Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 870 (2026)

Judgment by perjury; action on case

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section ME-LEGlegislature.maine.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
1.  Action; within 3 years.  When a judgment has been obtained against a party by the perjury of a witness introduced at the trial by the adverse party, the injured party may, within 3 years after that judgment or after final disposition of any motion for relief from the judgment, bring an action against such adverse party, or any perjured witness or confederate in the perjury, to recover the damages sustained by the injured party by reason of such perjury. The judgment in the former action does not bar an action under this section.  
[PL 2009, c. 187, §1 (NEW).]
2.  Specificity of claim.  A claim under this section must identify the specific testimony alleged to be false at the initial filing of the claim.  
[PL 2009, c. 187, §1 (NEW).]
3.  Record; evidence.  A claim may not be submitted under this section solely on the same record as in the former trial. Evidence discoverable by due diligence before the trial cannot be introduced as new evidence to establish perjury.  
[PL 2009, c. 187, §1 (NEW).]
4.  Standard of proof.  The plaintiff in an action under this section must prove the alleged perjury by clear and convincing evidence.  
[PL 2009, c. 187, §1 (NEW).]
5.  Affirmative defense.  It is an affirmative defense to an action under this section that the plaintiff has no new evidence to present concerning the alleged perjury.  
[PL 2009, c. 187, §1 (NEW).]
6.  Strictly construed.  The pleading and proof requirements of this section must be strictly construed.  
[PL 2009, c. 187, §1 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 2009, c. 187, §1 (RPR).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1984–2024 · leading case: Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18 (Me. 2008).
Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18 (Me. 2008). · cites it 2× “The trial court agreed that Bean’s complaint was not specific enough, but denied the motion to dismiss and gave Bean leave to amend his complaint.”
Glenwood Farms, Inc. v. O'Connor, 666 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Me. 2009). · cites it 4× “See 14 M.R.S.A. § 870. The Cozen Defendants’ policy argument effectively ignores the existence of these laws.”
Henry v. Deen, 310 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1984). “Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 870 (1964). He argues that sparse case law under the Maine statute should give comfort to those fearing a multiplicity of lawsuits arising from a civil action for perjury.”
Kraul v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 672 A.2d 1107 (Me. 1996). · cites it 3× “, on the plaintiffs’ consolidated actions seeking damages for perjury pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 870 (1980). The plaintiffs argue that the court erred in construing section 870 and in holding that the judgment in the previous trial was not based on perjured testimony.”
Spickler v. Greenberg, 644 A.2d 469 (Me. 1994). · cites it 2× “), following a jury trial in which Greenberg was found liable for perjury pursuant to Maine’s unique civil perjury statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 870 (1980). 1 Because Spickler failed to establish the elements necessary for recovery pursuant to the statute, we vacate the judgment.”
Spickler v. Greenberg, 586 A.2d 1232 (Me. 1991). “A civil action for perjury is created by 14 M.R.S.A. § 870 (1980), which provides: When a judgment has been obtained against a party by the perjury of a witness introduced at the trial by the adverse party, the injured party may, within 3 years after such judgment or after final…”
Spickler v. Dube, 626 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Me. 1986). · cites it 2× “The Court of Appeals pointed out that a current Maine statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 870, first enacted in 1864, does permit such an action.”
Spickler v. Dube, 635 F. Supp. 317 (D. Me. 1986). “Plaintiff is proceeding under 14 M.R.S.A. § 870, which states: When a judgment has been obtained against a party by the perjury of a witness introduced at the trial by the adverse party, the injured party may, within 3 years after such judgment or after final disposition of any…”
Chagnon v. Teske (D. Me. 2024). · cites it 8× “25), I both ordered the supplemental briefing and rejected all of Defendants’ other argument for outright dismissal of Chagnon’s Complaint based on either claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”
Knoblach v. Morris (Me. Super. Ct 2020). · cites it 6× “3 Knoblach argues that the claim is not barred because he states an independent claim for perjury pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 870; the issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law which is also reviewed de novo on appeal.”
Borlawsky v. Town of Windham (Me. Super. Ct 2004). · cites it 4× “§ 4682, Maine’s Civil Rights Act (against the Windham Defendants); (2) Violation of 14 M.R.S.A. § 870, Maine’s Civil Perjury Statute (against Janet Losciuto and Scott Losciuto); (3) False Imprisonment (against Janet Losciuto and Scott Losciuto); (4) False Arrest (against the…”
Hider v. City of Portland (Me. Super. Ct 2006). · cites it 2× “The Complaint asserts claims for perjury pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 870 (Count II);6conspiracy to commit perjury pursuant points in a motion to suppress.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 870(1) — 2 cases
Chagnon v. Teske (D. Me. 2024).
Chagnon v. Teske (D. Me. 2024). “25), I both ordered the supplemental briefing and rejected all of Defendants’ other argument for outright dismissal of Chagnon’s Complaint based on either claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.