DANGEROUS ANIMALS
Act 426 of 1988
287.321 Definitions.
Sec. 1.
As used in this act:
(a) "Dangerous animal" means a dog or other animal that bites or attacks a person, or a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the property or under the control of its owner. However, a dangerous animal does not include any of the following:
(i) An animal that bites or attacks a person who is knowingly trespassing on the property of the animal's owner.
(ii) An animal that bites or attacks a person who provokes or torments the animal.
(iii) An animal that is responding in a manner that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude was designed to protect a person if that person is engaged in a lawful activity or is the subject of an assault.
(iv) Livestock.
(b) "Livestock" means animals used for human food and fiber or animals used for service to human beings. Livestock includes, but is not limited to, cattle, swine, sheep, llamas, goats, bison, equine, poultry, and rabbits. Livestock does not include animals that are human companions, such as dogs and cats.
(c) "Owner" means a person who owns or harbors a dog or other animal.
(d) "Provoke" means to perform a willful act or omission that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude is likely to precipitate the bite or attack by an ordinary dog or animal.
(e) "Serious injury" means permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of a bodily function of a person.
(f) "Torment" means an act or omission that causes unjustifiable pain, suffering, and distress to an animal, or causes mental and emotional anguish in the animal as evidenced by its altered behavior, for a purpose such as sadistic pleasure, coercion, or punishment that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude is likely to precipitate the bite or attack.
History: 1988, Act 426, Eff. Mar. 30, 1989
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1995–2023 · leading case:
People v. Janes
People v. Janes (2013)
michctapp · cites it 20×
“In this case, the prosecution charged Janes with violating MCL 287.”
People v. Trotter (1995)
michctapp · cites it 2×
“545(23)(1), which provides: The owner of an animal that meets the definition of a dangerous animal in [MCL 287.321(a); MSA 12.545(21)(a)] that causes the death of a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, punishable under [MCL 750.”
Brans v. Extrom (2005)
michctapp
“, MCL 287.321(l)(d) (for the purposes of the dangerous animal statute, “ ‘[p]rovoke’ means to perform a willful act or omission that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude is likely to precipitate the bite or attack by an ordinary dog or animal”).”
People of Michigan v. Debra Olney (2017)
michctapp · cites it 14×
“MCL 287.321(a) defines “dangerous animal” in relevant part as follows: a dog or other animal that bites or attacks a person, or a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the property or under the control of its owner.”
People of Michigan v. Debra Olney (2017)
michctapp · cites it 14×
“MCL 287.321(a) defines “dangerous animal” in relevant part as follows: a dog or other animal that bites or attacks a person, or a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the property or under the control of its owner.”
Crandall v. Newaygo, County of (2023)
miwd · cites it 10×
“At any rate, the Court is not persuaded that Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321 creates property rights, as opposed to imposing liability for the conduct of a dog under an individual’s care.”
Michelle Reid v. Katrina Kramer (2019)
michctapp · cites it 6×
“The circuit court concluded that Bruiser was a “dangerous animal” under MCL 287.321(a) because the undisputed evidence showed that he had attacked and bit Henderson, that Henderson did not provoke Bruiser, and that no statutory exception applied.”
Michelle Reid v. Katrina Kramer (2019)
michctapp · cites it 6×
“The circuit court concluded that Bruiser was a “dangerous animal” under MCL 287.321(a) because the undisputed evidence showed that he had attacked and bit Henderson, that Henderson did not provoke Bruiser, and that no statutory exception applied.”
People of Michigan v. Geneke Antonio Lyons (2018)
michctapp · cites it 4×
“323(1), provides that the “owner of an animal that meets the definition of a dangerous animal in [MCL 287.321(a)] that causes the death of a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, punishable under [MCL 750.”
People of Michigan v. Geneke Antonio Lyons (2018)
michctapp · cites it 4×
“323(1), provides that the “owner of an animal that meets the definition of a dangerous animal in [MCL 287.321(a)] that causes the death of a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, punishable under [MCL 750.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (2021)
michctapp · cites it 3×
“On defendant’s motion, this Court later granted defendant’s motion to reduce the amount of the appellate bond and to stay execution of the district court’s euthanasia order.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (2021)
michctapp · cites it 3×
“On defendant’s motion, this Court later granted defendant’s motion to reduce the amount of the appellate bond and to stay execution of the district court’s euthanasia order.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321(a) — 10 cases
People v. Janes (2013)
michctapp
“In this case, the prosecution charged Janes with violating MCL 287.”
People v. Trotter (1995)
michctapp
“545(23)(1), which provides: The owner of an animal that meets the definition of a dangerous animal in [MCL 287.321(a); MSA 12.545(21)(a)] that causes the death of a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, punishable under [MCL 750.”
People of Michigan v. Debra Olney (2017)
michctapp
“MCL 287.321(a) defines “dangerous animal” in relevant part as follows: a dog or other animal that bites or attacks a person, or a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the property or under the control of its owner.”
People of Michigan v. Debra Olney (2017)
michctapp
“MCL 287.321(a) defines “dangerous animal” in relevant part as follows: a dog or other animal that bites or attacks a person, or a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the property or under the control of its owner.”
Michelle Reid v. Katrina Kramer (2019)
michctapp
“The circuit court concluded that Bruiser was a “dangerous animal” under MCL 287.321(a) because the undisputed evidence showed that he had attacked and bit Henderson, that Henderson did not provoke Bruiser, and that no statutory exception applied.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321(a)(i) — 3 cases
People v. Janes (2013)
michctapp
“In this case, the prosecution charged Janes with violating MCL 287.”
People of Michigan v. Geneke Antonio Lyons (2018)
michctapp
“323(1), provides that the “owner of an animal that meets the definition of a dangerous animal in [MCL 287.321(a)] that causes the death of a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, punishable under [MCL 750.”
People of Michigan v. Geneke Antonio Lyons (2018)
michctapp
“323(1), provides that the “owner of an animal that meets the definition of a dangerous animal in [MCL 287.321(a)] that causes the death of a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, punishable under [MCL 750.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321(a)(ic) — 1 case
People v. Janes (2013)
michctapp
“In this case, the prosecution charged Janes with violating MCL 287.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321(a)(ii) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321(c) — 1 case
People v. Janes (2013)
michctapp
“In this case, the prosecution charged Janes with violating MCL 287.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321(e) — 3 cases
People v. Janes (2013)
michctapp
“In this case, the prosecution charged Janes with violating MCL 287.”
Michelle Reid v. Katrina Kramer (2019)
michctapp
“The circuit court concluded that Bruiser was a “dangerous animal” under MCL 287.321(a) because the undisputed evidence showed that he had attacked and bit Henderson, that Henderson did not provoke Bruiser, and that no statutory exception applied.”
Michelle Reid v. Katrina Kramer (2019)
michctapp
“The circuit court concluded that Bruiser was a “dangerous animal” under MCL 287.321(a) because the undisputed evidence showed that he had attacked and bit Henderson, that Henderson did not provoke Bruiser, and that no statutory exception applied.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.321(l)(d) — 1 case
Brans v. Extrom (2005)
michctapp
“, MCL 287.321(l)(d) (for the purposes of the dangerous animal statute, “ ‘[p]rovoke’ means to perform a willful act or omission that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude is likely to precipitate the bite or attack by an ordinary dog or animal”).”
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