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11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
12	DISTRICT OF NEVADA	
13		
14	RIGHTHAVEN LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,	Case No. 2:10-cv-02155-JCM-PAL
15	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT AND
16	,	DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIMANT AZKAR
17	V.	CHOUDHRY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
18	AZKAR CHOUDHRY, an individual; and PAK.ORG, a corporation of unknown origin	RECONSIDERATION OF MAY 3, 2011, ORDER DENYING IN PART
19	and nature, Defendants.	DEFENDANTS' AND
20	Defendants.	COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR
21		FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
22	AZKAR CHOUDHRY, an individual,	OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
23	Counterclaimant,	OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR
24	V.	SUMMARY JUDGMENT
25	RIGHTHAVEN LLC, a Nevada limited	
26	liability company,	
27	Counter-defendant.	
28		

Defendant and Counterclaimant Azkar Choudhry ("Mr. Choudhry") hereby replies in

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

support of his Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's May 3, 2011, Order denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint, or in the alternative for summary judgment (respectively, the "Motion for Reconsideration," and the "Order"). This Reply is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file in this action, the Request for Judicial Notice (the "RJN") filed concurrently herewith, and any oral

argument the Court may allow.

INTRODUCTION

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I.

For the reasons discussed in Mr. Choudhry's Motion for Reconsideration, the inline linking and volitional conduct defenses are separate and independent, as are the facts relating to each. Inline linking describes the circumstance where a party (whether volitionally or not) merely links to a copyrighted work such that the work is displayed in an end-user's web browser, rather than hosting that work on its own server. Inline linking is noninfringing because the linking party does not, as a matter of law, copy, modify, distribute or publicly display the work when it does not host the work on its server. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160-1161 (9th Cir. 2007). Volition is different; it is an element of the plaintiff's claim in all copyright cases. See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (D. Nev. 2006) (a "plaintiff must . . . show volitional conduct on the part of the defendant in order to support a finding of direct copyright infringement."). Courts have routinely held that there is no volition where content arrives at a defendant's website by virtue of an automated process. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (an "element of volition or causation . . . is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party."). In this case, Mr. Choudhry has submitted ample evidence – distinct from the evidence he submitted in support of his inline linking defense – that because the Make Magazine content arrived at his server by means of an automated process, he engaged in no volitional conduct sufficient to give rise to a finding of direct copyright

infringement. This is true regardless of whether there was an inline link or not. Because the Court erred in holding that the volitional conduct analysis was dependent upon an evaluation of inline linking, and because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact relevant to Mr. Choudhry's volitional conduct defense, the Court should reconsider its denial of Mr. Choudhry's summary judgment motion as to that issue.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Defense Of Inline Linking Is Separate From And Unrelated To The Nonvolitional Conduct Defense.

In its Opposition, Righthaven attempts to muddy the waters regarding the issue presented in Mr. Choudhry's Motion for Reconsideration. The fact that Mr. Choudhry's conduct is noninfringing pursuant to more than one defense is irrelevant to the instant motion; Mr. Choudhry seeks reconsideration only as to the volitional conduct defense. In its Order of May 3, 2011, the Court ruled with respect to inline linking that the Court is not an expert in source code authorship, and that Righthaven had contested the authenticity of the HTML code submitted by Mr. Choudhry for the Court's consideration. [Order at 4.] Yet the HTML code and the other facts related to inline linking are irrelevant to the question of whether Mr. Choudhry's conduct was volitional. [Mot. for Recons. at 2-4.] Indeed, in analyzing volitional conduct, the Court should assume that the allegedly infringed work was actually copied to Mr. Choudhry's website, i.e., that inline linking did not occur. [Mot. for Recons. at 2.]

The defenses of inline linking (on the one hand) and the volitional conduct doctrine (on the other hand) are separate, unrelated, and independent grounds for concluding that Mr. Choudhry had no legal liability with regard to the allegedly infringing post that underlies this action. [Choudhry's Mot. to Dismiss at 8-15; Mot. for Recons. at 2-4.] Mr. Choudhry respectfully submits that the Court erred by failing to consider each defense, and the different evidence relevant to each defense, separately.

B. Mr. Choudhry Has Submitted Substantial Evidence Showing That He Engaged In No Volitional Conduct Related To The Allegedly Infringing Post.

Mr. Choudhry has submitted substantial and uncontroverted evidence that he engaged in no volitional conduct sufficient to give rise to liability for direct copyright infringement. For example, Mr. Choudhry has submitted a sworn declaration stating, among other pertinent facts, that:

- The software that runs the GupShup forums, vBulletin, checks for new content published through the RSS feeds to which GupShup subscribes on a regular and fully automated basis. If it finds new RSS content on a feed to which GupShup subscribes, it automatically posts that content to GupShup without any modification to the underlying content, and without any human intervention. [Choudhry Decl. ¶ 15].
- On or about October 8, 2010, in response to Make Magazine's update to its RSS feed, GupShup's vBulletin software automatically posted the text of the Make Magazine blog post entitled *Can a Building Be a Sun-Death Ray? Yes!*, and hyperlinks to the two images referenced therein, to GupShup's "RSS:Gadgets" sub-forum. This post occurred without [Mr. Choudhry's] knowledge or intervention . . . [Choudhry Decl. ¶ 29].
- Due to the automated operation of the RSS feed, the Make Magazine post appeared in GupShup's "RSS:Gadgets" sub-forum without [Mr. Choudhry's] knowledge, prior review, or prior approval. [Choudhry Decl. ¶ 29].
- Due to the automated nature of the RSS feed, [Mr. Choudhry does] not know the content of any RSS-generated posts that appear on [his] server, at least until after they have been automatically posted to a GupShup subforum. [Choudhry Decl. ¶ 38].

In addition, Righthaven's own exhibit [Complaint, Ex. 2], shows that the title of the subforum to which the content was posted is "RSS:Gadgets," indicating that the content that appears therein is as a result of automated third-party RSS feeds. *See also*, Choudhry Decl. ¶ 16 (". . . of 82 separate forum categories, only 8 include sub-forums linked to RSS feeds.").

Finally, the fact that the allegedly infringing post, [Complaint, Ex. 2], is identical to the original Make Magazine blog post that generated the RSS feed in question, [Exhibit I to the Declaration of Benjamin A. Costa in support of Mr. Choudhry's Motion to Dismiss], further

supports the conclusion that Make, not Mr. Choudhry, was the source of the alleged infringement in this case.

Mr. Choudhry has come forward with substantial evidence that demonstrates a lack of volitional conduct on his part. Accordingly, even if there were no inline linking defense available in this case, he is not liable for direct copyright infringement.

C. Righthaven Has Not Raised Any Dispute As To Any Material Fact Relevant To The Volitional Acts Doctrine, Nor Has It Demonstrated A Need For Discovery.

As Righthaven points out, the Court denied Mr. Choudhry's summary judgment motion not only on the erroneous ground that "Defendants' argument as to volition depends on the court concluding that, as a matter of law, the alleged infringement here was actually 'inline linking," but also because the Court found "the genuine issues of material fact cited by plaintiff Righthaven at pages eleven to twelve of the response brief (doc. #23) apropos." [Order at 4.] However, as to the latter ground, the Court did not specify whether some of all of the genuine issues it identified were related to inline linking, or alternatively to volitional conduct. Because the Court erred in holding that the volitional conduct defense depends upon an inline linking analysis, it appears that some or all of the genuine issues identified by the Court (such as those relating to the HTML code) were likely irrelevant to the volitional conduct analysis (and therefore immaterial with respect to that defense). Because the Court should analyze volitional conduct without regard to inline linking, only those facts relevant to volitional conduct need be undisputed in order for the Court to grant summary judgment in Defendants' favor.

Righthaven has offered nothing to dispute the facts that relate to Mr. Choudhry's lack of volition, beyond a list of generalized questions that in effect accuse (with no basis) Mr. Choudhry of lying to the Court in his declaration. Such questions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Vague doubts and suppositions that merely express an "unspecified hope of undermining [Mr. Choudhry's] credibility" are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. *Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co v. Argonaut Ins. Co.*, 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983). Rather, Righthaven "must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial." *Matsushita Elec Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted). It has failed to do so.

Similarly, Righthaven's argument that there has not yet been any discovery in this case is unavailing. A party seeking to prevent the grant of a motion for summary judgment and seeking a continuance for discovery must show "(1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are 'essential' to resist the summary judgment motion." *State of Cal., on Behalf of the California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell,* 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998) ("*Dept. of Toxic Substances*"); *see also, VISA Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of America,* 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). Righthaven has made none of these showings.

Rule 56(d) provides a mechanism for nonmoving parties to request an opportunity to pursue discovery, yet Righthaven failed to submit a declaration or affidavit pursuant to this Rule. "Rule [56(d)] requires affidavits setting forth the particular facts expected from the movant's discovery. Failure to comply with the requirements of Rule [56(d)] is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment." Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (addressing Rule 56(d) at its former location as Rule 56(f)).

Righthaven has failed to set forth any specific facts it might hope to elicit from further discovery with respect to volitional conduct, has failed to show that any such facts exist, and has failed to show that any such facts would be essential to resisting Choudhry's summary judgment motion. Righthaven is obligated to do more than posit questions that appear generically relevant; it must set forth specific facts that exist and/or that would preclude summary judgment pursuant to the volitional acts doctrine if discovered. *See Family Home and Finance Ctr., Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp.*, 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008). It has not done so.

Righthaven knows what an RSS feed is, and it knows that nonvolitional conduct is a valid defense to a claim for direct copyright infringement. In a case currently pending in the District of Colorado, in response to a defendant's motion to dismiss, filed before the parties had conducted any discovery, Righthaven argued:

Reply in Sup. of Mot. for Recons.

Defendants' assertions, however, completely ignore that [defendant] selected and posted the Work on the Website without any due diligence as to its source by simply relying on content made available from a third party's website. Thus, this is not a case where copyright protected content appeared on a defendant's website through subscription to an RSS feed or other service engaged to provide content.

Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A (Righthaven's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, *Righthaven LLC v. Tripso et al.*, Case No. 11-cv-00146-JLK, May 16, 2011 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). Accordingly, Righthaven has acknowledged that content appearing "on a defendant's website through subscription to an RSS feed or other service engaged to provide content," precisely the issue in this case, is not a proper basis for asserting direct copyright liability. Moreover, the above-referenced filing was made by Righthaven in response to a motion to dismiss, before discovery had been propounded and before experts had been retained, yet Righthaven was quite capable of accurately assessing the presence or absence of a subscription-based RSS feed in that case.

Righthaven's apparent aim in the instant proceeding is to stave off defeat for long enough to conduct costly discovery against Defendants, whose only "transgression" is the legally immunized conduct of subscribing to a third-party's RSS feed, and to send the message to other Righthaven victims that standing up to even baseless claims of infringement is far more costly than settlement. Because Righthaven has failed to properly submit <u>any</u> evidence that would tend to contradict Mr. Choudhry's volitional conduct defense, Mr. Choudhry requests reconsideration and issuance of summary judgment in his favor.

For the reasons set forth above, and in Mr. Choudhry's underlying Motion for Reconsideration, Mr. Choudhry respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its Order with

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Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant AZKAR CHOUDHRY and Defendant PAK.ORG.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), I hereby certify that I am a representative

DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIMANT AZKAR CHOUDHRY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT

DEFENDANTS' AND COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED OR, IN

ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the Court's CM/ECF system.

OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MAY 3, 2011, ORDER DENYING IN PART

of Azkar Choudhry and Pak.org and that on this 13th day of June, 2011, I caused the

THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OR, IN THE

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Reply in Sup. of Mot. for Recons.

Case No. 2:10-cv-02155-JCM-PAL

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