Neb. Rev. Stat. » Chapter 28
Nebraska Revised Statutes

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (2026)

Murder in the second degree; penalty

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) A person commits murder in the second degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation.

(2) Murder in the second degree is a Class IB felony.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 136 cases (22 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: State v. Burlison, 583 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998).
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State v. Burlison, 583 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998). · cites it 53× “FACTS In an amended information filed on December 7, 1992, the State charged Burlison with aiding and abetting another to commit the offense of murder in the second degree as defined by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1995). Burlison pleaded guilty to the charge under the terms…”
State v. Ryan, 543 N.W.2d 128 (Neb. 1996). · cites it 55× “Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court case is significantly distinguishable and not applicable to the reasons why we have continuously held that malice is an essential element of § 28-304. One of the dissenters contends that Ryan's jury "was instructed that they must find that…”
State v. Grimes, 519 N.W.2d 507 (Neb. 1994). · cites it 22× “Therefore, absent malice, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1989), would be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”
State v. Iromuanya, 719 N.W.2d 263 (Neb. 2006). · cites it 10× “(iii) Requested Malice and Self-Defense Instructions [22] Iromuanya argues that the district court erred in failing to either instruct the jury on malice as an element of second degree murder or give his requested self-defense instruction.”
Glass v. Kenney, 687 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2004). · cites it 10× “In his petition, Glass alleged that the statute defining second degree murder, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1995), was “null and void from its enactment” because the elements of the offense are not clearly distinguishable from those of manslaughter as defined by Neb.”
State v. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d 501 (Neb. 2001). · cites it 20× “Since 1978, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1995) has provided in part: "(1) A person commits murder in the second degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation.”
State v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631 (Neb. 2002). · cites it 8× “In the first place, our decision in Redmond clearly states that our decision in Burlison was not unexpected, because the line of cases that Burlison overruled was not without obvious disagreement and was in direct contradiction to the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304…”
State v. Caddy, 628 N.W.2d 251 (Neb. 2001). · cites it 11× “Conviction errors: Caddy assigns that the district court erred in failing to find that (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to defective informations; (2) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1995), the statute defining murder in the second degree, is unconstitutionally…”
State v. Thomas, 685 N.W.2d 69 (Neb. 2004). · cites it 6× “Thomas argues that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1995), which defines the offense of second degree murder, is unconstitutional because nothing in the definition prevents the State from arbitrarily and discriminatorily choosing to charge second degree murder rather than the…”
State v. Trevino, 432 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1988). · cites it 10× “Ramon Perez' recitation of the facts and in-court identification of Trevino as the assailant were corroborated at trial by the Heils and by Gilliland and Harger, as well as by three bar patrons, Martens, Ross, and Walrod. We shall now consider, in turn, each of Trevino's six…”
State v. Pettit, 445 N.W.2d 890 (Neb. 1989). · cites it 10× “2d 764 (1965), illustrates that in an appropriate factual setting, a jury must decide whether a homicide constitutes murder in the second degree, that is, a person causes another's death intentionally without premeditation (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1985)), or whether the…”
State v. Thomas, 769 N.W.2d 357 (Neb. 2009). · cites it 13× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 2008) has not contained language regarding malice for second degree murder since 1979.”
Show all 136 citing cases →
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304(1) — 18 cases
State v. Burlison, 583 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998). “FACTS In an amended information filed on December 7, 1992, the State charged Burlison with aiding and abetting another to commit the offense of murder in the second degree as defined by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1995). Burlison pleaded guilty to the charge under the terms…”
State v. Ryan, 543 N.W.2d 128 (Neb. 1996). “Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court case is significantly distinguishable and not applicable to the reasons why we have continuously held that malice is an essential element of § 28-304. One of the dissenters contends that Ryan's jury "was instructed that they must find that…”
State v. Iromuanya, 719 N.W.2d 263 (Neb. 2006). “(iii) Requested Malice and Self-Defense Instructions [22] Iromuanya argues that the district court erred in failing to either instruct the jury on malice as an element of second degree murder or give his requested self-defense instruction.”
State v. Lovelace, 322 N.W.2d 673 (Neb. 1982).
State v. Grimes, 519 N.W.2d 507 (Neb. 1994). “Therefore, absent malice, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1989), would be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304(2) — 8 cases
State v. Iromuanya, 719 N.W.2d 263 (Neb. 2006). “(iii) Requested Malice and Self-Defense Instructions [22] Iromuanya argues that the district court erred in failing to either instruct the jury on malice as an element of second degree murder or give his requested self-defense instruction.”
State v. Martin, 524 N.W.2d 58 (Neb. 1994).
State v. Derry, 534 N.W.2d 302 (Neb. 1995).
State v. Weaver, 677 N.W.2d 502 (Neb. 2004).
State v. Davlin, 719 N.W.2d 243 (Neb. 2006).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304(l) — 1 case
State v. Ryan, 543 N.W.2d 128 (Neb. 1996). “Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court case is significantly distinguishable and not applicable to the reasons why we have continuously held that malice is an essential element of § 28-304. One of the dissenters contends that Ryan's jury "was instructed that they must find that…”
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