Barnes v. McCrate (Me. 1851). · Go Syfert
Barnes v. McCrate (Me. 1851). Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Briscoe v. LaHue (scotus, 1983-03-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1907 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1907 1966 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Briscoe v. LaHue (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1983 · confidence medium
Ann. 951, 951-952 (1884); McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316, 319-320 (1879); Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442, 446-447 (1851); Cooper v. Phipps, 24 Ore. 357, 363-364 , 33 P. 985, 986-987 (1893); Shadden v. McElwee, 86 Tenn. 146, 149-154 , 5 S. W. 602 , 603-605 (1887); Cooley v. Galyon, 109 Tenn. 1, 13-14 , 70 S. W. 607 , 610 (1902); cf. Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193, 197-198 (1841) (statements by counsel); Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 312-313 (1872) (same).
cited Cited "see" Marrogi v. Howard
La. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442, 446-47 (1851).
cited Cited "see" Costanzo v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission
pactcomplallegh · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442, 446-77 (1851)....
cited Cited "see" Cooper v. Parker-Hughey
Okla. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442, 446-447 (1851). ...
discussed Cited "see" Panitz v. Behrend
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442, 446-447 (1851)____ A witness who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.
discussed Cited "see" Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Associates Engineers, Inc. (2×)
Wash. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442, 446-447 (1851).
Barnes versus McCrate
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Apr 15, 1851.
Deblois, for the plaintiff., G. F. Shepley, for defendant., W. P. Fessenden, on the same side., Deblois, in reply.
Tenney.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published
Tenney, J.,

orally.—It is not denied that there is, in some cases, a protection to witnesses for words duly spoken in the course of legal proceedings. Does that protection extend to this witness under the circumstances ?

There can be no question that if a witness, taking advantage of his position, and departing from what rightfully pertains to the case, should voluntarily slander one of the parties, he would be liable. But when called upon, in the progress of a cause, and under the rules of the court, and confining himself to that which rightfully pertains to the case, he is not liable for the testimony he may give. To hold otherwise would tend to intimidate a witness and to deter from a disclosure of[*447] the whole truth. He might have no means to prove his statements. He may have been robbed while alone. Should he testify to the fact, in the course of a regular trial of the offender, he would not be liable for his statement. This is a doctrine of the highest legal policy.

A witness is not supposed to know the exact line of proceeding. He is, therefore, under the direction of the court. In this case, a question was duly put to the witness, either by the court or by counsel. And it does not appear that, in his answer, he went beyond the scope of the question. If the question was put by the court, there could be no liability for answering it; if put by the plaintiff’s counsel, the plaintiff can have no ground of complaint that it was answered; if put by the defendant’s counsel, objection should have been made, and, if improper, it would have been excluded.

Nonsuit confirmed.