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Subdivision 1.Appeal.
A decree of dissolution of marriage or of legal separation is final when entered, subject to the right of appeal. When entered, the findings of fact and conclusions of law may constitute the judgment and decree. An appeal from the decree of dissolution that does not challenge the finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken does not delay the finality of that provision of the decree which dissolves the marriage beyond the time for appealing from that provision. A party may remarry before the time for appeal has run if it is not contested that the marriage is irretrievably broken or if a stipulation that the marriage is irretrievably broken is incorporated in the decree of dissolution.
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Subd. 2.Reopening.
On motion and upon terms as are just, the court may relieve a party from a judgment and decree, order, or proceeding under this chapter, except for provisions dissolving the bonds of marriage, annulling the marriage, or directing that the parties are legally separated, and may order a new trial or grant other relief as may be just for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59.03;
(3) fraud, whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment and decree or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment and decree or order should have prospective application.
The motion must be made within a reasonable time, and for a reason under clause (1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment and decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment and decree or order or suspend its operation. This subdivision does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment and decree, order, or proceeding or to grant relief to a party not actually personally notified as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
78
cases (
11 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case:
Marriage of Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
Marriage of Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 60× “Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to vacate a dissolution judgment under Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), without addressing the factors applicable to motions for relief under Minn.”
Marriage of Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 35× “Once a stipulation is merged into a judgment, the “sole relief’ lies in meeting the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (1998). Shirk, 561 N.”
Marriage of Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 24× “Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied husband’s motion to reopen the judgment and decree under Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3) (2006), based on its determination that wife did not commit fraud on the court? II.”
Marriage of Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1997).
· cites it 18× “We consider whether a sexual relationship between an attorney and his client, during the course , of representation, is grounds for reopening a final judgment and decree of divorce pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 518.145 (1996). On April 25, 1994, respondent Sandra Shirk’s (Ms.”
Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 2009).
· cites it 12× “In other words, absent mistake, fraud, newly discovered evidence, or other extraordinary circumstances, see Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2008), courts may not upset the division of marital property made at dissolution in the course of modifying a maintenance order.”
Marriage of Clark v. Clark, 642 N.W.2d 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 31× “Mother moved to reopen under Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2000). The district court denied mother’s motion.”
Marriage of Harding v. Harding, 620 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 19× “OPINION CRIPPEN, Judge Kjersti Susanna Harding’s appeal requires that we address the right of a party to obtain the reopening of a divorce judgment under Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(5) (2000), which states that the court may relieve a party from a marriage-dissolution decree…”
Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 11× “Appellant made a motion under Minn. Stat. § 518.145 , subd. 2(3) (2000) to reopen a dissolution judgment for fraud.”
Marriage of Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1996).
· cites it 12× “Consequently, on September 30, 1993, she moved, among other things, to vacate the provisions of the judgment and decree regarding spousal maintenance based on failure of consideration, and also to vacate the judgment and decree pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 518.145 (1994) on the…”
Marriage of Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158 (Minn. 1989).
· cites it 12× “NOTES [1] In 1988, apparently in response to the Lindsey decision, the legislature amended Minn.Stat. § 518.145 (1988) in order to provide a mechanism for re-opening dissolution decrees by motion or independent action.”
Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 16× “Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subds. 1, 2 (2008).”
Reid v. Strodtman, 631 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 12× “02 and Minn.Stat. § 518.145 (2000). The child-support magistrate concluded that those provisions did not apply to proceedings commenced under the Expedited Child Support Process, and denied appellant’s motion.”
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