Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
76 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Mulcahy v. Sullivan (massdistctapp, 2013-11-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mulcahy v. Sullivan (2×) also: Cited "see"
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Instead, the negligent defendant... bears the burden of showing that its negligence produced no loss to the plaintiff because, even if there had been no negligence, the underlying action would have achieved the same result Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597 , 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (1981). ‘[S]ince the client had no obligation “to prove his case” in the underlying action (he could have simply required the plaintiff to prove his case), he should not shoulder the burden of proving a defense in a malpractice action.’ (quoting NOLAN, TORT LAW §182 at 297); see also Deerfield Plast…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Udemba v. Lipede
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Bank v. Callahan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 82 (1984), quoting Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Correia v. Fagan
Mass. · 2008 · confidence medium
Co., 387 Mass. 814, 817 (1983); out of which arose (b) a duty “to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of [the attorney’s] legal duties,” Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981); (c) a violation of that duty, Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 646 (1986); and (d) “reasonably foreseeable loss [or damages] caused by [the attorney’s] negligence,” id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matthews v. D'Arcy
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005 (1985); Fall River Savings Bank v. Callahan, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 76, 82 (1984); Brown v. Gerstein, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 558, 566 (1984); DiPiero v. Goodman, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 929, 929-30 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983); and Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 598 (1981). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kourouvacilis v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
There, the plaintiff alleging malpractice by her former attorney in handling a litigation cannot rest on conclusory allegations or presumptions in order to establish causation, i.e., proximately caused damages, but rather must prove that, but for the attorney’s negligence, a favorable judgment or better settlement would probably have been obtained, a requirement often referred to as the “trial within a trial.” See Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 647 (1986); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 600 (1981).
examined Cited as authority (rule) St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Birch, Stewart, Kolasch & Birch, LLP (3×)
D. Mass. · 2006 · confidence medium
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (“St.Paul”), takes the position that the burden-shifting articulated in Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 600 , 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (1981) applies.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gallagher v. Bougioukas
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
See Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005 (1985); Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 647 (1986); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 598 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shimer v. Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP
Mass. App. Ct. · 2003 · confidence medium
In addition to proving that FHE failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in rendering him legal advice, Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005 (1985); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981), it was Shimer’s obligation to prove that FHE’s negligence was the proximate cause of his reasonably foreseeable damages or loss.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Ellis & Ellis
1st Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597 , 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (1981) (“[S]ince the client had no obligation ‘to prove his case’ in the underlying action (he could have simply required the plaintiff to prove his case), he should not shoulder the burden of proving a defense in the malpractice action.” (quoting Nolan, Tort Law § 182 at 297)); see also Deerfield Plastics Co. v. Hartford Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clerico v. Great Road Floors, Inc.
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
The Court rules that the standard of care in the circumstances of this case required David to provide an Agreement which bound Barrasso, and that his failure to do so amounted to a failure to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling the matter for which he was retained. 8 Pongonis v. Saab, 395 Mass. 1005 (1985); McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377-78 (1917); Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574, 578 (1878); Collucci v. Rosen, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 107 , 111 (1987); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 597-98 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Atlas Tack Corp. v. Donabed
Mass. App. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Murphy v. Conway, 360 Mass. 746, 749-750 (1972) (expert testimony of physicians necessary to establish standard of care); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981) (expert testimony of attorneys generally required); Ward v. Levy, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1101, 1102 (1989) (expert opinion required to show appropriate dental practice).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Altschuler v. Flynn
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1998 · confidence medium
Co., 404 Mass. 484 , 486-87 and n. 3 (1989); see also Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699, 706 (1991); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 600 (1981); Flynn would be likely to meet the burden.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Partin v. Fischer
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1997 · confidence medium
Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 598 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. Magri
Mass. App. Ct. · 1995 · confidence medium
At the same timé, she denied the motion as to the breach of contract claim, permitting it to go to the jury. 6 The plaintiffs’ unadorned allegation that the defendant “breached” an implied contract to use his “legal training, skills and experience” in representing them, although couched in contract terms, does nothing more than implicate the implied duty of an attorney “to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of his legal duties.” Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Desrosier v. White
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1995 · confidence medium
Furthermore, a plaintiff “must show that, but for the attorney’s failure, the [plaintiff] probably would have been successful in the prosecution of the litigation giving rise to the malpractice claim.” Colucci, supra at 113 , citing Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 600 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Jones
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1994 · confidence medium
Legal Malpractice An attorney “owes his client an obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of his legal duties.” Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 598 (1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Best v. Rome
D. Mass. · 1994 · confidence medium
Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597 , 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gray v. Boyle Investment Co. (2×)
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
App.3d 689 , 93 Ill.Dec. 297, 301 , 486 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1985) and Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. 597, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Deerfield Plastics Co. v. Hartford Insurance Co.
Mass. · 1989 · confidence medium
The Appeals Court rightly so held in Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 600 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colucci v. ROSEN, GOLDBERG, SLAVET, LEVENSON
Mass. App. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
To prevail on a claim of negligence by an attorney, a client must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling the matter for which the attorney was retained, see Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574, 578 (1878); McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377-378 (1917); Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005 (1985); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 597-598 (1981); that the client has incurred a loss; and that the attorney's negligence is the proximate cause of the loss, see McLellan v. Fuller, supra at 378 ; Nolan, Tort Law § 185 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein, P.C.
Mass. App. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
To prevail on a claim of negligence by an attorney, a client must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling the matter for which the attorney was retained, see Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574, 578 (1878); McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377-378 (1917); Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005 (1985); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597,597-598 (1981); that the client has incurred a loss; and that the attorney’s negligence is the proximate cause of the loss, see McLellan v. Fuller, supra at 378 ; Nolan, Tort Law § 185 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wagenmann v. Adams (2×) also: Cited "see"
1st Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Pongonis v. Saab, 486 N.E.2d at 29 ; Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App.Ct. at 598, 427 N.E.2d 1169 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cleckner v. Dale (2×)
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
App.3d 689 , 93 Ill.Dec. 297, 301 , 486 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1985) and Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. 597, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fishman v. Brooks
Mass. · 1986 · confidence medium
See McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377-378 (1917); Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574, 578 (1878); Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick. 440 , 442 (1834); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981); Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 Mass. L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fall River Savings Bank v. Callahan (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Mass. App. Ct. · 1984 · confidence medium
Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Gerstein
Mass. App. Ct. · 1984 · confidence medium
In that memorandum, the judge pointed out that the plaintiffs had to establish that they “would have succeeded in the underlying litigation but for the attorney’s negligence in not bringing suit.” See McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 378 (1917); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 600 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'NEIL v. Bergan
D.C. · 1982 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480-81 (3d Cir.1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 Cal.App.3d 641, 648 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 254, 256-57 (1981); Gibson v. Talley, 156 Ga.App. 593, 594 , 275 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1980); Sheetz v. Morgan, 98 Ill.App.3d 794, 799 , 54 Ill.Dec. 117, 120-21 , 424 N.E.2d 867, 870-71 (1981); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 1975); Glidden v. Terranova, - Mass.App. -, -, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170-71 (1981); Hill, supra, 312 Minn, at 336, 252 N.W.2d at 116 ; Walters v. Hastings, 84 N.M. 101, 107 , 500 P.2d 186, 192 (1972)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dipiero v. Goodman
Mass. App. Ct. · 1982 · confidence medium
The plaintiff was required to present evidence sufficient to warrant jury findings that the defendants had failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling her case, see Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574, 578 (1878); McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377-378 (1917); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598 (1981), that she had incurred a loss, and that the defendants’ malpractice was the proximate cause of the loss, see McLellan v. Fuller, supra at 378 ; Nolan, Tort Law § 185 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" Glenn v. Aiken (2×)
Mass. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 600 (1981), approved on this point in Deerfield Plastics Co. v. Hartford Ins.
discussed Cited "see" ca1 1987 (2×)
1st Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. at 600 , 427 N.E.2d 1169 18 The psychiatrist, it will be recalled, had found Wagenmann from the start to be "clearly competent" and to exhibit "no signs of mental illness whatsoever." 19 Healy's authorities, though off the point, do acknowledge the salience of both foreseeability and indicia of genuineness as important factors in considering whether recovery for emotional distress should be allowed.
examined Cited "see, e.g." St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Birch, Stewart, Kolasch & Birch, LLP. (4×)
D. Mass. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 597, 600 , 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Mass.App.Ct.1981) (same).
Roger C. Glidden & Another vs. Domenic S. Terranova
Massachusetts Appeals Court.
Nov 13, 1981.
427 N.E.2d 1169
Bertram W. Allen (Timothy Allen with him) for the plaintiffs., Stephen R. Duly for the defendant.
Brown, Rose, Dreben.
Cited by 41 opinions  |  Published
Rose, J.

The plaintiffs Glidden, husband and wife, brought suit against the defendant Terranova, an attorney, alleging several claims in tort and contract arising from the defendant’s representation of them in a prior legal proceeding. The plaintiffs had been sued in District Court by a real estate broker seeking to recover a commission earned in the[*598] sale of the plaintiffs’ home. They now contend that the defendant promised to represent them and remove the action to the Superior Court for a jury trial, and that the defendant’s failure to do so resulted in default judgments and, in subsequent supplementary proceedings, the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Glidden for contempt in not paying the judgment. At the trial below, the plaintiffs presented evidence to support their claim, after which the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict. The issues argued on appeal are whether the Superior Court judge was justified in allowing the motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff did not offer expert testimony to establish either an attorney-client relationship or that the defendant violated the standard of care owed by a lawyer to his client in these particular circumstances, and (2) the plaintiffs’ evidence could not support a conclusion that the defendant’s inaction was a proximate cause of the damages alleged by the plaintiffs. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to require denial of the motion for a directed verdict and reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.

1. An attorney owes his client an obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of his legal duties. Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574 (1878). McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374 (1917). Because the question whether an attorney has exercised sufficient legal care is one of fact for the jury to decide, expert testimony is generally necessary to establish the standard of care owed by an attorney in the particular circumstances and the defendant’s alleged departure from it. Nolan, Tort Law § 186, at 299 (1979). Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 Mass. L. Rev. 15, 17 (1978). However, expert testimony is not essential where the claimed legal malpractice is so gross or obvious that laymen can rely on their common knowledge or experience to recognize or infer negligence from the facts. See Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51, 57 (1811) (“whenever an attorney disobeys the lawful instructions of his client, and a loss ensues, for that loss the attorney is responsible”); Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick. 440[*599] (1834) (evidence found sufficient to sustain a verdict against the attorney on the ground of negligence despite the apparent lack of expert testimony). The rule that expert testimony is not always required to prove legal malpractice has been adopted in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802 (1975); Collins v. Greenstein, 61 Haw. 26 (1979); House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68 (1977); Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542 (1970); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324 (1977); Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173 (1980), and is consistent with the approach followed in Massachusetts in the medical malpractice context. See Polonsky v. Union Hosp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 624 (1981), and cases cited therein.

The plaintiffs here testified that the defendant agreed to represent them in an outstanding legal action and that all legal papers relative to that action were delivered to the defendant. According to their testimony, the defendant promised to remove the action to the Superior Court for a jury trial and later informed the plaintiffs that he had removed the action. The plaintiffs further testified that they did nothing about the action in reliance on the defendant’s representation that “everything is well in hand” and that he would “straighten the whole thing out.” Actually, the defendant neither filed an answer nor removed the action, a fact which came to the plaintiffs’ attention only after default judgments were entered in the District Court. The evidence indicates that the defendant was notified in advance, yet failed to appear at both the supplementary process hearing and the contempt hearing which resulted in Mr. Glidden’s arrest and imprisonment. Finally, the plaintiffs testified that they telephoned the defendant after Mr. Glidden was committed for contempt, at which time they were told by a secretary that the defendant was in conference and could not be disturbed. According to their testimony, the sole response to the plaintiffs’ request for legal assistance was a subsequent telephone call from the defendant’s secretary to Mrs. Glidden suggesting that they “raise bail” and seek other counsel. Viewed in the light most[*600] favorable to the plaintiffs, DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 514 (1974), the evidence was such that expert testimony was not required to determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed or whether the defendant’s conduct violated the standard of reasonable care and diligence. Accordingly, it was error for the court to allow the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the ground that no expert testimony was offered.

2. Where a party who was the plaintiff in a legal action sues his attorney for negligence in the prosecution of that action, he must establish that he probably would have succeeded in the underlying litigation were it not for the attorney’s negligence. McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. at 378; Siano v. Martinelli, post 946 (1981); Hurd v. DiMento & Sullivan, 440 F.2d 1322, 1323 (1st Cir. 1971). However, there are no cases in Massachusetts which answer the question of where the burden of proof lies in a malpractice action when the defendant-attorney allegedly failed to defend in the underlying litigation. The trial court in Salisbury v. Gourgas, 10 Met. 442 (1845), following the rule in an early English case, Godefroy v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413, 131 Eng. Rep. 159 (1831), imposed the burden on the attorney of proving that the client had no defense, but the propriety of this ruling was not addressed on appeal. We hold that the attorney should indeed bear the burden of proof in such a case, for “since the client had no obligation ‘to prove his case’ in the underlying action (he could have simply required the plaintiff to prove his case), he should not shoulder the burden of proving a defense in the malpractice action.” Nolan, Tort Law § 182, at 297 (1979). See Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 Mass. L. Rev. 15, at 17 n.31 (1978) (“to require the client to prove that the underlying action was defensible requires him to establish in the malpractice suit that which he would not have been required to prove in the underlying action”). Because the plaintiffs in the present case did not have the burden of proving that they would have prevailed in the underlying litigation if the defendant had not been negligent, it was error for the[*601] Superior Court judge to allow the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiffs did not prove the defendant’s negligence to be a proximate cause of their damages.

Judgment reversed.