Circuit Court for Cecil County Case No. C-07-CR-19-000806

Argued: April 5, 2024 IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND No. 22

September Term, 2023 ______________________________________

AARON JARVIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________

Fader, C.J. Watts *Hotten Booth Biran Gould Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________

Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J., which Gould, J., joins. ______________________________________

Filed: August 12, 2024

*Hotten, J., now a Senior Justice, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court. After being Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State recalled pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, Government Article) this document is authentic. Article IV, § 3A, she also participated in the 2024.08.12 decision and adoption of this opinion. ^[11]:51:00 -04'00'

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

Respectfully, I dissent. I would hold that the Circuit Court for Cecil County abused

its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense and that its abuse of discretion was not harmless. The majority opinion holds that “the record shows that there was no evidence that Petitioner subjectively believed his use of deadly force was necessary for his safety[,]” and therefore “the trial judge did not err in declining to instruct the jury

on imperfect self-defense.” Maj. Slip Op. 31. The Majority opinion perceives this as the correct result because, according to it, there were “two accounts of the events leading up

to Petitioner stabbing Mr. Durrett”— “Under one, the stabbing was accidental. Under the other, the stabbing was intentional and unprovoked.” Maj. Slip Op. at 17.

There are at least two important aspects of the majority opinion with which I disagree. First, the Majority does not consider the evidence admitted at trial in its entirety and, in not doing so, fails to recognize that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which it could be inferred that Aaron Jarvis, Petitioner, feared serious bodily injury and stabbed Ethan Durrett because he believed it necessary to protect himself.

Second, the Majority takes an idiosyncratic approach to case law that largely ignores that the question before this Court is whether Mr. Jarvis generated “some evidence” to support giving the instruction and that it is acceptable for a defendant to pursue inconsistent defenses. The Majority focuses on the circumstance that, according to it, the stabbing was either accidental or intentional and unprovoked and therefore concludes that the imperfect

self-defense instruction should not have been given. Under our case law, however, the question is not whether the stabbing was accidental, intentional, or unprovoked. The question is whether Mr. Jarvis believed that he was in danger of harm and believed that the force he used was necessary to prevent the harm. Relying on a 1967 civil case that

addresses the standard of proof required for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the Majority concludes that the same standard should apply in this case. With respect to jury instructions in criminal cases, however, case law makes clear that a defendant need generate only “some evidence” in support of a requested instruction for it to be given and that the “some evidence” standard may be satisfied by both circumstantial

and direct evidence, and that a defendant may pursue inconsistent defenses. See, e.g., Bazzle v. State, 426 Md. 541, 551, 45 A.3d 166, 171-72 (2012).

Although things such as provocation and intent may be factors in assessing a

defendant’s subjective belief, they are not dispositive. The existence or nonexistence of provocation is not what the giving of a self-defense instruction is based on. Rather, there must be some evidence that the defendant feared imminent harm and that the defendant

believed the use of force at issue was necessary to prevent it. In this case, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Jarvis, under a correct application of case law, there was sufficient evidence to generate an imperfect self-defense instruction. The record demonstrates that while pursing inconsistent defenses of accident and self-defense, Mr.

Jarvis generated sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to warrant the giving of an imperfect self-defense instruction. A rational juror could easily have determined that

Mr. Jarvis feared serious bodily harm and stabbed Mr. Durrett because he believed it was necessary to protect himself.

I. The Imperfect Self-Defense Jury Instruction

In this case, Mr. Jarvis pursued two theories of defense: self-defense and accident.

Based on the evidence, all of the requirements for a jury instruction on imperfect self- defense were met, including that there was “some evidence” that Mr. Jarvis believed he was in “apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from” Mr.

Durrett, the victim (regardless of whether that belief was reasonable), and that there was

“some evidence” that he believed that “the amount of force used was necessary” (regardless of whether that belief was reasonable). Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 234-35, 240, 166

A.3d 1044, 1053, 1056 (2017) (cleaned up).1 There was ample evidence that Mr. Jarvis

feared serious bodily harm by Mr. Durrett, i.e., believed that he was in danger, and that, while the two men were in a physical altercation, Mr. Jarvis believed that using a pocketknife was necessary for his own safety, i.e., believed that the amount of force he used was necessary.

To generate a jury instruction on self-defense, a defendant need only meet the “minimal” burden of pointing to “some evidence”—i.e., “any evidence”—that, “if believed, would support his claim that he acted in self-defense[.]” Porter, 455 Md. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056 (cleaned up). “[I]n evaluating whether competent evidence exists to

generate the requested instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused.” Bazzle, 426 Md. at 551, 45 A.3d at 172 (cleaned up). These principles apply regardless of whether the requested instruction concerns perfect or imperfect self-defense.

Our case law indicates that, where an instruction on perfect self-defense is generated, almost always, an instruction on imperfect self-defense is also generated. See

Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 434, 749 A.2d 787, 795 (2000). Perfect self-defense requires

that a person believe themself to be in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm, that the person not be the aggressor or the one who provoked the conflict, that the amount of force used not be unreasonable and excessive, and that the belief of apparent imminent or immediate danger be reasonable. See Porter, 455 Md. at

234-35, 166 A.3d at 1053. Where deadly force is used outside of a person’s home, the person must have also reasonably believed that safely retreating or otherwise avoiding danger was impossible. See id. at 235, 166 A.3d at 1053.

An instruction on imperfect self-defense is generated where a person: (1) feared imminent or immediate serious bodily harm or death, i.e., had a belief that serious bodily

harm or death was imminent, (2) believed that the amount of force used was necessary and, (3) in the case of deadly force used outside the home, that safely retreating or otherwise avoiding danger was impossible, and the beliefs need not be reasonable—the person need only show that such beliefs existed. See id. at 235, 166 A.3d at 1053. The key difference

between the two (perfect and imperfect self-defense) is that, with perfect self-defense, the beliefs must be reasonable. See id. at 234-35, 166 A.3d at 1053. In this case, for the same reasons that the evidence was sufficient to generate an instruction on perfect self-defense, for which a person’s beliefs must be objectively reasonable, the evidence was also sufficient to demonstrate an instruction on imperfect self-defense, which does not have a reasonableness of beliefs requirement.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Jarvis, the evidence demonstrated that he was embroiled in a dispute with his brother-in-law, a much larger man, who demanded to meet with him in a dark or secluded area, and that, upon meeting his brother-in-law, he brandished a knife because he feared serious bodily harm. And, even though Mr. Jarvis displayed the pocketknife, his brother-in-law physically attacked him, causing Mr. Jarvis to grab him and stab him.

The nature of the evidence adduced at trial is critical to resolution of the issue of whether an instruction on imperfect self-defense was warranted. The evidence presented at trial established the following. Mr. Durrett and Mr. Jarvis are brothers-in-law and at

some point, Mr. Jarvis took a car that belonged to their mother-in-law (i.e., the mother of their wives, who are sisters) and, as a result, Mr. Durrett was angry with Mr. Jarvis and looking for him. Evidence demonstrating Mr. Jarvis’s fear of harm by Mr. Durrett included a printout of text messages that the two men exchanged between midnight and 1 a.m. on the date of the stabbing, which the circuit court admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. At 12:18 a.m., Mr. Durrett sent Mr. Jarvis a text message, telling him to return their mother-in-law’s car. Mr. Durrett sent another text message stating that Mr. Jarvis’s wife was “hysterically

crying[,]” asking whether Mr. Jarvis was “sick in the head[,]” telling him to go home and “keep [his] mouth shut[,]” and concluding with: “[W]e don’t need serious issues[.]” After that, the two men exchanged text messages about meeting in person. Mr.

Durrett told Mr. Jarvis to meet him behind a Wawa. Mr. Jarvis told Mr. Durrett to meet

him at his apartment. Mr. Durrett said that he would meet Mr. Jarvis in a field near the apartment complex. Mr. Jarvis responded in pertinent part: “Dude it’s pitch black there are no cameras come to my house.” At 12:52 a.m., Mr. Durrett sent a text message stating:

“Ok out in the field[.]”

The text messages that the two men exchanged are evidence of Mr. Jarvis’s fear of harm by Mr. Durrett. First, Mr. Jarvis’s refusal to meet Mr. Durrett behind the Wawa or in the field—where, according to Mr. Jarvis, it was “pitch black” and there were “no

cameras”—indicates that Mr. Jarvis believed that the lights and security cameras at the apartment complex would deter Mr. Durrett from harming him. Second, the circumstance that the two men had an intense verbal altercation—during which Mr. Durrett accused Mr.

Jarvis of being “sick in the head” and proposed meeting him in person—helps to explain why Mr. Jarvis feared such a meeting.

Additional evidence that Mr. Jarvis was afraid of harm by Mr. Durrett is Mr. Jarvis’s

testimony that, to avoid conflict, he refrained from parking in the main parking lot of the apartment complex. Mr. Jarvis’s testimony indicated that he parked in an “accessory parking lot” rather than “the main parking lot,” which was where visitors always parked because it was closer to his apartment. After Mr. Jarvis’s counsel asked him why he parked in the accessory parking lot, he responded: “Because I wanted to avoid conflict.” After

Mr. Jarvis’s counsel asked him whether he wanted to fight Mr. Durrett, he responded:

“No[,]” and, after his counsel asked why not, he explained: “I just didn’t desire an altercation. There was no reason for me to.” These parts of Mr. Jarvis’s testimony indicate that he feared serious bodily harm by Mr. Durrett and tried to avoid him.

Despite Mr. Jarvis’s efforts, the two men encountered each other. Mr. Durrett testified that his wife drove him to the apartment complex and “parked in a place where

[they] normally” did not—ostensibly, the accessory parking lot where Mr. Jarvis parked.

According to Mr. Durrett, he got out of the car, walked approximately 10 steps, and then

saw Mr. Jarvis 20 or 30 feet away. Similarly, Mr. Jarvis testified that he got out of his car, turned around, and saw Mr. Durrett waiting for him, as close to him as the prosecutor was to the witness stand. According to Mr. Jarvis, he had not seen or heard Mr. Durrett before then because Mr. Durrett had been “dead silent.”

At that point, Mr. Durrett communicated to Mr. Jarvis that he wanted Mr. Jarvis to approach him. Mr. Durrett testified that Mr. Jarvis said: “Yo, mother f[***]er” and that he

“turned [his] back to [Mr. Jarvis] and said, ‘Get over here. Let’s talk, man.’” Mr. Jarvis’s testimony indicated that, without saying anything, Mr. Durrett motioned for him to go over to the nearby field. This testimony demonstrates that Mr. Durrett actively sought an in- person confrontation—which, according to Mr. Jarvis, he was trying to avoid.

Mr. Jarvis testified that, after Mr. Durrett motioned for him to go over to the nearby field, he refrained from saying anything and headed toward his apartment, but Mr. Durrett cut him off. Mr. Jarvis’s counsel asked him why he turned and walked away from Mr.

Durrett, and he responded: “Because I didn’t want any issues with him. I wanted to go home.” This part of Mr. Jarvis’s testimony is evidence that he avoided Mr. Durrett because he was afraid of him and that the in-person confrontation occurred because Mr. Durrett forced it.

The most significant evidence that Mr. Jarvis feared serious bodily harm by Mr.

Durrett, and that he believed that he needed to use a pocketknife, is Mr. Jarvis’s testimony that, after Mr. Durrett cut him off, he yelled and took out a pocketknife because he was

afraid of Mr. Durrett. In Mr. Jarvis’s words: “I started, you know, raising my voice, yelling, trying to draw attention.” After Mr. Jarvis’s counsel asked him why he yelled, he responded: “Because I was afraid of him.” “The yelling didn’t work[,]” so Mr. Jarvis took out a pocketknife—i.e., a folding knife—that he carried with him because he “work[ed] with [his] hands a lot.” Mr. Jarvis “flicked the knife open just to brandish it, just hoping

that he would see it.” Mr. Jarvis’s counsel asked him why he took out the pocketknife, and he responded: “Because I was afraid of him.”2 Mr. Jarvis explained: “He was sweating profusely. He was -- I don’t want to say belligerent but he was being aggressive in his movements.” If believed, these parts of Mr. Jarvis’s testimony would support an inference that he feared serious bodily harm by Mr. Durrett and that he believed using the pocketknife was necessary for his own safety.

On cross-examination, Mr. Durrett acknowledged that he played football in high school, was approximately 6’1” and 175 pounds, and agreed with Mr. Jarvis’s counsel that he is “quite a bit bigger than Mr. Jarvis[.]” Mr. Jarvis testified of Mr. Durrett: “He’s much

Mr. Jarvis added: “He looked like he was under the influence of something.” The 2

prosecutor made an objection, which the circuit court sustained. Clearly, the objection was not aimed at Mr. Jarvis’s testimony that he took out the pocketknife because he was afraid of Mr. Durrett.

larger than me.” The difference in size between Mr. Jarvis and Mr. Durrett supports an inference that Mr. Jarvis had reason to be afraid of Mr. Durrett and believed that using a pocketknife was a way to avoid harm.

Mr. Jarvis testified that, after he took out the pocketknife, Mr. Durrett approached him and swung at him. At that time, the pocketknife was in Mr. Jarvis’s hand. Mr. Jarvis testified: “I ducked it in the nick of time. And I proceeded to grab him because I didn’t want him to keep swinging at me.” The two men fell to the ground. The pocketknife was

in Mr. Jarvis’s hand at that time and when Mr. Durrett was stabbed. After being stabbed, Mr. Durrett tried to take the pocketknife from Mr. Jarvis. Eventually, Mr. Jarvis let go of the pocketknife, which Mr. Durrett grabbed and threw.

This part of Mr. Jarvis’s testimony constitutes evidence that he acted in self-defense by stabbing Mr. Durrett. Mr. Jarvis’s testimony indicates that the pocketknife was in his

hand when he grabbed Mr. Durrett, and he testified that the pocketknife was in his hand when Mr. Durrett was stabbed. Specifically, Mr. Jarvis testified that the pocketknife was in his right hand when the two men fell to the ground, and a registered nurse testified that

Mr. Durrett’s wound was on his left flank or the left side of his lower back. Tellingly, Mr.

Durrett testified that he was stabbed when Mr. Jarvis “quick hugged” him. And, as the Majority acknowledges, Mr. Durrett testified that, during the altercation, he stated to

Petitioner, “[Y]ou stabbed me didn’t you?” to which Petitioner replied, “Yeah, mother

[expletive], yes.” Maj. Slip. Op at 17. All of this testimony gives rise to the reasonable inference that Mr. Jarvis intentionally stabbed Mr. Durrett because he feared serious bodily harm by Mr. Durrett.

Although the Majority acknowledges that, during the altercation, Mr. Jarvis stated

that he stabbed Mr. Durrett and that this could be evidence that the stabbing was intentional, the Majority states: “But rather than establish that Petitioner acted under a belief that stabbing Mr. Durrett was an appropriate use of force in response to a threat, Mr. Durrett

testified that Petitioner’s use of deadly force was unprovoked and that Petitioner was the initial aggressor.” Majority Slip Op. at 17. This observation leads to the Majority’s conclusion that there were two accounts of the events: one “accidental” and the other that

“the stabbing was intentional and unprovoked.” Majority Slip Op. at 17. There are

multiple problems with the Majority’s approach. First, the Majority fails to consider all of the evidence. The Majority does not include in its analysis the fact that Mr. Jarvis testified that Mr. Durrett swung at him immediately before the stabbing. Nor does the Majority attempt to consider any of the circumstances that led up to the stabbing which would have given rise to an inference that Mr. Jarvis feared serious bodily harm and acted to protect himself. Rather than consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Jarvis as it is required to do, the Majority simply accepts Mr. Durrett’s testimony as to how the stabbing occurred and concludes that it was “unprovoked.”

The Majority concludes that because Mr. Durrett testified that the stabbing was unprovoked, an instruction on imperfect self-defense was not warranted. The Majority’s assessment not only overlooks other evidence adduced at trial but also misapplies the law.

The Majority is required to take the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Jarvis, which it fails to do. Applying that standard, the Majority is required to consider whether

- 10 - there is some evidence that Mr. Jarvis feared serious bodily harm and responded with force he believed necessary, which it failed to do. Instead, relying on Rodriguez v. Lynch, 246 Md. 623, 623, 626, 229 A.2d 83, 84, 85 (1967), a civil case from over 55 years ago, in which in assessing the sufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case of primary negligence, we stated that the light most favorable “does not require ‘the taking of isolated sentences, or parts of sentences, in the testimony, and construing them out of context, without any regard to the rest of the witness’s testimony[,]” the Majority concludes that, “[w]hile we have not made similar remarks in the criminal context when using the ‘in the light most favorable’ standard, say, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a criminal conviction, there is no reason to assume that the standard should be treated any differently when applied either in a civil or criminal case.” Maj. Slip Op. at 19 n.14. In my view, it is a mistake for the Majority to import the description of the light most favorable standard used in a civil case from a half a century ago to negate the conclusion that there was “some evidence” that Mr. Jarvis believed he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm from Mr. Durrett, and that there was “some evidence” that he believed that the amount of force used was necessary.^[3] In Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 208-09, 225, 571 A.2d 1251, 1253, 1261 (1990), where the defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder and the trial court refused 1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense?

2. If the circuit court did abuse its discretion, then did the Appellate Court legally err in determining that the abuse of discretion was harmless?

For the reasons articulated below, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense in this case. Because of that holding, we do not address the issue of harmless error.^[6]

II BACKGROUND

We begin by providing a brief overview of the law of self-defense before addressing the facts and procedural history.

A. The Law of Self-Defense

Maryland is among a minority of states that recognize both perfect and imperfect

self-defense in criminal cases. State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 233, 251 (2004) (“Maryland recognizes two varieties of self-defense—the traditional one that we now call perfect or complete self-defense and a lesser form sometimes referred to as imperfect or partial self- defense.”); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion

Heuristic, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 293, 325 (2012) (“[O]nly a minority of jurisdictions recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, although this number is growing.” (footnote omitted)). Perfect self-defense requires the following:

(1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential assailant;

6 See Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 556 (1993) (declining to “reach the harmless error issue” because this Court found “no error” on the part of the circuit court).

(2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger;

(3) The accused claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and (4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, that is, the force must not have been more force than the exigency demanded.

Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 234–35 (2017) (emphasis and citation omitted). In addition, in the case of deadly force outside of one’s home, an individual must make a reasonable effort to retreat before using such force. Id. at 235.

As its name suggests, perfect self-defense is a total defense to murder—and all lesser included offenses—and, if accepted by the trier of fact, necessitates an acquittal. Id.

Unlike perfect self-defense, imperfect self-defense is not a complete defense to the crime(s) charged. State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 486 (1984). Instead, imperfect self- defense modifies the first and fourth requirements of perfect self-defense (as articulated above). See Porter, 455 Md. at 235. Where perfect self-defense requires a defendant’s subjective belief regarding imminent danger to be reasonable, imperfect self-defense obviates that requirement, mandating a defendant to show “that he [or she] actually believed that he [or she] was in danger, even if that belief was unreasonable.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, while perfect self-defense requires that the force used be

objectively reasonable, imperfect self-defense allows for an unreasonable amount of force, so long as the defendant subjectively believed such force was necessary. Id. Lastly, in the case of deadly force used outside the home, to have acted in imperfect self-defense, a defendant “must have only ‘subjectively believe[d] that retreat was not safe’—that belief need not be reasonable.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 284 (1997)). Thus, in summary, imperfect self-defense requires the defendant to show that

he or she actually (i.e., subjectively) believed that: (1) he or she was in danger; (2) the amount of force he or she used was necessary; and (3) retreat was not safe. Id. Each of these beliefs can be unreasonable. Id.

In Porter, we explained that when a defendant accused of murder presents evidence of self-defense, a proper instruction enables the jury to reach one of three verdicts:

(1) guilty of murder, if the jury concludes that “the defendant did not have a subjective belief that the use of deadly force was necessary,” (2) not guilty, if the jury concludes “that the defendant had a reasonable subjective belief,” [i.e., perfect self-defense]; and (3) guilty of voluntary manslaughter, if the jury concludes “that the defendant honestly believed that the use of force was necessary but that this subjective belief was unreasonable under the circumstances.” [i.e., imperfect self-defense] Id. at 236 (quoting Faulkner, 301 Md. at 500–01).

B. Factual Background

The recitation of facts is drawn from the trial testimony that occurred over February

26 and 27, 2020, before the Honorable J. Frederick Price (the “trial judge”) in the Circuit

Court for Cecil County. We first recount the uncontroverted testimony. We then discuss the underlying altercation between Petitioner and Mr. Durrett from the perspectives of (1)

Mr. and Mrs. Durrett and (2) Petitioner.

Late on the night of May 5, 2019, Mrs. Durrett received a call from Ms. Shoap.

While the topic of that phone conversation is unknown, the phone call prompted an exchange of text messages and a voice message between Mr. Durrett and Petitioner. Mr.

Durrett initiated contact with the first text message on May 6, 2019, at 12:18 a.m.: [Mr. Durrett]: Yo this is Ethan. I need you to do the right thing and take Patty’s[7] car back .

[Mr. Durrett]: You have a new born at home dude and your wife is hysterically crying . Are you sick in the head dude ? Go there keep your mouth shut and love your family . Be thankful for what you have my dude. ..do the right thing please brother we don’t need serious issues

[Petitioner]: Let have serious issues dawg

(All sic in original). At this point in the exchange, Petitioner sent to Mr. Durrett a recorded

voice message that was sent as a text message.^[8] The pertinent portions of the remainder of the text messages are as follows:

[Mr. Durrett]: Hey friend meet me in the back of wawa so we can chat.. out of respect for your wife and kid I know you would never want to cause attention or drama where there sleeping

[Mr. Durrett]: I’m on my way

[Petitioner]: Come to my [expletive] house bro.

[Petitioner]: There is no talking at all.

[Mr. Durrett]: That disrespectful and you could get kicked out be smart 0lease come to wawa

[Mr. Durrett]: Or walk across the street

[Mr. Durrett]: Or look il meet you out in that field away from the apartments

7 Patty is Mr. Durrett and Petitioner’s mother-in-law (Mrs. Durrett and Ms. Shoap’s mother). Patty’s last name is not referenced within the record, and we mean no disrespect by referring to her by her first name only. At the time, Petitioner was borrowing Patty’s car but was refusing to return it. ^[8] While the voice message is not entirely discernable, Petitioner clearly (1) asks Mr. Durrett if Mr. Durrett wants to have “serious [expletive] issues” (2) states “let’s have serious [expletive] issues,” and (3) tells Mr. Durrett to “mind [his] own [expletive] business.” The entirety of the voice message is said in a passionate, upset tone.

[Petitioner]: Dude it’s pitch black there are no cameras come to my house. Ain’t no talkin or yelling..

(All sic in original).

Mrs. Durrett then drove herself and Mr. Durrett to Petitioner’s residence, the Pine

Hill Apartments (“Pine Hill”), located at 367 Fletchwood Road, Elkton, MD, near the Maryland-Delaware border. Pine Hill is an apartment complex that is situated between two parking lots. One lot, on the left, is an accessory lot and the other, on the right, wraps around the apartment buildings. When the Durretts arrived, they parked in the accessory

parking lot, which they do not typically use when they visit Pine Hill. The encounter and altercation between Mr. Durrett and Petitioner lasted no more than one minute. The particulars vary markedly depending on whom you ask. We recount each version.

1. The Durretts’ version of events

Upon arriving at the agreed upon location, Mrs. Durrett remained in the vehicle, which she kept running with the headlights on, while Mr. Durrett exited the vehicle and began walking towards the apartment buildings. Mr. Durrett noticed Petitioner standing roughly 20–30 feet ahead of him and heard Petitioner state, “Yo, mother [expletive].” Mr.

Durrett turned his back to Petitioner and motioned for Petitioner to come towards Mr.

Durrett so the two could have a discussion in a better-lit area and away from the apartment building so that Petitioner and his family could avoid getting kicked out of that complex.

Mr. Durrett heard Petitioner’s footsteps as he began running towards Mr. Durrett. Mr.

Durrett turned around and “planted [his] feet” just in time for Petitioner to run into Mr.

Durrett “pretty fast and pretty hard[,]” with Petitioner wrapping his arms around Mr.

Durrett in a hugging-like manner, stabbing him in his left lower back in the process.

In that moment, Mr. Durrett did not realize he had been stabbed; he simply felt “hot and adrenaline[,]” and believed that the knife’s impact simply had been a punch.

Petitioner’s force was enough to knock Mr. Durrett to the ground with Petitioner landing on top of Mr. Durrett. At this point, Mr. Durrett felt a “throbbing” sensation and said to

Petitioner, “Dude, you stabbed me, didn’t you?” Petitioner replied, “Yeah, you mother

[expletive], yes.” The two continued to roll around, but the altercation eventually ended with the two in a stalemate, with Mr. Durrett lying on his right shoulder and Petitioner behind and on top of him. Petitioner dropped the knife, and Mr. Durrett began pushing

Petitioner off him, punched Petitioner at least once, and was able to stand up. At this point, both individuals could see the blood from Mr. Durrett’s injury. Mrs. Durrett, who witnessed the entire altercation, exited the vehicle and began running towards Mr. Durrett and Petitioner. Petitioner attempted to get up, but Mr. Durrett kicked him in the stomach.

While on the ground, Petitioner stated “I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to.”

2. Petitioner’s version of events

Petitioner recalled the event quite differently. On May 5, Petitioner was working his typical work shift of 2:00/2:30 p.m.–10:45 p.m. Petitioner indicated that his wife, Ms.

Shoap, was worried about what might have delayed his arrival home and that his lack of urgency in returning home sparked an argument between them. On his way home, he received the text messages from Mr. Durrett (previously recounted). While he thought that Mr. Durrett’s text messages were inappropriate and passive aggressive, he did not desire any sort of altercation with Mr. Durrett.

Upon arriving at Pine Hill, Petitioner did not see anyone else, and he parked his car

in the accessory parking lot. Although the accessory parking lot is further away from the apartment buildings, Petitioner wanted to avoid any sort of conflict with Mr. Durrett, as visitors generally would park in the lot that is closer to, and wraps around, the apartment buildings. Petitioner exited his vehicle, locked the vehicle door, turned around, and saw

Mr. Durrett, who was waiting for him and motioned for Petitioner to go over to a field behind the apartment buildings. At this point, Petitioner made a few observations: Mrs.

Durrett’s car was parked in the accessory parking lot, Mr. Durrett appeared to be “sweating profusely[,]” and Mr. Durrett was being “aggressive in his movements.” Petitioner attempted to avoid Mr. Durrett by going around the other side of other parked vehicles because Petitioner “didn’t want any issues with [Mr. Durrett]” and “wanted to go home.”

Mr. Durrett followed Petitioner and cut him off, prompting Petitioner—out of fear— to raise his voice and yell in an attempt to draw attention to the two. When that tactic failed, Petitioner flicked open and brandished a knife that he carried for work on his utility

belt, hoping that Mr. Durrett would see it. Mr. Durrett eventually positioned himself within “swinging distance” of Petitioner and attempted to punch Petitioner. Petitioner “ducked in the nick of time[]” and “proceeded to grab [Mr. Durrett] because [Petitioner] didn’t want

[Mr. Durrett] to keep swinging at [Petitioner,]” as Mr. Durrett is “much larger than

[Petitioner].”

After Petitioner grabbed Mr. Durrett, the two went to the ground. Petitioner was not aware at that moment that he had stabbed Mr. Durrett, nor did he intend to stab Mr.

Durrett. The two were side-by-side on the ground; when Mr. Durrett realized he had been stabbed, he began wrestling with Petitioner for control of the knife. Meanwhile, Petitioner was fearful that Mr. Durrett would take possession of the knife and retaliate. Petitioner eventually let go of and threw the knife, and Mr. Durrett then “beat [Petitioner’s] head into

the asphalt[,]” kicking and punching Petitioner several times. At some point during the confrontation, Petitioner saw out of his peripheral vision Mrs. Durrett “pull[] out of the parking lot[]” and travel “up the other side of the development.” By the end of the roughly

60-second altercation, Mrs. Durrett had returned and attempted to pull Mr. Durrett off

Petitioner because Mr. Durrett was “bouncing [Petitioner’s] head off of the asphalt.”

When Mr. Durrett relayed to Mrs. Durrett that he had been stabbed, Petitioner stated that he “didn’t mean for it to happen. [He] didn’t mean for [Mr. Durrett] to be wounded or to get stabbed, to get hurt.” Even during his direct examination, Petitioner still was unsure how exactly the stabbing occurred, but he acknowledged that the knife was in his own hand when it did. He confirmed that he had no intent to kill Mr. Durrett and that he was not waiting for Mr. Durrett in the accessory parking lot.

* * *

The Durretts returned to their vehicle and sought medical attention for Mr. Durrett’s injury. Mr. Durrett eventually was treated at a hospital in Newark, Delaware. A few days later, Petitioner was arrested in Delaware and extradited to Maryland where he faced a five- count indictment: (I) attempted first-degree murder, (II) attempted second-degree murder, (III) first-degree assault, (IV) second-degree assault, and (V) reckless endangerment.

C. Procedural History

1. The Circuit Court for Cecil County

After the close of all the evidence, while discussing the verdict sheet and jury instructions, Petitioner’s trial counsel requested instructions for perfect and imperfect self- defense (MPJI-Cr 5:07 and 4:17.4).9 As to perfect self-defense, defense counsel stated that

Petitioner “testified that he got the knife out because he was afraid of Mr. Durrett . . . and he was trying to keep [Mr. Durrett] away from him.” Concerning imperfect self-defense, defense counsel further proffered that, even if Petitioner’s belief was not reasonable, “if the jury would believe that [Petitioner] believed that he was entitled to pull the knife out to protect himself, he’s entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction.” The State argued that the defense had not generated enough evidence for either the perfect or imperfect self- defense instruction and argued that both requests should be rejected. The trial judge granted Petitioner’s request for the perfect self-defense instruction but denied his request for the imperfect self-defense instruction; the trial judge gave no explanation for why he granted the former request but denied the latter. After the trial judge instructed the jury and just before closing arguments, defense counsel renewed his request for the imperfect self-defense instruction, which the trial judge “noted” and ultimately denied (by not so instructing the jury).

9 The State and Petitioner also submitted written requests for jury instructions. Petitioner specifically requested an instruction on both perfect and imperfect self-defense.

The jury acquitted Petitioner on the attempted murder charges, but it convicted him of first- and second-degree assault, as well as reckless endangerment. For his first-degree

assault conviction, the Honorable V. Michael Whelan10 sentenced Petitioner to 15 years of incarceration, all but 10 years suspended, with five years of supervised probation.

Petitioner timely appealed his convictions.

2. The Appellate Court of Maryland Pertinent to this appeal, Petitioner asked the Appellate Court whether the trial judge

erred in refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. Jarvis v. State, No. 744, 2023 WL 4676989, at *1 (Md. App. Ct. July 21, 2023).11 The Appellate Court recognized that the trial judge did not provide an explanation for granting the request for an instruction on perfect self-defense but not imperfect self-defense. Id. at *2. And the court further recognized that it would be difficult “to imagine a situation where a defendant would be able to produce sufficient evidence to generate a jury issue as to perfect self[-]defense but not as to imperfect self[-]defense.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Faulkner, 301 Md. at 502). Because “the existence of a belief is all imperfect self-defense requires, it will almost always be generated whenever perfect self-defense is generated.” Id.

10 Although Judge Price had been sitting as a Senior Judge since April 2009, pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, Article IV, § 3A, he voluntarily removed himself from recall status in the first half of September 2020, before Petitioner’s sentencing hearing. Thus, Judge Whelan sentenced Petitioner.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Petitioner, the Appellate Court stated that Petitioner did not want to fight Mr. Durrett and brought out his knife to deter conflict, and that Mr. Durrett was both physically bigger than Petitioner and threw the first punch. Id. at *3. The Appellate Court reasoned that, because the trial judge found this evidence sufficient to generate an instruction for perfect self-defense, the trial judge

“necessarily found that the reasonableness of [Petitioner’s] belief was at issue. According

to the Appellate Court, because the existence of [Petitioner’s] belief was thus also at issue, the trial [judge] abused [his] discretion by not also giving the imperfect self-defense

instruction.” Id. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court held that this error was harmless and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. Id.

III STANDARD OF REVIEW

At the request of either party, the trial court shall “instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding[,]” but the trial court need not “grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by [other] instructions[.]” Md. Rule 4-325(c). In other words, a requested jury instruction is required

when (1) it “is a correct statement of the law;” (2) it “is applicable under the facts of the case;” and (3) its contents were “not fairly covered elsewhere in the jury instruction[s] actually given.” Rainey v. State, 480 Md. 230, 255 (2022) (quoting Ware v. State, 348 Md.

19, 58 (1997)).

To assign error to a trial court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction, the aggrieved party must lodge an on-the-record objection “promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.” Md. Rule 4-325(f). On appeal, we review the overall decision of the trial court for an abuse of discretion, but the second requirement (whether the instruction is applicable in that case) is akin to assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, which requires a de novo review. Rainey, 480 Md. at 255.

In assessing whether a particular jury instruction is applicable under the facts of a given case, a defendant must, as an initial matter, “produce ‘some evidence’ sufficient to

raise the jury issue.” Arthur v. State, 420 Md. 512, 525 (2011). In the realm of self-defense, the defendant, thus, bears the initial burden of “producing ‘some evidence’ on the issue of mitigation or self-defense” to entitle him or her to a jury instruction. Dykes v. State, 319

Md. 206, 215 (1990) (quoting Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 40 (1988)). The defendant must meet this burden as to each element of the defense, though we have consistently held that this burden is a “fairly low hurdle[.]” Arthur, 420 Md. at 526. Indeed, the “some evidence” standard need not even rise to the level of a preponderance. State v. Martin, 329

Md. 351, 359 (1993). And because whether “some evidence” exists is viewed in the light most favorable to the requesting party, Rainey, 480 Md. at 268, both the source of that evidence and its weight compared to the other evidence presented at trial are immaterial, Martin, 329 Md. at 359.

IV ANALYSIS

We begin by summarizing the parties’ contentions before moving to our own analysis of the evidence in this case.

Petitioner argues that the trial judge “correctly instructed the jury on perfect self- defense[]” but erred when he declined to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense.

Petitioner contends that “[w]hen the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to [him], it is clear that he has met his burden of establishing the minimal quantum of evidence necessary to generate the [imperfect self-defense] instruction.” In support of that contention, he cites to his own testimony, which, he asserts, reveals the following:

• Mr. Durrett is a strong individual who is physically bigger than Petitioner;

• Petitioner feared Mr. Durrett and wanted to avoid confrontation with him;

• Mr. Durrett sought out Petitioner and cut off Petitioner’s route home; and • Petitioner utilized various tactics to avoid confrontation, such as yelling and trying to draw attention to the two, as well as brandishing a knife.

Based on that evidence, Petitioner asserts that, had the trial judge given the imperfect self-defense instruction, “a reasonable jury could have found that [he] had a subjective actual belief that his life was in danger and that he had to react as he did, even though the jury [ultimately] may have determined that his beliefs were unreasonable.”

The State doubles down on the other side: not only did the trial judge not err in refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense, but the trial judge committed error when he instructed the jury on perfect self-defense. Thus, according to the State, Petitioner

“actually received more—not less—than he was entitled to in terms of instructions.”

Regarding imperfect self-defense, the State believes that Petitioner did not present any evidence that he both “actually believed [that] he was in imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm” and “actually believed that his use of deadly force was necessary in response to such danger.”

We agree with the State that Petitioner did not meet his burden to produce “some evidence” to generate the imperfect self-defense instruction.

Cabining our review solely to the imperfect self-defense instruction, neither party introduced any evidence that Petitioner subjectively believed that stabbing Mr. Durrett was necessary to avoid imminent bodily injury.^[12] Reviewing Petitioner’s testimony in the light most favorable to him and accepting it as true, Petitioner undercuts the essence of a self- defense theory: that the act in question deliberately was done for self-defense purposes.

Petitioner did not testify at trial that he used deadly force against Mr. Durrett because he subjectively believed doing so was necessary for his safety, nor did he assert that in any

pretrial statement that was introduced at trial. And while circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom can satisfy the “some evidence” standard, see

Martin, 329 Md. at 363, we disagree that the evidence in this case, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Petitioner, satisfied the requisite threshold.

As we have explained, a defendant’s state of mind “must be determined by a consideration of his [or her] acts, conduct and words” but “[o]rdinarily,” the source of that evidence “will be testimony by the defendant.” Martin, 329 Md. at 361, 363 (cleaned up).

Here, Petitioner testified that he intentionally tackled Mr. Durrett but that he never—at any point—actively tried to stab Mr. Durrett. He admitted that, when both he and Mr. Durrett went to the ground, he had no idea that Mr. Durrett had been stabbed. After Mr. Durrett told Mrs. Durrett that he had been stabbed, Petitioner testified that he told the Durretts that he did not intend for Mr. Durrett to “get hurt[,]” “be wounded[,]” or “get stabbed[;]” he simply “didn’t mean for it to happen.” When asked during his direct examination how Mr.

Durrett “g[o]t stabbed,” Petitioner replied, “I honestly couldn’t tell you.”

The Durretts’ testimony similarly reflects the absence of any evidence that

Petitioner maintained a subjective belief that stabbing Mr. Durrett was necessary for Petitioner’s safety. Mr. Durrett testified that, during the altercation, he stated to Petitioner, “[Y]ou stabbed me didn’t you?” to which Petitioner replied, according to Mr. Durrett, “Yeah, mother [expletive], yes.” The jury could certainly infer from that statement from

Petitioner (as recounted by Mr. Durrett) that Petitioner intentionally stabbed Mr. Durrett.

But rather than establish that Petitioner acted under a belief that stabbing Mr. Durrett was an appropriate use of force in response to a threat, Mr. Durrett testified that Petitioner’s use of deadly force was unprovoked and that Petitioner was the initial aggressor.

There were thus two accounts of the events leading up to Petitioner stabbing Mr.

Durrett. Under one, the stabbing was accidental. Under the other, the stabbing was intentional and unprovoked. Neither account contains any evidence that Petitioner possessed a subjective belief that stabbing Mr. Durrett was necessary for Petitioner’s protection. In the first account, the stabbing was not necessary at all. In the second, it was necessary to carry out Petitioner’s desire to harm Mr. Durrett, not to protect Petitioner. Nor would it be appropriate to combine individual, out-of-context portions of the two accounts

to cobble together an inference that is inconsistent with both of them. While the “in the light most favorable” standard requires that the evidence and proper inferences be drawn

in Petitioner’s favor, that standard “does not require ‘the taking of isolated sentences, or parts of sentences, in the testimony and construing them out of context, without any regard to the rest of the witness’s testimony.’”13 Rodriguez v. Lynch, 246 Md. 623, 626 (1967)

(quoting Gatling v. Sampson, 242 Md. 173, 182 (1966)).14 In neither account, then, is there any evidence that Petitioner subjectively believed

that the amount of force he used was necessary for his protection. As we have explained, “[a]lthough as a legal matter there is no bar to putting forth different or inconsistent theories

of defense [e.g., accident and self-defense], there will often be practical problems of proof, particularly where different theories involve proof of different mental states on the part of the defendant.” Sims v. State, 319 Md. 540, 550–51 (1990). Here, Petitioner ran into these

“practical problems of proof[.]” Id. at 551. It becomes extremely difficult for a defendant to produce “some evidence” that he or she subjectively believed using deadly force was necessary to protect themselves, when the defendant testifies that the use of deadly force was accidental only. Cf. id. at 554–55 (“The issue in this instance involved the honestly

held subjective feelings of the perpetrator at the moment of the shooting. When the defendant maintains that he was not the perpetrator, this becomes a very difficult, though probably not impossible, burden to meet.” (footnote omitted)). In other words, we have

difficulty inferring that Petitioner subjectively believed that his use of deadly force (the knife) was necessary where the evidence from him shows that he never intended to use that very same deadly force and the evidence from the victim shows that his use of force was

intentional, but as the unprovoked aggressor.^[15] See Porter, 455 Md. at 235 (noting that the defendant must have “actually believed the amount of force used was necessary[]”

(emphasis omitted)); see also Selby v. State, 361 Md. 319, 332 (2000) (noting that voluntary manslaughter is an intentional homicide).

Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418 (2000), illustrates this issue well. In Roach, we were asked “whether [the defendant] was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction based

upon a theory of imperfect self-defense.” 358 Md. at 421. And like the trial judge here, the circuit court in Roach instructed the jury on perfect self-defense but not imperfect self-

defense. Id. at 425. Roach was charged with shooting and murdering another individual, Bunn. Id. at 421–22. At trial, Roach maintained that the shooting was an accident. Id. at

423–24. The State, however, introduced into evidence four pretrial statements that Roach made to the police. Id. at 422. In the first, second, and fourth statements, Roach never recounted any details regarding the shooting; he specifically claimed in his first statement that he was unaware of who shot Bunn, did not own a gun, and only heard the gunshots from across the street. Id. at 422–23.

In the third statement, however, Roach indicated that he and a third party began arguing and fighting over a $5 debt. Id. at 422. Bunn, a friend of the third party, joined the altercation and began fighting with Roach. Id. According to Roach, Bunn

came straight to me and start[ed] beating [me] to the ground so I seen the gun on the ground and [Bunn] seen the gun so I thought that he was going to kill me right there on scene but I got the gun from him and we was fighting for the gun until somebody said the Police is in the store so he didn’t care if the Police was in the store so I hit him with the gun and he start[ed] going across the street me and him so we start fighting again and because of him been drunk he fell over the curb and tried to take the gun and I shot him but I didn’t want to because I thought he was going to tried to do something to me . . . . When I picked up the gun, [Bunn] grabbed me. Vito yelled “hit him!” [Bunn] rushed me. I hit him with the gun. We kept struggling. We both continued struggling. We were across the street (George Palmer Highway). He fell at the curb in the parking lot of the Belle Haven Apartments. He tried to get up. I shot him.

Id. at 422–23. Roach later admitted in that statement that he owned the gun. Id. at 423.

The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court correctly declined to provide the imperfect self-defense instruction, explaining that Roach could “not have believed that he was using a level of force necessary to defend himself by shooting the victim, because, as he testified, he did not know the victim had been shot.” Id. at 425 (footnote and internal quotations omitted). We reversed that decision, noting that Roach’s third statement

“constituted some evidence of self-defense . . . sufficient to generate the issue.” Id. at 432.

Even though Roach testified at trial that the shooting was an accident, we noted that a defendant is entitled to any instruction that is “fairly supported by the evidence, even if several theories offered are inconsistent.” Id. (quoting Sims v. State, 319 Md. 540, 550

(1990)).

Like Roach, Petitioner was free to pursue alternative, and even inconsistent, defense theories (accident and self-defense). Also, like Roach, Petitioner’s testimony at trial sounded solely in accident, in that he disclaimed ever intentionally using the knife. See id.

at 423–24, 432. But Roach is distinguishable because there, unlike in Petitioner’s case, Roach’s pretrial statement that he intentionally shot the victim in self-defense was

introduced into evidence. For that reason, coupled with the rest of the relevant evidence, we were able to infer that Roach subjectively believed shooting the victim was necessary for his safety. This distinction is critical. Unlike Roach, there was no other evidence here that supported the theory that Petitioner intentionally stabbed Mr. Durrett because

Petitioner subjectively believed that such deadly force was necessary. See id. at 432.

Regarding that belief, the jury heard from Petitioner that Petitioner never intentionally used that deadly force against Mr. Durrett, and from Mr. Durrett that the use of force was intentional but unprovoked. That distinction is critical because by its very nature, imperfect self-defense relates to an intentional or knowing use of force that is for protection, not an accidental stabbing or an unprovoked stabbing. Testimony that an action was accidental—

alone—cannot be used to support the theory that the action was both an accident and intentionally done in self-defense. See id. Such testimony does not meet the “minimum threshold of evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case that would allow a jury to rationally conclude that the evidence supports the application of the legal theory desired.”

Dishman v. State, 352 Md. 279, 292 (1998) (second emphasis added).16

Petitioner contends that the record contained “some evidence” that he subjectively believed stabbing Mr. Durrett was necessary for his safety, namely the following circumstantial evidence: (1) Mr. Durrett played high school football and was physically bigger than Petitioner; (2) Mr. Durrett sought out Petitioner late at night, approached him from behind, and cut off his path home; (3) Petitioner was afraid of Mr. Durrett so he began yelling to draw attention to the two and then brandished his knife; and (4) Mr. Durrett threw the first punch, Petitioner ducked it, and then grabbed or quick hugged Mr. Durrett, with the pocketknife in his hand, because he did not want Mr. Durrett to keep swinging at him.

The Dissent makes a similar argument. Dissent Slip Op. at 6–9.

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Petitioner, this circumstantial evidence does not amount to “some evidence” that Petitioner subjectively believed stabbing Mr. Durrett was necessary for his safety. Indeed, Petitioner testified that he thought it was necessary to “grab” Mr. Durrett to avoid being punched, not that he thought it was necessary to stab Mr. Durrett to avoid death or serious bodily injury. (Emphasis added). In other words, Petitioner specifically testified that he thought it was necessary to use non-deadly force (grabbing Mr. Durrett), not that he thought it was necessary to use

deadly force (stabbing Mr. Durrett).17 Like his testimony that the stabbing was an accident, Petitioner’s own testimony negated the possibility that he felt it necessary to use a deadly weapon to defend himself. See Lambert v. State, 70 Md. App. 83, 98 & n.2 (1987) (holding

that, defendant claiming that, “not realizing the knife was in his hand, he punched the victim in ‘self-defense[]’” but failing to state that he “felt it necessary to stab the victim to defend himself[,]” the defendant’s “own testimony negated the possibility he felt it

necessary to use a deadly weapon[]”). As the Appellate Court explained in Lambert, “[w]hile someone in [Petitioner’s] position might have entertained an honest but

unreasonable belief that he [or she] needed to use deadly force to defend him[ or herself], the evidence furnishes no indication that [Petitioner] did, in fact, so believe.” Id. at 99.

Petitioner relies on our decision in Martin to support his argument that there was ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that he acted in self-defense.

There, the trial court declined to give an imperfect self-defense instruction, and the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Martin, 329 Md. at 353. The defendant did not deny firing the fatal shot, but he claimed he had no recollection of the incident

because he was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana. Id. at 355, 362. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in declining to provide an imperfect self- defense jury instruction. Id. at 353–54. The issue before the Court was whether evidence of the defendant’s state of mind at a prior encounter with the victim could be used to show the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the shooting, which occurred later that same day.^[18] See id. at 359–68.

Evidence with respect to the first encounter, we noted, “was rather detailed and it

focused on [Martin’s] acts, conduct[,] and words.” Id. at 363. That evidence was that the defendant and victim had a verbal argument, the victim told the defendant to leave the area and “don’t come back unless I tell you can” and that if the defendant did come back “it would be [the victim] kicking [the defendant’s] ass[.]” Id. at 354. The victim followed the defendant briefly as the defendant left the area. Id. Based on this evidence, we concluded that we could “arguably” infer that the defendant was then fearful of the victim. Id. at 364.

On the other hand, we concluded that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the second encounter which would allow us

to infer that the defendant acted in self-defense. Id. Because the victim died and the defendant testified that he could not remember the incident due to his intoxication, the sole evidence was testimony from the victim’s friend who was with the victim immediately prior to the shooting. Id. That evidence was that the victim spotted the defendant in his car, told his friend he was going to see what the defendant was doing there, and walked to the car “carrying a beer cup in one hand and a ‘party ball’[19] in the other.” Id. 354–55.

The victim’s friend then recounted that he heard a gunshot, saw the victim falling, and saw the defendant drive off in his car. Id. at 355. We rejected Martin’s attempt to extrapolate the evidence regarding his state of mind from the first encounter onto the second, stating that “[because] it is [Martin’s] subjective belief at the moment that the fatal shot is fired that is relevant and probative, evidence of a prior mental state will not suffice.” Id. at 365

(emphasis added). We concluded that because evidence pertaining to the second encounter

“provided no details of, or insight into, the circumstances of the shooting from the [defendant’s] perspective, his acts, his words, his conduct, there was nothing from which to draw an inference as to what the [defendant] subjectively believed or felt when he fired the fatal shot.” Id. at 364. Accordingly, we held that the trial court did not err in declining to give the imperfect self-defense instruction. Id. at 368.

Petitioner argues that the “evidence of the circumstances existing at the time of the stabbing from Petitioner’s perspective is far more detailed than what the Court found

‘detailed,’ ‘focused,’ and descriptive of Martin’s mental state during the first encounter

[with the victim].” We do not disagree with that statement, but it does not aid Petitioner because those circumstances did not give rise to an inference that Petitioner held a subjective belief that his use of deadly force was necessary. We did not hold in Martin that when there is detailed evidence that can aid in divining a defendant’s state of mind, a court must automatically give an imperfect self-defense jury instruction. Every case will have different evidence, and no matter how detailed the pertinent testimony may be, a court must make an independent evaluation of the admissible evidence in determining whether to provide a requested jury instruction. Here, in the light most favorable to Petitioner, there was, at most, evidence that he had a fear of Mr. Durrett as to which he thought a proportional response was lunging at and grabbing Mr. Durrett. There was no evidence that

Mr. Durrett had a propensity for violence, was armed, pulled a gun on Petitioner, or had brutally attacked Petitioner before. Compare Gunther v. Maryland, 228 Md. 404 (1962)

(defendant knew that the victim had severely beaten his sister on multiple occasions, “always” carried a gun, and had previously threatened to shoot someone, so when victim unexpectedly jumped into defendant’s car and raised his hand, defendant assumed victim had a gun),20 with Roach, 358 Md. at 422–23 (evidence indicated that victim and defendant were fighting over possession of a gun, defendant thought victim “was going to kill [him]

right there on scene[,]” so defendant shot victim when victim tried to take the gun), and Wilson v. State, 422 Md. 533, 543 (2011) (victim pulled a gun on the defendant which defendant perceived as a “[k]ill or be killed[]” situation). We simply do not have that kind of evidence in this case.

Finding no support in the totality of the circumstantial evidence just discussed, Petitioner contends that the altercation with Mr. Durrett all happened “very quickly,” so “it

would be reasonable for the jury to perceive the intentional conduct of threatening use of force by (brandishing the knife) and the stabbing []as one continuous act.” In support of his argument, Petitioner cites State v. Gomaz, 414 N.W.2d 626 (Wisc. 1987).

In Gomaz, the defendant killed the victim using a knife and was charged with first- degree murder. 414 N.W.2d at 628. The “defendant admitted that she intentionally threatened the use of self-defense, did not deny that [the victim] died as a result of a stab wound from the knife that she wielded, but she claimed that she did not intentionally thrust the knife into the deceased.” Id. at 631. The trial court gave a perfect self-defense

instruction but not an imperfect self-defense or manslaughter instruction. Id. at 629. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed her conviction on the basis that she was entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction. Id. at 627–28. On appeal, the State essentially argued that the defendant was not entitled to self-defense instruction of either kind because “self-defense is premised upon an intentional act, [so] an assertion of accidental or unintentional killing is inconsistent with a claim that use of force

is necessary for self-defense.” Id. at 629. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed, stating that it would not split hairs between “the intentional conduct of threatening use of force from the ultimate unintentional act resulting from the actions taken in self-defense” because such an exercise would “create an inconsistency [that] would . . . impose a fictional

distinction upon what was essentially one continuous act.” Id. at 631. Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial. Id. at 636.

Gomaz is not applicable because we previously have rejected the rationale underpinning it. In Martin, we stated that “intent and a subjective belief of imminent peril are not identical.” 329 Md. at 363. Circumstantial evidence tending to prove intent does not necessarily also tend to prove a subjective belief of imminent danger because [w]hat one intends to do and what one believes, even as the precipitating predicate for one’s intent, are entirely separate and distinct states of mind. A defendant may intend to kill the victim, but only because he or she honestly believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, which can only be avoided by the use of force.

Id. Gomaz, thus, rejects what Martin explicitly embraces: the distinction between state of mind as to imminent danger and one’s intent to use force. Gomaz blurs the distinction that this Court recognized by ignoring the very real possibility that some individuals may threaten force, hoping to deter a potential attacker, while concurrently never intending to use that threatened force. Indeed, the evidence in this case shows that is essentially what

occurred here, at least according to Petitioner. Petitioner testified that he brandished the knife in order to deter a confrontation, explaining that he “flicked the knife open just to brandish it, just hoping that [Mr. Durrett] would see it[,]” not because he actually believed that stabbing Mr. Durrett was necessary to protect himself from death or serious bodily injury. It should go without saying that brandishing a knife in hopes of deterring conflict is not the same thing as actively using that knife to stab someone because of a subjective belief that doing so is necessary for one’s safety.

Gomaz also is distinguishable for another reason: it involved a request for a jury instruction based on a Wisconsin self-defense statute, which stated that a “person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another[,]” and that the person

“may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as he reasonably believes is necessary[.]” Gomaz, 414 N.W.2d at 630 n.4 (quoting § 939.48) (emphasis added).21 Maryland does not have a similar statute, and our case law has consistently focused solely on the “use” of force as opposed to “threat” thereof. See, e.g., Porter, 455 Md. at 234–36

(providing a detailed overview of both the perfect and imperfect self-defense elements in Maryland and referring solely to the “use” of force).

We conclude that the record shows that there was no evidence that Petitioner

subjectively believed his use of deadly force was necessary for his safety. We, therefore, hold that the trial judge did not err in declining to instruct the jury on imperfect self- defense.

V CONCLUSION

Petitioner was free to argue to the jury that the stabbing of Mr. Durrett was both an accident and intentionally done in self-defense. But that choice alone does not require that the jury automatically be so instructed on those inconsistent theories. Petitioner was required to put forth evidence to fairly support each theory of defense. See Sims, 319 Md. at 550 (“[A] defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense that is fairly supported by the evidence, even if several theories offered are inconsistent.”).

Here, there was no evidence to support one of the two inconsistent theories now proffered by Petitioner.

Rather, the evidence supported only two theories: (1) that the stabbing was unintentional; or (2) that the stabbing was intentional but unprovoked, and Petitioner was the primary aggressor. Neither account presented any evidence tending to show that

Petitioner subjectively believed stabbing Mr. Durrett was necessary for his safety. Thus, Petitioner did not meet the “some evidence” threshold to warrant generating an instruction

as to imperfect self-defense. The trial judge did not err in refusing to give that instruction, and Petitioner received more than he was entitled to when the trial judge instructed the jury on perfect self-defense. Because the trial judge committed no error in declining to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense, we do not opine on the second question presented regarding harmless error, and we affirm Petitioner’s conviction.

JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.