Mass. Gen. Laws » Part IV Title II Chapter 277
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, § 39 (2026)

Construction of certain words used in indictment

✓ current as of July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section MAmalegislature.gov (official) JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Section 39. The words used in an indictment may, except as otherwise provided in this section, be construed according to their usual acceptation in common language; but if certain words and phrases are defined by law, they shall be used according to their legal meaning.

The following words, when used in an indictment, shall be sufficient to convey the meaning herein attached to them:

Adultery.—Sexual intercourse by a married person with a person not his spouse or by an unmarried person with a married person.

Affray.—Fighting together of two or more persons in a public place to the terror of the persons lawfully there.

Aggravated Rape.—Sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse by a person with another person who is compelled to submit by force and against his will or by threat of bodily injury; and either such sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse results in or is committed with acts resulting in serious bodily injury, or is committed by a joint enterprise, or is committed during the commission or attempted commission of an offense defined in section fifteen A, fifteen B, seventeen, nineteen or twenty-six of chapter two hundred and sixty-five, section fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen or eighteen of chapter two hundred and sixty-six, or section ten of chapter two hundred and sixty-nine.

False Pretences.—False representations made by word or act of such a character, or made under such circumstances and in such a way, with the intention of influencing the action of another, as to be punishable.

Forgery.—The false making, altering, forging or counterfeiting of any instrument described in section one of chapter two hundred and sixty-seven, or any instrument which, if genuine, would be a foundation for or release of liability of the apparent maker.

Fornication.—Sexual intercourse between an unmarried male and an unmarried female.

Murder.—The killing of a human being, with malice aforethought.

Rape.—Sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse by a person with another person who is compelled to submit by force and against his will or by threat of bodily injury, or sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a child under sixteen years of age.

Robbery.—The taking and carrying away of personal property of another from his person and against his will, by force and violence, or by assault and putting in fear, with intent to steal.

Stealing. Larceny.—The criminal taking, obtaining or converting of personal property, with intent to defraud or deprive the owner permanently of the use of it; including all forms of larceny, criminal embezzlement and obtaining by criminal false pretences.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 53 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1925–2025 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1981).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1981). · cites it 12× “265, § 22 (defining and punishing rape), and G. L. c. 277, § 39 (defining the word “rape” as used in an indictment), were completely revised by St.”
United States v. Paul Parnell, 818 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “1972) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 277, § 39 ). “[S]o long as the victim is aware of the application of force which relieves him of his property .”
Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire, 21 N.E.3d 968 (Mass. 2015). · cites it 4× “Larceny is a specific intent crime that requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to steal or deprive the owner permanently of the use of the property.”
United States v. Starks, Jr., 861 F.3d 306 (1st Cir. 2017). · cites it 2× “at 843 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, § 39 ). Jones I illustrates how little force is necessary for an unarmed robbery conviction.”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1972). · cites it 5× “Under our statutes, as at common law, in order to sustain a charge of robbery, there must be proof of a larceny 2 (1) “from .”
Commonwealth v. Mills, 764 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 2002). · cites it 2× “See G. L. c. 277, § 39. We agree with the well-reasoned analysis of the Appeals Court that filing false earnings reports with the board does not constitute a tres-passory taking of money, and the “release of a claim to money” is not property within the meaning of G.”
Commonwealth v. Starling, 416 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1981). · cites it 2× “G.L.c. 277, § 39. See Commonwealth v. Desmarteau, 16 Gray 1 , 9 (1860).”
Commonwealth v. Puleio, 474 N.E.2d 1078 (Mass. 1985). · cites it 2× “" The judge then read to the jury from G.L.c. 277, § 39, which defines murder as "the killing of a human being with malice aforethought," and from G.”
United States v. Mulkern, 854 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2017). “2d at 843 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, § 39 ). Looking to parry Mulkern’s purse-snatching/de-minimis-force argument, the government again quotes the Massachusetts high court in Jones: Snatching necessarily involves the exercise of…”
E.C.O. v. Compton, 984 N.E.2d 787 (Mass. 2013). “265, § 23; G. L. c. 277, § 39. “Instant messaging” is “a form of computer communication in which individuals hold an online conversation via the [I]ntemet .”
Commonwealth v. Gallant, 369 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. 1977). “265, § 24B (assault of a minor with intent to rape), and G. L. c. 277, § 39 (definitions for indictments).”
Commonwealth v. Joyner, 4 N.E.3d 282 (Mass. 2014). “83, 87 (1972), quoting G. L. c. 277, § 39. In general, the Commonwealth can establish fear by showing “objectively menacing conduct by the defendant, .”
Show all 53 citing cases →
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.