administrative law judge -- Administrative regulations for procedures for
resolution of claims.
(1) If the parties fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this
chapter, either party may make written application for resolution of claim. The
application must be filed within two (2) years after the accident, or, in case of death,
within two (2) years after the death, or within two (2) years after the cessation of
voluntary payments, if any have been made. When the application is filed by the
employee or during the pendency of that claim, he or she shall join all causes of
action against the named employer which have accrued and which are known, or
should reasonably be known, to him or her. Failure to join all accrued causes of
action will result in such claims being barred under this chapter as waived by the
employee.
(2) Except with respect to claims for benefits by reason of pneumoconiosis, the
commissioner shall issue notice of the filing to all parties and shall promptly assign
the claim to an administrative law judge. The administrative law judge shall
facilitate the exchange of information pertinent to the claim pursuant to
administrative regulations promulgated by the commissioner. Within forty-five (45)
days of the date of issuance of the notice required by this section, the employer or
carrier shall file notice of claim denial or acceptance, setting forth specifically those
material matters which are admitted, those which are denied, and the basis of any
denial of the claim.
(3) Within one hundred twenty (120) days of July 14, 2018, the commissioner shall
promulgate or amend existing administrative regulations establishing procedures for
the resolution of claims. The administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to the
provisions of this subsection shall be effective on an emergency basis and be
applied to all pending claims.
Effective: July 14, 2018
History: Amended 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 40, sec. 7, effective July 14, 2018. -- Amended
2010 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 1810, effective July 15, 2010. -- Amended 2000 Ky. Acts
ch. 514, sec. 17, effective July 14, 2000. -- Amended 1996 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts
ch. 1, sec. 12, effective December 12, 1996. -- Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 181, Part
3, sec. 14, effective April 4, 1994. -- Amended 1987 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1,
sec. 31, effective January 4, 1988. -- Amended 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 191, sec. 1. --
Amended 1970 Ky. Acts ch. 16, sec. 1. -- Amended 1964 Ky. Acts ch. 192, sec. 19. -
- Amended 1948 Ky. Acts ch. 64, sec. 14. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec.
1, effective October 1,1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 4932.
Notes of Decisions
Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye, 415 S.W.3d 631 (Ky. 2013).
· cites it 9× “This Court affirmed the conclusion by the Court of Appeals that Jones’s “left shoulder claim remained viable under KRS 342.270.” Id. at 245 . In doing so, this Court stated that “[a] claim remains ‘pending’ until the appellate process is exhausted” and that Jones’s “right…”
Kroger Co. v. Jones, 125 S.W.3d 241 (Ky. 2004).
· cites it 11× “185 provides that no proceeding under Chapter 342 may be maintained unless an application for adjustment of claim is filed within two years of the accident, and KRS 342.270 requires the join-der of all known claims against the employer.”
Ridge v. VMV Enter., Inc., 114 S.W.3d 845 (Ky. 2003).
· cites it 15× “OPINION OF THE COURT KRS 342.270(1) requires the joinder of all known causes of action against the named employer during the pendency of a workers’ compensation claim.”
Butler's Fleet Serv. v. Martin, 173 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 6× “We are not persuaded by Martin’s contention that KRS 342.270 compels a different result by requiring a workers’ compensation claimant to join, during the pendency of his claim, “all causes of action against the named employer which have accrued and which are known, or should…”
Hodge v. Ford Motor Co., 124 S.W.3d 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 14× “In support of its claim that the ALJ improperly considered evidence related to the March 8, 2000, injury, and based an award on that injury, Ford argues in favor of a strict interpretation of KRS 342.270(1), which requires an injured party to join all causes of action against a…”
Gray v. Trimmaster, 173 S.W.3d 236 (Ky. 2005).
· cites it 2× “KRS 342.270(2); 803 KAR 25:010, § 5(2)(b).”
Brown v. Indiana Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2005).
· cites it 2× “185(1), or by failing to timely file the claim, KRS 342.270(1); or the employee simply chose not to pursue benefits under the Act, State Farm Mut.”
KI USA Corp. v. Hall, 3 S.W.3d 355 (Ky. 1999).
· cites it 8× “KRS 342.270 makes it apparent that the legislature attempted to expedite the processing of claims and to encourage informal resolution.”
City of Louisville v. Slack, 39 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. 2001).
· cites it 4× “KRS 342.270(4). No transcript is permitted at the arbitrator level.”
Ex Parte Se. Alabama Med. Ctr., 835 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
“See KRS 342.270 and KRS 342.275. Utilization review was not intended as a sword for the skewering of medical benefits issues but rather was designed to provide an opportunity to all parties in a medical fee question to avoid the necessity of [a] lengthy litigation process.”
Hitachi Auto. Prods. USA, Inc. v. Craig, 279 S.W.3d 123 (Ky. 2008).
· cites it 2× “KRS 342.270(1) provides that an injured worker who cannot agree with the employer regarding compensation must file an application for resolution of the claim “within two (2) years after the accident, or .”
Cornett v. Corbin Materials, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1991).
· cites it 2× “Therefore, in response to claimant’s argument that KRS 342.270 and .275 and 803 KAR 25.011 § 5(5) and § 10(1) are mandatory and thus the prehearing conference and hearing must be held, like the Court of Appeals, we do not believe “shall” in the statutes or regulations was meant…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.270(1) — 31 cases
Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye, 415 S.W.3d 631 (Ky. 2013).
“This Court affirmed the conclusion by the Court of Appeals that Jones’s “left shoulder claim remained viable under KRS 342.270.” Id. at 245 . In doing so, this Court stated that “[a] claim remains ‘pending’ until the appellate process is exhausted” and that Jones’s “right…”
Ridge v. VMV Enter., Inc., 114 S.W.3d 845 (Ky. 2003).
“OPINION OF THE COURT KRS 342.270(1) requires the joinder of all known causes of action against the named employer during the pendency of a workers’ compensation claim.”
Hodge v. Ford Motor Co., 124 S.W.3d 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).
“In support of its claim that the ALJ improperly considered evidence related to the March 8, 2000, injury, and based an award on that injury, Ford argues in favor of a strict interpretation of KRS 342.270(1), which requires an injured party to join all causes of action against a…”
Brown v. Indiana Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2005).
“185(1), or by failing to timely file the claim, KRS 342.270(1); or the employee simply chose not to pursue benefits under the Act, State Farm Mut.”
Butler's Fleet Serv. v. Martin, 173 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).
“We are not persuaded by Martin’s contention that KRS 342.270 compels a different result by requiring a workers’ compensation claimant to join, during the pendency of his claim, “all causes of action against the named employer which have accrued and which are known, or should…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.270(2) — 12 cases
Gray v. Trimmaster, 173 S.W.3d 236 (Ky. 2005).
“KRS 342.270(2); 803 KAR 25:010, § 5(2)(b).”
Cornett v. Corbin Materials, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1991).
“Therefore, in response to claimant’s argument that KRS 342.270 and .275 and 803 KAR 25.011 § 5(5) and § 10(1) are mandatory and thus the prehearing conference and hearing must be held, like the Court of Appeals, we do not believe “shall” in the statutes or regulations was meant…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.270(3) — 6 cases
Butler's Fleet Serv. v. Martin, 173 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).
“We are not persuaded by Martin’s contention that KRS 342.270 compels a different result by requiring a workers’ compensation claimant to join, during the pendency of his claim, “all causes of action against the named employer which have accrued and which are known, or should…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.270(3)(b) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.270(4) — 2 cases
KI USA Corp. v. Hall, 3 S.W.3d 355 (Ky. 1999).
“KRS 342.270 makes it apparent that the legislature attempted to expedite the processing of claims and to encourage informal resolution.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.270(5) — 3 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.270(i) — 1 case
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