State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417 (Minn. 1982). · Go Syfert
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State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417 (Minn. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“ny time evidence tends to establish a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape, the evidence should be admitted unless its potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.”
58 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Minnesota v. Jared Armand Cobb (minnctapp, 2015-03-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State of Minnesota v. Jared Armand Cobb
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ny time evidence tends to establish a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape, the evidence should be admitted unless its potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Michael Allan Carbo, Jr.
Minn. · 2024 · confidence medium
We agree with Carbo that, here, the probative value of the evidence establishing a motive for B.E.’s purported actions was not substantially outweighed by the State’s interest in “guarding [the victim’s] privacy and in protecting her from harassment.” State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Larry Ray House
Minn. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Caselaw indicates that evidence otherwise inadmissible under rule 412 may be received if it “tends to establish a [victim’s] predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape.” State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Christopher Thomas Wenthe (2×)
Minn. · 2015 · confidence medium
We have construed the rape-shield law as allowing sexual-history evidence, however, when “admission is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Osma Mardoqueo Escho Sanchez
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct “may be admitted where it is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accuser, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 1991) (citing State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 4 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Olsen
Minn. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
One such exception permits admission of “[a]ny evidence tending to establish a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape ... unless its potential for unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value.” State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 204 (Minn.App.1989) (citing State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1989); see also State v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.App.2002), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wyrick (2×)
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1981) (excluding cross-examination of victim on alleged prior false accusation of rape because it amounted to a general credibility attack on the basis of an unrelated incident and there was no convincing proof that the accusation was false); Ex parte Loyd, 580 So.2d 1374, 1376 (Ala.1991) (holding that defendant could cross-examine victim about admittedly false pri- or charges and threats regarding sexual crimes because they were relevant to whether the defendant committed sodomy or if the victim was continuing a habit of making false accusations…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State s. Anthony Lynn Wyrick (2×)
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
App. 1983) (holding that the defendant could cross-examine the victim about a prior accusation but that he would be bound by the victim’s answer); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1978) (holding that defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine victim about prior false accusation of rape because it might have damaged the victim’s credibility and the defendant proved in an offer of proof that the accusation was false); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982) (holding that the defendant should have been allowed to impeach the victim with a prior false ac…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Sullivan
Conn. · 1998 · confidence medium
Indeed, most jurisdictions that have considered the issue of impeachment of complaining witnesses have held that evidence of prior false accusations is admissible to impeach the complainant’s credibility. 5 See Covington v. State, supra, 703 P.2d 442 ; People v. Simbolo, 188 Colo. 49, 52 , 532 P.2d 962 (1975); State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 92 , 685 P.2d 830 (1984); People v. Gorney, 107 Ill. 2d 53, 58-61 , 481 N.E.2d 673 (1985); Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, supra, 376 Mass. 94 ; People v. Garvie, supra, 148 Mich. App. 448 ; State v…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Enger
Minn. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kobow
Minn. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Carpenter
Minn. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
The effect of rule 404(c) on admission of evidence regarding a complainant’s prior sexual conduct was addressed in State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kroshus
Minn. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
State v. Cos *205 well, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Minn. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
In making this determination, the court must balance the state’s interest in guarding the victim’s privacy and protecting her from harassment against the accused’s constitutional right of confrontation, id. at 419 (applying the balancing approach of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clinebell v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1988 · confidence medium
App. 271 , 443 A.2d 607 (1982) (credibility); Bohannon , 376 Mass, at 94, 378 N.E.2d at 991 (credibility); People v. Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 380 , 40 N.W. 473, 478-79 (1888) (substantive evidence); People v. Garvie, 148 Mich. App. 444, 448 , 384 N.W.2d 796, 798 (1986) (credibility); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982) (credibility); State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193, 198-201 (Mont. 1984) (probative of state of mind); State v. Johnson, 102 N.M. 110, 117-18 , 692 P.2d 35, 43 (App. 1984) (credibility); Baron, 58 N.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wedan v. State
Minn. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
See State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn.1986); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. LeClair
Or. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
See State v. Lantz, 44 Or App 695, 702 , 607 P2d 197 , rev den 289 Or 275 (1980); State v. Leonard, 707 P2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985); 7 State v. Caswell, 320 NW2d 417, 419 (Minn 1982); see also Galvin, “Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade,” 70 Minn L Rev 763,858 (1986); Tanford and Bocchino, “Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment,” 128 U Pa L Rev 544, 563 (1980); Caulfield, “The New Oregon Sexual Offenses Evidence Law: An Evaluation,” 55 Or L Rev 493,500 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. John David Bartlett (2×)
8th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Cf. Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1981); (where relevant, accused should be permitted to show complainant made false accusations of rape in the past); People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 348-49 , 365 N.W.2d 120, 125 (1984); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982) (same); People v. Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 953 , 401 N.E.2d 185, 187 , 425 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1979) (same), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 949 , 100 S.Ct. 2913 , 64 L.Ed.2d 805 (1980); see generally 23 C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Powe v. State
Minn. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Although Minn.Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 prohibits the admission of evidence concerning a complainant’s previous sexual conduct except under limited circumstances, it has been established that, when evidence tends to establish a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape, it “should be admitted unless the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.” State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982) (citing United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 , 271 n. 2 (8th Cir.1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Booker
Minn. · 1984 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982). (b) Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the complainant’s physical and emotional condition shortly after the incident.
cited Cited "see" State of Minnesota v. Curtis Dwayne Thurston
Minn. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982).
examined Cited "see" State of Minnesota v. Paul Bradley Lanphear (5×)
Minn. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a victim’s past sexual conduct is admissible when constitutionally required); 6 Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 306 (explaining that sexual-history evidence is admissible when “constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense” (quotation omitted)).
cited Cited "see" State v. Lee
Minn. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.1982). 3 .Where the substance of a husband's testimony is unknown, there is no basis for holding that the exclusion of evidence is reversible error.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Hagen (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Minn. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d at 419 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Gerring
Minn. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419-20 (Minn.1982). 2.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Coates (2×)
Ill. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See People v. Hurlburt (1958), 166 Cal. App. 2d 334 , 333 P.2d 82 ; People v. Evans (1888), 72 Mich. 367 , 40 N.W. 473 ; see also State v. Caswell (Minn. 1982), 320 N.W.2d 417 (defendant has a constitutional right to impeach with evidence of a prior false accusation).
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Douglas L. CASWELL, Appellant
81-386.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Jun 11, 1982.
320 N.W.2d 417
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, and Kathy King, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant., Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Gary Hansen and Kenneth W. Saffold, Sp. Asst. At-tys. Gen., St. Paul, Robert W. Kelly, County Atty., Stillwater, for respondent.
Otis.
Cited by 42 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 48%
OTIS, Justice.

Appellant was found guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, Minn. Stat. § 609.342(e) (1980) (actor causes personal injury to complainant and uses force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration), for raping a former woman companion, and was sentenced to 43 months in prison. On appeal he seeks a new trial on the grounds the trial court prejudicially erred (1) in refusing to admit evidence that a short time before the alleged offense the complainant had falsely accused someone else of having raped her; and (2) in giving an instruction on credibility of witnesses which suggested that appellant’s testimony merited special scrutiny. We affirm.

Complainant is a young single mother who in the summer of 1979 allowed appellant to live with her and her daughter in complainant’s apartment.

Early on September 2, 1980, two weeks after appellant had moved out of the apartment at complainant’s request, he returned to find another male friend there. Appellant entered complainant’s bedroom, shut the door, and assaulted her. She testified that it was then the rape occurred.

Complainant’s friend left the apartment and called the police. They saw complainant screaming in the open window of her bedroom. Appellant was either trying to shut the window or subdue complainant.

The police forced their way into the apartment and found complainant lying nude on the floor by the window, screaming and crying, with blood coming from her lip. Appellant came out of the bathroom wearing only jeans, which he was buckling.

After appellant was arrested, complainant was taken to a hospital for examination. A doctor noted a bruise over her right eye and under her right cheek and a freshly chipped right upper molar. The examination established that sexual intercourse had occurred some time within the previous 6 to 8 hours.

Complainant’s daughter and the male friend corroborated much of her testimony. The daughter testified that she observed appellant choke, drag, and kick complainant. The male friend testified that he heard screams and the sound of someone being slapped. Later he heard appellant tell the daughter that if she did not do as appellant told her he would give her “what her mother got.”

The defense admitted penetration but claimed it was consensual. Appellant testified that he had sexual intercourse with complainant three times after they broke up and that at the time of the incident he was there in response to her invitation to spend the night. He denied striking her,[*419] claimed he saw no bruises, and suggested she may have inflicted them herself.

The defense was allowed to introduce evidence and to cross examine complainant about her prior sexual relationship with appellant. One Michael Wilbert, testified to his relationship with complainant and to the fact she made a false report to the police when they broke up in December 1979. However, the trial court refused to admit evidence that complainant admitted she falsely told appellant Wilberg was involved in a prior rape. It is this ruling which is the main issue on appeal.

Minn.R.Evid. 404(c)(1), which replaced the evidentiary provisions of Minn.Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3, provides:

(c) Past conduct of victim of certain sex offenses.
(1) In a prosecution under Minn.Stats. 609.342 to 609.346 evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the jury, except by court order under the procedure provided in rule 404(c). Such evidence can be admissable only if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature and only in the following circumstances:
(A) When consent of the victim is a defense in the case,
(i) Evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct tending to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue, relevant and material to the issue of consent;
(ii) evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct with the accused; or
(b) When the prosecution’s case includes evidence of semen, pregnancy or disease at the time of the incident or, in the case of pregnancy, between the time of the incident and trial, evidence of specific instances of the victim’s previous sexual conduct, to show the source of the semen, pregnancy or disease.

The federal version of the rule, Fed.R. Evid. 412, differs in that it also contains a subsection specifically allowing for admission of a victim’s past sexual conduct in all cases in which admission is constitutionally required. Reading such a requirement into our rule, we hold that in this case the trial court properly applied the rule as it reads, but that admission of the evidence was constitutionally required.

The Eighth Circuit holds that any time evidence tends to establish a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape, the evidence should be admitted unless its potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. See United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271, n.2 (8th Cir. 1978). Any other approach would risk violating the defendant’s right to due process, to confront his accusers, and to offer evidence in his own defense. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); State v. Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470 (Minn.1979), and discussion in Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 65-67 (1977), which relies in part upon this court’s decision in State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 624, 289 N.W. 575, 578 (1940) (“Cross-examination to show the bias, prejudice, interest, or disposition of the witness to tell the truth as a matter of right, the exercise of which is indispensable to show the truth”).

Using the balancing approach in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), it would be difficult to argue that the court’s excluding the evidence in question accomplished the state’s interest in guarding the complainant’s privacy and in protecting her from harassment. The jury could infer from her sexual relationship with appellant the standard of her values. We question whether one who has falsely accused another of rape has standing to claim she is harrassed by evidence of that false accusation. Under the circumstances the potential for unfair prejudice cannot be said to substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence.

Whether the error was prejudicial depends on the strength of the state’s evi[*420] dence. Here appellant admits that sexual intercourse occurred; there was a fight; when the police arrived complainant was hysterical, was bruised, and bleeding from her lip. The false claim of rape which complainant made to appellant against Wil-berg was not made to the police and she did not persist in making it after it became clear that it had negative consequences for Wilberg. Appellant’s version of the facts did not jibe with the testimony of other witnesses, particularly with that of the police.

Accordingly we hold that the refusal to admit the impeachment evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See Watts v. State, 305 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Minn.1981).

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in its instruction on the credibility of witnesses. He refers specifically to this charge:

Now, if in this case you find that any witness has wilfully testified falsely concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust the testimony of that witness in other matters and you may, if you wish, reject all or part of the testimony of that witness, or you may give it such weight as you think it deserves.

Appellant asserts that the effect of that instruction was to cast unwarranted doubt on his credibility. Although the instruction is not one favored by the authors of CRIM-JIG [1] it did not single out appellant as did the instruction in State v. Underwood, 281 N.W.2d 337 (Minn.1979). We hold appellant is not entitled to a new trial on this ground.

Affirmed.

1

. See comments to section 3.01 and State v. Schallock, 281 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Minn.1979).