History:
L. 1965, ch. 348, § 2; L. 1976, ch. 243, § 2; L. 1976, ch. 242, § 69; L. 1977, ch. 199, § 1; L. 1978, ch. 223, § 1; L. 1982, ch. 238, § 1; L. 1986, ch. 211, § 2; L. 1988, ch. 202, § 1; L. 1990, ch. 92, § 17; L. 1993, ch. 225, § 3; Repealed, L. 1996, ch. 167, § 65; April 18.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. In reviewing involuntary commitment proceeding, there must be a reasonable inference the patient is mentally impaired and is presently dangerous to himself, herself or others. In re Gatson, 3 Kan. App. 2d 265, 266, 268, 269, 593 P.2d 423.
2. Cited; duties of police officer discussed; immunity for performance of general public duties. Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 113, 121, 643 P.2d 129 (1982).
3. Duty owed to patient and public by superintendent of state hospital and physicians employed; liability for release of dangerous patient. Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. 484, 491, 673 P.2d 86 (1983).
4. Liability of state hospital and physicians shown in wrongful death action where discharged patient known to be dangerous. Durflinger v. Artiles, 563 F. Supp. 322, 324.
5. Veterans hospital's lack of duty to prevent release of voluntary psychiatric patient with known violent tendencies examined. Hokansen v. U.S., 868 F.2d 372, 376 (10th Cir. 1989).
6. No constitutional requirement that proposed patient be in imminent or present danger or has recently committed overt serious act. In re Treatment of Albright, 17 Kan. App. 2d 135, 136, 836 P.2d 1 (1992).
7. Noted in opinion holding current statutes (K.S.A. 22-3428 et seq.) regarding continued commitment of insanity acquittee unconstitutional; court engrafts new requirements. In re Application of Noel for Discharge Hearing, 17 Kan. App. 2d 303, 310, 838 P.2d 336 (1992).
8. Cause of action for negligent release of mental patient by physician does not apply to voluntary patients. Boulanger v. Pol, 258 Kan. 289, 298, 900 P.2d 823 (1995).
9. Sexually violent predator act held unconstitutional violation of substantive due process. In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246, 261, 912 P.2d 129 (1996).
10. Provision in K.S.A. 59-2946 excluding persons suffering from organic mental disorder from being involuntarily committed held not unconstitutionally vague. In re Vanderblomen, 264 Kan. 676, 680, 956 P.2d 1320 (1998).
11. Inability to care for oneself by not eating and attempting to walk to California evidence person might be a danger to oneself. Hesler v. Osawatomie State Hospital, 620 Kan. 616, 620, 971 P.2d 1169 (1999).
12. Principles of res judicata discussed and applied in second commitment proceeding. In re Care & Treatment of Sporn, 289 Kan. 681, 215 P.3d 615 (2009).
13. Secretary of SRS cannot legally comply with order pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3303(1) and 59-2945 et seq. if incompetency is due to traumatic brain injury. State v. Johnson, 289 Kan. 870, 218 P.3d 46 (2009).
Boulanger v. Pol (1995) kan · cites it 6דIn finding that a cause of action for negligent release of an involuntary patient would be recognized, the court in Durflinger relied primarily on K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902, which provided: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired,…”
Kansas v. Crane (2002) scotus“” Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-2902 (h) (1994).) We granted the State of Kansas’s petition for certiorari.”
In re the Care & Treatment of Hendricks (1996) kan · cites it 4דMental illness is defined in K.S.A. 59-2902(h) as meaning any person who: “(1) [i]s suffering from a severe mental disorder to the extent that such person is in need of treatment; (2) lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment; and (3) is likely to cause…”
Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) scotus“" Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2902 (h) (1994). The statute does not tell us why it imposes this requirement.”
In Re Application of Noel for Discharge Hearing (1992) kanctapp · cites it 8ד22-3428a and amendments thereto, `likely to cause harm to self or others' has the meaning provided by K.S.A. 59-2902 and amendments thereto." K.”
Hesler v. Osawatomie State Hospital (1999) kan · cites it 4ד2d 823 (1995), and K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902, the involuntary commitment statute applicable in Durflinger , are authoritative.”
In Re the Treatment of Gatson (1979) kanctapp · cites it 6דK.S.A. 1977 Supp. 59-2902 provides: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired to the extent that such person .”
Durflinger v. Artiles (1983) kan“The statute in effect at the time of the commitment defining “mentally ill person” was K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902 which provided, in pertinent part: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally *492 impaired, except by reason of mental deficiency…”
In Re Jones (1980) kan · cites it 2דBy contrast, for civil involuntary commitment purposes, a mentally ill person is defined by K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 59-2902(1) as follows: "(1) The term `mentally ill person' shall mean any person who is mentally impaired to the extent that such person is in need of treatment and who…”
People v. Stevens (1988) colo · cites it 2ד18, § 7101(17) (1987). The Kansas legislature amended its civil commitment statute in 1987 to require proof that the person sought to be committed is “likely” to be dangerous to self or others.”
State v. Johnson (2009) kan“, only contained a definition for “mentally ill person,” which was found in K.S.A. 59-2902(h). See In re Vanderblomen, 264 Kan.”
Hendrix Ex Rel. Smith v. City of Topeka (1982) kan“A mentally ill person is defined by K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 59-2902 as follows in relevant part: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired to the extent that such person is in need of treatment and who is dangerous to himself or herself or…”
In Re the Treatment of Gatson (1979) kanctapp“K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 59-2902 provides: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired to the extent that such person .”
In Re Jones (1980) kan“By contrast, for civil involuntary commitment purposes, a mentally ill person is defined by K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 59-2902(1) as follows: "(1) The term `mentally ill person' shall mean any person who is mentally impaired to the extent that such person is in need of treatment and who…”
Boulanger v. Pol (1995) kan“In finding that a cause of action for negligent release of an involuntary patient would be recognized, the court in Durflinger relied primarily on K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902, which provided: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired,…”
— K.S.A. § 59-2902(g) — 2 cases
In Re Application of Noel for Discharge Hearing (1992) kanctapp“22-3428a and amendments thereto, `likely to cause harm to self or others' has the meaning provided by K.S.A. 59-2902 and amendments thereto." K.”
People v. Stevens (1988) colo“18, § 7101(17) (1987). The Kansas legislature amended its civil commitment statute in 1987 to require proof that the person sought to be committed is “likely” to be dangerous to self or others.”
— K.S.A. § 59-2902(g)(2) — 1 case
Hesler v. Osawatomie State Hospital (1999) kan“2d 823 (1995), and K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902, the involuntary commitment statute applicable in Durflinger , are authoritative.”
— K.S.A. § 59-2902(h) — 5 cases
In re the Care & Treatment of Hendricks (1996) kan“Mental illness is defined in K.S.A. 59-2902(h) as meaning any person who: “(1) [i]s suffering from a severe mental disorder to the extent that such person is in need of treatment; (2) lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment; and (3) is likely to cause…”
State v. Johnson (2009) kan“, only contained a definition for “mentally ill person,” which was found in K.S.A. 59-2902(h). See In re Vanderblomen, 264 Kan.”
Boulanger v. Pol (1995) kan“In finding that a cause of action for negligent release of an involuntary patient would be recognized, the court in Durflinger relied primarily on K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902, which provided: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired,…”
Boulanger v. Pol (1995) kan“In finding that a cause of action for negligent release of an involuntary patient would be recognized, the court in Durflinger relied primarily on K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902, which provided: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired,…”
Boulanger v. Pol (1995) kan“In finding that a cause of action for negligent release of an involuntary patient would be recognized, the court in Durflinger relied primarily on K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2902, which provided: “(1) The term ‘mentally ill person’ shall mean any person who is mentally impaired,…”
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