Commonwealth v. Thomas, 269 N.E.2d 277 (Mass. 1971). · Go Syfert
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Commonwealth v. Thomas, 269 N.E.2d 277 (Mass. 1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Commonwealth v. Yasir Y., a juvenile (mass, 2024-08-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Yasir Y., a juvenile
Mass. · 2024 · confidence medium
"We therefore have no difficulty in finding a clear legislative intention to afford juveniles" who appeal from State prison sentences "at least the same fundamental safeguards afforded to adults similarly situated." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Household Retail Services, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue
Mass. · 2007 · confidence medium
“Where the language of a statute is plain, it must be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words.” Gurley v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 595, 598 (1973), citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. the Trans-Lease Group
Mass. App. Ct. · 1993 · confidence medium
The plaintiffs offer little argument for their construction of § 15 other than a liberal interpretation of an isolated phrase in the section which provides that when the insurer and the employee are heard on the merits of the settlement, the judge may consider the matter and “the amount, if any, to which *409 the insurer is entitled out of such settlement by way of reimbursement.” They sweep aside the consequences of their reading of § 15 by claiming that the plain statutory language must be given its “usual and natural meaning.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Meacham v. Commonwealth
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 1993 · confidence medium
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED. OF AM. v. Problem Pregnancy
Mass. · 1986 · confidence medium
If by its omission of any discussion of this issue the court means to indicate that it is so obvious as not to merit any discussion, I agree. [2] General Laws c. 93A, § 1 ( b ) (1984 ed.), provides in full: "`trade' and `commerce' shall include the advertising, the offering for sale, rent or lease, the sale, rent, lease or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this commonwealth." […
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc.
Mass. · 1986 · confidence medium
General Laws c. 93A, § 1 (b) (1984 ed.), provides in full: “ ‘trade’ and ‘commerce’ shall include the advertising, the offering for sale, rent or lease, the sale, rent, lease or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this commonwealth.” This court has consistently held that when the statutory language is plain, the words must receive their “usual and natural meaning.�…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chemical Bank v. Rinden Professional Ass'n
N.H. · 1985 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 , 269 N.E.2d 277, 278 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (2×)
Mass. · 1984 · confidence medium
General Laws c. 4, § 6, provides the general standard that, unless a term in a Statute is “technical,” “words and phrases shall be construed according to the[ir] common and approved Usage.” See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971); Tilton v. Haverhill, 311 Mass. 572, 577 (1942).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Grieco
Mass. · 1982 · confidence medium
So ordered. 1 The Commonwealth argues that the words of the statute must be given their “usual and natural meaning.” See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department of Youth Services v. a Juvenile
Mass. · 1981 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387-388 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shoolman v. Health Facilities Appeals Board
Mass. App. Ct. · 1980 · confidence medium
Absent some indication to the contrary, the plain language of a statute must be interpreted “in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Lee
Mass. App. Ct. · 1980 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Krasner, 358 Mass. 727, 729 [1971].” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Rodriguez (2×) also: Cited "see"
Mass. · 1978 · confidence medium
We add that we are influenced in some degree by the fact that most changes of juvenile procedure in the spirit of In re Gault were brought in at the urging of the juvenile and presumably to benefit him (see Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 388 [1971]), 9 whereas in the present case the party resists the analogy to the criminal. *638 (b) Juvenile records as "any other evidence.” If juvenile records do not qualify as "criminal” within that term as used in § 5, we have yet to deal with the further expression in the same section, "any other evidence that tends to indicate that he is a s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ciszewski v. Industrial Accident Board
Mass. · 1975 · confidence medium
In the absence of such manifestations to the contrary, we adopt the plain meaning of the section, Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971); *143 Gurley v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 595, 598 (1973), and hold that the board has authority to adopt the rule requested by the plaintiff.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. Town of Burlington
Mass. App. Ct. · 1974 · confidence medium
Its language (as well as that of its legislative history 3 ) “is plain, and therefore it is to be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of ... [its] words.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Gove
Mass. · 1974 · confidence medium
When the statutory language is plain, the words must receive their “usual and natural meaning.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Town of Arlington v. State Tax Commission
Mass. · 1974 · confidence medium
Co. 309 Mass. 412, 416 (1941), “This is a case where there is no room for judicial interpretation of anything but plain, homely words of the English language used by the Legislature, which must be presumed to have intended what they so plainly said.” See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 (1971), and cases cited.
cited Cited "see" School Committee of Springfield v. Board of Education
Mass. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See *438 Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387 , and cases cited; G.
Commonwealth vs. Arthur Thomas (And Two Companion Cases)
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Apr 29, 1971.
269 N.E.2d 277
Mark. E. Budnitz for the defendants., Terence M. Troyer, Assistant District Attorney (Roger A. Karz with him) for the Commonwealth.
Taebo, Spalding, Spiegel, Qeibico, Bbaecheb.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
Spalding, J.

The defendants were adjudged delinquents under G. L. c. 119, § 58, after a trial in a District Court. They appealed to the Superior Court under G. L. c. 119, § 56, where they demanded a jury trial. Their demands were denied, subject to their exceptions. The defendants were tried to a judge, adjudged delinquent, and sentenced to the custody of the Youth Service Board. The sole question presented by their bill of exceptions is whether it was error to deny their demands for a jury trial. [2] We are of opinion that it was.

General Laws c. 119, § 56, as amended through St. 1964,[*387] c. 308, § 1, which deals with juvenile appeals to the Superior Court, states in relevant part: “The appeal, if taken, shall be tried and determined in like manner as appeals in criminal cases, except that the trial of said appeals in the superior court shall not be in conjunction with the other business of that court, but shall be held in a session set apart and devoted for the time being exclusively to the trial of juvenile cases” (emphasis supplied). The language of this statute is plain, and therefore it is to be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words. Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373. Commonwealth v. Krasner, 358 Mass. 727, 729. G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.

Turning to the statutes governing criminal trials in the Superior Court, we find that cases are to be tried to a jury unless the defendant expressly elects to be tried by the court. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 278, § 2. G. L. c. 263, § 6, as appearing in St. 1933, c. 246, § 1. The right of a defendant to be tried by a jury in a criminal case is specifically guaranteed in art. 12 of our Declaration of Rights. “¡(T]rial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149. We therefore have no difficulty in finding a clear legislative intention to afford juveniles who appeal to the Superior Court at least the same fundamental safeguards afforded to adults similarly situated. We are of opinion that trial by jury is of such fundamental importance that had the Legislature intended to deny this right to juveniles it would have said so in unequivocal language.

In opposition to this conclusion the Commonwealth points to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 119, § 53, which reads: “Sections fifty-two to sixty-three, inclusive [(which deal with delinquency], shall be liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance. Proceedings against children under said sections shall not be deemed criminal [*388] proceedings” (emphasis supplied). We find nothing in this language inconsistent with our conclusion here. In view of the specific language of § 56 relating to juvenile appeals to the Superior Court, we are not disposed to construe it so as to deprive juveniles of a jury trial. See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 401, 404-405. To give a child a jury trial is not to brand him a criminal but to secure to him a fundamental fact-finding safeguard. The legislative design to protect juveniles from such things as the stigma of a criminal record and from serving sentences in adult correctional institutions ought not to be distorted to deprive juveniles of their fundamental right to a trial by jury in the determination of their guilt. This conclusion, of course, in no way affects the special disposition provisions of G. L. c. 119.

In view of our interpretation of G. L. c. 119, § 56, we do not reach the question whether apart from the statute a jury trial is required under either the Massachusetts or Federal Constitution.

Exceptions sustained.

2

This question is one of first impression. While there is dictum in Marsden v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 564, 566, to the effect that Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 316, had decided this question contrary to the defendants’ present contention, the point of the statutory standards to be applied in a Superior Court trial of a juvenile under G. L. c. 119, § 56, was not before the court in either case.