State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1984). · Go Syfert
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State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
65 citation events (56 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Allen (iowa, 2005-01-07) · Strongest negative: State of Iowa v. Archaletta Latrice Young (iowa, 2015-04-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
examined Overruled State of Iowa v. Archaletta Latrice Young (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Iowa · 2015 · confidence high
See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 687 N.W.2d 263 , 264–65 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam); State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984), overruled by Wilkens, 687 N.W.2d at 265 ; Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d at 10 .
examined Overruled State of Iowa v. Archaletta Latrice Young (6×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Iowa · 2015 · confidence high
See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 687 N.W.2d 263, 264-65 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam); State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984), overruled by Wilkins, 687 N.W.2d at 265 ; Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d at 10 .
examined Overruled Amended July 17, 2015 State of Iowa v. Archaletta Latrice Young (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Iowa · 2015 · confidence high
See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 687 N.W.2d 263 , 264–65 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam); State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984), overruled by Wilkens, 687 N.W.2d at 265 ; Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d at 10 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Allen
Iowa · 2005 · confidence medium
Allen simply pointed the district court to our Cooper decision, where we stated under nearly identical circumstances that “the reasoning of Bal-dosar and our own view of the importance of counsel” precluded enhancement. 343 N.W.2d at 486 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wilkins
Iowa · 2004 · confidence medium
This court accepted the Baldasar plurality opinion in State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984), stating that “the reasoning of Baldasar and our own view of the importance of counsel” dictated that two prior uncounseled convictions could not be used to enhance a theft conviction to theft in the third degree.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Tovar (2×)
Iowa · 2003 · confidence medium
See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585, 1587 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169, 173-74 (1980) (holding a “prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment”), overruled in part by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 749 , 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1928 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 (1994) (holding uncounseled convictions could enhance later offenses provided no incarceration was imposed in the first prosecution); State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984) (holding, where defendant had not been advised of her right to counsel i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Grogan
Iowa · 1986 · confidence medium
We expanded the Scott doctrine somewhat in State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984) by holding that, regardless of whether there is an imposition of a prison sentence, an un-counseled conviction may not, in the absence of a valid waiver, be used to enhance a subsequent criminal violation.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Watchman
N.M. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1984) (lack of reliability of prior uncounseled conviction of indigent defendant prevents enhancement of later sentence); State v. Hamilton, 104 N.M. 614 , 725 P.2d 590 (Ct.App.1986) (sixth amendment to United States Constitution is a jurisdictional barrier to the conviction and sentence of an indigent defendant who is denied representation of counsel); State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635 , 556 P.2d 43 (Ct.App.1976) (statement of defendant not shown to have been voluntarily made cannot be admitted in evidence against accused over his objection).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sargent v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d 528 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Lovell v. State, 678 S.W.2d 318 (Ark. 1984); State v. Priest, 722 P.2d 576 (Kan. 1986); Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Wiggins, 399 So. 2d 206 (La. 1981); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985); see also State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1984) (holding that two prior uncounseled convictions for theft prevented the state from convicting defendant of theft in the third degree); State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364 (Wis. 1982) (holding Baldosar not applicable to a second DUI conviction where the defe…
STATE of Iowa, Appellant,
v.
Venice (NMN) COOPER, Appellee
83-137.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Feb 15, 1984.
343 N.W.2d 485
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Mary Jane Blink, Asst. Atty. Gen., James C. Bauch, County Atty., and Theodore R. Stone, Asst. County Atty., for appellant., Virginia Hollins Davidson, Asst. Public Defender, Waterloo, for appellee.
McGiverin, Larson, Schúltz, Carter, Wolle.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
LARSON, Justice.

Defendant Cooper was accused of theft of property not exceeding fifty dollars in value, a simple misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 714.2(5). Here, however, because of two prior convictions for theft, she was charged under section 714.2(3) (1983) which permits a charge of theft in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor, for theft “by one who has before been twice convicted of theft.” The district court here found that at the time of both prior convictions, Cooper was indigent and not advised of her right to appointed counsel. On both occasions, the court had been advised the state was not seeking a jail sentence and fines were imposed.

In the district court, Cooper moved to dismiss, claiming that because her prior convictions were obtained without the benefit of counsel, the State was not permitted to use them to enhance the new charge. The district court agreed and dismissed the charge. [1] We affirm.

The State concedes that Cooper could not be sentenced to imprisonment where the sentence was based in part, as it would be here under the enhanced charge, on prior uncounseled convictions. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980). In Baldasar, a twenty-nine dollar theft offense was prosecuted as a felony under an enhancement statute because of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor theft conviction.. The Supreme Court overturned the felony judgment and sentence of imprisonment. The State contends, however, that Baldasar serves only to prevent incarceration on the present charge, that it does not void the charge or conviction.

We find that the reasoning of Baldasar and our own view of the importance of counsel preclude an enhanced conviction as well as a sentence of imprisonment. People v. Rocha, — Colo. —, —, 650 P.2d 569, 570 (1982) (prior uncounseled traffic offenses cannot support a charge of habitual traffic offender; motion to suppress evidence of prior convictions granted); State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 903-905 (Minn.1983) (prior conviction for drunk driving obtained on a guilty plea without a valid waiver of counsel cannot convert a subsequent drunk driving offense into a gross misdemeanor under an enhancement statute); People v. Dorn, 105 Misc.2d 244, 431 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1980) (where defendant is not informed of his right to appointed counsel in prior drunk driving conviction, evidence of that conviction suppressed in subsequent enhanced charge proceeding following a second drunk driving arrest); State v. Grenvik, 291 Or. 99, 628 P.2d 1195 (1981) (prior uncounseled drunk driving conviction not permitted to enhance subsequent drunk driving charge; remanded for retrial on unenhanced charge). The lack of reliability in an uncounseled conviction that prevents the imposition of incarceration also prevents the enhancement of the charge. The penal consequences of an enhanced conviction include more than the sentencing option of imprisonment; fines, possibly even more enhanced charges, social stigma, potential loss of a job, and decreased employment prospects also result.

Further, if the State’s reading of Balda-sar was correct, that case should have been remanded for resentencing only. See People v. Allen, 118 Mich.App. 537, 546, 325 N.W.2d 485, 489 (1982).

AFFIRMED.

1

. While the grounds urged for dismissal are not among those provided by Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(6) the state has raised no objection on that basis, and we treat the issue as one tried by consent.