Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2

Criminal trespass; denial of entry; denial by posting with purple marks; permission to enter; exceptions

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     Sec. 2. (a) As used in this section, "authorized person" means a person authorized by an agricultural operation or a scientific research facility to act on behalf of the agricultural operation or the scientific research facility.

     (b) A person who:

(1) not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of another person after having been denied entry by the other person, that person's agent, or a law enforcement officer acting on behalf of the other person or that person's agent;

(2) not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other person, that person's agent, or a law enforcement officer acting on behalf of the other person or that person's agent;

(3) accompanies another person in a vehicle, with knowledge that the other person knowingly or intentionally is exerting unauthorized control over the vehicle;

(4) knowingly or intentionally interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the person's consent;

(5) not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally enters the:

(A) property of an agricultural operation that is used for the production, processing, propagation, packaging, cultivation, harvesting, care, management, or storage of an animal, plant, or other agricultural product, including any pasturage or land used for timber management, without the consent of the owner of the agricultural operation or an authorized person; or

(B) dwelling of another person without the person's consent;

(6) knowingly or intentionally:

(A) travels by train without lawful authority or the railroad carrier's consent; and

(B) rides on the outside of a train or inside a passenger car, locomotive, or freight car, including a boxcar, flatbed, or container without lawful authority or the railroad carrier's consent;

(7) not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally enters or refuses to leave the property of another person after having been prohibited from entering or asked to leave the property by a law enforcement officer when the property is:

(A) vacant real property (as defined in IC 36-7-36-5) or a vacant structure (as defined in IC 36-7-36-6); or

(B) designated by a municipality or county enforcement authority to be:

(i) abandoned property or an abandoned structure (as defined in IC 36-7-36-1); or

(ii) an unsafe building or an unsafe premises (as described in IC 36-7-9);

(8) not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of an agricultural operation (as defined in IC 32-30-6-1) without the permission of the owner of the agricultural operation or an authorized person, and knowingly or intentionally engages in conduct that causes property damage to:

(A) the owner of or a person having a contractual interest in the agricultural operation;

(B) the operator of the agricultural operation; or

(C) a person having personal property located on the property of the agricultural operation;

(9) not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of a scientific research facility (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-287) without the permission of, or with permission which was fraudulently obtained from, the owner of the scientific research facility or an authorized person, and knowingly or intentionally engages in conduct that causes property damage to:

(A) the owner of or a person having a contractual interest in the scientific research facility;

(B) the operator of the scientific research facility; or

(C) a person having personal property located on the property of the scientific research facility;

(10) knowingly or intentionally enters the property of another person after being denied entry by a court order that has been issued to the person or issued to the general public by conspicuous posting on or around the premises in areas where a person can observe the order when the property has been designated by a municipality or county enforcement authority to be:

(A) a vacant property;

(B) an abandoned property;

(C) an abandoned structure (as defined in IC 36-7-36-1); or

(D) an unsafe building or an unsafe premises (as described in IC 36-7-9);

(11) knowingly or intentionally enters or refuses to leave the polls (as defined in IC 3-5-2.1-80) or chute (as defined in IC 3-5-2.1-21) after having been prohibited from entering or asked to leave the polls or chute by a precinct election officer (as defined in IC 3-5-2.1-82) or a law enforcement officer acting on behalf of a precinct election officer; or

(12) knowingly or intentionally:

(A) without permission or prior authorization, enters an area of property that is locked; or

(B) refuses to leave an area of a property that is otherwise not accessible to the public, after being asked to leave the area of a property by a law enforcement officer or an employee or agent of the owner or operator of the property;

commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if it is committed on a scientific research facility, on a facility belonging to a public utility (as defined in IC 32-24-1-5.9(a)), on school property, or on a school bus or the person has a prior unrelated conviction for an offense under this section concerning the same property. The offense is a Level 6 felony, for purposes of subdivision (8), if the property damage is more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) and less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). The offense is a Level 5 felony, for purposes of subdivisions (8) and (9), if the property damage is at least fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).

     (c) A person has been denied entry under subsection (b)(1) when the person has been denied entry by means of:

(1) personal communication, oral or written;

(2) posting or exhibiting a notice at the main entrance in a manner that is either prescribed by law or likely to come to the attention of the public;

(3) a hearing authority or court order under IC 32-30-6, IC 32-30-7, IC 32-30-8, IC 36-7-9, or IC 36-7-36; or

(4) posting the property by placing identifying purple marks on trees or posts around the area where entry is denied.

     (d) For the purposes of subsection (c)(4):

(1) each purple mark must be readily visible to any person approaching the property and must be placed:

(A) on a tree:

(i) as a vertical line of at least eight (8) inches in length and with the bottom of the mark at least three (3) feet and not more than five (5) feet from the ground; and

(ii) not more than one hundred (100) feet from the nearest other marked tree; or

(B) on a post:

(i) with the mark covering at least the top two (2) inches of the post, and with the bottom of the mark at least three (3) feet and not more than five (5) feet six (6) inches from the ground; and

(ii) not more than thirty-six (36) feet from the nearest other marked post; and

(2) before a purple mark that would be visible from both sides of a fence shared by different property owners or lessees may be applied, all of the owners or lessees of the properties must agree to post the properties with purple marks under subsection (c)(4).

     (e) A law enforcement officer may not deny entry to property or ask a person to leave a property under subsection (b)(7) unless there is reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring.

     (f) A person described in subsection (b)(7) or (b)(10) violates subsection (b)(7) or (b)(10), as applicable, unless the person has the written permission of the owner, the owner's agent, an enforcement authority, or a court to come onto the property for purposes of performing maintenance, repair, or demolition.

     (g) A person described in subsection (b)(10) violates subsection (b)(10) unless the court that issued the order denying the person entry grants permission for the person to come onto the property.

     (h) Subsections (b), (c), and (g) do not apply to the following:

(1) A passenger on a train.

(2) An employee of a railroad carrier while engaged in the performance of official duties.

(3) A law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency response personnel while engaged in the performance of official duties.

(4) A person going on railroad property in an emergency to rescue a person or animal from harm's way or to remove an object that the person reasonably believes poses an imminent threat to life or limb.

(5) A person on the station grounds or in the depot of a railroad carrier:

(A) as a passenger; or

(B) for the purpose of transacting lawful business.

(6) A:

(A) person; or

(B) person's:

(i) family member;

(ii) invitee;

(iii) employee;

(iv) agent; or

(v) independent contractor;

going on a railroad's right-of-way for the purpose of crossing at a private crossing site approved by the railroad carrier to obtain access to land that the person owns, leases, or operates.

(7) A person having written permission from the railroad carrier to go on specified railroad property.

(8) A representative of the Indiana department of transportation while engaged in the performance of official duties.

(9) A representative of the federal Railroad Administration while engaged in the performance of official duties.

(10) A representative of the National Transportation Safety Board while engaged in the performance of official duties.

As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.3. Amended by Acts 1977, P.L.340, SEC.43; P.L.151-1989, SEC.12; P.L.242-1993, SEC.2; P.L.164-1993, SEC.11; P.L.1-1994, SEC.168; P.L.259-1999, SEC.3; P.L.158-2009, SEC.7; P.L.88-2009, SEC.4; P.L.203-2013, SEC.25; P.L.158-2013, SEC.462; P.L.21-2014, SEC.3; P.L.32-2016, SEC.1; P.L.181-2018, SEC.20; P.L.276-2019, SEC.5; P.L.75-2021, SEC.8; P.L.209-2021, SEC.12; P.L.220-2021, SEC.10; P.L.79-2023, SEC.3; P.L.171-2024, SEC.6; P.L.23-2025, SEC.1; P.L.186-2025, SEC.239.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 196 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: Kevin M. Clark v. State of Indiana
Kevin M. Clark v. State of Indiana (2013) ind · cites it 6× “Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (a)(1), (2) (2008).”
Jones v. State (1982) ind · cites it 13× “Yet, if he enters by `breaking,' as that term has been employed in defining burglary, with the intent to commit a felony therein, he commits a burglary — although not a trespass, because the entry was authorized.”
Paul R. Semenick v. State of Indiana (2012) indctapp · cites it 22× “Deputy Crittendon then moved 1 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 . 2 In light of our disposition for insufficiency of the evidence, we need not address Semenick’s contention that he could not be prosecuted under the Criminal Trespass statute because he was exercising his First Amendment…”
Walter Lyles v. State of Indiana (2012) ind · cites it 33× “In this case, the State charged the defendant with Criminal Trespass for violating Section 35-43-2-2(a)(2), which makes it a crime for a person who, "not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another…”
Thomas W. Oster, II v. State of Indiana (2013) indctapp · cites it 8× “Requiring independent evidence of intent is necessary to maintain the distinction between burglary and other criminal offenses involving property invasion such as criminal trespass, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 , or residential entry, Ind.”
Taylor v. State (2005) indctapp · cites it 10× “not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that person's agent.”
Jeremiah Walls v. State of Indiana (2013) indctapp · cites it 10× “3 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 . 4 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 .”
Glispie v. State (2011) indctapp · cites it 8× “” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (b)(l). Glispie contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he entered Modern’s property after being denied entry by Modern or its agent.”
Drakkar R. Willis v. State of Indiana (2015) ind · cites it 4× “knowingly or intentionally interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the person’s consent ... commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.”
Gordon v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (2013) innd · cites it 12× “5), criminal trespass (Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2(a)), theft (Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2(a)), and conversion (Ind.”
Thomas P. Donovan v. Hoosier Park, LLC d/b/a Hoosier Park, Racing & Casino, Centaur, Inc., Hoosier Park, L.P., Centaur H (2017) indctapp · cites it 6× “” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (a)(l) (2009). A person has been “denied entry” when the person has been notified of the restriction by means of “personal communication, oral or written[.”
Ahmmad Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Incorporated, Steve Lindgren, Larry Williams, City of Gary, Indiana, Nakon Security, I (2006) ca7 · cites it 2× “” Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(2). The defendants assert that it is undisputed that both Lindgren and Officer Williams asked Pourghoraishi to leave, but this simply is not so.”
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(1)(c) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(4) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a) — 10 cases
Jeremiah Walls v. State of Indiana (2013) indctapp “3 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 . 4 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 .”
Olsen v. State (1996) indctapp
Gordon v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (2013) innd “5), criminal trespass (Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2(a)), theft (Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2(a)), and conversion (Ind.”
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(1) — 13 cases
Willis v. State (2002) indctapp
Jeremiah Walls v. State of Indiana (2013) indctapp “3 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 . 4 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 .”
Gordon v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (2013) innd “5), criminal trespass (Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2(a)), theft (Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2(a)), and conversion (Ind.”
Alves v. State (2004) indctapp
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(2) — 11 cases
Paul R. Semenick v. State of Indiana (2012) indctapp “Deputy Crittendon then moved 1 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 . 2 In light of our disposition for insufficiency of the evidence, we need not address Semenick’s contention that he could not be prosecuted under the Criminal Trespass statute because he was exercising his First Amendment…”
Ahmmad Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Incorporated, Steve Lindgren, Larry Williams, City of Gary, Indiana, Nakon Security, I (2006) ca7 “” Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(2). The defendants assert that it is undisputed that both Lindgren and Officer Williams asked Pourghoraishi to leave, but this simply is not so.”
Walter Lyles v. State of Indiana (2012) ind “In this case, the State charged the defendant with Criminal Trespass for violating Section 35-43-2-2(a)(2), which makes it a crime for a person who, "not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another…”
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(4) — 9 cases
Drakkar R. Willis v. State of Indiana (2015) ind “knowingly or intentionally interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the person’s consent ... commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.”
Wright v. State (1995) ind
Jones v. State (1982) ind “Yet, if he enters by `breaking,' as that term has been employed in defining burglary, with the intent to commit a felony therein, he commits a burglary — although not a trespass, because the entry was authorized.”
Walker v. State (1983) ind
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(5) — 9 cases
Goodpaster v. State (1980) ind
Higgins v. State (2003) indctapp
Walter Lyles v. State of Indiana (2012) ind “In this case, the State charged the defendant with Criminal Trespass for violating Section 35-43-2-2(a)(2), which makes it a crime for a person who, "not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another…”
Justice v. State (1988) ind
J.M. v. State (2000) ind
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(d) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(l) — 7 cases
Gordon v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (2013) innd “5), criminal trespass (Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2(a)), theft (Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2(a)), and conversion (Ind.”
Glispie v. State (2011) indctapp “” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (b)(l). Glispie contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he entered Modern’s property after being denied entry by Modern or its agent.”
Maroney v. State (2006) indctapp
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b) — 5 cases
Smithley v. State (1991) indctapp
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1) — 11 cases
Kevin M. Clark v. State of Indiana (2013) ind “Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (a)(1), (2) (2008).”
Travis v. State (2004) indctapp
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2) — 12 cases
Drakkar R. Willis v. State of Indiana (2015) ind “knowingly or intentionally interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the person’s consent ... commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.”
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(4) — 3 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(5)(B) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(c) — 4 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(c)(1) — 3 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(c)(2) — 1 case
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