44-501b.
Legislative intent; employer obligation, burden of proof; liability.
(a) It is the intent of the legislature that the workers compensation act shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees within the provisions of the act. The provisions of the workers compensation act shall be applied impartially to both employers and employees in cases arising thereunder.
(b) If in any employment to which the workers compensation act applies, an employee suffers personal injury by accident, repetitive trauma or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment, the employer shall be liable to pay compensation to the employee in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the workers compensation act.
(c) The burden of proof shall be on the claimant to establish the claimant's right to an award of compensation and to prove the various conditions on which the claimant's right depends. In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this burden of proof, the trier of fact shall consider the whole record.
(d) Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no employer, or other employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury, whether by accident, repetitive trauma, or occupational disease, for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act nor shall an employer be liable to any third party for any injury or death of an employee which was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against a third party and for which workers compensation is payable by such employer.
History:
L. 2011, ch. 55, § 1; May 15.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Plaintiff's tort action was barred under the Kansas workers compensation act exclusive remedy provisions because defendant was plaintiff's statutory employer and plaintiff was already receiving workers' compensation benefits from his direct employer. Stottlemyre v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., 107 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1190 (D. Kan. 2015).
2. The dual capacity doctrine, a judicially recognized exception to the exclusive remedy provision, does not apply when the employee is injured by a machine manufactured by the employer. Jefferies v. United Rotary Brush Corp., 62 Kan. App. 2d 354, 515 P.3d 743 (2022).
Est. of Graber v. Dillon Companies, 439 P.3d 291 (Kan. 2019). · cites it 4דK.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-501b(b). In 2011 the Legislature excluded from the events eligible for benefits an accident or injury that "arose either directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes .”
Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc., 506 P.3d 267 (Kan. 2022). “44-532a(a) and (b), read together, grant the Fund a cause of action to recoup amounts paid only against the "employer" that either lacked adequate workers compensation insurance or was otherwise unable to pay benefits to an injured worker under the KWCA—in this case, Ballin.”
Graber v. Dillon Companies, 377 P.3d 1183 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2דK.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-501b. Appellate courts do not owe deference to the ALJ s or the Boards interpretation of the given statute.”
Endres v. Young – Hill, 419 P.3d 40 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2דInstead, it relied entirely upon the holding in Scott. Moving on, we note that the Plaintiffs also contend that their claim did not "arise out of employment" as that phrase is defined in the Act.”
Pardo v. United Parcel Serv., 422 P.3d 1185 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 3ד44-510d(b)(23)'s requirement that the Sixth Edition be used to calculate his award and K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 44-501b(d)'s exclusive remedy mandate violate § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Long v. Houser, 456 P.3d 549 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020). “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-501b(b). But certain injuries are excluded from coverage.”
Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc., 493 P.3d 958 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). “K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 44-501b(a). See Fernandez v.”
Jefferies v. United Rotary Brush Corp., 515 P.3d 743 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 3ד3d 236 (2021) (referencing K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 44-501b[d], providing, "if an injured worker could have recovered compensation for an injury under the Act, the worker cannot bring an action against the employer or another employee for damages based on common-law negligence");…”
Bragg v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc. (D. Kan. 2021). · cites it 6ד” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Response To Defendant, Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc.’s Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #26) at 18–19.”
Gray v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (D. Kan. 2025). · cites it 6דSee K.S.A. § 44-501b(d). III. ANALYSIS The KWCA contains an exclusive-remedy provision.”
Antonio Ramirez v. Garay's Roofing, LLC, 444 P.3d 1018 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). “The Fund notes that Pat was directly involved in construction work and Pat testified that construction was a part of Kelly's business.”
Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc., 506 P.3d 267 (Kan. 2022). “44-532a(a) and (b), read together, grant the Fund a cause of action to recoup amounts paid only against the "employer" that either lacked adequate workers compensation insurance or was otherwise unable to pay benefits to an injured worker under the KWCA—in this case, Ballin.”
Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc., 493 P.3d 958 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021). “K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 44-501b(a). See Fernandez v.”
Est. of Graber v. Dillon Companies, 439 P.3d 291 (Kan. 2019). “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-501b(b). In 2011 the Legislature excluded from the events eligible for benefits an accident or injury that "arose either directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes .”
Endres v. Young – Hill, 419 P.3d 40 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). “Instead, it relied entirely upon the holding in Scott. Moving on, we note that the Plaintiffs also contend that their claim did not "arise out of employment" as that phrase is defined in the Act.”
Long v. Houser, 456 P.3d 549 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020). “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-501b(b). But certain injuries are excluded from coverage.”
Est. of Graber v. Dillon Companies, 439 P.3d 291 (Kan. 2019). “K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-501b(b). In 2011 the Legislature excluded from the events eligible for benefits an accident or injury that "arose either directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes .”
Antonio Ramirez v. Garay's Roofing, LLC, 444 P.3d 1018 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). “The Fund notes that Pat was directly involved in construction work and Pat testified that construction was a part of Kelly's business.”
Pardo v. United Parcel Serv., 422 P.3d 1185 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). “44-510d(b)(23)'s requirement that the Sixth Edition be used to calculate his award and K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 44-501b(d)'s exclusive remedy mandate violate § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Endres v. Young – Hill, 419 P.3d 40 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). “Instead, it relied entirely upon the holding in Scott. Moving on, we note that the Plaintiffs also contend that their claim did not "arise out of employment" as that phrase is defined in the Act.”
Bragg v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc. (D. Kan. 2021). “” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Response To Defendant, Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc.’s Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #26) at 18–19.”
Gray v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (D. Kan. 2025). “See K.S.A. § 44-501b(d). III. ANALYSIS The KWCA contains an exclusive-remedy provision.”
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