(1) A law enforcement officer has the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state and of the political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer or otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere within his or her primary jurisdiction.
(2) Any law enforcement officer who is within this state, but beyond his or her primary jurisdiction, has the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state or any legal ordinance of any city or incorporated village or otherwise perform the functions of his or her office, including the authority to arrest and detain suspects, as if enforcing the laws or performing the functions within his or her primary jurisdiction in the following cases:
(a) Any such law enforcement officer, if in a fresh attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing a felony, may follow such person into any other jurisdiction in this state and there arrest and detain such person and return such person to the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction;
(b) Any such law enforcement officer, if in a fresh attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, may follow such person anywhere in an area within twenty-five miles of the boundaries of the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction and there arrest and detain such person and return such person to the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction;
(c) Any such law enforcement officer shall have such enforcement and arrest and detention authority when responding to a call in which a local, state, or federal law enforcement officer is in need of assistance. A law enforcement officer in need of assistance shall mean (i) a law enforcement officer whose life is in danger or (ii) a law enforcement officer who needs assistance in making an arrest and the suspect (A) will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested, (B) may cause injury to himself or herself or others or damage to property unless immediately arrested, or (C) may destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of a crime; and
(d) Any municipality or county may, under the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act or the Joint Public Agency Act, enter into a contract with any other municipality or county for law enforcement services or joint law enforcement services. Under such an agreement, law enforcement personnel may have such enforcement authority within the jurisdiction of each of the participating political subdivisions if provided for in the agreement. Unless otherwise provided in the agreement, each participating political subdivision shall provide liability insurance coverage for its own law enforcement personnel as provided in section 13-1802.
(3) When probable cause exists to believe that a person is operating or in the actual physical control of any motor vehicle, motorboat, personal watercraft, or aircraft while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any drug or otherwise in violation of section 28-1465, 28-1466, 28-1472, 37-1254.01, 37-1254.02, 60-4,163, 60-4,164, 60-6,196, 60-6,197, 60-6,211.01, or 60-6,211.02, the law enforcement officer has the power and authority to do any of the following or any combination thereof:
(a) Transport such person to a facility outside of the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction for appropriate chemical testing of the person;
(b) Administer outside of the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction any post-arrest test advisement to the person; or
(c) With respect to such person, perform other procedures or functions outside of the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction which are directly and solely related to enforcing the laws that concern a person operating or being in the actual physical control of any motor vehicle, motorboat, personal watercraft, or aircraft while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any other drug or otherwise in violation of section 28-1465, 28-1466, 28-1472, 37-1254.01, 37-1254.02, 60-4,163, 60-4,164, 60-6,196, 60-6,197, 60-6,211.01, or 60-6,211.02.
(4) For purposes of this section:
(a) Class I railroad has the same meaning as in section 81-1401;
(b) Law enforcement officer has the same meaning as peace officer as defined in section 49-801 and also includes conservation officers of the Game and Parks Commission and Class I railroad police officers; and
(c) Primary jurisdiction means the geographic area within the territorial limits of the state or political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
15
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1997–2025 · leading case:
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
· cites it 46× “INTRODUCTION Following the county court’s denial of a motion to sup- press evidence from his stop and arrest, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). The district court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the arresting officer had jurisdictional…”
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2006).
· cites it 14× “We affirm because (1) Reilly had reasonable suspicion to detain the car and its occupants for further investigation, (2) the detention was reasonable, (3) Reilly had probable cause particularized to Voichahoske that he was concealing drugs on his *67 person, and (4) the…”
State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656 (Neb. 2021).
· cites it 9× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (Reissue 2016) is not a venue statute.”
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 63× “I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
State v. Cuny, 595 N.W.2d 899 (Neb. 1999).
· cites it 9× “Section 29-215(2)(b) states as follows: Any such law enforcement officer who is within this state, but beyond the territorial limits of his or her primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state or any legal ordinance of any city or…”
State v. Connick, 557 N.W.2d 713 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 8× “254, § 1, now codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (Reissue 1995). Section 29-215, which became effective March 1, 1994, provides in part: (1) Every sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, police officer, or peace officer as defined in subdivision (15) of section…”
State v. Warriner, 675 N.W.2d 112 (Neb. 2004).
· cites it 3× “2002) provides that a police officer, if in a fresh attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, may follow such person anywhere in an area within twenty-five miles of the boundaries of the law enforcement officer’s primary…”
State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656 (Neb. 2021).
· cites it 9× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (Reissue 2016) is not a venue statute.”
State v. Hill, 677 N.W.2d 525 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 5× “The district court based its determination that Sims had authority to detain Hill, in part, on a reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (2)(c)(ii) (Cum.”
State v. Duarte (Neb. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 11× “The county court found that the traffic stop was also lawful pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (2)(b) (Reissue 2016) because the officer had been in fresh pursuit of Duarte for less than 1 minute and was only about ½ mile into La Vista after observing Duarte make his illegal…”
State v. Furman (Neb. Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 9× “Furman’s argument asserts that Backer violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he acted outside of his primary jurisdiction in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (Reissue 2016). Section 29-215 generally provides that an officer has “the power and authority to enforce the…”
State v. Porter, 33 Neb. Ct. App. 453 (Neb. Ct. App. 2025).
“Applying that rationale to the facts in Hoehn, which was centered on an alleged violation of a Nebraska jurisdictional statute that conferred no authority to arrest the defendant out- side of the police officer’s jurisdictional territory, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(1) — 5 cases
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2006).
“We affirm because (1) Reilly had reasonable suspicion to detain the car and its occupants for further investigation, (2) the detention was reasonable, (3) Reilly had probable cause particularized to Voichahoske that he was concealing drugs on his *67 person, and (4) the…”
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
“INTRODUCTION Following the county court’s denial of a motion to sup- press evidence from his stop and arrest, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). The district court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the arresting officer had jurisdictional…”
State v. Cuny, 595 N.W.2d 899 (Neb. 1999).
“Section 29-215(2)(b) states as follows: Any such law enforcement officer who is within this state, but beyond the territorial limits of his or her primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state or any legal ordinance of any city or…”
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
State v. Connick, 557 N.W.2d 713 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997).
“254, § 1, now codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (Reissue 1995). Section 29-215, which became effective March 1, 1994, provides in part: (1) Every sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, police officer, or peace officer as defined in subdivision (15) of section…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(2) — 3 cases
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2006).
“We affirm because (1) Reilly had reasonable suspicion to detain the car and its occupants for further investigation, (2) the detention was reasonable, (3) Reilly had probable cause particularized to Voichahoske that he was concealing drugs on his *67 person, and (4) the…”
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
State v. Hill, 677 N.W.2d 525 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).
“The district court based its determination that Sims had authority to detain Hill, in part, on a reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (2)(c)(ii) (Cum.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(2)(b) — 3 cases
State v. Cuny, 595 N.W.2d 899 (Neb. 1999).
“Section 29-215(2)(b) states as follows: Any such law enforcement officer who is within this state, but beyond the territorial limits of his or her primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state or any legal ordinance of any city or…”
State v. Warriner, 675 N.W.2d 112 (Neb. 2004).
“2002) provides that a police officer, if in a fresh attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, may follow such person anywhere in an area within twenty-five miles of the boundaries of the law enforcement officer’s primary…”
State v. Duarte (Neb. Ct. App. 2022).
“The county court found that the traffic stop was also lawful pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (2)(b) (Reissue 2016) because the officer had been in fresh pursuit of Duarte for less than 1 minute and was only about ½ mile into La Vista after observing Duarte make his illegal…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(2)(c) — 1 case
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2006).
“We affirm because (1) Reilly had reasonable suspicion to detain the car and its occupants for further investigation, (2) the detention was reasonable, (3) Reilly had probable cause particularized to Voichahoske that he was concealing drugs on his *67 person, and (4) the…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(2)(c)(ii) — 2 cases
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2006).
“We affirm because (1) Reilly had reasonable suspicion to detain the car and its occupants for further investigation, (2) the detention was reasonable, (3) Reilly had probable cause particularized to Voichahoske that he was concealing drugs on his *67 person, and (4) the…”
State v. Hill, 677 N.W.2d 525 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).
“The district court based its determination that Sims had authority to detain Hill, in part, on a reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (2)(c)(ii) (Cum.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(2)(c)(ii)(C) — 1 case
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2006).
“We affirm because (1) Reilly had reasonable suspicion to detain the car and its occupants for further investigation, (2) the detention was reasonable, (3) Reilly had probable cause particularized to Voichahoske that he was concealing drugs on his *67 person, and (4) the…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(2)(d) — 2 cases
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
“INTRODUCTION Following the county court’s denial of a motion to sup- press evidence from his stop and arrest, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). The district court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the arresting officer had jurisdictional…”
State v. Duarte (Neb. Ct. App. 2022).
“The county court found that the traffic stop was also lawful pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (2)(b) (Reissue 2016) because the officer had been in fresh pursuit of Duarte for less than 1 minute and was only about ½ mile into La Vista after observing Duarte make his illegal…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(3) — 2 cases
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
“INTRODUCTION Following the county court’s denial of a motion to sup- press evidence from his stop and arrest, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). The district court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the arresting officer had jurisdictional…”
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(3)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
“INTRODUCTION Following the county court’s denial of a motion to sup- press evidence from his stop and arrest, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). The district court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the arresting officer had jurisdictional…”
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(3)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
“INTRODUCTION Following the county court’s denial of a motion to sup- press evidence from his stop and arrest, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). The district court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the arresting officer had jurisdictional…”
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(3)(c) — 2 cases
State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634 (Neb. 2024).
“INTRODUCTION Following the county court’s denial of a motion to sup- press evidence from his stop and arrest, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). The district court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the arresting officer had jurisdictional…”
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(4)(b) — 1 case
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(c)(3) — 1 case
State v. Hoehn, 999 N.W.2d 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
“I write separately because I disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215 (3)(c) - 467 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 32 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE V.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.