(1) When two (2) vehicles approach or enter an intersection from different roadways at
approximately the same time, the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the
right-of-way to the vehicle on the right.
(2) The right-of-way rule declared in subsection (1) is modified at highways and
through intersections and as otherwise stated in this chapter.
(3) Preferential right-of-way may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs. The state
highway commissioner, with reference to state highways, and local authorities, with
reference to other highways under their jurisdiction, may designate any intersection
as a stop intersection or as a yield intersection and erect stop signs or yield signs at
one (1) or more entrances to such intersections.
(4) Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, every operator of a vehicle
approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, before
entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then at the
point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has view of approaching
traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the
operator shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or
approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard
during the time when such operator is moving across or within the intersection or
junction of roadways.
(5) The operator of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall, in obedience to such sign,
slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for
safety to stop, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, before entering
the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then at the point
nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching
traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After slowing and stopping,
the operator shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or
approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard
during the time such operator is moving across or within the intersection or junction
of roadways; provided, however, that if such an operator is involved in a collision
with a vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways after driving past a yield
sign without stopping, such collision shall be deemed prima facie evidence of his
failure to yield right-of-way.
(6) The operator of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows:
(a) Right turns - both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made
as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway;
(b) Left turns - the operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the
turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the
direction of travel of such vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be
made to the left of the center of the intersection and so as to leave the
intersection or other location in the extreme right-hand lane lawfully available
to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being
entered.
(7) The Transportation Cabinet and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions
may cause official traffic control devices to be placed and thereby require and direct
that a different course from that specified in this section be traveled by turning
vehicles and, when such devices are so placed, no operator shall turn a vehicle other
than as directed and required by such devices.
(8) The operator of any vehicle shall not turn such vehicle so as to proceed in the
opposite direction unless such movement can be made in safety without interfering
with other traffic.
(9) The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into
an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close
thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
(10) The operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross a roadway from any place other
than another roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the
roadway to be entered or crossed.
(11) On highways with a center lane restricted for left turns off the highway by vehicles
proceeding in both directions:
(a) A left turn shall not be made from any other lane; and
(b) A vehicle shall not be driven in a center lane as described in this subsection
except when preparing for or making a left turn off the highway or merging
onto the highway after making a left turn from a side road or other entrance.
Effective: July 12, 2006
History: Amended 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 173, sec. 14, effective July 12, 2006. -- Amended
1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 144, effective July 15, 1980. -- Amended 1978 Ky. Acts
ch. 46, sec. 3, effective June 17, 1978. -- Amended 1960 Ky. Acts ch. 148, sec. 2,
effective June 16, 1960. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective
October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. secs. 2739g-37, 2739g-42.
Notes of Decisions
Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
· cites it 17× “It should be noted that KRS 189.330 (7) directs that when entering or crossing a highway from a private road or driveway the entering vehicle "shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.”
Southard v. Belanger, 966 F. Supp. 2d 727 (W.D. Ky. 2013).
· cites it 6× “Ky.Rev.Stat. § 189.330(9), the statute ón which the Plaintiff relies, states as follows: The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the…”
Vaughn v. Jones, 257 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
· cites it 3× “Vaughn slowed down as he saw Jones approaching the intersection, Jones came to a complete stop as he was required to do by KRS 189.330(4). Vaughn testified Jones looked in his direction, then the other way and then pulled out into the highway in front of him.”
Baker v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
· cites it 8× “” There is no difference in principle in the two sections of KRS 189.330. Both are for the purpose of assuring through traffic the right of way over vehicles entering upon the highway from an inferior highway, private road, or driveway.”
Thomas v. Dahl, 170 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943).
· cites it 2× “Stats, (now KRS 189.330). The Traffic Code of Louisville, Ordinance No.”
Brumbach v. Day, 260 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
· cites it 3× “KRS 189.330 (6). Of course, Mr. Day was not required to exercise an infallible judgment, but was required to use such care as a reasonably cautious and prudent person would exercise under the circumstances.”
Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
· cites it 3× “This is in accordance with KRS 189.330(4). The defendant maintains that this was too favorable to the plaintiff, for the instruction *708 should have followed the terms of KRS 189.”
Riggs v. Miller, 396 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
· cites it 2× “” Thus he failed to observe a duty placed upon him by KRS 189.330(4). Nor was it sufficient that he should have stopped on this occasion; he should also have yielded the right of way to Garland by not proceeding into the intersection until he was able to do so with safety.”
Killman v. Taylor, 453 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
· cites it 3× “It is my belief that the majority opinion repeals in part KRS 189.330 and overrules Chambliss v. Lewis, Ky.”
Charlton v. Jacobs, 619 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 2× “It is evident from answers to the interrogatories filed by the estate approximately a month and a half after commencement of this action that the case had as its statutory basis KRS 189.330 dealing with right-of-way at an intersection.”
Black v. Bishop, 207 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947).
· cites it 2× “• The point is raised by appellants that the driver of the automobile failed to stop at the intersection, as *527 required by Section 189.330, sub. 4, KBS. Whether or not this admitted failure constituted negligence or the proximate cause of the accident, it is not necessary for…”
Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 6× “Although it is undisputed that Hill Avenue is a superior street, thereby giving Underwood a statutory right-of-way, the trial court only instructed the jury under KRS 189.330(1). That section of the statute states as follows: (1) When two (2) vehicles approach or enter an…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(1) — 6 cases
Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
“Although it is undisputed that Hill Avenue is a superior street, thereby giving Underwood a statutory right-of-way, the trial court only instructed the jury under KRS 189.330(1). That section of the statute states as follows: (1) When two (2) vehicles approach or enter an…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(2) — 7 cases
Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
“Although it is undisputed that Hill Avenue is a superior street, thereby giving Underwood a statutory right-of-way, the trial court only instructed the jury under KRS 189.330(1). That section of the statute states as follows: (1) When two (2) vehicles approach or enter an…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(3) — 3 cases
Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
“Although it is undisputed that Hill Avenue is a superior street, thereby giving Underwood a statutory right-of-way, the trial court only instructed the jury under KRS 189.330(1). That section of the statute states as follows: (1) When two (2) vehicles approach or enter an…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(4) — 23 cases
Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
“It should be noted that KRS 189.330 (7) directs that when entering or crossing a highway from a private road or driveway the entering vehicle "shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.”
Vaughn v. Jones, 257 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
“Vaughn slowed down as he saw Jones approaching the intersection, Jones came to a complete stop as he was required to do by KRS 189.330(4). Vaughn testified Jones looked in his direction, then the other way and then pulled out into the highway in front of him.”
Baker v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
“” There is no difference in principle in the two sections of KRS 189.330. Both are for the purpose of assuring through traffic the right of way over vehicles entering upon the highway from an inferior highway, private road, or driveway.”
Riggs v. Miller, 396 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
“” Thus he failed to observe a duty placed upon him by KRS 189.330(4). Nor was it sufficient that he should have stopped on this occasion; he should also have yielded the right of way to Garland by not proceeding into the intersection until he was able to do so with safety.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(5) — 6 cases
Riggs v. Miller, 396 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
“” Thus he failed to observe a duty placed upon him by KRS 189.330(4). Nor was it sufficient that he should have stopped on this occasion; he should also have yielded the right of way to Garland by not proceeding into the intersection until he was able to do so with safety.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(6) — 6 cases
Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
“It should be noted that KRS 189.330 (7) directs that when entering or crossing a highway from a private road or driveway the entering vehicle "shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.”
Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
“This is in accordance with KRS 189.330(4). The defendant maintains that this was too favorable to the plaintiff, for the instruction *708 should have followed the terms of KRS 189.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(7) — 10 cases
Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
“It should be noted that KRS 189.330 (7) directs that when entering or crossing a highway from a private road or driveway the entering vehicle "shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.”
Baker v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
“” There is no difference in principle in the two sections of KRS 189.330. Both are for the purpose of assuring through traffic the right of way over vehicles entering upon the highway from an inferior highway, private road, or driveway.”
Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
“This is in accordance with KRS 189.330(4). The defendant maintains that this was too favorable to the plaintiff, for the instruction *708 should have followed the terms of KRS 189.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.330(9) — 1 case
Southard v. Belanger, 966 F. Supp. 2d 727 (W.D. Ky. 2013).
“Ky.Rev.Stat. § 189.330(9), the statute ón which the Plaintiff relies, states as follows: The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.