ESTATES AND PROTECTED INDIVIDUALS CODE
Act 386 of 1998
700.2803 Forfeiture, revocation, or severance.
Sec. 2803.
(1) An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills or who is convicted of committing abuse, neglect, or exploitation with respect to the decedent forfeits all benefits under this article with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, a family allowance, and exempt property. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer or felon disclaimed his or her intestate share.
(2) The felonious and intentional killing or the conviction of the felon for the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of the decedent does all of the following:
(a) Revokes all of the following that are revocable:
(i) Disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer or felon in a governing instrument.
(ii) Provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the killer or felon.
(iii) Nomination of the killer or felon in a governing instrument, nominating or appointing the killer or felon to serve in a fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, funeral representative, trustee, or agent.
(b) Severs the interests of the decedent and killer or felon in property held by them at the time of the killing, abuse, neglect, or exploitation as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer or felon into tenancies in common.
(c) Bars the killer or felon from exercising a power under section 3206(1).
(3) A severance under subsection (2)(b) does not affect a third party interest in property acquired for value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the killer or felon unless a writing declaring the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property that are relied on, in the ordinary course of transactions involving that type of property, as evidence of ownership.
(4) A provision of a governing instrument is given effect as if the killer or felon disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, for a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the killer or felon predeceased the decedent.
(5) A killer's or felon's wrongful acquisition of property or interest not covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer or felon cannot profit from his or her wrong.
(6) After all right to appeal has been exhausted, a judgment of conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious and intentional killing or the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of the decedent conclusively establishes the convicted individual as the decedent's killer or as a felon, as applicable, for purposes of this section. With respect to a claim of felonious and intentional killing, in the absence of a conviction, the court, on the petition of an interested person, shall determine whether, under the preponderance of evidence standard, the individual would be found criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent. If the court determines that, under that standard, the individual would be found criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent, the determination conclusively establishes the individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section.
(7) This section does not apply if the forfeiture, revocation, or severance would occur because of abuse, neglect, or exploitation and the decedent executed a governing instrument after the date of the conviction expressing a specific intent to allow the felon to inherit or otherwise receive the estate or property of the decedent.
History: 1998, Act 386, Eff. Apr. 1, 2000 ;-- Am. 2012, Act 173, Eff. Oct. 1, 2012 ;-- Am. 2016, Act 57, Eff. June 27, 2016
PopularName Notes:
EPIC
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 2004–2025 · leading case:
In re Nale Est., 803 N.W.2d 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
In re Nale Est., 803 N.W.2d 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 12× “Respondent argues that the probate court improperly construed MCL 700.2803, Michigan’s “slayer statute,” as preventing her, as one convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of the decedent, from receiving benefits from the decedent’s estate.”
Papazian v. Goldberg (In Re Mardigian Est.), 917 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 2018).
“For example, MCL 700.2803(2)(a)( i ) provides, "The felonious and intentional killing or the conviction of the felon for the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of the decedent .”
Nale v. Ford Motor Co. Uaw Ret. Plan, 703 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
· cites it 2× “Michigan, like most other states, has adopted a “slayer statute” which provides: “The felonious and intentional killing of the decedent [revokes] [disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrument.”
John Syron v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 506 F. App'x 500 (6th Cir. 2012).
“Reli-aStar also noted that it had contacted the police department in Novi, Michigan to verify that Syron was not involved in Ian-ni’s death (pursuant to Michigan’s “slayer statute,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803 ), but that the police had not yet ruled out anyone in the murder…”
Cook v. Grierson, 845 A.2d 1231 (Md. 2004).
“18-A, § 2-803 (West 1998)(predeceased); Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803 (2002)(disclaimed); Minn.”
in Re Hadley Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 16× “FACTS The decedent, Maxine Hadley, who was respondent’s mother, died on May 23, 2014 from carbon monoxide poisoning; the manner of death was listed as a homicide.”
in Re Hadley Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 16× “FACTS The decedent, Maxine Hadley, who was respondent’s mother, died on May 23, 2014 from carbon monoxide poisoning; the manner of death was listed as a homicide.”
in Re Mikes Sr Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 15× “(respondent) appeals as of right an October 11, 2013 probate court order granting appellee/personal representative’s (petitioner’s) petition for revocation of benefits under Michigan’s “slayer statute,” MCL 700.2803. The court denied appellant’s motion for rehearing and…”
20250116_C366592_63_366592.Opn.Pdf (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 6× “There is no dispute in this case that Elaine and Donnie both died of natural causes and 2 The full amount was $207,000, but the Trust had paid Elaine $47,000 during that period.”
in Re Coats Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “5 MCL 700.2803 provides that “[a]n individual who .”
in Re Coats Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “5 MCL 700.2803 provides that “[a]n individual who .”
in Re Oxender Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
“Appellant then filed a third petition, seeking relief under the -2- “slayer statute,” MCL 700.2803. Appellant thereafter moved to voluntarily dismiss the first and second petitions without prejudice, while appellees moved additionally for summary disposition of the third…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803(1) — 3 cases
20250116_C366592_63_366592.Opn.Pdf (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).
“There is no dispute in this case that Elaine and Donnie both died of natural causes and 2 The full amount was $207,000, but the Trust had paid Elaine $47,000 during that period.”
in Re Mikes Sr Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“(respondent) appeals as of right an October 11, 2013 probate court order granting appellee/personal representative’s (petitioner’s) petition for revocation of benefits under Michigan’s “slayer statute,” MCL 700.2803. The court denied appellant’s motion for rehearing and…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803(2)(a) — 1 case
Papazian v. Goldberg (In Re Mardigian Est.), 917 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 2018).
“For example, MCL 700.2803(2)(a)( i ) provides, "The felonious and intentional killing or the conviction of the felon for the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of the decedent .”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803(5) — 4 cases
in Re Hadley Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
“FACTS The decedent, Maxine Hadley, who was respondent’s mother, died on May 23, 2014 from carbon monoxide poisoning; the manner of death was listed as a homicide.”
in Re Hadley Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
“FACTS The decedent, Maxine Hadley, who was respondent’s mother, died on May 23, 2014 from carbon monoxide poisoning; the manner of death was listed as a homicide.”
in Re Mikes Sr Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“(respondent) appeals as of right an October 11, 2013 probate court order granting appellee/personal representative’s (petitioner’s) petition for revocation of benefits under Michigan’s “slayer statute,” MCL 700.2803. The court denied appellant’s motion for rehearing and…”
20250116_C366592_63_366592.Opn.Pdf (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).
“There is no dispute in this case that Elaine and Donnie both died of natural causes and 2 The full amount was $207,000, but the Trust had paid Elaine $47,000 during that period.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803(6) — 4 cases
in Re Hadley Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
“FACTS The decedent, Maxine Hadley, who was respondent’s mother, died on May 23, 2014 from carbon monoxide poisoning; the manner of death was listed as a homicide.”
in Re Hadley Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).
“FACTS The decedent, Maxine Hadley, who was respondent’s mother, died on May 23, 2014 from carbon monoxide poisoning; the manner of death was listed as a homicide.”
in Re Mikes Sr Est. (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“(respondent) appeals as of right an October 11, 2013 probate court order granting appellee/personal representative’s (petitioner’s) petition for revocation of benefits under Michigan’s “slayer statute,” MCL 700.2803. The court denied appellant’s motion for rehearing and…”
20250116_C366592_63_366592.Opn.Pdf (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).
“There is no dispute in this case that Elaine and Donnie both died of natural causes and 2 The full amount was $207,000, but the Trust had paid Elaine $47,000 during that period.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.