Commonwealth v. Richards, 296 N.E.2d 506 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973). · Go Syfert
Commonwealth v. Richards, 296 N.E.2d 506 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: SARA CLINE & Others v. PLANNING BOARD OF FRAMINGHAM & Others (massappct, 2025-10-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SARA CLINE & Others v. PLANNING BOARD OF FRAMINGHAM & Others
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
On appeal, we do not pass on the wisdom or potential efficacy of conditions imposed by the board, which is in the best position for an "evaluation of the seriousness of the problem." Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 821 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley
Mass. · 2012 · confidence medium
The board argues that, because there will be a measurable increase in traffic, “[i]t is the board’s evaluation of the seriousness of the problem, not the judge’s, which is controlling,” quoting Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 821 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc. v. Board of Appeal
Mass. · 2009 · confidence medium
Although the judge determines the facts, it is “the board’s evaluation of the seriousness of the problem, not the judge’s, which is controlling.” Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 488 (1979), quoting Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 821 (1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sommer v. Monga
Mass. App. Ct. · 1994 · confidence medium
See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543, 544 (1867); Commonwealth v. Rezendes, 353 Mass. 228 (1967); Commonwealth v. Richards, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 821-822 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colangelo v. Board of Appeals of Lexington (2×)
Mass. · 1990 · confidence medium
"To hold that a decision ... denying a permit is arbitrary ... whenever the board, on the facts found by the trial judge, could have granted a permit, would eliminate the board's intended discretion." Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 486 (1979), quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277-278 (1969). "[I]t is `the board's evaluation of the seriousness of the problem, not the judge's, which is controlling.'" Subaru of New England, Inc., supra at 488, quoting Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 82…
discussed Cited "see" Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Appeals
Mass. App. Ct. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821 (1973); Dowd v. Board of Appeals of Dover, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 148, 154 (1977); Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 488 (1979).
cited Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Richards
Mass. App. Ct. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Richards, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821 (1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rae v. Vultaggio
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Schiffone v. ZBA of Walpole, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 981, 984 (1990) (“[I]t is ‘the board’s evaluation of the seriousness of the problem, not the judge’s, which is controlling,’ ” quoting Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 8 Mass.App.Ct. 483, 488 (1979), in turn quoting from Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass.App.Ct. 821 (1973)). 24.
Commonwealth
v.
Ralph P. Richards
Massachusetts Appeals Court.
May 7, 1973.
296 N.E.2d 506
Robert A. Stanziani for the defendant. John F. Creedon, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

On December 1, 1970, the defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed, briefs were submitted by the parties, and the matter was argued before this court at its January sitting. Subsequently, on January 30, 1973, the defendant was granted a six day furlough from the institution to which he had been committed. He has never returned from that furlough. On learning that the defendant was a fugitive, the attorney for the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. At the hearing on the motion, counsel for the defendant agreed that the defendant had been granted a furlough, had not returned at its expiration, and that his whereabouts were unknown. In Commonwealth v. Rezendes, 353 Mass. 228, it was clearly[*822] stated that the right of appeal cannot be permitted to a fugitive from justice. In that case the court said, “By his voluntary act, which renders him unavailable to await the decision of the court, he has waived appellate rights. There is no occasion for us to consider his exceptions or any arguments now made on his behalf. This is the necessary consequence of our cases, a result which we fully approve. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543. Commonwealth v. Dowdican’s Bail, 115 Mass. 133, 137. Henderson v. Henderson, 329 Mass. 257, 258. Ellis v. Doherty, 334 Mass. 466, 468. See Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138. See also 69 A. L. R. 2d 824, 848.”

Robert A. Stanziani for the defendant. John F. Creedon, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Appeal dismissed.