Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 7A

Presumptions; employee unable to testify

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Section 7A. In any claim for compensation where the employee has been killed or found dead at his place of employment or, in the absence of death, is physically or mentally unable to testify, and such testimonial incapacity is causally related to the injury, it shall be prima facie evidence that the employee was performing his regular duties on the day of injury or death and that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 10 cases, 1960–2010 · leading case: Carpenter's Case

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Carpenter's Case (2010) mass · cites it 2× “The insurer argues that the board incorrectly applied G. L. c. 152, § 7A (§ 7A), 2 to the facts of this case; the board erroneously declined to consider the insurer’s defense *438 pursuant to G.”

Moss's Case (2008) mass · cites it 2× “If an employee cannot testify in his or her own behalf in seeking workers’ compensation benefits, how can the claim be proved? One answer to this question can be found in G. L. c. 152, § 7A (§ 7A), which establishes prima facie evidence of various elements of a workers’…”

Collins's Case (1986) massappct · cites it 5× “The employee urges that the single member and the board erroneously ruled that the prima facie effect of G. L. c. 152, § 7A, did not apply and that they also improperly considered opinion evidence of two physicians which was based in part on facts not admitted in evidence.”

Anderson's Case (1977) mass “In this case we are called upon to construe the meaning of G. L. c. 152, § 7A, and to determine whether that statute was correctly applied by the reviewing board (board) of the Industrial Accident Board.”

Riordan's Case (1972) mass “The employee died while at work and the claimant asserts that under G. L. c. 152, § 7A, there is a presumption that the claim comes within the provisions of the chapter.”

Crawford's Case (1960) mass “In fairness to all the parties, we should have the benefit of proper subsidiary findings by the trier of questions of fact before we decide whether the evidence warranted the conclusions of the board.”

Roumeliotis v. Zenga (1980) masssuperct · cites it 3× “Did Nicholas Roumeliotis’ Death Arise Out Of and In The Course of His Employment? G.L. c. 152, §7A reads as follows: In any claim for compensation where the employee has been killed, or found dead at his place of employment or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it…”

Lynch's Case (1967) mass “The case was submitted under the provisions of G. L. c. 152, § 7A, which establishes the presumption on an employee’s death that the claim comes within the provisions of the chapter, that sufficient notice of injury was given, and that the death “was *783 not occasioned by the…”

Costa's Case (2001) massappct “The issue before us is whether the provisions of G. L. c. 152, § 7A, as amended in 1991 (see St.”

Iljinas's Case (1975) massappct “As both parties concede that G. L. c. 152, § 7A, as amended by St. 1971, c.”

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