claims occurring after December 12, 1996 -- Payment of settlements for
income benefits -- Transfer of responsibilities from division to Kentucky
Employers' Mutual Insurance Authority.
(1) There is created the Division of Workers' Compensation Funds in the
Department of Workers' Claims which shall be responsible for the
administration of the special fund and the coal workers' pneumoconiosis fund
and the maintenance of records regarding the payment of claims by these
funds. The Division of Workers' Compensation Funds shall have no
responsibility for the coal workers' pneumoconiosis fund once the assets and
liabilities have been transferred to the Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance
Authority, which will administer the fund pursuant to KRS 342.1243. The
Division of Workers' Compensation Funds shall be headed by a director
appointed by the secretary of the Education and Labor Cabinet, with the prior
written approval of the Governor pursuant to KRS 12.050. The director shall be
responsible for overseeing the administration of the funds and the maintenance
of records regarding the payment of claims by the funds.
(2) The special fund shall have no liability upon any claim in which the injury
occurred, or for cumulative trauma, the disability became manifest, or, for
occupational disease, if the date of injury or last exposure occurred, after
December 12, 1996.
(3) Where the employer has settled its liability for income benefits and thereafter a
determination has been made of the special fund's liability, the special fund
portion of the benefit rate shall be paid over the maximum period provided for
by statute for that disability, with the period of payment beginning on the date
settlement was approved by an administrative law judge. This provision is
remedial and shall apply to all pending and future claims.
Effective:July 1, 2022
History: Amended 2022 Ky. Acts ch. 236, sec. 152, effective July 1, 2022. --
Amended 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 82, sec. 5, effective June 29, 2017; and ch. 173,
sec. 10, effective April 10, 2017. -- Amended 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 1786,
effective July 15, 2010. -- Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 246, sec. 1, effective July
15, 2002. -- Amended 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 514, sec. 6, effective July 14, 2000. --
Amended 1996 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1, sec. 3, effective December 12,
1996. -- Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 181, Part 9, sec. 31, effective April 4, 1994.
-- Amended 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 67, sec. 1, effective July 13, 1990; and ch. 390,
sec. 1, effective July 13, 1990. -- Amended 1987 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch.
1, sec. 9, effective January 4, 1988. -- Amended 1984 Ky. Acts ch. 414, sec. 34,
effective July 13, 1984. -- Amended 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 278, sec. 17, effective
July 15, 1982. -- Amended 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 104, sec. 3, effective July 15,
1980. -- Amended 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 256, sec. 1, effective June 17, 1978. --
Amended 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 78, sec. 17. -- Amended 1964 Ky. Acts ch. 192,
sec. 11. -- Amended 1962 Ky. Acts ch. 276, sec. 1. -- Amended 1960 Ky. Acts
ch. 147, sec. 9. -- Amended 1948 Ky. Acts ch. 64, sec. 12. -- Amended 1946 Ky.
Acts ch. 23, sec. 1. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective
October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 4901.
Notes of Decisions
Transp. Motor Express, Inc. v. Finn, 574 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1978).
· cites it 23× “Further, in our view, Pennington, supra , has no direct application to apportionment under KRS 342.120. The apportionment function is separate and distinct from the function provided for in KRS 342.”
Garrett Mining Co. v. Nye, 122 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2003).
· cites it 22× “However, applying former KRS 342.120 [1] and Young v. Fulkerson, Ky.”
Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc., 474 S.W.3d 129 (Ky. 2015).
· cites it 11× “620(1), it also amended the apportionment statute, KRS 342.120. Before the 1972 .amendment, KRS 342.”
Beale v. Stratton, 779 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1989).
· cites it 15× “” KRS 342.120, as adopted in 1982, reads as follows: 342.”
Yocom v. Jackson, 554 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
· cites it 8× “(Emphasis added) * * * # * * “While under subsection (1)(a) of KRS 342.120 a pre-existing disabling condition may require apportionment regardless of its nature, under subsection (1)(b) of that statute (here applicable) a nondisabling condition must fall within the…”
Haycraft v. Corhart Refractories Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976).
· cites it 4× “To the extent that the claimant was actively disabled prior to April 11,1974, under KRS 342.120 he cannot be compensated. For the remainder of his disability attributable to the present condition of his back he is entitled to compensation to be divided between the employer and…”
Duty v. Double Eagle Co., 939 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997).
· cites it 28× “The effect of KRS 342.120 on the amount and duration of the Special Fund’s payments were at issue.”
Dealers Transp. Co. v. Thompson, 593 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 9× “We fail to see how the Special Fund has any liability under an “arousal” theory based on KRS 342.120. This is because there is evidence in this record sufficient to enable a reasonable mind to conclude that the working conditions to which decedent was exposed were the single…”
Yocom v. Loy, 573 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1978).
· cites it 9× “’ Turning to KRS 342.120, we find that the Special Fund was to be made a party to the proceedings, ‘if either or both’ of two conditions existed.”
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Conway v. Thompson, 300 S.W.3d 152 (Ky. 2010).
· cites it 2× “080(3) ("No statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared."). [42] Commonwealth Dept. of Agriculture v.”
Leeco, Inc. v. Crabtree, 966 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1998).
· cites it 6× “1 The thrust of the argument is that KRS 342.120 requires apportionment of the actual award of income benefits which is projected for a totally disabling work-related injury.”
Beale v. Shepherd, 809 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1991).
· cites it 6× “Where there was a subsequent injury, KRS 342.120 required that an employer be held liable only for the increase in disability due to the subsequent injury.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(1) — 36 cases
Yocom v. Loy, 573 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1978).
“’ Turning to KRS 342.120, we find that the Special Fund was to be made a party to the proceedings, ‘if either or both’ of two conditions existed.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(1)(a) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(1)(b) — 4 cases
Haycraft v. Corhart Refractories Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976).
“To the extent that the claimant was actively disabled prior to April 11,1974, under KRS 342.120 he cannot be compensated. For the remainder of his disability attributable to the present condition of his back he is entitled to compensation to be divided between the employer and…”
Yocom v. Jackson, 554 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
“(Emphasis added) * * * # * * “While under subsection (1)(a) of KRS 342.120 a pre-existing disabling condition may require apportionment regardless of its nature, under subsection (1)(b) of that statute (here applicable) a nondisabling condition must fall within the…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(2) — 8 cases
Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc., 474 S.W.3d 129 (Ky. 2015).
“620(1), it also amended the apportionment statute, KRS 342.120. Before the 1972 .amendment, KRS 342.”
Beale v. Stratton, 779 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1989).
“” KRS 342.120, as adopted in 1982, reads as follows: 342.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(2)(a) — 1 case
Beale v. Stratton, 779 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1989).
“” KRS 342.120, as adopted in 1982, reads as follows: 342.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(2)(b) — 6 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(3) — 29 cases
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Conway v. Thompson, 300 S.W.3d 152 (Ky. 2010).
“080(3) ("No statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared."). [42] Commonwealth Dept. of Agriculture v.”
Haycraft v. Corhart Refractories Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976).
“To the extent that the claimant was actively disabled prior to April 11,1974, under KRS 342.120 he cannot be compensated. For the remainder of his disability attributable to the present condition of his back he is entitled to compensation to be divided between the employer and…”
Dealers Transp. Co. v. Thompson, 593 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
“We fail to see how the Special Fund has any liability under an “arousal” theory based on KRS 342.120. This is because there is evidence in this record sufficient to enable a reasonable mind to conclude that the working conditions to which decedent was exposed were the single…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(3)(4) — 1 case
Dealers Transp. Co. v. Thompson, 593 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
“We fail to see how the Special Fund has any liability under an “arousal” theory based on KRS 342.120. This is because there is evidence in this record sufficient to enable a reasonable mind to conclude that the working conditions to which decedent was exposed were the single…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(4) — 55 cases
Transp. Motor Express, Inc. v. Finn, 574 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1978).
“Further, in our view, Pennington, supra , has no direct application to apportionment under KRS 342.120. The apportionment function is separate and distinct from the function provided for in KRS 342.”
Beale v. Stratton, 779 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1989).
“” KRS 342.120, as adopted in 1982, reads as follows: 342.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(5) — 14 cases
Beale v. Stratton, 779 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1989).
“” KRS 342.120, as adopted in 1982, reads as follows: 342.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(6) — 17 cases
Leeco, Inc. v. Crabtree, 966 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1998).
“1 The thrust of the argument is that KRS 342.120 requires apportionment of the actual award of income benefits which is projected for a totally disabling work-related injury.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(6)(b) — 3 cases
Leeco, Inc. v. Crabtree, 966 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1998).
“1 The thrust of the argument is that KRS 342.120 requires apportionment of the actual award of income benefits which is projected for a totally disabling work-related injury.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(7) — 9 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(8) — 2 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(8)(b) — 4 cases
Duty v. Double Eagle Co., 939 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997).
“The effect of KRS 342.120 on the amount and duration of the Special Fund’s payments were at issue.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(b) — 2 cases
Dealers Transp. Co. v. Thompson, 593 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
“We fail to see how the Special Fund has any liability under an “arousal” theory based on KRS 342.120. This is because there is evidence in this record sufficient to enable a reasonable mind to conclude that the working conditions to which decedent was exposed were the single…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(l)(a) — 4 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.120(l)(b) — 5 cases
Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc., 474 S.W.3d 129 (Ky. 2015).
“620(1), it also amended the apportionment statute, KRS 342.120. Before the 1972 .amendment, KRS 342.”
Haycraft v. Corhart Refractories Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976).
“To the extent that the claimant was actively disabled prior to April 11,1974, under KRS 342.120 he cannot be compensated. For the remainder of his disability attributable to the present condition of his back he is entitled to compensation to be divided between the employer and…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.