

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiffs:
SHAWN MANGANO COLBY WILLIAMS DONALD CAMPBELL Attorneys at Law

For the Defendants:
LAURENCE F. PULGRAM KURT OPSAHL Attorneys at Law

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Transcribed by:
Donna Davidson, RDR, CRR, CCR 318 Certified Realtime Reporter 400 South Virginia Street Reno, Nevada 89501
(775) 329-0132

THE COURT: Be seated.
THE CLERK: Righthaven, LLC, versus Democratic Underground, LLC, et a1, 2:10-cv-1356-RLH-GWF.

This is the time set on order for a show cause hearing and also for the motion to reconsider.

Counse1, please note your appearances for the record.

MR. MANGANO: Shawn Mangano on behalf of plaintiff Righthaven, LLC.

MR. WILLIAMS: Good morning, Your Honor, Colby Williams on behalf of Stephens Media.

MR. CAMPBELL: Donald Drew Campbel 1 on behalf of Stephens Media.

MR. PULGRAM: Laurence Pulgram on behalf of Democratic Underground.

MR. OPSAHL: Kurt Opsah1, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, on behalf of Democratic Underground.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. WILLIAMS: Excuse me, Your Honor. I heard your clerk say this was also set for a motion for
there's anything about what Mr. Mangano just said that suggests to the Court that I need to hear from Democratic Underground.

MR. OPSAHL: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me make it clear that the Court is also not here to find fault with Mr. Coons or Mr. Chu.

I do find it significant, however, that in all of this -- and I -- I've read and reread this sentence from the statement in the response, and I quote from the second page: It is certainly understandable how Local Rule 7-1.1 could have arguably been reasonably construed to not require the disclosure of Stephens Media's interest in any recovery.

I was impressed that you were able to get three hedge words or qualifiers within the space of four words in that sentence and wondered if maybe you ran out of them.

That significant, I guess, to me is is that we don't have any affidavit from Mr. Chu or Mr. Coons: One, that they made a mistake; two, that they didn't understand it; three, that they didn't understand Local Rule 7.1-1. But, more importantly, I don't have any evidence that they even knew about the relationship; that they were familiar with the terms and circumstances
of the strategic agreement.
An argument that they arguably could have reasonably construed to not require that, in the Court's opinion, is, frankly, ludicrous.

Rule 7.1-1, the purpose of it, the primary purpose of it, is to make sure that the Court becomes aware, as soon as possible, of any need to recuse itself because of any conflict of interest. But it's the violation of the rule, in addition to all of the other things that took place in this case and any other cases that the Court has in front of it - and I think there are -- I think there are or were 34 cases that were assigned to me by Righthaven in this case. I do not understand the argument that an agreement whereby Stephens Media got half of any recovery or settlement could any -- in any way be construed as not having a direct pecuniary interest.

And, again, I'm not here to sanction Mr. Coons or Mr. Chu. And I will tell you now that I do not think that the Court's sanction power is limited to sanction Mr. Chu or Mr. Coons. The Court does have the right to sanction an attorney when he violates it.

I don't have any evidence that they intentionally kept this from the Court. But I have a lot of evidence that Righthaven intentionally kept it. This is not an
issue of negligence, in the Court's view. It goes to the evidence of an intentional avoidance of disclosing information and specific direct statements contrary to that.

I think I have sufficient inherent power to sanction. And I think Rule 11 gives me even additional power to sanction for violation of this rule under these circumstances.

Counsel that was representing Righthaven, Mr. Coons and Mr. Chu, were both in-house counsel, if you will.

Mr. Gibson, who took over and I think was counsel at the time that the SAA was disclosed is the CEO of Righthaven. So I think for purposes of the language of 7.1-1, in this instance, Righthaven qualifies at a party acting pro se. Because it's their in-house people doing it, it's not outside counsel as they have now.

In the Court's view, the arrangement between Righthaven and Stephens Media is nothing more nor less than a law firm, which, incidentally, I don't think is licensed to practice law in this state, but a law firm with a contingent fee agreement masquerading as a company that's a party.

There was a clear pecuniary interest, in the Court's view, by Stephens Media. Mr. Gibson negotiated
the agreement. He signed the agreement. He certainly knew the agreement and its contents. He has a significant amount of experience. At least that is represented to me. I think this has been part of a concerted effort to hide Stephens Media's role in this litigation.

Plaintiff claimed that it had various exclusive rights when it knew that the ability to exercise those rights were retained exclusively by Stephens Media. It constantly and consistently refused to produce the agreement. And it wasn't until after the Court ordered that it be disclosed and then unsealed that they started admitting their reasons.

There was, in fact, in the -- in Stephens Media's reply to their motion -- in support of their motion to dismiss, that they state, and I quote, "Stephens Media has never been identified or disclosed as a party who has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of any Righthaven case, and for good reason," close quote.

The representations about the relationship and the rights of Righthaven were misrepresentations. They were misleading. And that -- the failure to disclose them -- and you can speak and argue that there's no case law or there are no -- there's no definition in the rule that lays out what a direct pecuniary interest is. I
don't know how more direct you can get. The fact that it has to go to Righthaven first and then go to Stephens Media, in the Court's view, does not remove it from being a direct pecuniary interest. It was there. They had the right to have -- they had the right, actually, to settle claims on their own.

And the Court finds it troubling, quite frankly, in all of the cases that I'm aware of filed in this district, and I've lost count as to how many there were, that not only were the terms of the agreement disclosed, but that there was a consistent, repeated failure to identify Stephens Media as having any interest in this lawsuit.

And it isn't enough to say, well, the Court should have been on notice of it. The Court has the right to accept the representations made by a party through counsel. And when it finds that those representations are not true and, having looked at all this evidence, finds that they are intentionally untrue, the Court feels that there is a necessity of and finds that there is an obligation on the Court to sanction Stephens Media.

I've given a lot of thought as to what kind of sanction is required. I appreciate the fact that counsel has attempted to rectify the problem that has
existed. It does not change or affect the Court's opinion as to whether or not it was an accident or a misunderstanding as opposed to being an intentional -I'll call it failure to disclose, for want of a stronger term, although I think a stronger term is justified. But as part of the sanction, the Court is going to order that every case Righthaven has in any jurisdiction in this country must be provided with a copy of this Court's decision about the agreement, the one on standing, and that the agreement be disclosed to parties that Righthaven has sued.

The Court is also going to order a monetary sanction against Righthaven, itself, in the amount of $\$ 5,000$ and order that Local Rule 7.1-1 will be properly complied with, either retrospectively or prospectively, in all cases that are filed by Righthaven with respect to this agreement.

Is there anything -- yes, counsel?
Incidentally, that monetary sanction will be paid within two weeks to the clerk of court.

MR. MANGANO: Your Honor, just a couple points of clarification. And I understand that you will be issuing a written opinion based upon what we -- based upon this hearing, I assume?

THE COURT: I'm not sure I will, counsel.

I'11 give that some consideration.
MR. MANGANO: Okay. Well, in view of that uncertainty, I'd just --

THE COURT: If I do issue a written opinion, counsel, I'm also going to direct that it be provided, filed in every other case that Righthaven has against anybody on this --

MR. MANGANO: Okay.
THE COURT: Along these issues.
MR. MANGANO: Okay. Your Honor, just for point of clarification, you've mentioned a couple bases for your sanction power; and it's not to challenge your sanction powers, but to clarify the record.

You've mentioned Rule 11, you've mentioned the inherent power, and you've mentioned the local rule. These sanctions that you just enumerated, do those fall under, one, all or -- one specific sanction power or under all your inherent power --

THE COURT: I'm invoking all of them, counsel.
MR. MANGANO: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
And a second point of clarification is that you said that parties -- all parties who are sued to be provided with a copy of the agreement, the strategic alliance agreement.

THE COURT: That will not apply to those cases
that have been dismissed, unless there's going to be an appeal in those cases.

MR. MANGANO: Okay. So all -- essentially all pending matters, would that be --

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MANGANO: Okay. And would your order include -- since as the Court, I'm sure, is aware, we have a clarification and we have what's now a restated version of the SAA, restated and amended version, would you like those provided as well?
the COURT: No.
MR. MANGANO: Just the SAA?
THE COURT: And no -- any revisions, amendments after the fact, in the Court's view, is irrelevant to this issue.

MR. MANGANO: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Any questions from other defendant?
MR. OPSAHL: It may also be useful for some of those cases to have a copy of Righthaven's operating agreement.

THE COURT: I beg your pardon?
MR. OPSAHL: It may also be useful to -- for the defendants in those cases to have a copy of Righthaven's operating agreement along with the
strategic alliance.
THE COURT: I think that was part of my order, counsel, is that the operating -- well, are you talking about the strategic alliance agreement?

MR. OPSAHL: There's a strategic alliance agreement as between Stephens Media and Righthaven; then there's also the Righthaven operating agreement, which is the organizational document for Righthaven.

MR. MANGANO: Your Honor, that's -- the issue here is the failure to disclose Stephens Media, which is a party to the --

THE COURT: Yes. I will not include that, counsel. I don't think it's relevant to this.

MR. OPSAHL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. MANGANO: And, Your Honor, there are cases pending, such as in the District of Colorado, which involve -- do not involve Stephens Media, but they involve MediaNews Group as the holder of the work that's been assigned.

Would your order require a production of the SAA or the production of the operative agreement, which I believe has been publicly filed already in the lead case that's resulted in a stay of some 34 actions?

THE COURT: In Colorado, you're talking about?
MR. MANGANO: Yes. All the Colorado
actions -- all the Colorado actions, to my knowledge, do not involve Stephens Media content.

I just want to make sure that when you say produced in all jurisdictions, it's not all -- not all jurisdictions involve Stephens Media content. So --

THE COURT: Are the agreements, the strategic agreements the same?

MR. MANGANO: No. They are in a different form. The content is significantly -- it looks different. It's very -- the document that controls those agreements has been produced and has not been sealed.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. MANGANO: So the only other jurisdiction would be there's a pending action in South Carolina, and there are the pending actions in this jurisdiction that involve Stephens Media.

THE COURT: You are obligated to the one in South Carolina, but you're also obligated to advise the Colorado court of this decision.

MR. MANGANO: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. PULGRAM: And, finally, Your Honor, Laurence Pulgram. You stated that if you issued a ruling in writing on this matter today, on this OSC, that you would ask that it be provided to the other
courts.
In the absence of that written ruling, would it make sense for the transcript of your ruling, up to the colloquy here, to be provided to other courts in lieu of a written order, to save Your Honor from having to write the written order?

MR. MANGANO: I think that's the understanding. If there's no order, I'm to produce the transcript, correct?

THE COURT: Yes. I think that's a good suggestion. And that will be the order if it wasn't clear otherwise.

Anything else?
MR. MANGANO: No, Your Honor.
MR. OPSAHL: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: We'11 be in recess.
(The proceedings were concluded at 9:35 a.m.)

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.


Donna Davidson, RDR, CRR, CCR \#318
Date Official Reporter

