¹ The State contends that defendant also forfeited plain-error review by not raising it in his opening brief. The State is incorrect. It is well established that plain error may be raised for the first time in a reply brief, as defendant did. People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 412 (2010) (citing People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347-48 (2000)). - 17 - No. 1-12-0958 process. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). In the context of an error relating to jury instructions, the Illinois Supreme Court has enumerated a specific test for second-prong plain error: whether the omitted instruction created a serious risk that the jurors incorrectly convicted the defendant because they did not understand the applicable law, so as to severely threaten the fairness of the trial. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 190-91. We first address why the error was not second-prong plain error, then turn to the first prong. ¶ 58 Defendant cannot show that the exclusion of the instruction created a serious risk that the jury misunderstood the law because the trial court gave a nearly identical instruction to the jury. IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 states in full: "You have before you evidence that [(the) (a)] defendant made [a] statement[s] relating to the offense[s] charged in the [(indictment) (information) (complaint)]. It is for you to determine [whether the defendant made the statement[s], and, if so,] what weight should be given to the statement[s]. In determining the weight to be given to a statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made." (Alterations in original.) The court's instruction, which recited a portion of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11, was nearly identical to that instruction: "[Y]ou may consider a witness's earlier inconsistent statement as evidence without this limitation when the statement narrates, describes or explains an event or condition the witness has personal knowledge of. It is for you to determine whether the witness made the earlier statement and if so what weight should be given to that statement. In determining the weight to be given to an earlier statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made." - 18 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 59 Like IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07, the court's instruction informed the jury that it should determine whether the witness made the earlier statement and what weight that statement should be given. The court's instruction further told the jury to consider "all of the circumstances" under which the statement was made in deciding its weight. Moreover, defendant cannot show that the jury did not apply the court's instruction to defendant's prior statements. The court's instruction applied to "inconsistent statement[s]," such as defendant's prior admissions that Breed was armed. Defendant's prior statement described an event of which he had personal knowledge: his robbery of Williams. The court further informed the jury that it should treat defendant's testimony like that of any other witness. These instructions conveyed the same principles as IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07. ¶ 60 We find support for this conclusion in People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d 585, 599-600 (2008), where, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the court found that the same instructional error did not prejudice the defendant. Like this case, the jury in Johnson received only IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11. Id. at 599-600. The court concluded that, because IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 and IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 were essentially identical, the defendant could not show that he suffered prejudice from the omission of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07. Id. at 600. We find that the rationale of the court in Johnson applies with greater force in this case. Whereas the defendant in Johnson—who asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim—was simply required to show that the omission of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 created a reasonable probability that the fairness of his trial was undermined (Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 598), defendant in this case must show that the omission of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 created a serious risk that the jury misunderstood the applicable law in such a way that the fairness of his - 19 - No. 1-12-0958 trial was in jeopardy. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 190-91. In light of defendant's higher burden in this case, we find Johnson to be persuasive. ¶ 61 Defendant cites People v. Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019, in support of his second-prong plain error argument, but Turman involved a more confusing set of jury instructions. In Turman, the jury was given both IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 and IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11. Id. ¶¶ 28, 32. However, the version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 given to the jury did not include the portion of the instruction telling the jury that it was for them to decide whether the defendant had made the incriminating statement. Id. ¶ 28. The version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11, on the other hand, did include that language. Id. ¶ 32. Because one instruction told the jury that it could decide whether a witness made a prior statement, while the other did not, the jury might have incorrectly concluded that they could not determine whether the defendant made his statement. Id. ¶ 33. In this case, by contrast, the only instruction given to the jury about witnesses' prior statements correctly told them that it was for them to decide whether the witness made the statement. The jury did not have to reconcile conflicting instructions. Therefore, the risk that the jury would apply differing standards to defendant's statement and other witnesses' prior statements was not present in this case. ¶ 62 Defendant also contends that this error constituted plain error because the evidence at trial was closely balanced. However, as we stated above, the evidence against defendant was strong. Thus, defendant cannot show that the court's error threatened to tip the balance of the evidence in the State's favor. Moreover, the omission of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury received a nearly identical instruction to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07. See People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 141 (harmless error "certainly cannot rise to the level of plain error"); People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2003) (error in jury instructions - 20 - No. 1-12-0958 will be considered harmless if result of trial would not have been different if jury had been properly instructed). With instructions laying out the same legal principles as the omitted instruction, the result of the trial would have been the same even had the trial court not erred. ¶ 63 3. Evidence Of Williams's Interest In The Police Investigation ¶ 64 Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to his questioning Williams about whether Williams thought the police would investigate this case more thoroughly if he told them that Breed had a gun. The trial court found that this question called for a speculative answer. On appeal, defendant claims that the question was not speculative; it sought to provide a reason why Williams would lie about Breed having a gun. The State counters that defendant has forfeited this issue, and that the trial court properly excluded testimony that would have amounted to Williams speculating on police practice. ¶ 65 Defendant acknowledges that he forfeited review of this issue by failing to include it in a posttrial motion. See Denson, 2014 IL 116231, ¶ 11. However, defendant urges us to review this error under the first prong of plain error. We begin by determining whether the trial court erred in limiting defendant's cross-examination. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 189. We apply an abuse of discretion standard to this question. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 130 (1998). ¶ 66 We agree with defendant that the question posed by defense counsel did not call for a speculative response. Defense counsel asked Williams two questions about what he thought the police would do if he told them Breed had a gun. First, she asked, "[W]hen you told the police officer that you were robbed at gunpoint, you thought that—you told the police officer that because you thought that they would be more likely to catch the person?" (Emphasis added.) Second, she asked, "Did you think the police officer would look for the person if they didn't have a gun?" (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel explained that these questions went to Williams's state - 21 - No. 1-12-0958 of mind. In other words, they were an attempt to elicit testimony that would suggest that Williams had an incentive to lie about the presence of the gun, i.e., that he thought the police would be more likely to pursue the robbers if he said they were armed. Defendant did not ask Williams to speculate as to whether the police were in fact more likely to investigate robberies committed with firearms than those committed without firearms. Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that defense counsel's question called for speculation. See, e.g., People v. Morris, 162 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1051-52 (1987) (counsel's question asking defendant what he thought victim was going to do to him did not call for speculation into victim's intent; it went to defendant's state of mind and whether he acted in self-defense). ¶ 67 However, even though the trial court erred in excluding this evidence, defendant cannot establish that it constituted first-prong plain error. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a); Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48 (first prong of plain error applies where evidence is so closely balanced that error threatened to tip scale in favor of State). As we explained above, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. We hold defendant to his forfeiture of this issue. ¶ 68 We also note that, if defendant had been permitted to continue with this line of questioning, it was unlikely that he would have uncovered evidence to support his case. When defense counsel first asked Williams whether he told the police that Breed had a gun because he thought it would make the police more likely to catch Breed, before the State objected, Williams answered, "No." Defense counsel's second question in this line of questioning, which merely rephrased the first question, would have likely elicited the same answer. While we cannot be certain whether Williams would have provided helpful evidence for the defense, his answer to counsel's first question—the only answer we have on the record—suggests otherwise. ¶ 69 4. Perfecting The Impeachment Of Williams - 22 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 70 Defendant's final contention of error relating to his right to present a defense is that the trial court erred in preventing him from perfecting his impeachment of Williams. On the first day of trial, defense counsel asked Williams if he told Detective Escalante that Breed went through his pockets and then drew the gun. Williams denied saying that. Those facts would conflict with Williams's trial testimony, in which he said that Breed drew the gun at the beginning of the robbery and did not go through his pockets. The next day, defense counsel planned to call Escalante to testify that Williams did tell him those things. However, Escalante was unavailable because he had apparently gone on medical leave. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial because she could not perfect her impeachment of Williams without Escalante. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion because defense counsel had not served Escalante with a subpoena. ¶ 71 On appeal, defendant for the first time claims that the trial court should have ordered a continuance so that defense counsel could secure Escalante's appearance. The State responds that defendant forfeited this issue because he did not ask for a continuance below and that the trial court had no duty to sua sponte order one. ¶ 72 We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to this issue. See People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 125 (2009) (decision to grant or deny continuance is subject to abuse of discretion standard). An abuse of discretion occurs where a trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 3d 354, 359 (2004). ¶ 73 Defendant's argument is undercut by the fact that he never sought the continuance he now claims the court should have granted. Instead, at trial, defense counsel sought a mistrial due to Escalante's absence. Defendant acknowledges this fact but argues that the trial court should have taken it upon itself to order a continuance in the interests of justice. - 23 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 74 This court has repeatedly rejected the notion that trial courts possess an obligation to sua sponte continue cases, even where the denial of a continuance may prejudice the defendant. E.g., People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (4th) 100901, ¶ 138 (trial courts do not have duty to sua sponte continue case after State amends charging instrument); People v. Wilder, 325 Ill. App. 3d 987, 995 (2001) (trial court not required to sua sponte continue trial for defendant to obtain civilian clothes to wear in front of jury); People v. Barnes, 130 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1030 (1985) (trial court did not have duty to sua sponte continue trial to permit defendant to subpoena expert witness to support his case). Defendant offers no persuasive reason why we should depart from this principle or why defense counsel could not have asked to continue the trial. ¶ 75 Defendant cites People v. Amos, 204 Ill. App. 3d 75, 83 (1990), but it appears that the defendant in that case requested a continuance to locate a witness to perfect the impeachment of another witness for the State. Although the court did not expressly say that the defendant had requested a continuance, the court in Amos framed the defendant's argument as whether the court "abused its discretion in denying the defense a continuance." (Emphasis added.) Id. This suggests that the defendant asked for, but was denied, a continuance. Moreover, even if the defendant in Amos had not requested a continuance, he represented himself (albeit with standby counsel). Id. at 80. The trial court's obligations with respect to a pro se defendant may differ from those where, as in this case, the defendant is represented by counsel. Here, the trial court did not have a duty to request a continuance on defense counsel's behalf. ¶ 76 We recognize that Detective Escalante's absence precluded defendant from perfecting his impeachment of Williams. However, it was incumbent on defense counsel to request a continuance in order to secure his presence. Defense counsel did not do that. Instead, she asked for a mistrial. Before this court, defendant does not assert that the trial court erred in denying his - 24 - No. 1-12-0958 motion for a mistrial, thereby forfeiting that issue. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 294 (2010) (party forfeits review of issue that he does not argue on appeal). ¶ 77 We also note that, even if defendant had received a continuance to secure Escalante's presence, the impeachment he would have offered would have been relatively minor. Escalante would simply testify that Williams told him that Breed went through his pockets, then pulled out a gun. This would contradict Williams's trial testimony, where he said that Breed pulled out the gun before going through his pockets. This slight discrepancy in the sequence of events would not have significantly undermined the major points of Williams's testimony, including the crucial fact that Breed had a gun during the robbery. We cannot conclude that the trial court had a duty to order a continuance sua sponte, let alone that the failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. ¶ 78 5. Cumulative Error ¶ 79 Finally, defendant contends that, when all of the collective errors at his trial are viewed together, he was deprived of his right to present his defense. Defendant is correct that, although any individual error may not constitute reversible error, the cumulative impact of errors may necessitate a new trial. People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992). However, we do not believe that this case presents such an instance. ¶ 80 Viewing the record as a whole, defendant was able to present his defense adequately. He testified that Breed did not have a gun, and was allowed to explain why he signed a confession saying otherwise. Defendant received a jury instruction that, while incorrect in form, correctly informed the jury that it should decide whether defendant made his incriminating statement and that it should consider all of the circumstances surrounding that statement. Although the trial court prevented defendant from inquiring into Williams's possible interest in lying about the presence of - 25 - No. 1-12-0958 a gun, that ruling did not constitute first-prong plain error because the evidence at defendant's trial was not closely balanced. Finally, the trial court was under no obligation to sua sponte grant defendant a continuance. As each of the errors either had a minor impact or no impact at all, defendant has not shown that, taking them together, they deprived him of his right to present his defense. ¶ 81 The dissent contends that the errors in this case were so numerous that a new trial is required. Citing People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000), the dissent argues that, regardless of the strength of the evidence against defendant, there are circumstances where trial errors are so numerous and so severe that we must order a new trial in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. While we do not take issue with the dissent's recitation of the rule in Blue, we do not think this is a case where we must invoke that rule. In Blue, the defendant was on trial for murdering a police officer. Id. at 105-09. In its case-in-chief, the State introduced the officer's uniform, which was covered with blood and brain-matter stains and torn from the paramedics' attempts to save the officer's life. Id. at 120. Moreover, the State draped the tattered uniform on a mannequin that stood in the courtroom during a large portion of its case-in-chief, and the trial court provided the jury with rubber gloves so that they could handle the uniform during deliberations. Id. at 121. During the State's rebuttal closing argument, it told the jury that the officer's family " 'need[ed] to hear from [the jury] that they will get justice,' " and that "every police officer" in Illinois "need[ed] to hear from [the jury]." Id. at 128. The supreme court held that the "synergistic effect" of the uniform and the improper closing argument required a new trial, regardless of the strength of the evidence against the defendant. Id. at 139. The court noted that these errors "encouraged the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion" and that the state possessed "an intent *** to place the jury's responsibility as citizens on trial." Id. at 139, 140. - 26 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 82 No similar appeal to the jury's emotions or passions occurred in this case. Although the trial court made several incorrect rulings, they did not deprive defendant of his fundamental right to present his defense—he testified that Breed was not armed and that his confession was false—or to challenge the State's case. We see no overreaching on the State's part in an attempt to appeal to the jury's emotions. While we do not, by any means, condone or encourage the trial court's numerous errors, the errors in this case do not rise to the same level as those in Blue, such that reversal is required regardless of the strength of the evidence. ¶ 83 The dissent also takes issue with our characterization of the evidence against defendant as "overwhelming," first noting that Williams's testimony was inconsistent with his prior statement to his mother. We find no significant inconsistency between the two. While Williams did not specifically tell his mother that Breed was armed when he first recounted the robbery to her, neither did he tell her that Breed was unarmed; he simply did not discuss the detail of the weapon when he first talked to her, before they went to the police. In his words at trial, Williams testified that he "didn't come out and exactly say that [to his mother], no." This issue was not further developed at trial, so we cannot be sure why Williams omitted that detail when talking with his mother. It is also worth reminding that everything else that Williams said at trial—that he was robbed, what was stolen, and the fact that defendant and an accomplice were the perpetrators—was admitted as true by defendant at trial, and that defendant's statements strongly corroborated Williams's testimony that Breed had a gun. ¶ 84 The dissent's second basis for concluding that the evidence is not overwhelming is that Detective Escalante's testimony was inconsistent with ASA Berg's testimony from the pretrial suppression hearing, where Berg testified that she did not read defendant's handwritten statements to him. But even if Escalante was incorrect in testifying that Berg read the statement to defendant, - 27 - No. 1-12-0958 this fact does not render the written statement untrustworthy, especially since defendant's mother was present when defendant gave the statement. Moreover, defendant initialed the statement where any changes were made, suggesting that defendant had an opportunity to review his statement to approve or reject any changes. ¶ 85 Finally, the dissent notes that we must take defendant's evidence into account when deciding whether the evidence was overwhelming. We have. But compared to the State's evidence, defendant's case was weak. Defendant's theory of the case breaks down as follows: (1) Williams lied about the presence of a gun, though he told the truth about everything else; (2) Detective Escalante coerced defendant into admitting that his accomplice used a gun during the robbery; and (3) defendant never read the statement in which he admitted that his accomplice used a gun, even though both he and his mother signed every page of that statement and initialed numerous corrections to the statement. None of these propositions create a reasonable doubt that the jury could reach a different outcome on retrial. ¶ 86 It is unreasonable to believe that Williams lied to the police about the presence of a gun because he thought it would make the police more enthusiastic about catching the perpetrators. The dissent does not acknowledge that Williams was asked that very question—whether he mentioned a gun because he thought it would make the police "more likely to catch the person"—and Williams answered "no" before the judge sustained the objection to the question. That aside, given that Williams told the truth, by defendant's admission, about every other aspect of the crime, the notion that he lied about this one significant detail based on some hidden agenda to motivate the police department is a stretch, to say the least. ¶ 87 It is even harder to believe that, despite defendant's claim that he insisted that his accomplice was unarmed, Escalante coerced defendant into admitting that Breed had a gun and, in - 28 - No. 1-12-0958 cahoots with ASA Berg, fabricated defendant's written statement, which defendant and his mother initialed and signed in several places without reviewing. It would require a complete suspension of disbelief to accept that defendant did not know he was signing a statement confessing to the crime and to the presence of a firearm in that crime. His claim that he thought he was signing a "notice of his rights" is unbelievable, considering that he had already signed a statement clearly marked as a "Notice of Rights." In fact, he signed that notice of rights twice and initialed it in six places; his mother also signed it. His written statement, in contrast, was clearly entitled, "Statement of Marlon Minter" and contained five pages of handwritten detail. By our count, defendant signed that statement in six separate places and his mother in five; he and his mother each placed their initials next to corrections in eight separate places in that statement. The notion that defendant did not know what he was signing strains all credibility. Although we reach that conclusion independently of anything that took place during the hearing on the motion to suppress defendant's statement, we would note parenthetically that the trial court heard this same testimony from defendant at the suppression hearing, and the trial court characterized the notion that defendant did not read the statement before signing it as "hogwash" and found "no basis whatsoever" for defendant's claim of coercion. ¶ 88 When considering defendant's case against Williams's testimony, defendant's oral statement to Escalante, and defendant's written statement, each of which was consistent with one another, we are left with no reasonable doubt regarding the outcome of defendant's trial. No rational jury would have acquitted defendant based on that evidence. ¶ 89 B. Defendant's Tattoos ¶ 90 Defendant raises three challenges to the trial court's rulings regarding his tattoos: - 29 - No. 1-12-0958 1. That the trial court erred in precluding him from using makeup to cover the tattoos on his face; 2. That the trial court incorrectly permitted the State to cross-examine defendant about tattoos on his arms that were not visible to the jury and about which defendant did not testify on direct examination; and 3. That the trial court erred in refusing to give a modified instruction telling the jury to disregard defendant's tattoos. We address each contention in turn. ¶ 91 1. Makeup To Cover Tattoos ¶ 92 Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in precluding him from applying flesh-toned makeup to conceal the tattoos on his face. Defendant argues that the tattoos were irrelevant to any issue in the case because he did not have them at the time of the robbery and, in any event, his identity was not at issue. Defendant also claims that his inability to cover his tattoos prejudiced him because they "were likely to offend or frighten" the jurors. The State contends that the court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's request, and that there was no prejudice to defendant because no evidence was introduced linking defendant's tattoos to gangs or other criminal activity. ¶ 93 Before reaching the substance of defendant's argument, we must resolve the parties' conflict over the correct standard of review. Defendant, citing People v. Miklos, 393 Ill. App. 3d 205 (2009), argues that we should apply de novo review because the trial court's ruling deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. However, the issue in Miklos was whether a delay in a hearing on the suspension of defendant's driver's license deprived him of due process. Id. at 209-10. It did not deal with a trial court's ability to regulate the appearance of the defendant or - 30 - No. 1-12-0958 witnesses during a trial, an issue to which courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard. E.g., People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 267 (1977) (decision to shackle defendant is subject to abuse of discretion standard); People v. Bowman, 2012 IL App (1st) 102010, ¶¶ 61-62 (decision to allow defense witnesses to testify in civilian clothing or prison attire is subject to abuse of discretion). We find that Miklos is inapplicable and apply an abuse of discretion standard. ¶ 94 Turning to the substance of defendant's argument, neither defendant nor the State cites to any relevant Illinois precedent on this issue. We have not uncovered any, either. However, other jurisdictions have dealt with this issue. We look to those decisions to inform our analysis. ¶ 95 In Jackson v. United States, 945 A.2d 621, 623 (D.C. Ct. App. 2008), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motion to permit him to use cover-up makeup to conceal a teardrop tattoo on his face. Defendant argued that the tattoo amounted to other-crimes evidence because " '[i]n some circles, the presence of a teardrop tattoo means that the person wearing it has killed somebody.' " (Alteration in original.) Id. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the tattoo amounted to other-crimes evidence, finding that the meaning of the tattoo was open to interpretation and did not definitively signal criminal behavior. Id. at 626. Though it acknowledged the possibility that jurors would interpret the tattoo negatively, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion because the defendant was not prejudiced. Id. The court also noted that two of the State's witnesses relied upon the tattoo in identifying the defendant. Id. at 627. ¶ 96 In State v. Ross, 115 So. 3d 616, 622 (La. Ct. App. 2013), the trial court granted the State's motion in limine to prevent the defendant from covering the teardrop tattoos on his face with makeup. The court found that the defendant's tattoos were relevant to establish his identity because one of the State's witnesses identified him by the tattoos. Id. at 623. The court also found that the - 31 - No. 1-12-0958 jury's being able to see the tattoos did not prejudice the defendant because no testimony was elicited regarding their meaning. Id. ¶ 97 Finally, in State v. Ortiz, 300 P.3d 786, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 2013), the Court of Appeals of Utah rejected the defendant's argument that he should have been permitted to cover his facial tattoos because they were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected the fundamental premise of the defendant's argument: that his facial tattoos were even evidence that could be considered irrelevant or prejudicial. Id. According to the court, the tattoos were simply part of the defendant's general appearance and were not subject to the limits of the rules of evidence. Id. The court noted that neither the State nor any of the witnesses referred to the tattoos during his trial. Id. at 788. None of the witnesses identified the defendant via his tattoos. Id. at 788, n.2. The court also noted that tattoos are not inherently prejudicial in the same way as prison clothing or handcuffs. Id. ¶ 98 We can draw several principles from these cases that apply to this case. Like the teardrop tattoos at issue in each of these cases, defendant's tattoos were never given a negative meaning. To the contrary, defendant attached innocuous meanings to each of his tattoos in his testimony. The State introduced no gang evidence to rebut this testimony and made no argument that defendant's tattoos should be negatively interpreted. As the court in Ortiz stated, tattoos do not carry the same inherently prejudicial effect as prison clothing or handcuffs. While defendant's tattoos did not serve a relevant purpose like identification, they were simply a part of his general appearance until he elected to explain their meaning. Until that point, defendant's tattoos did not even constitute evidence that would be required to meet the standard of relevancy. ¶ 99 We also reject defendant's contention that the trial court's ruling compelled him to exercise his right to testify and waive his right to remain silent. Defendant elected to explain the meaning of his tattoos to the jury, fearing that the jury would draw negative inferences from them. However, - 32 - No. 1-12-0958 the mere fact that defendant sought to avoid the prejudicial effect of his appearance does not render his waiver of his right to silence involuntary. Cf. People v. Poe, 16 Ill. App. 3d 805, 805-07 (1974) (proper admission of other-crimes evidence did not compel defendant to testify to dispel prejudicial effect of that evidence); People v. Tillman, 116 Ill. App. 2d 24, 32 (1969) (defendant was not compelled to testify to explain why he fled after State introduced evidence of flight). As the trial court noted, defendant chose to get the tattoos; no one compelled him to. Likewise, no one compelled him to explain their meaning in court. ¶ 100 Defendant cannot show that allowing the jury to see his unaltered physical appearance was reversible error. Defendant chose to tattoo his own face and then chose to explain the meaning of those tattoos to the jury. The State presented no evidence to give a negative meaning that would have necessitated such explanation. We conclude that the trial court did not commit error in precluding defendant from covering his facial tattoos with makeup. ¶ 101 2. State's Cross-Examination About Other Tattoos ¶ 102 Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to order him to roll up his sleeves and show the jury additional tattoos that were otherwise not visible. Defendant argues that this action exceeded the scope of his direct examination, which focused solely on the tattoos that the jury could see. The State contends that defendant opened the door to its cross-examination about his other tattoos by testifying as to the meaning of his facial tattoos and that, in any event, the tattoos on his arms had no prejudicial effect on this case. ¶ 103 The scope of cross-examination is left to the discretion of the trial court. People v. Stevens, 2014 IL 116300, ¶ 16. Accordingly, we will only reverse a trial court's decision regarding the scope of cross-examination if that decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. - 33 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 104 Defendant analogizes his being compelled to display the tattoos on his arms to the prosecutor's improper cross-examination in People v. Hernandez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 780 (2004). In Hernandez, two eyewitnesses identified the defendant as one of the people fleeing the scene of the offense. Id. at 787. They also testified that he was wearing a short-sleeved shirt at the time, but did not mention any tattoos on his arms. Id. In an effort to discredit their testimony, the defendant presented several witnesses who testified that the defendant had prominent tattoos on his arms. Id. In cross-examining those witnesses, the State asked whether they were aware that the defendant had a tattoo of a devil on his chest. Id. The court found that the State impermissibly exceeded the scope of the direct examination of the defense witnesses because the only relevant tattoos were the ones that would have been visible during the incident, i.e., the ones on the defendant's arms. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that this error was harmless because the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. Id. at 787-88. ¶ 105 In this case, like Hernandez, the trial court erred in allowing the State to inquire about defendant's tattoos that were not visible to the jury. The inquiry went beyond the scope of defendant's direct examination, which was limited to an explanation of defendant's visible tattoos. The State's questions were irrelevant to any issue at trial. ¶ 106 We further find, however, that this error, like the error in Hernandez, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. None of the tattoos that defendant was required to show the jury carried any obvious negative connotation. To the contrary, defendant's tattoos depicted his nickname, the word "Chief," and his mother's name. None of those tattoos are patently prejudicial like the defendant's devil tattoo in Hernandez. Moreover, the State did not attempt to draw any negative inferences from any of defendant's tattoos in its closing argument. - 34 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 107 While defendant contends that "[i]t is well known that gang leaders are referred to as 'chief,' " no evidence at defendant's trial provided the jury with that information. Defendant cites two cases, People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 352 (1970), and People v. Barajas, 322 Ill. App. 3d 541, 549 (2001), in support of his contention, but in both of those cases the State introduced evidence that gang leaders are called "chiefs." We cannot simply assume that the jury ascribed that meaning to the word "chief" in this case, where there was absolutely no gang evidence presented. Thus, even if the court erred in permitting the State to have defendant display his arm tattoos, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 108 3. Modified Jury Instructions Regarding Tattoos ¶ 109 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to deliver one of four modified versions of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.01 (4th ed. 2000), telling the jurors that they should not consider his tattoos in reaching their verdict. We review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. People v. Dorn, 378 Ill. App. 3d 693, 698 (2008). For many of the reasons we have just given, we find no abuse of discretion. Defendant testified that his tattoos had innocuous meanings, in some instances giving testimony about the tattoos' symbolic references to his deceased family members that likely painted him in a sympathetic light with the jury but, in any event, certainly did not prejudice him. And though the State's cross-examination on this topic was overly broad, it did not result in the admission of prejudicial evidence. Thus, defendant has not shown that his proposed jury instructions were necessary to alleviate the effects of any prejudicial evidence. ¶ 110 Defendant claims that People v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2006), is persuasive in this case. We disagree. In Newsom, the State elicited testimony that the defendant, who was on trial for possessing a firearm, had tattoos of firearms on his neck and body. Id. at 597, 599. The trial - 35 - No. 1-12-0958 court instructed the jury that it was not to consider the defendant's tattoos as evidence that he actually possessed a firearm. Id. at 600. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in permitting the State to elicit evidence of the defendant's tattoos, but concluded that that error was harmless in part because the trial court instructed the jury to not rely on the defendant's tattoos as evidence of his guilt. Id. at 600-05. This case is distinct from Newsom because this case did not involve the admission of any prejudicial tattoo evidence. Whereas the State in Newsom presented evidence that the defendant had a tattoo of the very item he had been accused of possessing, the jury in this case heard no prejudicial evidence regarding defendant's tattoos. We find no error in the trial court's rejection of defendant's proposed instructions. ¶ 111 C. Judicial Bias And Hostility ¶ 112 Defendant also claims that the trial court displayed a biased and hostile attitude toward the defense throughout the proceedings. He argues that the trial court made improper comments in the presence of the jury, threatening his ability to receive a fair trial. ¶ 113 The State first argues that defendant forfeited review of this issue by failing to include it in his posttrial motion. Defendant counters that this court should relax the rules of forfeiture as to this issue because it involves the conduct of the trial judge. Defendant's argument relies upon the doctrine, first recognized in People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963), that a trial attorney should not be expected to object to the trial judge's comments or conduct during proceedings before that same judge. In People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 485-89 (2009), the Illinois Supreme Court clarified that the Sprinkle doctrine should be applied only in extraordinary circumstances where an objection would have " 'fallen on deaf ears.' " The supreme court explained that its application of this rule "closely resemble[d]" the application of second-prong plain error, i.e., where an error is so serious that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process. Id. - 36 - No. 1-12-0958 at 487. Defendant also argues that, even if Sprinkle does not apply, we should excuse his forfeiture based upon the first prong of the plain error doctrine because the evidence against him was closely balanced. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a); People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48. ¶ 114 We first examine whether the trial court's comments constituted error. Then, we turn to whether we should relax the forfeiture rule under Sprinkle. Finally, we consider defendant's first-prong plain error claim. ¶ 115 1. Whether The Trial Court's Comments Were Improper ¶ 116 While trial judges have wide discretion in presiding over trials, they may not make comments or insinuations showing their opinion on witnesses' credibility or counsel's arguments. People v. Tatum, 389 Ill. App. 3d 656, 662 (2009). Moreover, a hostile attitude toward a criminal defendant, his witnesses, or his attorney may improperly influence the jury in reaching its verdict, resulting in an unfair trial. People v. Eckert, 194 Ill. App. 3d 667, 674 (1990). ¶ 117 Defendant first takes issue with three of the trial court's comments before his trial began. Defendant argues that the trial court twice refused to enter an order letting him make phone calls to his mother from Cook County Jail even though he was only 17 years old, that the trial court told defendant he was "stuck" with a trial date because he demanded a speedy trial, and that the trial court made comments suggesting that defendant should be prejudiced by the fact that he had received facial tattoos since the offense. ¶ 118 We disagree that any of these alleged comments affected defendant's trial. First, none of them were made in the presence of the jury. Therefore, it is difficult to see how any of these comments could have affected the verdict in this case. See People v. Lopez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101395, ¶¶ 70-71 (comments trial judge made to defense counsel during sidebars held in chambers did not affect jury's verdict). - 37 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 119 Second, none of these comments were improper. With respect to the phone calls, the trial judge explained that he would not sign orders compelling jail officials to allow defendant to make phone calls because defendant had been charged with a new offense while in prison and categorized as "high risk" by the jail. As to the trial date, defendant ignores the fact that his attorney acquiesced to the trial date. After demanding trial, defense counsel said, "Judge, I think in good faith the State can certainly pick any date that they want." Finally, as to the trial court's comments about defendant's tattoos, defendant misconstrues the trial court's statements. The trial judge did not say that defendant should be prejudiced by his tattoos; the court said that defendant was not entitled to put on makeup, potentially obscuring his appearance, simply because he elected to get tattoos on his face. We see no impropriety in any of these comments. ¶ 120 Defendant next argues that the trial court made three improper and prejudicial comments during defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Escalante. The first occurred after defense counsel elicited testimony from Escalante that ASA Berg's summary of defendant's report was not verbatim. Counsel asked Escalante, "[S]he did not write down everything that was said?" Defense counsel pressed Escalante for a yes-or-no answer, and the following colloquy occurred: "MR. EVANS [Assistant State's Attorney]: Objection, it has been asked and answered[.] THE COURT: Sustained. MS. SNEED [Defense counsel]: I don't think that we got a 'yes' or 'no' answer. THE COURT: He said that it was not word for word. Not verbatim means not word for word. So obviously that means that there were some words that may have been left out." ¶ 121 The second allegedly improper comment occurred when defense counsel was cross-examining Escalante about his search for Breed and the gun that was purportedly used - 38 - No. 1-12-0958 during the robbery. Escalante testified that defendant told him that someone named "Breed," who had the gun, lived somewhere on 146th Street in Harvey. The trial court sustained the State's objection to counsel's follow-up question: "And so you knew a nickname, you knew a first name, and you knew an approximate location of where Breed lived?" The court also sustained the State's objection to defense counsel's asking Escalante whether he ever arrested Breed. Then, counsel began to ask, "Now, you are telling us that you had a name of a person—," when the State objected again. The court responded, "Counselor, that is totally sustainable. It has got no basis whatsoever as to—based on any cross-examination." ¶ 122 The third allegedly improper comment was made when defense counsel questioned Escalante about his efforts to recover the gun. Defense counsel asked if Escalante took Williams's statement that Breed was armed "at face value," and Escalante said he did. Defense counsel then asked, "So [Williams] says that there was a gun, you never investigated where—to try to find the gun, you just took everything at face value?" The State objected to this question and the court said, "Sustained. That's not what he said." Escalante had previously testified that he searched for the gun after Williams reported the robbery. ¶ 123 The court's comments during defense counsel's cross-examination of Escalante were not improper. Defense counsel persistently tried to inquire as to whether Escalante had arrested or tried to arrest Breed, but the court sustained the State's objections to the relevance of that questioning. Defense counsel again began the same line of questioning, but the trial court admonished counsel, albeit in strong words, to desist. Notably, defendant does not claim that the trial court erred in precluding counsel from asking about whether Breed was arrested; he simply takes issue with the trial court's phrasing. However, in light of defense counsel's persisting in a line of questioning that the court excluded, it was not improper for the court to respond as it did. See - 39 - No. 1-12-0958 Lopez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101395, ¶¶ 74-77 (finding that trial court's criticisms of defense counsel in its rulings were not improper where defense counsel persisted in making errors in cross-examination and trial court's criticisms related to why questions were objectionable). ¶ 124 Similarly, after counsel misconstrued Escalante's testimony that he took Williams's complaint at face value as evidence that the police did not look for the gun, the trial court could permissibly sustain the State's objection. The trial court's comment was not improper; it was accurate. Escalante had testified, just moments before, that he did look for the gun involved. Likewise, the trial court permissibly explained the meaning of the word "verbatim" in response to defense counsel's repeated questioning about whether ASA Berg took down defendant's statement word for word. The trial court simply explained why it had sustained the State's objection; defense counsel had already received an answer to her question. The trial court's comments during defendant's cross-examination were thus proper attempts to clarify and expedite the trial. See People v. Young, 248 Ill. App. 3d 491, 502 (1993) (trial court's efforts to clarify and expedite examination of witness are not improper). ¶ 125 Defendant next challenges two comments made by the court during his own testimony. First, defendant argues that the trial court evinced a "lack of respect" by not immediately granting defense counsel's request for a sidebar when the State asked him to show the jury the tattoos on his arms: "Q. [Assistant State's Attorney:] Stand up and roll up your sleeves. MS. SNEED [Defense counsel]: Judge, I am going to object. THE COURT: Objection is overruled. MS. SNEED: Can I have a side bar? THE COURT: No, objection is overruled. - 40 - No. 1-12-0958 MS. SNEED: Excuse me. Can I have a side bar, Judge? MR. VOLKMAN [Assistant State's Attorney]: Stand up and roll of [sic] your sleeves up. MS. SNEED: Can I have a side bar? THE COURT: Fine, let's have a side bar." Then, at the sidebar, the court asked defense counsel, "All right. What's your objection this time?" ¶ 126 Defendant does not explain how these comments were improper, especially when the trial court granted the sidebar his attorney requested. Although the trial court's question at the sidebar was terse, it was not made in the presence of the jury. ¶ 127 Second, defendant takes issue with the trial court's comment after sustaining the State's objection to his testimony on redirect examination: "Q. [Defense counsel:] And even though your weren't manhandled by the police, Detective Escalante did threaten to put other cases on you? MR. VOLKMAN [Assistant State's Attorney]: Objection, leading, asked and answered. THE COURT: Sustained. And it has been asked and answered 7 million times. Move on, Counselor." ¶ 128 This comment, while unnecessarily sarcastic, was otherwise a proper response to defense counsel's repeated questioning on the same topic. Just moments before, defendant had testified that he agreed to sign the statement prepared by ASA Berg because he did not want to be charged with any more cases. Defendant testified to the same facts during his direct examination. The trial court's comment was merely an attempt to stop defense counsel from repeating questions. Lopez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101395, ¶¶ 74-77. - 41 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 129 Finally, defendant argues that, during his attorney's closing argument, the trial court improperly misconstrued Detective Escalante's testimony. Defense counsel attempted to argue that Escalante did not thoroughly investigate whether there was a gun because he did not actually believe that a gun was used during the robbery: "But look at it this way. He was a detective for Harvey for 11 years. That's his job, to find criminals. [Defendant] told him Breed's nickname, he told him Breed's first name, he told him where Breed lived. MR. VOLKMAN [Assistant State's Attorney]: Objection. *** THE COURT: Sustained. That's not what he said. MS. SNEED [Defense counsel]: He did say Breed lived on 146th Street in Harvey. That was the evidence. THE COURT: That's about two miles long. MS. SNEED: It may be two miles long. THE COURT: That's what he testified to. MS. SNEED: It may be two miles long, ladies and gentlemen, but Detective Escalante is not the only police officer on that force. He has a whole Harvey Police Department at his disposal. If this were a murder, I bet they would have gone those two miles to find that gun or find that murder suspect. So it's not out of the realm of possibility that Detective Escalante could have found this gun and found this Breed." - 42 - No. 1-12-0958 Defendant contends that the trial judge misstated the evidence when he said that Escalante testified that 146th Street was two miles long. In actuality, defendant notes, Escalante simply testified that 146th Street ran across the city of Harvey. ¶ 130 We agree with defendant that the trial court's statement that 146th Street is "two miles long" was improper. The specific length of that street in Harvey was never put into evidence by Detective Escalante or anyone else; the detective merely testified that "146th Street runs across the City of Harvey from east to west." Moreover, the trial court improperly assumed a prosecutorial role in arguing with defense counsel about Detective Escalante's testimony. See People v. Jackson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 631, 647 (2009) (trial court abuses its discretion when it adopts role of either party). The trial court undermined defense counsel's argument by implying that 146th Street was too long to meaningfully inform Escalante of Breed's location. Thus, the trial court did not simply misstate the evidence; the trial court signaled to the jury that the evidence supporting counsel's argument was weak. This comment was error. ¶ 131 Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly curtailed defense counsel's closing argument while simultaneously granting the State substantial leeway in drawing inferences from the evidence. During her closing argument, defense counsel attempted to argue that, if Detective Escalante believed a gun was involved, he would have more thoroughly searched for Breed and the gun: "And buried in Detective Escalante's testimony I specifically asked him if he thought there were [sic] really a gun involved would he have looked for it, and he said yes. So Detective— MR. EVANS [Assistant State's Attorney]: Objection. That's not the testimony, Judge. - 43 - No. 1-12-0958 MS. SNEED [Defense counsel]: I wrote it down. THE COURT: Overruled. It's argument. MS. SNEED: That's what he said. So Detective Escalante didn't quite believe that there was a gun involved either. MR. VOLKMAN [Assistant State's Attorney]: Judge, we're going to object to that last one. There's no evidence of that whatsoever. THE COURT: Sustained. What Detective Escalante['s] beliefs were are somewhat personal to him. Unless you could read his mind, because he did[n]'t say he did not believe there was a gun involved. So the objection is sustained. The jury is instructed to disregard the last statement." Defendant then compares that ruling during defense counsel's closing argument with the trial court's ruling allowing the State to argue that defendant fabricated his defense despite the fact that there was no evidence to support it: "Now, Mr. Minter knows about those consequences now after the 26 months you heard him talk about, after 26 months of being able to consult with his attorney and bone up on the law a little bit. MS. SNEED [Defense counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: It's argument. Overruled. MR. EVANS [Assistant State's Attorney]: Because now he's had the opportunity to bone up on the law of armed robbery and accountability. *** - 44 - No. 1-12-0958 He didn't know when he told Detective Escalante that he and Breed robbed Mr. Williams with that gun about accountability. He didn't know when he told Assistant State's Attorney Desiree Berg that he and Breed robbed Markel Williams with a gun about accountability. He probably figured hey— MS. SNEED: Judge, I'm going to object. THE COURT: Basis? MS. SNEED: That's not the evidence. That was not the evidence. MR. EVANS: That's a reasonable inference from the evidence. THE COURT: Reasonable inference from the evidence, overruled. MR. EVANS: He didn't know about accountability when he had gave [sic] that five page confession to Assistant State's Attorney Desiree Berg on that day, bear in mind with his mother in the room, but he knows about it today. MS. SNEED: Again, I'm going to object as to what Mr. Minter knew about accountability. That was not introduced into evidence. THE COURT: Noted for the record. Overruled." ¶ 132 Viewing the trial court's rulings during the defense and State closing arguments in concert, we agree that the trial court improperly favored the State during its argument. In both instances, defense counsel and the State were attempting to undermine the credibility of one of their opponent's witnesses. Defense counsel argued that Escalante did not actually think that Breed was armed because he would have found the gun if he had. Defense counsel based that inference upon Escalante's testimony that he would look for a gun if he believed one was used, as well as the fact that no gun was recovered. Even though Escalante testified that he did look for the gun, defense - 45 - No. 1-12-0958 counsel was entitled to draw a contrary inference from other evidence. The trial court's ruling prevented defendant from so arguing. ¶ 133 However, as shown above, the trial court let the State make a similar argument, over defendant's objection. Arguably, the State's insinuation that defendant fabricated his testimony after his attorney told him about the law of accountability was improper in light of the fact that it lacked any evidence that defendant did not know of the law of accountability. See People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 549 (2000) (it is improper for prosecution to suggest that defense counsel fabricated defense theory unless there is some evidence on which to base those assertions); People v. Conley, 187 Ill. App. 3d 234, 250 (1989) (closing argument must be based on evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from evidence). However, whether the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's objection is not critical to our analysis. Rather, the trial court's rulings during closing argument show that the trial court strictly limited defense counsel's argument while simultaneously allowing the State much more leniency. Although the trial court was not obligated to provide absolute parity in its rulings, the court must remain impartial and not display prejudice or favor toward either party. Tatum, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 662. In light of the inconsistency in its treatment of the parties' closing arguments, we find that the trial court erred. See People v. Mitchell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 167, 171 (1992) (trial court acted improperly in allowing State to explain law of accountability in its closing argument, but precluding defense counsel from arguing law as well). ¶ 134 2. Whether The Sprinkle Doctrine Should Apply ¶ 135 Having found that the trial court abused its discretion during closing argument, we must still address whether we should excuse defendant's forfeiture of this issue because any objection by defense counsel would have fallen on deaf ears. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 487. Defendant contends - 46 - No. 1-12-0958 that, taken as a whole, the trial court's comments and rulings indicated that the trial court held a hostile and biased attitude toward the defense. Thus, according to defendant, he should not have been required to object to the trial court's comments. ¶ 136 Defendant cites People v. Mitchell, where this court ordered a new trial because of the trial court's displays of bias against, and hostility toward, the defense. Mitchell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 169-71. In Mitchell, the trial court interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness who said he was interviewed by someone claiming to be from the " 'District Attorney's Office,' " bolstering that witness's testimony by saying that there was, in fact, such a thing as a district attorney in Illinois. Id. at 170. The appellate court noted that this not only undermined defense counsel's impeachment, but it added evidence in the State's favor. Id. The trial court also injected evidence in the State's favor by interrupting defense counsel's cross-examination regarding whether the defendant's interrogation was recorded, saying that tape recorders " 'are not used in police stations.' " Id. The trial court also "disparaged" defense counsel's questioning regarding the State's lack of fingerprint evidence, accused defense counsel of " 'ma[king] up' " impeachment evidence, and mocked the defendant's testimony while he was on the stand. Id. at 170-71. The trial court also displayed partiality during closing arguments, allowing the State to argue about the law but precluding the defense from doing the same. Id. at 171. ¶ 137 We find that Mitchell is distinguishable from this case. We recognize that, like the trial court in Mitchell, the trial court in this case improperly injected evidence during defense counsel's closing argument and ruled inconsistently during the parties' closing arguments. However, the sheer volume of disparaging remarks, the repeated introduction of evidence favoring the State, and clear bias against defense counsel in Mitchell was not present here. Instead, the trial court's impropriety was limited to two instances during closing argument. Unlike the trial court in - 47 - No. 1-12-0958 Mitchell, the trial court in this case did not display persistent disdain for the defense. Thus, we decline to apply Sprinkle based solely on what defendant describes as the trial court's hostility toward the defense. ¶ 138 Moreover, the record suggests that the trial court would not have ignored defense counsel's objections, as the rule in Sprinkle requires. We recognize that it would be unreasonable to expect defense counsel to further interrupt her own closing argument to object to the trial court's improper comments. See People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 266 (1986) (declining to apply forfeiture to issue of whether trial court considered improper factors in sentencing because defense counsel should not have been expected to interrupt court in midst of its findings in order to object). But defendant did not include any mention of these comments in his posttrial motion, either. In the same motion, he argued that the trial court's evidentiary rulings and rulings regarding defendant's tattoos were improper and deprived defendant of a fair trial. At the hearing on her posttrial motion, defense counsel vigorously argued that the trial court's rulings prejudiced defendant. The trial court heard these arguments, without interruption, before denying them. Nothing suggests that counsel would have been precluded from raising an additional objection regarding the court's comments during her closing argument. See People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 612 (2010) (declining to apply Sprinkle because nothing in record suggested that trial court would have ignored an objection to its questioning of venire); McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 488 (declining to apply Sprinkle because nothing suggested that trial court would not have entertained objections to its handling of jury notes). Because defendant has not shown that his objection would have fallen on deaf ears, we decline to relax the forfeiture rule pursuant to Sprinkle. ¶ 139 3. Whether The Evidence Was Closely Balanced - 48 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 140 Defendant also argues that, even if the trial court's comments do not justify relaxation of the forfeiture rule under Sprinkle, his conviction must be reversed because the evidence was closely balanced. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a); Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48 (first prong of plain error applies where evidence is so closely balanced that error threatened to tip the scale in favor of the State). However, as we stated above, the State's evidence establishing defendant's guilt was strong. Therefore, we do not agree that the trial court's improper comments during closing argument threatened to unfairly tip the balance of the evidence against defendant. ¶ 141 D. Constitutionality Of Automatic Transfer ¶ 142 Defendant next contends that the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, which required that he be tried as an adult for this offense (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a)(iv) (West 2008)), violates the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution. ¶ 143 Since briefing was completed in this case, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶¶ 88-111, which rejected the identical challenges that defendant now raises. We must apply the holding of Patterson to this case. See People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365 (1996) (Illinois Supreme Court decisions apply to all cases pending when decision is announced unless supreme court directs otherwise); People v. Gillespie, 2014 IL App (4th) 121146, ¶¶ 26-31 (applying Patterson because case was pending at time Patterson was decided). Although defendant's argument relies upon the United States Supreme Court cases of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Illinois Supreme Court also considered those cases in upholding the automatic-transfer statute. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶¶ 96, 100. We must reject - 49 - No. 1-12-0958 defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of the automatic-transfer statute for the reasons stated in Patterson. ¶ 144 E. Voidness Of The Armed-Robbery Firearm Enhancement ¶ 145 In his opening brief, defendant claimed that the 15-year firearm enhancement applied to his sentence was void because it had been held unconstitutional in People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63, 86-88 (2007). In his reply brief, defendant concedes that, since filing his opening brief, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Public Act 95-688 (eff. Oct. 23, 2007) revived the firearm enhancement. People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 27. We must apply Blair to this case. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d at 365; see also People v. Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311, ¶ 49; People v. McFadden, 2014 IL App (1st) 102939, ¶ 34, pet. for leave to appeal allowed, No. 117424 (May 28, 2014) (applying Blair where the case was pending at the time Blair was decided). As defendant committed this offense on March 24, 2009, after the enhancement was revived, the trial court properly applied it to his sentence. ¶ 146 F. Improper Consideration Of Pending Charges In Sentencing ¶ 147 Defendant's final argument is that the trial court improperly considered charges pending against him as aggravating factors increasing his sentence. The State responds that the trial court did not consider any improper factors; it considered the pending charges as evidence of defendant's tendency to recidivate, which is a proper factor in aggravation. For the reasons stated below, we agree with defendant. ¶ 148 We review a sentence that falls within statutory limits for an abuse of discretion. People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 56. However, when a trial court considers an improper factor in aggravation, the trial court abuses its discretion. People v. McAfee, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1096 (2002). - 50 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 149 The trial court may not rely on bare arrests or pending charges in aggravation of a sentence. People v. Johnson, 347 Ill. App. 3d 570, 575 (2004). But the court may rely on evidence of a defendant's other criminal activity, even if that conduct has not resulted in a conviction, where the trial court finds the evidence to be relevant and accurate. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 498-99 (1981). A mere list of arrests or charges in a presentence report, unsupported by live testimony or other evidence at the sentencing hearing, does not meet those standards. People v. Thomas, 111 Ill. App. 3d 451, 454 (1983); see also Johnson, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 576 (trial court impermissibly considered bare fact that defendant had been arrested for a sexual assault in Arkansas); People v. Wallace, 145 Ill. App. 3d 247, 256 (1986) (trial court improperly considered pending rape charge as aggravating factor). ¶ 150 In this case, the trial court erred in considering defendant's pending possession of contraband and aggravated battery charges as aggravating factors. The presentence investigation report showed that defendant had been charged with possession of contraband and aggravated battery of a peace officer while he was in custody awaiting trial in this case. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the State presented no evidence relating to these charges, but argued that they showed that defendant had "decided to conduct further acts of violence." In discussing the aggravating factors applicable to defendant, the court cited the two charges listed in the presentence report. Then, the court found that defendant had "continued" to commit crimes, citing his two pending charges and saying that they "do[ ] not go well for him." Clearly, the trial court considered the bare fact that defendant had been charged with two offenses while in custody as an aggravating factor. ¶ 151 The State claims that the trial court did not consider defendant's charges as an aggravating factor; instead, the trial court considered the likelihood that defendant would recidivate, as - 51 - No. 1-12-0958 evidenced by the fact that he had been charged with two new offenses. That distinction is meaningless. In order to find that defendant was likely to commit more offenses based upon his pending charges, the trial court necessarily had to assume that defendant actually committed those unproven offenses. Yet the trial court heard no evidence at the sentencing hearing from which he could determine whether defendant actually committed a battery or possessed contraband in jail. The reason that bare charges—as opposed to convictions—should not be considered is that the underlying facts have not yet been proven. People v. Gaines, 21 Ill. App. 3d 839, 846 (1974). Here, the trial court had no basis upon which to decide whether defendant actually committed the offenses the State claimed he had committed. Thus, the trial court improperly relied on the mere fact that defendant had been charged with those offenses to aggravate his sentence. ¶ 152 The State cites People v. Hunzicker, 308 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966 (1999), to support its distinction, but the defendant in that case did not argue that the trial court improperly considered pending charges. Rather, he argued that, generally, his sentence was excessive. Id. Thus, although the trial court considered the defendant's arrest while on bond as aggravating evidence, the appellate court was not specifically asked to decide whether that consideration was improper and did not do so. Id. at 963, 966; see also People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 323 (2010) (appellate court should not consider unraised and unbriefed issues in order to reverse judgment). We do not read Hunzicker as broadly as the State, particularly when such a reading of that decision would conflict with well-established precedent on this issue. See Johnson, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 575; People v. Gomez, 247 Ill. App. 3d 68, 73-74 (1993); Wallace, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 256; Thomas, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 454. ¶ 153 We must still consider what effect, if any, the trial court's error had on defendant's sentence. Where a trial court considers an improper factor in aggravation, we must order - 52 - No. 1-12-0958 resentencing if we cannot determine the weight that the trial court gave to the aggravating factor. McAfee, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1096-97. Conversely, where the trial court appears to place minimal emphasis upon an improper factor, a new sentencing hearing is not required. E.g., Gomez, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 74 (declining to order resentencing where trial court simply mentioned defendant's arrests in passing). ¶ 154 Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to 23 years' incarceration, two years above the statutory minimum. The only aggravating factors the trial court considered, other than defendant's two pending charges, was an adjudication of delinquency for battery entered when defendant was 16 and the fact that defendant had threatened to "shoot *** up" the victim's house if he told the police about the robbery. The fact that the trial court found relatively few aggravating factors applicable to defendant suggests that the pending charges may have played a role in increasing his sentence. Moreover, the trial court twice noted that defendant faced pending charges and stated that those charges did not "go well for" defendant. The repetition of the improper factor, coupled with the fact that the trial court also said that the charges reflected negatively on defendant, leads us to conclude that the charges likely played more than a minimal role in defendant's sentencing. Consequently, we vacate defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing. ¶ 155 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 156 For the reasons stated above, we affirm defendant's conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. Defendant was not denied his right to present a defense. He was not deprived of a fair trial by virtue of the jury seeing his tattoos. While the trial court erred in making improper comments and inconsistent rulings during closing arguments, defendant has not established that those errors were plain errors. Defendant's constitutional and voidness challenges to his sentence are foreclosed by recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions. However, defendant is - 53 - No. 1-12-0958 entitled to be resentenced because the trial court improperly considered charges pending against him at the time he was sentenced. ¶ 157 Conviction affirmed; sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing. ¶ 158 JUSTICE COBBS, dissenting. ¶ 159 I respectfully dissent. One of the most fundamental principles of our criminal justice system has been overlooked in the majority's disposition of this case. “A criminal defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial conducted according to law." People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). Here, the majority identifies a number of significant trial errors but, nonetheless, concludes that defendant was not denied a fair trial. ¶ 160 Our supreme court has admonished that when a defendant alleges that his due process rights have been compromised, prejudice to the defendant's case is not the sole issue on review. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000). Rather, we must also consider "whether a substantial right has been affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant's trial was fundamentally fair." Id. at 138 (citing 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Even if I could conclude that the trial court’s errors, taken individually, did not warrant reversal, mindful of our supreme court’s admonishment in Blue, surely, in this case, the cumulative effect of those errors not only created "a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant's case," but ultimately deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139. ¶ 161 To begin, defendant asserts four separate trial court errors in support of his claim that he was denied due process. Of the four errors, the majority finds that three have merit. I agree. The majority attempts to diminish the severity of these three errors by concluding that either the errors had minimal effect on defendant’s presentation of his defense or that, regardless of the errors, the evidence against him was overwhelming. I disagree. - 54 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 162 First, the majority concludes that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection and excluding, as hearsay, defendant’s testimony that Detective Escalante and Assistant State’s Attorney Berg made coercive statements to him. The majority additionally concludes that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection and excluding, as hearsay, defendant's testimony that ASA Berg refused to accept his assertions that Breed, his co-offender, did not have a gun. The majority finds that because the evidence was overwhelming, defendant was not prejudiced, and thus, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 163 The “overwhelming” evidence in this case consists, in sum, of the victim’s testimony regarding the offense which, he averred, included the offenders’ use of a gun — a version which differed from the version recounted first to his mother, in which he did not mention a gun, and was disputed by defendant; Escalante’s testimony concerning his investigation of the offense — testimony which included his statement that he did not locate the gun allegedly used by Breed in the commission of the offense; and, defendant's signed written confession — a confession drafted by ASA Berg, who was not available to testify at trial, but who had testified at the suppression hearing that she did not read the statement to defendant prior to him signing it. Defendant's testimony, which also counts as evidence, was to the effect that no gun was used in the commission of the offense; that he signed the confession without having fully read it, under threat of additional robbery charges; and, that he told Escalante that no gun had been used and provided Escalante with identifying address information for Breed, the alleged gunman. If we may discount the erroneously excluded evidence, then yes, as the majority concludes, the evidence here might be considered overwhelming. Therein, however, lies the problem — the trial court's erroneous exclusion of defendant's admissible evidence, which happens to challenge the State's evidence, and which also happens to support defendant's theory of the case. - 55 - No. 1-12-0958 ¶ 164 The majority further concludes that defendant's trial testimony, though not implausible, would not have significantly undermined the strength of the State's evidence. The State's evidence consisted of the victim's testimony — testimony which was disputed by defendant; Escalante's testimony — testimony in which he stated that ASA Berg had read the confession to defendant, when in fact, ASA Berg's own testimony was to the contrary; and, the confession itself — a document based on ASA Berg's interview with the 16 year old defendant, which commenced at about 2:00 a.m. in the morning, consisting of five (5) handwritten pages (even though recording equipment was readily available in the interview room) and, which defendant averred was an inaccurate product of coercive conduct. Whether defendant's testimony would have been fatally undermined by the State's evidence depended entirely on a credibility determination. A matter, which we understand, rests within the province of the jury. ¶ 165 Finally, the majority concludes that the evidence at issue was cumulative because defendant was ultimately allowed to testify that his statement was coerced. The cumulative evidence consists of two statements during the course of defendant's testimony: One —"[b]ecause, like the reason I said earlier, I didn't want to get charged with any more charges that I had nothing to do with at all." And two — "[b]ecause I didn't want to get charged with any more cases." The majority finds support for its reasoning with reliance on People v. Seesengood, 266 Ill. App. 3d 351, 358-59 (1994). ¶ 166 In Seesengood, the court found that the evidence which had been erroneously excluded in that case cumulative because the "[d]efendant fully communicated to the jury the substance of his alleged hearsay conversation, as well as its effect on his allegedly innocent state of mind." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 359. I am hard-pressed to conclude that the brief testimony permitted in this case fully communicated to the jury the substance of defendant's conversations with either - 56 - No. 1-12-0958 Escalante or with ASA Berg, much less its effect on his state of mind. Moreover, as the majority notes, with respect to the excluded testimony regarding defendant's statements to ASA Berg, the court not only sustained the objection but, advised the jury to disregard the testimony as hearsay. Further, even if the permitted testimony could be perceived as adequate to convey defendant's claims of coercion, that testimony did nothing to address his additional claims that the confession contained allegedly false information. Finally, I would note that the alleged hearsay testimony was immediately preceded by a number of sustained objections as defense counsel vainly attempted to elicit defendant's testimony to support his claim of coercion. We presume, as we must, that the jury properly performed its duty and disregarded it. ¶ 167 Defendant's testimony was apparently the only evidence to support his theory of the case. The majority correctly concludes that the trial court improperly sustained each of the State's objections to his testimony on the statements of Escalante and Berg as hearsay. The error is further exacerbated when, in a sidebar concerning the admissibility of defendant's testimony, defense counsel comments on alleged threats made by Escalante and the court responds, "the fact that there are these threats, this is the first time that I am hearing about this. It never came out, and it is hearsay evidence." Clearly, the trial court's error infringed on defendant's right to present his defense; so substantial a right such that our courts find it cognizable as plain error even if not properly preserved. See People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 80-81 (1990). In my view, these errors alone constituted reversible error. ¶ 168 Additionally, the trial court's error in limiting defendant's cross examination of the victim regarding whether he had a motive to lie about the involvement of a gun, coupled with the court's failure to give defendant's requested proper jury instruction pertaining to his incriminating statement, also casts doubt upon the reliability of defendant's conviction. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at - 57 - No. 1-12-0958 138. The majority focuses heavily on the weight of the State’s evidence against defendant in disposing of these issues, but regardless of the strength of the evidence, the law requires that defendant be given an opportunity to present his version of the facts and to challenge the State's evidence against him. See People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 90 (2001) (analyzing defendant's right to present a defense claim under the second prong of the plain error doctrine due to the importance of the right involved)); See also People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1977) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 (1967)) (holding that "an accused has the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of events as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies")). However, in this case, the jury was permitted to hear the State's theory of the case, while defendant was considerably limited in his attempts to respond to the charges against him. ¶ 169 Further, although the wording of IPI 3.06-3.07 and IPI 3.11 is in some ways similar, the wording and the purpose of the two instructions are, in fact, different. As the majority notes, the trial court gave only a portion of IPI 3.11, the portion which includes the following text: "[Y]ou may consider a witness's earlier inconsistent statement as evidence without this limitation when ***." (Emphasis added.) IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11. Having given a portion of IPI 3.11, the text "without this limitation" is left unexplained, and makes no sense in the context of the cobbled together version given by the trial court. Yet, the majority concludes that defendant cannot show any serious risk that the jury misunderstood the law because the court gave a nearly identical instruction to IPI 3.06-3.07. ¶ 170 I would note additionally, that the court in People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d 585 (2008), a case upon which the majority relies for its harmless error finding, held that the error in the court’s failure to give the correct jury instruction there was harmless because in that case, with the - 58 - No. 1-12-0958 exception of including the word “earlier,” the given and requested instructions were similar. Significantly, in Johnson, the defendant's confession was videotaped and played to the jury. Thus, the majority expressed that the jury was able to make the connection between the "prior inconsistent statement" (IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 language) and the defendant as a "witness" (IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 language). No such video recording of this defendant's confession was available to ensure that the jury made the proper connection in this case. In the face of the trial court’s erroneous rulings concerning the admissibility of the evidence on coercion, including the court’s acknowledgement that it was not aware of threats made to induce the confession, the jury instruction error serves as one more error in a series of others which compromised defendant’s due process rights to a fair trial. ¶ 171 Defendant next asserts three separate claims of error with respect to the trial court's rulings regarding his tattoos. The majority finds error with respect to two of the three claims, but nonetheless, finds the errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I disagree. ¶ 172 Defendant first claims error in the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to conceal his facial tattoos with flesh-toned makeup. The majority establishes that the standard of review of this claimed error is abuse of discretion and I have no cause to disagree. Whether the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in ruling on defendant's motion, however, is another matter. In any case, I agree with the majority that general regulation of a defendant's appearance is within the discretion of the trial court. Unlike the majority, however, I disagree that either Jackson v. United States, 945 A. 2d 621 (D.C. Ct. App. 2008), or State v. Ross, 115 So. 3d 616 (La. Ct. App. 2013), or State v. Ortiz, 300 P. 3d 786 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) provide any support for the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to conceal. The majority notes that in Jackson and Ross the court denied defendant's request to conceal his tattoo with makeup because witnesses relied on the tattoos for - 59 - No. 1-12-0958 identification purposes. I note additionally the Jackson court's holding that even if the court improperly precluded the defendant from concealing his teardrop tattoo, it was "almost certain" that he was not prejudiced because the outcome of the trial strongly indicated that the jury accepted the defendant's testimony regarding the mitigating circumstances in his case. Jackson, 945 A. 2d at 628. Additionally, the majority notes that the Ortiz court upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's request to cover his facial tattoo because they were simply part of his general appearance and neither the State nor any of the witnesses referred to the tattoos during trial. However, the majority fails to mention that the jurors in Ortiz "were specifically asked whether the facial tattoos would affect their ability to be fair and impartial and none of the jurors indicated that they would." Ortiz, 300 P. 3d 786, n 2. ¶ 173 I gather from these cases that a denial of a motion to cover a defendant's tattoos, while in the discretion of the trial court, is most proper when the defendant's tattoos serve a relevant purpose, such as identification, or where facts support the conclusion that the appearance of a defendant's tattoos had no influence on the jury's verdict. In this case, defendant's facial tattoos served no relevant purpose and there is no way to determine whether the tattoos adversely affected the jury's perception of defendant. ¶ 174 It appears from the record that defendant, at the age of 16, was arrested for the commission of this offense. At some time during pretrial incarceration, defendant elected to tattoo parts of his flesh. Apparently, during voir dire, defendant, without approval from the court, concealed the tattoos with flesh-toned makeup. The court, once made aware, commented that he did not notice that defendant had on makeup. A request for approval from the court to conceal the tattoos prior to trial was met with the following colloquy: “MS. SNEED [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, at this time I am asking that the - 60 - No. 1-12-0958 Court to allow the public defender's office to apply makeup to Marlon Minter's face in order to conceal the tattoos. The makeup, as you see, is flesh tone. It does not change the color of his face. It will just help to conceal the tattoo that he has up above his right eye, which is initials I-K-E, and also the tattoo above his left eye of A-T-G, along with a spider web. And then there is a teardrop dripping from his right eye, teardrop dripping from his left eye, two teardrops dripping from his chin next to his - - to the right side of his mouth. * * * And, Judge, we think that it would be prejudicial if the jury were allowed to view those tattoos because the jury would have a preconceived notion about the defendant upon viewing those tattoos. THE COURT: Well, Ms. Sneed, I understand what you are saying. But who created that condition? MS. SNEED: He did create the condition, however, and he is not trying to – it won't conceal how he looked when he was arrested because when he was arrested he did not have these tattoos. THE COURT: Okay. So he has willfully changed his appearance while he was in custody, is that what you are telling me. MS. SNEED: Well, his appearance has changed, yes Judge. But by the same token, I believe the prejudicial nature of the tattoos, people have preconceived notions about people with tattoos, especially when they have teardrops. * * * And I think that it is very little for the Court to do to allow us to apply makeup. He wore makeup yesterday, and __ THE COURT: Because I wasn't aware of it. I mean, and you guys did it without getting my permission. - 61 - No. 1-12-0958 MS SNEED: We didn't know that we had to have permission, Judge. THE COURT: Well, what you are doing is changing – you are bringing contraband, stuff into the court system without my permission. *** MR. D’ANGELO [ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: * * * He is the one who made himself look like this. * * * His appearance should not be camouflaged. The defendant has done this, and the jury has the right to see it. *** MS. SNEED: Judge, when people see gang – they associate teardrops with gang tattoos. They don't know what those tattoos necessarily mean, but they attach meaning to it themselves, whatever those meanings are. MR. D’ANGELO: * * * If you are so concerned that * * * the jury is going to be confused by what the defendant has done to himself * * * put him on the stand and let him explain it to the trier of fact. That's his opportunity. *** THE COURT: Motion is denied. *** I don't even see the tattoos from here. So you are making a mountain out of a mole hill. If that's how he looks, that's how he looks. I am not going to allow him to put anything on his face that's not how he naturally looks. *** MS. SNEED: When he was arrested for this case, *** he did not have tattoos. THE COURT: So what? He changed his appearance while he was in custody. I didn't change it. You didn't change it. The State didn't change it. He chose to change it - 62 - No. 1-12-0958 himself. That's the way that he is going to appear. The motion is denied. All right." ¶ 175 The circuit court is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all defendants receive a fair trial, (People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 485 (2000)), not the defendant. As the majority acknowledges, there is little case law to guide us. However, the guidance found lacking is not necessary for resolution of this issue in this case. That is so because I see no suggestion that the court properly considered defense counsel's argument with respect to the prejudicial effect of defendant's appearance, or that the court on its own considered possible prejudice. Instead, the court's focus centered largely on the fact that the defendant had, of his own volition, altered his appearance. To find no abuse of discretion requires that there have been a proper exercise of that discretion. Because I believe that the trial court failed to consider the prejudicial effect of the defendant’s tattoos, or how the State would have been prejudiced by permitting the tattoos to be concealed, as deferential as the standard is, on the facts of this case, I would find that the court abused its discretion. See, e.g., People v. Houser, 305 Ill. App. 3d 384, 390-392. ¶ 176 By no means do I sanction defense counsel's prior concealment of defendant's tattoos absent the court's approval. However, it occurs to me that the non-visible appearance of defendant's tattoos during voir dire and then the visible appearance of the tattoos during trial might actually have been more confusing to the jury. Confusion, not to mention possible prejudice, which should have been considered by the trial court. ¶ 177 The majority next concludes that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to cross-examine defendant about his non-visible tattoos. Yet, the majority finds that the error was harmless, reasoning that his tattoos did not carry any obvious negative connotation and the State did not attempt to draw any negative inferences from any of the tattoos. I disagree. Defense counsel objected to the line of the questioning by the State regarding the non-visible tattoos as - 63 - No. 1-12-0958 beyond the scope of direct examination. Interestingly, earlier at trial, during defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim concerning his observations of the offenders, the State, in explaining the basis of its objection to defense counsel's questioning, offered that "[c]ross–examination is limited to the direct examination." I believe that each of the trial court's rulings regarding defendant's tattoos contributed to the denial of defendant's due process right to a fair trial. ¶ 178 In my opinion, the majority fails to sufficiently address defendant's contention that the State's irrelevant inquiry, over defense counsel's several objections, may have improperly influenced the jury's perception of him. Instead, the majority seemingly dismisses the real possibility that the State's improper action had any effect on the jury, noting that the State does not introduce any evidence to suggest defendant's gang involvement. However, I am not convinced, given the overall tenor of the trial proceedings, that the State's action was as harmless as the majority concludes. Although the State did not explicitly question defendant regarding whether he was involved in a gang, the implication was present, most notably through the State's attempt to elicit the meaning of defendant's "chief" tattoo, which yielded no positive explanation and thus, could have been negatively perceived by the jury. ¶ 179 Although the majority finds that the State's inquiry into defendant's non-visible tattoos was improper, it nonetheless concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a cautionary jury instruction. In so concluding, the majority reasons that defendant testified that his tattoos had innocuous meanings. Defendant argues, and I agree, that the appearance of the tattoos themselves gives rise to the potential for prejudice, regardless of the meaning that defendant attempted to ascribe to them. The trial court could have easily ensured that that tattoos, both visible and non-visible, would not have any bearing on the jury's decision by - 64 - No. 1-12-0958 simply issuing a jury instruction. The court instead rejected defendant's request with no apparent reasoning. ¶ 180 The majority rejects defendant's reliance on People v. Newsom, 452 F. 3d 593 (6th Cir. 2006). In Newsom, the reviewing court found that the trial court's error in admitting defendant's irrelevant tattoos as evidence was cured by the trial court's subsequent instruction to the jury not to consider the tattoos in reaching its decision. The majority finds the instant case distinguishable from Newsom, concluding that this case did not involve the admission of any prejudicial tattoo evidence. ¶ 181 Although the discussion in Newsom indicated that the content of the defendant’s tattoos was unfairly prejudicial, and indeed it was, the court’s finding of error was not based on the content of the tattoos, but instead on the fact that any probative value of the tattoo evidence was outweighed by the possible prejudicial effect. Id. at 603. Here, although defendant’s explanation of the content of many of his tattoos was positive, the State’s, further, improper questioning concerning the “Chief” tattoo was not responded to with any positive explanation. Defendant’s tattoos were not being offered by the defense as evidence, but instead, to diminish any possible prejudice. Clearly, the State’s improper inquiry was for a different purpose. Given that the motion to conceal was denied, and that the defense’s testimony regarding the tattoos was not offered as any substantive evidence regarding the offense, the prejudicial effect of the State’s cross-examination required for its cure an instruction to ensure that the jury's verdict would not rest on considerations other than the evidence alone. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 140. ¶ 182 Unfortunately, error in this case was not confined to the evidentiary phase of this trial. The majority also finds that the trial court abused its discretion during closing argument. Specifically, the majority finds error in that the court misconstrued Escalante's testimony and then - 65 - No. 1-12-0958 argued with defense counsel about the testimony. Additionally, the court strictly limited defense counsel's argument but allowed the State considerable leeway in drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. However, the majority concludes that defendant forfeited review of this issue because it was not properly preserved. In my view, because the trial court's actions during closing arguments affected defendant's substantial right to a fair and impartial trial, I believe that his claim is properly reviewable under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005). The trial court's seeming partiality during the final arguments had the potential to leave a lasting impression on the jury. See Lewerenz, 24 Ill. 2d at 301 (stating that "jurors are quick to perceive any leaning of the court and place great reliance upon what he says and does, so that his statements and intimations are liable to have the force of evidence and be most damaging to an accused"). Further, a number of the court's comments and rulings throughout the entire course of the proceedings evidenced a hostile disposition toward defendant and ultimately contributed to the denial of his right to a fair and impartial trial. Suffice it to say that “[t]he atmosphere in and around the courtroom might be so hostile as to interfere with the trial process, even though an examination of the record conformed to the requirements of law: the defendant had counsel, the jury members stated they were impartial, the jury was correctly charged, and the evidence was legally sufficient to convict.” Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561 (1965) (quoting Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86-90, (1923)). ¶ 183 The majority identifies a number of significant trial court errors and improper comments. In that regard, I note finally that the majority's decision to vacate defendant's sentence is based on yet another improper comment from the trial court regarding defendant's pending charges. "Each of the errors *** in and of themselves, cast doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process." Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139. Yet, the majority finds no denial of due process. I disagree. In this case, the - 66 - No. 1-12-0958 cumulative effect of the trial court's errors created a "synergistic effect" on defendant's trial which necessitates a reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial. Id. at 138. - 67 -