K.S.A. » Chapter 21
Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 21-5427 (2026)

Stalking

✓ current as of May 2026
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21-5427. Stalking. (a) Stalking is:

(1) Recklessly engaging in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person in the circumstances of the targeted person to fear for such person's safety, or the safety of a member of such person's immediate family and the targeted person is actually placed in such fear;

(2) engaging in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person with knowledge that the course of conduct will place the targeted person in fear for such person's safety or the safety of a member of such person's immediate family;

(3) after being served with, or otherwise provided notice of, any protective order included in K.S.A. 21-3843, prior to its repeal or K.S.A. 21-5924, and amendments thereto, that prohibits contact with a targeted person, recklessly engaging in at least one act listed in subsection (f)(1) that violates the provisions of the order and would cause a reasonable person to fear for such person's safety, or the safety of a member of such person's immediate family and the targeted person is actually placed in such fear; or

(4) intentionally engaging in a course of conduct targeted at a specific child under the age of 14 that would cause a reasonable person in the circumstances of the targeted child, or a reasonable person in the circumstances of an immediate family member of such child, to fear for such child's safety.

(b) Stalking as defined in:

(1) Subsection (a)(1) is a:

(A) Class A person misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (b)(1)(B); and

(B) severity level 7, person felony upon a second or subsequent conviction;

(2) subsection (a)(2) is a:

(A) Class A person misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (b)(2)(B); and

(B) severity level 5, person felony upon a second or subsequent conviction;

(3) subsection (a)(3) is a:

(A) Severity level 9, person felony, except as provided in subsection (b)(3)(B); and

(B) severity level 5, person felony, upon a second or subsequent conviction; and

(4) subsection (a)(4) is a:

(A) Severity level 7, person felony, except as provided in subsection (b)(4)(B); and

(B) severity level 4, person felony, upon a second or subsequent conviction.

(c) For the purposes of this section, a person served with a protective order as defined by K.S.A. 21-3843, prior to its repeal or K.S.A. 21-5924, and amendments thereto, or a person who engaged in acts which would constitute stalking, after having been advised by a law enforcement officer, that such person's actions were in violation of this section, shall be presumed to have acted knowingly as to any like future act targeted at the specific person or persons named in the order or as advised by the officer.

(d) In a criminal proceeding under this section, a person claiming an exemption, exception or exclusion has the burden of going forward with evidence of the claim.

(e) The present incarceration of a person alleged to be violating this section shall not be a bar to prosecution under this section.

(f) As used in this section:

(1) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts over a period of time, however short, which evidence a continuity of purpose. A course of conduct shall not include constitutionally protected activity nor conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person. A course of conduct shall include, but not be limited to, any of the following acts or a combination thereof:

(A) Threatening the safety of the targeted person or a member of such person's immediate family;

(B) following, approaching or confronting the targeted person or a member of such person's immediate family;

(C) appearing in close proximity to, or entering the targeted person's residence, place of employment, school or other place where such person can be found, or the residence, place of employment or school of a member of such person's immediate family;

(D) causing damage to the targeted person's residence or property or that of a member of such person's immediate family;

(E) placing an object on the targeted person's property or the property of a member of such person's immediate family, either directly or through a third person;

(F) causing injury to the targeted person's pet or a pet belonging to a member of such person's immediate family;

(G) utilizing any electronic tracking system or acquiring tracking information to determine the targeted person's location, movement or travel patterns; and

(H) any act of communication;

(2) "communication" means to impart a message by any method of transmission, including, but not limited to: Telephoning, personally delivering, sending or having delivered, any information or material by written or printed note or letter, package, mail, courier service or electronic transmission, including electronic transmissions generated or communicated via a computer;

(3) "computer" means a programmable, electronic device capable of accepting and processing data;

(4) "conviction" includes being convicted of a violation of K.S.A. 21-3438, prior to its repeal, this section or a law of another state which prohibits the acts that this section prohibits; and

(5) "immediate family" means:

(A) Father, mother, stepparent, child, stepchild, sibling, spouse or grandparent of the targeted person;

(B) any person residing in the household of the targeted person; or

(C) any person involved in an intimate relationship with the targeted person.

History: L. 2010, ch. 136, § 62; L. 2011, ch. 30, § 27; L. 2021, ch. 48, § 1; L. 2023, ch. 78, § 1; July 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 22 cases (15 in the last 5 years), 2016–2026 · leading case: State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). · cites it 14× “For the first time on appeal, Chavez asserted that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 is internally inconsistent because subsection (a)(3) requires proof of reckless conduct while subsection (c) creates a presumption the defendant's conduct was knowing.”
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 139× “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Sinzogan, 388 P.3d 176 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 3× “” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5427(a)(3). Proving stalking pursuant to K.”
State v. Lyon, 471 P.3d 716 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020). “" K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5427(3) indicates ".”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 137× “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. White, 384 P.3d 13 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). “21-6206(a)(1) (B) and (C), and one count of stalking in violation of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5427(a)(2). At trial, White testified the comments he made were because the former county attorney was representing his ex-wife and he could not get law enforcement to help him.”
State v. Smith, 452 P.3d 382 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). “Harassment is defined as "a knowing and intentional course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”
State v. Robinson (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 17× “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 contains a nonexhaustive list of actions that may form a course of conduct and thus give rise to a stalking conviction.”
State v. Zendle (Kan. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 6× “Accepting Zendle's reading of the statute would impermissibly render "following" vestigial and substantially curtail the intended legislative scope of the protections to be afforded against stalking.”
Smith v. Lawrence, Kansas, City of (D. Kan. 2020). · cites it 4× “, K.S.A. § 21-5427). Plaintiff’s attempt to conflate these separate charges complicated resolution of this motion and demonstrates a fundamental misapprehension regarding the offense with which she was charged.”
State v. Toliver (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 3× “Under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5427(a)(3): "(a) Stalking is: .”
State v. Fitzgerald (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 3× “Fitzgerald entered a plea agreement under which the State agreed to dismiss several charges if he pleaded guilty to the following: • 19 CR 3411: o Stalking (2 counts), K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), Class A Person Misdemeanors; o Harassment by Telecommunication…”
Show all 22 citing cases →
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(3) — 1 case
State v. Lyon, 471 P.3d 716 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020). “" K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5427(3) indicates ".”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(a)(1) — 7 cases
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Zendle (Kan. Ct. App. 2023). “Accepting Zendle's reading of the statute would impermissibly render "following" vestigial and substantially curtail the intended legislative scope of the protections to be afforded against stalking.”
State v. Fitzgerald (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “Fitzgerald entered a plea agreement under which the State agreed to dismiss several charges if he pleaded guilty to the following: • 19 CR 3411: o Stalking (2 counts), K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), Class A Person Misdemeanors; o Harassment by Telecommunication…”
State v. Alexander (Kan. Ct. App. 2024).
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(a)(2) — 2 cases
State v. White, 384 P.3d 13 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). “21-6206(a)(1) (B) and (C), and one count of stalking in violation of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5427(a)(2). At trial, White testified the comments he made were because the former county attorney was representing his ex-wife and he could not get law enforcement to help him.”
State v. Robinson (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 contains a nonexhaustive list of actions that may form a course of conduct and thus give rise to a stalking conviction.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(a)(3) — 10 cases
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). “For the first time on appeal, Chavez asserted that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 is internally inconsistent because subsection (a)(3) requires proof of reckless conduct while subsection (c) creates a presumption the defendant's conduct was knowing.”
State v. Sinzogan, 388 P.3d 176 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). “” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5427(a)(3). Proving stalking pursuant to K.”
State v. Fitzgerald (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “Fitzgerald entered a plea agreement under which the State agreed to dismiss several charges if he pleaded guilty to the following: • 19 CR 3411: o Stalking (2 counts), K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), Class A Person Misdemeanors; o Harassment by Telecommunication…”
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Collins (Kan. Ct. App. 2024).
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(a)(3)(A) — 1 case
State v. Kerns (Kan. Ct. App. 2024).
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(b)(1) — 1 case
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). “For the first time on appeal, Chavez asserted that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 is internally inconsistent because subsection (a)(3) requires proof of reckless conduct while subsection (c) creates a presumption the defendant's conduct was knowing.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(b)(1)(A) — 2 cases
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(b)(3) — 1 case
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). “For the first time on appeal, Chavez asserted that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 is internally inconsistent because subsection (a)(3) requires proof of reckless conduct while subsection (c) creates a presumption the defendant's conduct was knowing.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(b)(3)(A) — 1 case
State v. Young (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(b)(4)(A) — 2 cases
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(c) — 2 cases
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). “For the first time on appeal, Chavez asserted that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 is internally inconsistent because subsection (a)(3) requires proof of reckless conduct while subsection (c) creates a presumption the defendant's conduct was knowing.”
State v. Toliver (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). “Under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5427(a)(3): "(a) Stalking is: .”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(f) — 1 case
State v. Pennington (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(f)(1) — 5 cases
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). “For the first time on appeal, Chavez asserted that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 is internally inconsistent because subsection (a)(3) requires proof of reckless conduct while subsection (c) creates a presumption the defendant's conduct was knowing.”
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Robinson (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 contains a nonexhaustive list of actions that may form a course of conduct and thus give rise to a stalking conviction.”
State v. Zendle (Kan. Ct. App. 2023). “Accepting Zendle's reading of the statute would impermissibly render "following" vestigial and substantially curtail the intended legislative scope of the protections to be afforded against stalking.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(f)(1)(A) — 2 cases
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(f)(1)(B) — 3 cases
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). “For the first time on appeal, Chavez asserted that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 is internally inconsistent because subsection (a)(3) requires proof of reckless conduct while subsection (c) creates a presumption the defendant's conduct was knowing.”
State v. Robinson (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5427 contains a nonexhaustive list of actions that may form a course of conduct and thus give rise to a stalking conviction.”
State v. Zendle (Kan. Ct. App. 2023). “Accepting Zendle's reading of the statute would impermissibly render "following" vestigial and substantially curtail the intended legislative scope of the protections to be afforded against stalking.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(f)(1)(C) — 3 cases
State v. Toliver (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). “Under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5427(a)(3): "(a) Stalking is: .”
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(f)(1)(G) — 2 cases
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
— K.S.A. § 21-5427(f)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Loganbill (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
State v. Loganbill, 518 P.3d 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). “His suggested statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5427 is not supported by the clear text of this statute.”
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