People v. Akis, 347 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. 1976). · Go Syfert
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People v. Akis, 347 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
556 citation events (34 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Lee (illappct, 2024-01-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 40 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People v. Lee
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Koonce Ex Rel. Koonce v. Pacilio (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1999 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
if hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, it must be given its 'natural probative effect
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Koonce v. Pacilio (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1999 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
if hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, it must be given its 'natural probative effect' and was competent ab initio
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Walker
Ill. App. Ct. · 2026 · confidence medium
Apart from her “ ‘Mack’ ” testimony, defendant reasons, “there were only two pieces of substantively admissible evidence that suggested [he] was involved in the robbery:” (1) the pizza box with defendant’s and Parks’s fingerprints on it, which was left behind in the residence, and (2) the phone records “show[ing] that [defendant] called Parks several times around the time of the robbery.” ¶ 112 Defendant could be understood as implying that the only evidence that counts is evidence which is “substantively admissible.” However, “[a] rule of evidence not invoked by tim…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Maggio
Ill. App. Ct. · 2026 · confidence medium
“This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). “[R]eviewing courts apply this standard regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial [citation], and circumstantial evidence meeting this standard is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction [citation].” Id. at 281 . “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weig…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Moreno
Ill. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
“A jury waiver will not be held invalid where a defendant unambiguously chooses a bench trial with his counsel at his side unless some prejudice to the defendant is alleged and proved.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 300 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Smith
Ill. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
App. 3d 594, 598 (1991); People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976) (“[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”); Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.11 (approved Oct. 17, 2014) (the jury has a duty to evaluate the defendant’s testimony in contrast with his prior inconsistent statements). ¶ 22 Moreover, the evidence showed that the defendant shot Harris in the face immediately after Harris struck Dajon.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Johnson
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
“This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rainey
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
As axiomatic as the proposition that a witness must have personal knowledge of the matters testified to is the proposition that hearsay testimony admitted without objection “ ‘is to be considered and given its natural probative effect.’ ” People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 263 (1985) (quoting People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976)). ¶ 23 Accordingly, having found that no error occurred regarding Morgan’s testimony, there cannot be plain error and we must honor defendant’s procedural forfeiture. ¶ 24 B.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Richardson
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
“A jury waiver will not be held invalid where a defendant unambiguously chooses a bench trial with his counsel at his side unless some prejudice to the defendant is alleged and proved.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 300 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barnett (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
“This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to 13 be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Riley (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
“This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976). ¶ 13 To sustain a conviction for domestic battery, as charged here, the State needed to prove that defendant �…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Z.P.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence “it is not the function of this court to retry the defendant.” People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nettles
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
“This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Guerrero
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
“This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Knox
Ill. App. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
App. 3d 536, 539 (1979), citing People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976); People v. Ramsey, 205 Ill. 2d 287, 294 (2002) (“once hearsay is properly admitted, the trier of fact is free to give it its natural probative value.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Daniel
Ill. App. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976). ¶ 38 Daniel next argues his lack of flight and the absence of evidence showing he attempted to conceal the contraband supports an inference that he had no knowledge of the contraband’s presence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re K.P.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
App. 3d 250, 256 (2003) (an objection not offered in the trial court is waived); People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976) (when hearsay evidence admitted without objection it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Max
Ill. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
We will not retry this case on appeal (see Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d at 43 ) or substitute our judgment for that of the jury (see People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298-99 (1976)). ¶ 71 As her final contention on appeal, defendant argues that she was denied a fair trial and due process because of the cumulative effect of all of the errors that occurred at trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. Frankie's Beef/Pasta and Catering
Ill. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976). ¶ 15 Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the Act provides an exclusive remedy for Rodriguez’s injury.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Torres
Ill. · 2012 · confidence medium
See People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470-75 (2005); People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976). ¶ 57 Thus, we consider whether the second requirement for admission of Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony is met, i.e., whether defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross- examine Pena at that hearing. ¶ 58 In Rice and Sutherland, in the course of considering whether an adequate opportunity existed for cross-examination of the witness at the prior proceeding, this court looked, inter alia, to the “motive and focus” of the examination conducted at the first proceeding, and that which w…
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Banks
Ill. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Banks
Ill. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Herring
Ill. App. Ct. · 2001 · confidence medium
See, e.g., People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 204 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 837 (1998); People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 , 347 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Herring Replaces opinion filed June 22, 2001, and withdrawn
Ill. App. Ct. · 2001 · confidence medium
See, e.g., People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 204 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 837 (1998); People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 , 347 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Wells
Ill. · 1998 · confidence medium
Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 163 ; People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Wells
Ill. · 1998 · confidence medium
Galvin , 127 Ill. 2d at 163 ; People v. Akis , 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rasmussen
Ill. App. Ct. · 1992 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298-99 (court affirmed unlawful use of weapons charge on grounds that police officer’s testimony that defendant passed an object to his passenger, who then dropped a gun out of the car, was “convincing and competent”); Hammer, 228 Ill.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Wendt
Ill. App. Ct. · 1989 · confidence medium
People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298-99 , 347 N.E.2d 733, 734-35 (“[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. [Citations.] Where the evidence is merely conflicting a court of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact”).
cited Cited "see" In re Aiden M.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
Id.; see People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976). ¶ 21 However, K.P. is distinguishable from the present case.
discussed Cited "see" People v. Sudzus (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296 , 347 N.E.2d 733 ; compare People v. Einoder (1980), 82 Ill.
discussed Cited "see" People v. Washington (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296 , 347 N.E.2d 733 .
discussed Cited "see" People v. Stade (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296 , 347 N.E.2d 733 .
discussed Cited "see" People v. Sutton (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296 , 347 N.E.2d 733 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." People v. Greenleaf (4×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
A reviewing court will not set aside a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless "the evidence is so palpably contrary to the verdict or judgment that it is unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory and thus creates a reasonable doubt of guilt." ( People v. Witherspoon (1991), 216 Ill.App.3d 323, 333 , 160 Ill.Dec. 76 , 576 N.E.2d 1030 .) A circuit court's determination will be reversed on appeal only if the reviewing court finds, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that no *115 rational trier of fact could have found the essential elemen…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Miszkiewicz (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 501, 508 , 475 N.E.2d 879 ; see also People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296 , 347 N.E.2d 733 ; People v. Trefonas (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 92 , 136 N.E.2d 817 .) In the case at bar, defense counsel’s actions were clearly strategic.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Reynolds
Ill. App. Ct. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
App. 3d 271, 274 ; see also People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 .) Once the trial court has ruled on the motion to suppress, a reviewing court will not disturb that order unless it is manifestly erroneous.
cited Cited "see, e.g." People v. Parker
Ill. App. Ct. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Berland
Ill. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
However, it is established that “[a] conviction will not be set aside merely because the evidence is contradictory.” (People v. Guido (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 204, 208 ; see also People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298-99 ; People v. Pagan (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 525, 533-34 .) The trial judge, in handing down his decision, stated that he was impressed by the credibility of the eyewitnesses and noted that they had no reason whatsoever to lie.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Collins (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1978 · signal: see also · confidence low
The result reached by the trial court “ ‘should not be set aside unless the proof is so unsatisfactory as to cause a reasonable doubt of guilt to appear.’ ” People v. Reese (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 51, 59 , 294 N.E.2d 288 , quoting from People v. Walcher (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 159, 165 , 246 N.E.2d 256 ; see also People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298-99 , 347 N.E.2d 733 .
The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant,
v.
SAMUEL AKIS, Appellee
47548.
Illinois Supreme Court.
May 14, 1976.
347 N.E.2d 733
William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Laurence J. Bolon, Michael E. Shabat, Kevin Sweeney, and Donald M. Devlin, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People., James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Robert B. Thompson and Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee.
Ryan.
Cited by 285 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #39,362 of 633,719
Citer courts: Appellate Court of Illinois (2)
MR. JUSTICE RYAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Samuel Akis, was charged with unlawful use of weapons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 24 — 1(a)) and carrying a firearm without an Illinois Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 83 — 2). He was convicted of both charges in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. The appellate court reversed the convictions. (27 Ill. App. 3d 74.) We granted the State leave to appeal.

At approximately 11 p.m. on December 1, 1972, Chicago police officer Thomas Boyd and his partner observed an automobile traveling west on 59th Street at an excessive rate of speed. Defendant was driving the vehicle accompanied by James Bates, in the front seat, and a second passenger in the back seat. The officers focused their spotlight on defendant’s automobile and brought it to a stop.

Officer Boyd testified that he could see inside the defendant’s car and that he observed the defendant moving around as if reaching in his pocket and removing something and handing it to James Bates, the front seat passenger. As the defendant’s car was stopping, Officer Boyd saw the front seat passenger drop a gun to the ground. The weapon was a loaded .32-caliber revolver.

After recovering the weapon, the officers placed the occupants of defendant’s automobile under arrest and informed them of their rights. Officer Boyd testified that he then asked Bates where he had gotten the gun. Bates responded that the defendant had given him the gun. The defendant was then asked if he had State and city registration cards for the weapons. He replied that he did not.

At the trial both the defendant and Bates maintained that no gun had been passed between them and subsequently dropped outside the car. The defendant also testified that his defroster did not work and that he could not see out of the back windows.

The appellate court held that the State had failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse the holding of the appellate court.

This court has often held that it is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. (People v. Zuniga (1973), 53 Ill.2d 550; People v. Hurst (1969), 42 Ill.2d 217.) Where the evidence is merely conflicting a court of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. Clark (1964), 30 Ill.2d 216.

We find ample evidence in the record to support the judgment of the trial court. The arresting officer testified that he saw the defendant “moving around as if reaching in his pocket and removing something; and I observed him reach over and hand something to the passenger. ” Shortly thereafter he saw the passenger drop the revolver to the ground. During this time the officer’s observation was aided by the spotlight that had been focused upon the defendant’s car, and the officer testified that he distinctly remembered being able to see inside the car. The defendant denied that he handed a gun to the passenger and stated that the windows were too foggy to see out. However, the trial court was not compelled to accept this version in light of the convincing and competent testimony of the arresting officer.

Defendant is additionally linked to the revolver by the passenger’s statement, made in defendant’s presence, that the gun had been given to him by the defendant. The defendant maintains that the officer’s testimony concerning this statement was hearsay. Though no objection was raised at trial, defendant contends that this court cannot now consider the statement. We do not agree with this contention.

A rule of evidence not invoked by timely objection is waived. Although we express no opinion as to whether the testimony in question did constitute hearsay, it is sufficient to note that when evidence of that character is admitted without objection it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect. (People v. Trefonas (1956), 9 Ill.2d 92; 1 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 18 (3d ed. 1940).) We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court also reversed the convictions on the ground that the defendant did not understanding^ waive his right to a jury trial. Defendant has now abandoned this position on the basis of our decision in People v. Murrell (1975), 60 Ill.2d 287, which was decided subsequent to the appellate court opinion in the present case. We agree that Murrell is dispositive of the issue.

In Murrell we held that a defendant will be bound by a jury waiver made in his presence by his attorney. In this case the defendant personally waived a jury trial in the presence of his counsel. Defendant did not hesitate or express doubt before waiving a jury. The court asked: “You want to be tried by this court or jury?” The defendant replied: “This court.” The case then proceeded to trial before the court. We find no material distinction between the present case and the situation presented by Murrell. As in Murrell the defendant does not contend that he wanted a jury trial or that he was somehow unlawfully deprived of his right to a jury trial. A jury waiver will not be held invalid where a defendant unambiguously chooses a bench trial with his counsel at his side unless some prejudice to the defendant is alleged and proved.

The judgment of the appellate court reversing the convictions of the defendant is reversed and the judgments of the circuit court of Cook County are affirmed.

Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.