TAX TRIBUNAL ACT
Act 186 of 1973
205.746 Evidence; written decision; rules of privilege; objection; official report of proceeding; availability of writings to public; costs for transcripts.
Sec. 46.
(1) In a proceeding before the tribunal all parties may submit evidence. The tribunal shall make its decision in writing. The tribunal may admit and give probative effect to evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence may be excluded. Effect shall be given to the rules of privilege recognized by law. An objection to an offer of evidence may be made.
(2) A proceeding before the tribunal shall be officially reported. A writing prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by the tribunal in the performance of an official function shall be made available to the public in compliance with Act No. 442 of the Public Acts of 1976, being sections 15.231 to 15.247 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Costs assessed for transcripts shall be collected by the clerk and paid into a revolving fund to be used solely to defray the costs of preparing transcripts.
History: 1973, Act 186, Eff. July 1, 1974 ;-- Am. 1976, Act 365, Imd. Eff. Dec. 23, 1976 ;-- Am. 1978, Act 439, Imd. Eff. Oct. 9, 1978
Compiler's Notes:
In subsection (2) of this section, “15.247” evidently should read “15.246”.
Notes of Decisions
Great Lakes Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp. v. City of Ecorse, 227 Mich. App. 379 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “” The statutes governing the types of evidence that the Tax Tribunal may consider are set forth in the apa and the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.746; MSA 7.650(46). Vomvolakis, supra at 246 .”
Bechtel Power Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 340 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
“MCL 205.746; MSA 7.650(46). Section 13(l)(d) of the act, however, exempts from disclosure "[rjecords or information specifically described and exempted from disclosure by statute”.”
Greer v. Dep't of Treasury, 377 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
“See MCL 205.746; MSA 7.650(46). *254 The opinion of the hearing officer, adopted by the Tax Tribunal, carefully outlined the evidence, made credibility decisions and determined that petitioners failed to carry their burden of proof in challenging the amount of the assessment.”
Vomvolakis v. Dep't of Treasury, 377 N.W.2d 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
“) MCL 205.746; MSA 7.650(46). MRE 803(6) deals with the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and states: "(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.”
Viorica Miclea v. City of Farmington Hills (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 3× “” 3 We note that petitioner makes a misplaced argument to the extent she argues that the tribunal erred in concluding that substantial evidence supported a conclusion that the special assessment was proportionate to the benefit conferred.”
Shashi Thakur v. City of Farmington Hills Mi (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 3× “” 3 We note that petitioner makes a misplaced argument to the extent he argues that the tribunal erred in concluding that substantial evidence supported a conclusion that the special assessment was proportionate to the benefit conferred.”
Alexander Kathawa v. Twp. of West Bloomfield (Mich. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 3× “RULES OF EVIDENCE Petitioner argues that the tribunal violated MCL 205.746(1),2 which states that “[t]he tribunal may give probative effect to evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.”
Alexander Kathawa v. Twp. of West Bloomfield (Mich. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 3× “RULES OF EVIDENCE Petitioner argues that the tribunal violated MCL 205.746(1),2 which states that “[t]he tribunal may give probative effect to evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.”
Richard M Battani Jr v. Almont Twp. (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 3× “DUE PROCESS Petitioner also argues that the 10-minute limit on his presentation at the Tax Tribunal hearing deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to submit evidence pursuant to MCL 205.746 and deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to be heard in violation of his due…”
Jd Norman Indus. v. City of Leslie (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 2× “Rather, it claims the appraisal was offered for a non- hearsay purpose, namely, “to corroborate the facts used by Gary Wilhite in making a purchase offer for the assets of Len Industries.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 205.746(1) — 8 cases
Viorica Miclea v. City of Farmington Hills (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
“” 3 We note that petitioner makes a misplaced argument to the extent she argues that the tribunal erred in concluding that substantial evidence supported a conclusion that the special assessment was proportionate to the benefit conferred.”
Shashi Thakur v. City of Farmington Hills Mi (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
“” 3 We note that petitioner makes a misplaced argument to the extent he argues that the tribunal erred in concluding that substantial evidence supported a conclusion that the special assessment was proportionate to the benefit conferred.”
Alexander Kathawa v. Twp. of West Bloomfield (Mich. Ct. App. 2022).
“RULES OF EVIDENCE Petitioner argues that the tribunal violated MCL 205.746(1),2 which states that “[t]he tribunal may give probative effect to evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.”
Alexander Kathawa v. Twp. of West Bloomfield (Mich. Ct. App. 2022).
“RULES OF EVIDENCE Petitioner argues that the tribunal violated MCL 205.746(1),2 which states that “[t]he tribunal may give probative effect to evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 205.746(2) — 4 cases
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