¹ The court had initially excluded these statements, but defendant opened the door when questioning Gariti and also during G.E.’s testimony. - 10 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U “[STATE]: Did defendant ever touch any other part of your body? [G.E.]: He kind of touched me by my boob.” ¶ 28 During cross-examination, G.E. testified that she spoke with her mother and the assistant State’s Attorneys before testifying, but they did not tell her what to say. Her mother told her to tell the truth. Also, the attorneys allowed her to review her own statement to Berg by watching the video. As to whether defendant touched G.E. on her skin, counsel asked: “[DEFENSE]: [During the video interview], you said ‘nothing happened with my underwear.’ Do you remember that? [G.E.]: No. [DEFENSE]: You don’t? If I showed you the video, would you remember? Would that jog your memory? [G.E.]: Maybe. [DEFENSE]: [plays video] He asked you what happens with your clothes, and you said ‘nothing.’ [G.E.]: Yes. But if you keep on playing it, I say more. [DEFENSE]: [plays video] Okay. He just asked you if you had clothes on, and you said ‘yes;’ correct? [G.E.]: Yes. But he asked if [sic] on the skin, and I said ‘yes.’ [DEFENSE]: Okay. But you saw where he asked if you were wearing clothes, and you said ‘yes?’ [G.E.]: Yes. Maybe I got confused for the question.” ¶ 29 As to whether defendant touched G.E. more than one time, counsel asked: - 11 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U “[DEFENSE]: And you told [Berg] that [defendant’s] period touched your butt one time? [G.E.]: Yes, I did. [DEFENSE]: And today, four years later, you are saying it happened many times? [G.E.]: Yes. [DEFENSE]: Did you ever tell [Berg] that it happened many times? [G.E.]: No, but I told my mom.” On redirect, G.E. explained that she felt more comfortable talking to her mom than to Berg, “because like she is my mom.” G.E. also told Julie Pohlman, who worked at the Child Advocacy Center, that it happened more than once. ¶ 30 As to whether defendant caused physical pain, counsel asked: “[DEFENSE]: And you told [Berg] whatever [defendant] did to you it didn’t hurt; right? [G.E.]: I think, yes. [DEFENSE]: Did [defendant] ever hurt you? [G.E.]: Yes. Yeah.” However, defendant did not cause G.E. to bleed or have trouble going to the bathroom. On redirect, G.E. explained that defendant hurt her “like sexually wise.” Also on redirect, the State asked G.E. what she meant by the phrase “in her butt”: “[STATE]: Well you have a part of your butt where poop comes out. You know that, right? [G.E.]: Yeah. [STATE]: Was it that part? - 12 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U [G.E.]: I don’t think so.” ¶ 31 C. Trial Court Findings ¶ 32 The trial court found defendant guilty of counts I and III, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (penis-to-buttocks contact) and aggravated criminal abuse of a child (sexual conduct based on penis-to-buttocks contact). As to count I, it explained: “[Aside from the section 115-10 witnesses], [t]here is one witness who testified as to the events that occurred. There is no question that there are some issues with that witness, that being G.E. ***. G.E. testified that this [penis-to-buttocks contact] happened on at least one occasion. There is some question as to whether or not it happened on several occasions based on the testimony I have heard. There is no question she testified it happened on one occasion. There is no question in this court’s mind and I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the incident occurred between the penis of the defendant and the buttocks area of the minor.” ¶ 33 As to count III, the court stated: “Count III mirrors count I, except for that alleges sexual conduct, not contact. I agree with the State that, since I found there was contact, I also find in this case that there was conduct. *** I can’t think of any other reason why an adult male would place his penis on the buttocks of a minor [eight] years old except for his sexual arousal.” The court determined that count III would merge into count I. ¶ 34 As to count II, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (anal penetration), the court found defendant not guilty. It explained: “It is my finding that the contact was on the skin but did - 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U not penetrate anything.” (Emphasis added.) As to count IV, aggravated criminal sexual abuse (mouth-to-buttocks contact), the court found defendant not guilty. It explained that the only evidence supporting the charge came from the section 115-10 testimony, when G.E. told Berg that defendant kissed her buttocks. G.E. did not testify to the occurrence, so the court could not find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant filed an unsuccessful posttrial motion, raising the same arguments he now raises on appeal. ¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 36 On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the section 115-10 statements; (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict, because G.E. gave inconsistent statements and because the State failed to prove the element of sexual gratification; and (3) the indictment was insufficient to act as a bar against a future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. For the reasons that follow, we reject each of defendant’s arguments. ¶ 37 A. Section 115-10 ¶ 38 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the section 115-10 statements. Section 115-10 sets forth the following exception to the rule against hearsay statements: “(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13, *** including, but not limited to, prosecutions for violations of Sections 11- 1.20 through 11-1.60 *** of the [Code] *** the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule: (1) testimony by the victim of an out of court statement made by the victim that he or she complained of such act to another; and (2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element - 14 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim. (b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if: (1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and (2) The child or person with an intellectual disability, a cognitive impairment, or developmental disability either: (A) testifies at the proceeding; ***” (725 ILCS 5/115-10(a), (b) (West 2014)). ¶ 39 The State bears the burden to prove that the time, content, and circumstances of the statements provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37, 43 (1992). The trial court’s decision to admit evidence under section 115-10 will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 343 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the determination is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010). ¶ 40 Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting G.E.’s statements to Berg and Gariti, because the statements were inconsistent with one another. If the statements were inconsistent with one another, defendant urges, then neither statement contains sufficient safeguards of reliability. Specifically, defendant points to three inconsistencies, those being whether the contact: (1) involved G.E.’s bare skin; (2) occurred more than once; and (3) caused physical pain. We agree with defendant that the relative consistency of a child’s out-of-court statements speaks to the reliability of those statements. See Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d at 44 (when a child - 15 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U makes consistent out-of-court statements to two different adults, the content of those statements is deemed more reliable). ¶ 41 Defendant’s argument fails, however, because it is not adequately supported by the record. It is the appellant’s burden to prepare and submit the record to the reviewing court. People v. Hughes, 229 Ill. App. 3d 469, 474 (1992). Any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. As such, in absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial judge understood and properly applied the law. People v. Alduino, 260 Ill. App. 3d 665, 671 (1994). ¶ 42 Defendant’s argument hinges on a comparison between the statements that G.E. made to Berg (as aired at the February 23, 2018, section 115-10 hearing) and those that she made to Gariti (as aired at the April 16, 2018, section 115-10 hearing). Any inconsistencies between the two statements would not have become apparent until the second section 115-10 hearing. However, the transcripts from that hearing are absent from the record. Therefore, we cannot be certain that defendant did not already raise, and the court did not already address, these inconsistencies. Alternatively, it is possible that defendant did not raise this issue below and, therefore, would have forfeited it. We do know, from the court’s written order, that it chose to admit only portions of G.E.’s statements to Gariti. The court, therefore, acted in a discerning manner when deciding to admit the statements, and, in absence of evidence to the contrary, we must presume that it understood the law and made the correct ruling. ¶ 43 In any case, from the record that we do have, we are not troubled by the ruling. The inconsistencies noted by defendant are not so extreme as defendant would have this court believe. First, inconsistencies regarding contact to the skin need not have precluded admission. When Berg asked G.E. clearly and directly whether the contact occurred over clothes or on the skin, G.E. - 16 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U answered “skin.” When Berg asked open-ended, ambiguous questions, such as “did anything happen to your clothes?,” G.E. answered “no.” We understand that Berg was trying to avoid leading questions. Still, it is unlikely that an eight-year-old child would understand the aim of the question. (Also, as we will discuss, G.E. later explained at trial her reason for answering as she did.) Second, inconsistencies regarding frequency need not have precluded admission. While G.E. told Berg that defendant put his penis in her buttocks just once, she did tell him that, on a different day, defendant kissed her buttocks. Thus, G.E. consistently maintained that the abuse was not a one-time occurrence. Third, inconsistencies regarding physical pain need not have precluded admission. G.E. told Berg that the penis-to-buttocks contact did not hurt. Both parties seem to agree that G.E. meant no physical pain. G.E. told Gariti, in contrast, that the contact did hurt. Admittedly, this is a legitimate inconsistency. Still, the court looks only to see whether there are sufficient safeguards of reliability. This inconsistency, weighed against other positive indicia of reliability, was not enough to preclude admission. The court was able to explore the statement at trial, where the question of physical pain most directly informed the anal-penetration charge. The court acquitted defendant of that charge. In sum, in the context of a bench trial, where the trial court merely sought sufficient indicia of reliability for purposes of admission yet ultimately discredited the statement that was most damaging to defendant, we see no sign of error. ¶ 44 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 45 Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The Code defines the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child as follows: “A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that person is 17 years of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, between the sex organ - 17 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U or anus of one person and the part of the body of another for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused, or an act of sexual penetration, and *** the victim is under 13 years of age.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2014). ¶ 46 It is the State’s burden to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must ask if, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact in assessing witness credibility or assigning weight to the evidence. Siguenza- Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 224-25. ¶ 47 Defendant argues that, due to inconsistencies in G.E.’s testimony and out-of-court statements, the State was unable to prove that defendant committed an act of contact, however slight, between his penis and G.E.’s buttocks. Defendant also argues that, even if defendant committed the act of contact, the State failed to prove that the contact was for the purpose of sexual gratification. We address these arguments in turn. ¶ 48 In addition to the inconsistencies addressed in the prior section—skin contact, frequency, and physical pain—defendant also points to G.E.’s trial testimony that defendant touched her breast. Defendant further claims that G.E. is generally unreliable, as demonstrated by her tendency to answer “I don’t know” to basic questions and her admission that she did not tell Berg the truth regarding frequency. ¶ 49 We revisit our earlier discussion on certain inconsistencies, this time in light of G.E.’s trial testimony. As to skin contact, the court reasonably determined that there was skin contact. Again, - 18 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U when asked a direct question, G.E. consistently maintained that defendant touched her on the skin. She later explained at trial that the question, “what happened to your clothes?,” confused her. As to frequency, G.E. explained at trial that she did not tell Berg the whole truth. She did not feel as comfortable speaking with Berg and her father as she felt speaking with her mother. Four years later, she was able to tell Pohlman, another female, that the version of events she told her mother was the truth: defendant touched her more than once. As to whether defendant hurt her, G.E. explained at trial that she meant that defendant hurt her “like sexually wise.” G.E. agreed that defendant did not cause her to bleed or have trouble going to the bathroom. G.E. also stated that defendant did not place his penis in the part of the buttocks that expelled waste, i.e., the anus. The question of physical pain most directly informed the anal-penetration charge, and, as stated, defendant was acquitted of that charge. Finally, as to whether defendant touched G.E. anywhere other than her buttocks, G.E. testified at trial that defendant “kind of touched me by my boob.” (Emphasis added.) Later, during cross-examination, G.E. testified that defendant did not touch her on the front of her body. Admittedly, this is an inconsistency, but not a sharp one. A child might not use the words “intentional” or “incidental,” but a child may testify to facts that support the inference of one type of touch over the other. G.E. repeatedly stated that defendant touched her buttocks, and he pulled down her pants when doing so. There, she described an intentional touch. G.E. once stated that defendant “kind of” touched her “by” her boob. There, she described an incidental touch. G.E. was, arguably, consistent in stating that defendant intentionally touched only her buttocks. ¶ 50 Defendant complains that G.E. is generally unreliable. Indeed, G.E. answered “I don’t know” to basic questions. She also admitted that she did not tell Berg the whole truth. Contrary to defendant’s position, however, and viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the State, this - 19 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U does not make G.E. a liar. G.E. was able to explain certain inconsistencies, and she did provide a consistent account of other key details. G.E. consistently maintained that defendant touched his penis to her bare bottom, that defendant did not talk during the incident, that the incident occurred in defendant’s bedroom at her grandmother’s house, and that M.B. was in the room. The trial court may have reasonably determined that G.E. was, overall, credible. The court acknowledged weaknesses in G.E.’s testimony: “There is no question that there are some issues with *** [G.E.’s testimony].” However, again, the court acquitted defendant of certain charges. G.E. “didn’t think” defendant “did anything else” to her buttocks, and the court acquitted defendant of count IV (mouth-to-buttocks contact). G.E. “didn’t think” defendant placed his penis in the part of her buttocks that expelled waste, and the court acquitted defendant of count II (anal penetration). Nevertheless, after observing G.E.’s demeanor and listening to the whole of her testimony, it believed her fundamental assertion that, on at least one occasion, defendant touched his penis to her bare bottom. “I find beyond a reasonable doubt that [an] incident occurred between the penis of the defendant and the buttocks area of the minor.” We defer to the trial court’s credibility determination. ¶ 51 We next address whether the State proved that defendant acted for the purpose of sexual gratification. That a defendant acted for the purpose of sexual gratification may be inferred from the evidence. In re Matthew K., 355 Ill. App. 3d 652, 655 (2005). When the defendant is an adult, it may be easier to infer that certain types of contact to a person’s private areas were made for the purpose of sexual gratification. Id. ¶ 52 Here, G.E.’s testimony, which a rationale trier of fact could have believed, showed that defendant, a 26-year-old man, initiated an intentional, non-incidental contact between his bare penis and the bare bottom of an eight-year-old child when no other adults were present. There is - 20 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U no proper purpose for such contact. The only reasonable inference was that defendant initiated the contact for the purpose of sexual gratification. As the court stated: “I can’t think of any other reason why an adult male would place his penis on the buttocks of a minor [eight] years old except for his sexual arousal.” ¶ 53 C. Double Jeopardy ¶ 54 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the indictment. Defendant focuses only on the indictment for counts I and III, each of which alleged predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Again, defendant was convicted of both of those counts, and count III merged into count I. The sufficiency of the charging instrument is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d 492, 495 (1994). ¶ 55 Specifically, defendant argues that the indictment did not meet the requirements of section 116-2(c) of the Code, in that it did not bar a future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. Section 116-2(c) provides: “Motion in arrest of judgment. (a) A written motion in arrest of judgment shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State. (b) The court shall grant the motion when: (1) The indictment, information or complaint does not charge an offense, or (2) The court is without jurisdiction of the cause. (c) A motion in arrest of judgment attacking the indictment, information, or complaint on the ground that it does not charge an offense shall be denied if the indictment, information or complaint apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a - 21 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution out of the same conduct.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/116-2 (West 2014)). Defendant concedes that the indictment described the act or acts alleged to have been committed by defendant with sufficient specificity to prepare a defense. Defendant argues, however, that the indictment was insufficient to guarantee that a conviction resulting from said indictment would bar a future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. ¶ 56 Defendant’s argument is unclear. He seems to contend that, because the indictment contained a date range (April 1, 2014, to June 12, 2014), and, because G.E. testified that defendant committed multiple acts during that period, defendant could, in the future, be charged with additional offenses. He also seems to imply that, because the trial court found that the contact happened at least once but did not rule out the possibility that the contact happened more than once, defendant is subject to be re-tried for a charge of penis-to-buttocks contact occurring between April 1, 2014, and June 12, 2014. ¶ 57 We reject these contentions. The State may provide a date range, rather than an exact date, in an indictment for a child sex offense. See, e.g., People v. Albarron, 2018 IL App (1st) 151508, ¶ 22 (five-year range). That the State here provided a date range, and a narrow one at that, is of no import. Also, a defendant may cite to the record in a prior prosecution to protect himself from being placed in double jeopardy. People v. Stephenson, 2016 IL App (1st) 142031, ¶ 23. ¶ 58 Here, were the State to attempt to re-prosecute defendant for acts arising out of the same conduct, he could easily point to the record in the instant case to protect himself from being placed in double jeopardy. The court here acknowledged the possibility that the penis-to-buttocks contact happened more than once. It found, however, that, regardless of whether the contact happened once or more than once, defendant was guilty of at least one act of penis-to-buttocks contact (and - 22 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190285-U was acquitted of any and all acts of anal penetration and mouth-to-buttocks contact) during the stated period. Defendant cannot be re-tried for alleged misconduct arising out of this act, because, as any review of the record would show, his conviction already encompasses any and all such contact occurring during the stated period. ¶ 59 Defendant’s reliance on Hughes, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 474, is misplaced. The defendant in that case was found guilty of obstructing a peace officer. The court determined that the information did not apprise the defendant of the precise offense charged—an oversight that is not at issue in the current case. Id. The court also determined, without much discussion, that it was not clear from the record—which was devoid of transcripts from the trial—whether a conviction based on the information would bar a future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. Id. The instant case does not involve a failure to apprise the defendant of the precise offense charged. Also, the record in the instant case, which does contain the trial transcripts (albeit not the second section 115-10 hearing transcripts), establishes that a conviction based on the indictment would bar a future prosecution. Hughes is simply not analogous to the instant case. ¶ 60 As we have already rejected defendant’s argument, we will not address the State’s point that, should it attempt to charge defendant for acts of sexual misconduct occurring during the stated period, it would have a difficult time meeting joinder requirements. ¶ 61 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 62 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. ¶ 63 Affirmed. - 23 -