State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). · Go Syfert
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State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Minnesota v. Paul Harvey McGee (minnctapp, 2016-11-28)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Paul Harvey McGee
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Suspicion must be based on more than a “mere hunch.” State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1997). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Bryan Anthony Case (2×)
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.69 (“Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in good working order which . . . is in constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual noise[.]); .71, subd. 1(a)(1) (“A person shall not drive or operate any motor vehicle with a windshield cracked . . . to an extent to limit or obstruct proper vision[.]”) (2010); State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that “[i]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Danyelle Raymon Williams
Minn. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., George, 557 N.W.2d at 577 n.1 (“[U]nder a Whren analysis, any subjective desire by [the officer] to seek evidence of other illegal activity would not have invalidated the stop, had it been otherwise valid.”); State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1997) (citing Whren for the proposition that “the actual or ulterior motives of an officer do not invalidate police action that is justifiable on the basis that a violation of law has occurred”). 7 More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated explicitly that its decisions and the decisions of the United States Supre…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Miller
Minn. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn.App.1997) (stating “if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle”) (quotation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Robinson (2×)
NY · 2001 · confidence medium
CITES WHREN WITH APPROVAL State v Ossana (199 Ariz 459, 461, 18 P3d 1258, 1260 [2001]); People v Valenzuela (74 Cal App 4th 1202, 1207, 88 Cal Rptr 2d 707, 711 [Ct App 1999]); People v Ingram ( 984 P2d 597, 603 [Colo 1999] [en banc]); Karamychev v District of Columbia ( 772 A2d 806 , 813 n 9 [DC 2001]); People v Rucker (294 Ill App 3d 218, 224, 689 NE2d 1203, 1208 [1998]); State v Predka ( 555 NW2d 202, 205-206 [Iowa 1996]); State v Hardyway (264 Kan 451, 456, 958 P2d 618, 622 [1998]); Wilson v Commonwealth ( 37 SW3d 745, 749 [Ky 2001]); State v Waters (780 So 2d 1053, 1056 [La 2001]); Wilkes …
discussed Cited "see" State v. Richmond
Minn. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Minn.App.1997) (holding police officer may make investigatory stop of motor vehicle if officer has specific and articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion of motor vehicle violation or criminal activity (citing State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn.1981))).
STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,
v.
Matthew A. BATTLESON, Respondent
CX-97-337.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Jul 22, 1997.
567 N.W.2d 69
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, St. Paul, for Appellant., Matthew B. Johnson, Assistant Faribault City Attorney, Faribault, for Appellant., Stephen R. Ecker, Faribault, for Respondent.
Huspeni, Willis, Holtan.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

WILLIS, Judge.

Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of an investigatory stop of respondent Matthew Á. Battleson’s vehicle. The state alleges that the officer had an articulable, reasonable suspicion that Battleson violated the law, and the stop was, therefore, justified.

FACTS

After sunset on November 2, 1996, Officer Scott Mehr spotted a pickup truck parked near the end of a dead-end street in Fari-bault. There were no homes or driveways in the area, but the truck was near the entrance to an N.S.P. electrical substation. As Officer Mehr drove toward the truck, it began moving, driving half on the shoulder and half on the roadway. Officer Mehr testified that the truck moved approximately 10 feet before the truck’s driver, Battleson, turned on his headlights. The truck traveled approximately 300 to 400 feet partly on the shoulder and partly on the roadway before Officer Mehr pulled it over. Officer Mehr immediately noticed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage and other indicia of intoxication when he spoke with Battleson. He asked Battleson to perform various field sobriety tests and then placed Battleson under arrest. Battleson was charged with gross misdemeanor alcohol-related driving offenses.

Battleson moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the investigatory stop. At the omnibus hearing, Officer Mehr testified as the court viewed a videotape, made from the officer’s squad car, of the arrest. The court concluded

I’m satisfied [Officer Mehr] didn’t stop [Battleson] for a traffic offense and just stopped him to investigate what he was doing there, and that’s not permitted.

The court granted Battleson’s motion to suppress and dismissed the case, finding that Officer Mehr did not have “an articulable basis for a stop.” This appeal followed.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in finding that Officer Mehr did not have a reasonable, ar-ticulable basis for suspecting that Battleson violated the law sufficient to justify an investigatory stop of Battleson’s truck?

ANALYSIS

[W]hen reviewing a pre-trial order suppressing evidence where the facts are not in dispute and the trial court’s decision is a question of law, the reviewing court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.

State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn.1992). In an appeal from a pretrial order, this court will not reverse the district court’s determination unless the state clearly and unequivocally shows that (1) the district court erred and (2) absent reversal, the error will have a “critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn.1987).

Critical impact has been shown in cases where the suppression of the evidence “destroys” or “significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.” Id. at 551. Here, the suppression resulted in a dismissal and, therefore, had a critical impact on the state’s case.

The remaining issue is whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Officer Mehr did not have a reasonable, ar-ticulable basis for suspecting that Battleson violated the law. A police officer may make an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle if the officer has “‘specific and articulable facts’ establishing ‘reasonable suspicion’ of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity.” State [*71] v. Duesterkoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn.1981) (citation omitted). The suspicion must be based upon more than a mere hunch. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Minn.1989). An officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn.1997). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” Id.

The state argues that Officer Mehr saw a violation of the law and was, therefore, justified in stopping Battleson. We find the state’s argument persuasive. Minn.Stat. § 169.48, subd. 1 (1996), provides that every vehicle on a Minnesota highway “shall display lighted lamps and illuminating devices” from sunset to sunrise. Battleson drove his truck after sunset, albeit for a short distance, without displaying his lights, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.48. Battleson also drove a significant distance partly on the roadway and partly on the shoulder. The supreme court has found that evidence of such driving behavior supports a conviction of careless driving, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.13 (1996). See State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Minn.1977) (concluding that evidence of speeding and driving onto shoulder of road supported jury verdict of careless driving). We conclude that when Officer Mehr saw Battleson driving without his headlights on and partly off the roadway, he had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that Battleson violated the law and was justified in making an investigatory stop.

The district court found that the stop was unlawful because it was pretextual. But the United States Supreme Court has determined that the actual or ulterior motives of an officer do not invalidate police action that is justifiable on the basis that a violation of law has occurred. Whren v. United States, — U.S. -, --, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1773-74, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also State v. Everett, 472 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn.1991) (concluding that if there is objective basis for arrest or search, the arrest or search is lawful even if officer’s action was based on wrong ground or involved improper motive). Regardless of what Officer Mehr’s motives might have been, he had a reasonable, articulable legal basis for suspecting that Battleson violated the law and, thus, the stop was valid. Cf George, 557 N.W.2d at 578-79 (holding stop was not reasonable where police officer suspected that headlight configuration was illegal, yet had no objective legal basis for suspicion). The district court clearly erred in suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the investigatory stop.

DECISION

The district court clearly erred in suppressing the evidence obtained from the investigatory stop of Battleson’s vehicle, and suppression of the evidence had a critical impact on the state’s case.

Reversed.