Sec. 2. (a) A person engages in conduct "intentionally"
if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do
so.
(b) A person engages in conduct "knowingly" if, when he engages
in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.
(c) A person engages in conduct "recklessly" if he engages in the
conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that
might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from
acceptable standards of conduct.
(d) Unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a
kind of culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is
required with respect to every material element of the prohibited
conduct.
As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.1. Amended by Acts
1977, P.L.340, SEC.4.
Notes of Decisions
Mark Leonard v. State of Indiana, 73 N.E.3d 155 (Ind. 2017).
· cites it 8× “1981) ] we noted that ‘prohibited conduct’ and ‘element’ within Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (d) are not synonymous and if the legislature had intended culpability to apply to every material element, the phrase ‘of the prohibited conduct’ would be superfluous.”
Engelica E. Castillo v. State of Indiana, 974 N.E.2d 458 (Ind. 2012).
· cites it 8× “2d 596, 598 (1979); see also Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (a) ("A person engages in conduct 'intentionally' if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.”
Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 2002).
· cites it 14× “Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (d) requires that the level of mental culpability required for commission of the offense itself is required with respect to every element of the offense.”
Racxon Cruze McDowell v. State of Indiana, 102 N.E.3d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 10× “1999) (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (b) ). To beat someone as severely as Rachel was beaten goes well beyond the realm of acting recklessly, i.”
Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1996).
· cites it 16× “Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(d) (West 1986) (emphasis added).”
Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. 2002).
· cites it 10× “Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b); Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1.”
Jermaine McKinley v. State of Indiana, 45 N.E.3d 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 14× “sexual desires,” defendant acted intentionally, the Court of Appeals and Defendant reason that Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(d) requires “intentional” mental culpability with respect to every element of ’ the child molesting offense.”
Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1998).
· cites it 7× “CODE § 35-41-2-2(a) (1993). In contrast, "reckless indifference to human life," as used in Tison, 481 U.”
Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. 2012).
· cites it 8× “I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). [1] Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.”
State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996).
· cites it 4× “Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (a) (1982). Conduct is “knowing” if the defendant was aware of a high probability that he or she was engaging in the conduct.”
Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 8× “" I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a) (1998). Absent an admission by a defendant, intent "must be determined from a consideration of the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual consequences thereof.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(3a) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a) — 87 cases
Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
“" I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a) (1998). Absent an admission by a defendant, intent "must be determined from a consideration of the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual consequences thereof.”
Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1998).
“CODE § 35-41-2-2(a) (1993). In contrast, "reckless indifference to human life," as used in Tison, 481 U.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) — 166 cases
Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. 2002).
“Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b); Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1.”
Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. 2012).
“I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). [1] Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.”
State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996).
“Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (a) (1982). Conduct is “knowing” if the defendant was aware of a high probability that he or she was engaging in the conduct.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(c) — 78 cases
Racxon Cruze McDowell v. State of Indiana, 102 N.E.3d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
“1999) (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (b) ). To beat someone as severely as Rachel was beaten goes well beyond the realm of acting recklessly, i.”
Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. 2012).
“I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). [1] Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d) — 20 cases
Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1996).
“Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(d) (West 1986) (emphasis added).”
Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 2002).
“Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (d) requires that the level of mental culpability required for commission of the offense itself is required with respect to every element of the offense.”
Jermaine McKinley v. State of Indiana, 45 N.E.3d 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“sexual desires,” defendant acted intentionally, the Court of Appeals and Defendant reason that Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(d) requires “intentional” mental culpability with respect to every element of ’ the child molesting offense.”
Mark Leonard v. State of Indiana, 73 N.E.3d 155 (Ind. 2017).
“1981) ] we noted that ‘prohibited conduct’ and ‘element’ within Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (d) are not synonymous and if the legislature had intended culpability to apply to every material element, the phrase ‘of the prohibited conduct’ would be superfluous.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(e) — 4 cases
Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. 2002).
“Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b); Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1.”
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