counts. The felony murder conviction was vacated as a matter of law, and the conviction for aggravated assault merged into the murder conviction for sentencing purposes. Appellee was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, and the trial court imposed a five-year sentence for the possession of a firearm conviction, which was suspended. Appellee filed a timely motion for new trial which was twice amended. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for new trial, as amended, by order dated August 5, 2014. The State filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the January 2016 term of court for a decision to be made on the briefs.

2

Pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-58(a), aparty whoobjectstoajurychargeorafailuretocharge is required to inform the trial court of the objection before the jury retires to deliberate. Pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-58 (b), if a party fails to object as requiredby subsection (a), appellate review is precluded “unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.”