8-1506.
Authorized emergency vehicles; rights, duties and liability of drivers thereof.
(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.
(b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this article;
(2) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(3) exceed the maximum speed limits so long as such driver does not endanger life or property;
(4) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions; and
(5) proceed through toll booths on roads or bridges without stopping for payment of tolls, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation and the picking up or returning of toll cards.
(c) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1738 and visual signals meeting the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1720, except that an authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle.
(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others.
History:
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 8-1506; L. 1977, ch. 43, § 1; July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
21
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1979–2024 · leading case:
Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983).
Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983).
· cites it 60× “The district court found Officer Shore operated his vehicle in compliance with K.S.A. 8-1506 and, accordingly, was immune from liability pursuant to K.”
Robbins v. City of Wichita, 172 P.3d 1187 (Kan. 2007).
· cites it 22× “First, the Thornton decision does not adequately address K.S.A. 8-1506. Second, the Thornton decision is no longer in accord with the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue.”
Montgomery v. Saleh, 419 P.3d 8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 45× “K.S.A. 8-1506 excuses drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from following traffic laws under certain conditions.”
Rhoten v. Dickson, 223 P.3d 786 (Kan. 2010).
· cites it 12× “” The negligence per se theory was brought under K.S.A. 8-1506, stating “defendants engaged in a violation of K.”
Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 680 P.2d 877 (Kan. 1984).
· cites it 9× “Their drivers were therefore subject to K.S.A. 8-1506 which provides: “(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not upon returning from…”
Peak v. Ratliff, 408 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1991).
· cites it 4× “Syllabus Point 6 of Thornton states: “The privileges granted by K.S.A. 8-1506 do not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and does not protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for…”
DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986).
· cites it 2× “The court stated: "We conclude the `due care' requirement of K.S.A. 8-1506(d) applies only to the police officer's physical operation of his own vehicle and not to the decision to chase or continue to chase a law violator.”
City of Caddo Valley v. George, 9 S.W.3d 481 (Ark. 2000).
· cites it 2× “Here, the trial court found sufficient evidence of the officers' negligence to place that issue before the jury. In addition, the Kansas statute provides that the emergency vehicle privilege does not relieve the driver of the duty to "drive with due regard for the safety of all…”
State v. Anderson, 12 P.3d 883 (Kan. 2000).
· cites it 3× “21-3405, for his failure to comply with K.S.A. 8-1506, which provides that the driver *71 of an authorized emergency vehicle may proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign when in pursuit of a violator of the law, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe…”
Clark v. Thomas, 505 F. Supp. 2d 884 (D. Kan. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Accordingly, the discretionary function exception does not apply in this case, and defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs state-law tort claims.”
State v. Simpson, 732 P.2d 788 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 11× “Simpson conceded at trial that a driver of an ordinary car would be guilty of reckless driving and passing in a no-passing zone.”
— K.S.A. § 8-1506(a) — 2 cases
Montgomery v. Saleh, 419 P.3d 8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
“K.S.A. 8-1506 excuses drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from following traffic laws under certain conditions.”
State v. Simpson, 732 P.2d 788 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
“Simpson conceded at trial that a driver of an ordinary car would be guilty of reckless driving and passing in a no-passing zone.”
— K.S.A. § 8-1506(b)(2) — 1 case
— K.S.A. § 8-1506(c) — 2 cases
Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983).
“The district court found Officer Shore operated his vehicle in compliance with K.S.A. 8-1506 and, accordingly, was immune from liability pursuant to K.”
— K.S.A. § 8-1506(d) — 11 cases
Montgomery v. Saleh, 419 P.3d 8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
“K.S.A. 8-1506 excuses drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from following traffic laws under certain conditions.”
Robbins v. City of Wichita, 172 P.3d 1187 (Kan. 2007).
“First, the Thornton decision does not adequately address K.S.A. 8-1506. Second, the Thornton decision is no longer in accord with the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue.”
Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983).
“The district court found Officer Shore operated his vehicle in compliance with K.S.A. 8-1506 and, accordingly, was immune from liability pursuant to K.”
DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986).
“The court stated: "We conclude the `due care' requirement of K.S.A. 8-1506(d) applies only to the police officer's physical operation of his own vehicle and not to the decision to chase or continue to chase a law violator.”
Peak v. Ratliff, 408 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1991).
“Syllabus Point 6 of Thornton states: “The privileges granted by K.S.A. 8-1506 do not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and does not protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for…”
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