Roehrig v. City of Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). · Go Syfert
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Roehrig v. City of Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“he law is well settled that limitations against a claim for contribution on a tort liability start running not from the time of the commission of the tort, but from the time of the right of action for contribution accrues (ordinarily by payment).”
21 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Heinemann v. Hallum (ark, 2006-03-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Heinemann v. Hallum
Ark. · 2006 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he law is well settled that limitations against a claim for contribution on a tort liability start running not from the time of the commission of the tort, but from the time of the right of action for contribution accrues (ordinarily by payment).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alaska General Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell
Alaska · 2000 · confidence medium
See, eg., Goldsberry v. Frank Clendaniel, Inc., 109 A.2d 405, 408 (Del.Super.1954) (legislature would not create right to contribution and then. place it in power of the original plaintiff to decide whether it could be exercised); Roehrig v. City of Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Ky.1970) (reason statute of limitations does not run from time of tort injury is so imjured party cannot foreclose right to contribution by suing just before statute expires). 26 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States
3rd Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Southeastern Maritime Co., 620 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam); Roehrig v. City of Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky.1970); W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McGrath v. STANLEY CARVER
Mass. · 1986 · confidence medium
Dep’t of Transp. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 763 (1980); Stephens v. McBride, 97 Ill. 2d 515, 520 (1983); Roehrig v. Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1970); White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 371 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 , 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977); Perello v. Woods, 197 N.J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Olsen Ex Rel. Olsen v. Jones (2×)
Iowa · 1973 · confidence medium
To that array wc now add Roehrig v. City of Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky.App.1970) and Cotham v. Board of County Commissioners, 260 Md. 556 , 273 A.2d 115, 117, 121 (Md.1971); and, of course, there is Michigan, whose reversal of position has already been discussed.
discussed Cited "see" Hubbard v. Chidel
D.C. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Roehrig v. City of Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky.1970) and commenting that: (''[F]ailure of notice did not bar a claim of contribution ... because the claim normally would not accrue within the time allowed for giving notice.”) (citation omitted). 14 .D.C.Code § 12-309 (1995) provides, in relevant part: An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Colum…
discussed Cited "see" Group Health Ass'n v. District of Columbia General Hospital (2×)
D.C. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
In Keleket X-Ray Corp. v. United States, 107 U.S. App.D.C. 138, 140, 275 F.2d 167, 169 (1960), the court held that "Kelek-et’s claim to contribution [under the Federal Tort Claims Act] did not accrue before Keleket had been sued by Slater [the original plaintiff].” Keleket, however, involved a statute of limitations, not a notice statute, and is therefore not dispositive of the notice question (though it may be persuasive; see Roehrig, supra, 454 S.W.2d at 704 ). 7 .Judge Wolf relied on an unpublished opinion by another judge in tin earlier case, Rendelman v. American University, Civil Act…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Prince George's County v. Longtin (2×)
Md. · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Roehrig v. Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Ky.Ct.App.1970) (notice period for contribution claim begins when statute of limitations for such a claim would); Bryant v. City of Lafayette, 946 P.2d 499 (Colo.Ct.App.1997) (like a statute of limitations, tort claims notice period for automobile accident was tolled by “discovery rule” during plaintiffs prolonged period of unconsciousness); C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist.
Jane Ann ROEHRIG, Executrix of the Estate of Urban J. Steinbock, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOUISVILLE, Appellee
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976).
May 22, 1970.
454 S.W.2d 703
William Mellor, Louisville, for appellant., Eugene H. Alvey, Director of Law, Louisville, Wm. A. Stephenson, Asst. Director of Law of City of Louisville, Louisville, for appellee.
Cullen, Neikirk.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
CULLEN, Commissioner.

On October 25, 1967, an automobile being operated by Urban J. Steinbock hit a tree which stood at or near the edge of a road in a city park in Louisville. Stein-bock died about one month later. On October 1, 1968, his widow, who was a passenger in the automobile at the time of the accident, brought suit against Jane Ann Roehrig, executrix of his will, seeking damages for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained by Mrs. Steinbock in the accident. The executrix filed a third-party complaint against the City of Louisville, seeking contribution on any recovery against the executrix, on the theory that the city negligently had maintained the tree on or near the road. The city moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that any liability on its part was barred by reason of the fact that notice of claim of injury had not been given to the city within 90 days of the accident, as required by KRS 411.110. The circuit court sustained the motion and entered a judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, the judgment being made final and appeal-[*704] able by compliance with CR 54.02. The executrix has appealed.

The only question on the appeal is whether the giving (by someone) of the notice provided for in KRS 411.110 is a condition precedent to the making of a claim for contribution against a city on a liability for damages for injuries growing out of a defect in a public street, etc.

As concerns the application of statutes of limitation, the law is well settled that limitations against a claim for conribution on a tort liability start running not from the time of the'commission of the tort, but from the time the right of action for contribution accrues (ordinarily by payment). See Annotation, 20 A.L.R.2d 925; and Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16. The reason for the rule is that otherwise the injured party could foreclose a tortfeasor’s right to contribution by waiting to bring his action until just before the statute of limitations ran on his claim. The tort-feasor would be helpless to save his right of contribution. (It is true, as we held in Parker v. Redden, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 586, that a declaration or adjudication of liability for contribution can be made before the right to recover contribution has fully matured through payment, but obviously a proceeding for an adjudication of the right to contribution could not be brought before the injured party himself had asserted any claim.)

While the notice statute here in question is not a statute of limitations, see Galloway v. City of Winchester, 299 Ky. 87, 184 S.W.2d 890, we think the controlling consideration should be the same; that is, the extent to which the tortfeasor has any control over whether the statute is complied with. If he has no effective control, in that he cannot by his own act give the required notice, and cannot compel the injured party to give notice, then the fact that the statutory notice was not given should not bar the claim for contribution. The statute, KRS 411.110, is as follows:

“No action shall be maintained against any city in this state because of any injury growing out of any defect in the condition of any bridge, street, sidewalk, alley or other public thoroughfare, unless notice has been given to the mayor, city clerk or clerk of the board of aldermen in the manner provided for the service of notice in actions in the Rules of Civil Procedure. This notice shall be filed within ninety days of the occurrence for which the damage is claimed, stating the time of and place where the injury was received and the character and circumstances of the injury, and that the person injured will claim damages therefor from the city.”

It will be observed that the statute requires statements of “the character and circumstances of the injury, and that the person injured will claim damages therefor from the city.” This court has required considerable exactness and specificity in the statement of the character and circumstances of the injury. See Berry v. City of Louisville, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 818, and Dukes v. City of Louisville, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 110. The requirement has been such that normally the statement would have to come from the knowledge of the injured person. And of course only he could state with any authority that he “will claim damages therefor from the city.” For these reasons we think it is reasonably clear that the statute contemplates that the notice is to be given by or at the direction of the injured person. A tortfeasor, in most situations, could not give the notice because he could not make the required statements.

It is true that one of the primary purposes of the notice is to give the city an opportunity to investigate the cause of the accident and to determine the condition of the defect complained of, and this would apply to any kind of claim growing out of the accident. Berry v. City of Louisville, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 818. But another impor[*705] tant purpose is to enable the city to examine the injuries alleged to have been sustained. Spangler’s Adm’r v. City of Middlesboro, 301 Ky. 237, 191 S.W.2d 414. The tortfeasor could give a notice fulfilling the first purpose, but ordinarily could not give one effectively fulfilling the second one.

The fact that the matter of ability to meet the notice requirements is an important consideration in determining the applicability of the statute was recognized by this court in Spangler’s Adm’r v. City of Middlesboro, supra, in holding that the giving of notice under the statute was not a condition precedent to the bringing of an action for wrongful death.

Because of the factor of lack of control by the tortfeasor over the giving of notice, it is our conclusion that the fact that no notice of claim of damages has been given under KRS 411.110 will not bar the prosecution of a claim for contribution.

In reaching our conclusion we have given consideration to the decisions (few in number) of courts of other states on this question, which are annotated in 93 A.L.R.2d at pages 1385 to 1391. It appears that only two cases have been decided involving notice statutes substantially identical to Kentucky’s. [1] One of the cases is Geiger v. Calumet County, 18 Wis.2d 151, 118 N.W.2d 197, in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the failure of notice did not bar a claim for contribution, pointing out that the statute could not be construed as requiring notice of a claim for contribution because the claim normally would not accrue within the time allowed for giving notice. The other case is American Automobile Ins. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 294, 107 N.W.2d 320, which involved a claim for indemnity rather than for contribution but which is not a significant distinguishing factor as concerns our question. There the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the failure of notice did bar the claim for indemnity. The primary support for the holding was found in the ascribed purpose of the statute to enable the city to make timely investigations into the time, place and circumstances of the accident.

We believe that the conclusion of the Wisconsin court is the sounder one.

The judgment is reversed with directions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

All concur, except NEIKIRK, J., who did not sit.
1

. The other cases covered by the annotation concerned statutes having a purpose different from that of our statute.