RENDERED: OCTOBER 31, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0566-MR GEORGE BEASON, JR. APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 11-CR-00474

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES. JONES, A., JUDGE: Acting without the assistance of counsel, George Beason appeals from the Hardin Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for post- conviction relief under CR1 60.02(d)-(f). Beason argues that his convictions are void because of alleged irregularities in the 2011 grand-jury proceedings that led to his indictment. Finding the motion untimely and procedurally barred, we affirm.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hodge v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Ky. 2020); Meece v. Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. 2017). “Whether a defendant is entitled to the extraordinary relief provided by CR 60.02 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

A movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a CR 60.02 motion unless he “affirmatively alleges facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege[s] special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.” White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000).

III. ANALYSIS

Kentucky law establishes an orderly and exclusive process for review of criminal convictions. A defendant aggrieved by a judgment must first pursue a direct appeal, raising every ground of error reasonably known at that time.

Thereafter, while still in custody, he may seek collateral relief under RCr 11.42 for any constitutional claims that were not and could not have been raised on direct appeal. Once those avenues have been exhausted, a motion under CR 60.02 provides only a limited, residual remedy. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856-58 (Ky. 1983).

As the Court in Gross explained, this sequential process is the exclusive method for a convicted defendant to challenge the judgment, designed to ensure both efficiency and finality in criminal proceedings. Id. at 856. Consequently, CR 60.02 cannot be used to relitigate matters previously determined or those that could have been presented on direct appeal or in an RCr 11.42 motion. Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886; Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Ky. 2008).

The rule’s narrow function is to bring before the court issues that could not have been raised by any other procedure and which, if true, would render the original judgment manifestly unjust. Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Ky. 2023). It is not a substitute for direct appeal or collateral review under RCr 11.42, nor does it authorize repetitive or piecemeal litigation of known claims. Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886; Baze, 276 S.W.3d at 766.

This framework reflects a deliberate hierarchy: direct appeal addresses ordinary trial error; RCr 11.42 provides a vehicle for constitutional challenges while a defendant remains in custody; and CR 60.02, invoked sparingly, preserves the integrity of the judicial process only in extraordinary circumstances. The orderly sequence preserves both fairness and finality, the cornerstones of Kentucky’s post-conviction jurisprudence.

The circuit court denied Beason’s CR 60.02 motion on two independent grounds: it was not filed within a reasonable time, and it sought to relitigate issues that could have been raised earlier. Both determinations were correct.

Beason sought post-conviction relief under CR 60.02(d), (e), and (f). Those provisions permit a court to relieve a party from a final judgment on grounds of “fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified evidence” (d); because “the judgment is void” or “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application” (e); or for “any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief” (f).

Although subsections (d) through (f) contain no fixed deadline, they are still subject to the requirement that the motion be made within a reasonable time. CR 60.02; Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858. What constitutes a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of each case, but delays of five years or more have consistently been found excessive. Id.; Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886.

Beason’s motion was filed in December 2023—more than eleven years after his conviction and nearly nine years after his direct appeal became final. The circuit court correctly concluded that such a delay was unreasonable under the rule and denied the motion on that basis. See Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858 (five-year delay untimely); Reyna v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Ky. App. 2007) (four-year delay within trial court’s discretion to deny).

The circuit court also properly found the motion procedurally barred. CR 60.02 “is not intended to provide relief for grounds that could be attacked through direct appeals or collateral motions such as grounds under RCr 11.42.” Meece, 529 S.W.3d at 285 (emphasis omitted); Baze, 276 S.W.3d at 766. The alleged irregularities in the grand-jury proceedings were apparent from the record and could have been raised before trial or on direct appeal. Because CR 60.02 may not be used as a substitute for ordinary appellate or collateral review, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying relief on procedural grounds.

Finally, the circuit court did not err in denying Beason’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Whether a motion under CR 60.02(d)-(f) was filed within a reasonable time is a question committed to the trial court’s discretion, and a hearing is unnecessary to make that determination. Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Ky. App. 2009) (“An evidentiary hearing is not required to assess the reasonable time restriction inherent in CR 60.02 motions as such is left to the discretion of the Court.”). Here, the record before the circuit court conclusively supported its denial of relief without further proceedings.^[3]

IV. CONCLUSION

Beason’s motion for relief under CR 60.02(d), (e), and (f) was filed well beyond a reasonable time and sought to raise issues that could have been presented before trial or on direct appeal. Because the rule is not a substitute for those prior proceedings and because no jurisdictional defect or extraordinary circumstance is shown, the Hardin Circuit Court acted within its discretion in denying relief. Accordingly, the order of the Hardin Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

George Beason, Jr, pro se Russell Coleman LaGrange, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Ken W. Riggs Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky