Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-307

Zoning regulations; adoption; notice; hearing

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No airport zoning regulations shall be adopted, amended, or changed under the Airport Zoning Act except by the action of the legislative body of the political subdivision in question, or the joint airport zoning board provided for in section 3-304, after a public hearing in relation thereto, at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. At least ten days' notice of the hearing shall be published in an official paper, or a paper of general circulation, in the political subdivision or subdivisions in which the airport hazard area is located.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15 cases, 1974–1994 · leading case: Bank of Valley v. Mattson
Bank of Valley v. Mattson (1983) neb · cites it 4× “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980), which provides in pertinent part: “(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.”
Skiles v. Security State Bank (1992) nebctapp · cites it 13× “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980). The case was tried to a jury, inter alia, on the issue of whether Evelyn and Orval Skiles had agreed to pledge the CD’s as security for Bradley Skiles’ debts.”
Arcadia State Bank v. Nelson (1986) neb · cites it 4× “Nelson has failed to specifically deny his signature on the notes offered by the Plaintiff, and pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code, Section 3-307, the signatures are deemed admitted and, further, that the promissory notes are valid and enforceable due to the Defendant’s failure…”
Ashland State Bank v. Elkhorn Racquetball, Inc. (1994) neb · cites it 2× “§ 3-307(2). Opstein stipulated that his signature appeared on the note.”
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Nielsen (1984) neb · cites it 2× “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980) as appli *300 cable, the language emphasized above being a literal statement of a portion of that statute.”
Barelmann v. Fox (1992) neb “§ 3-307(2) (Reissue 1980), “[w]hen signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.”
Columbus Bank & Trust Co. v. High Country Stable (1979) neb · cites it 2× “Defendants’ answer did not specifically deny the signature on the note and, therefore, section 3-307, U. C. C., applies. That *726 section provides: ‘‘(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an instrument is admitted.”
Newman Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver (1981) neb “Defendants’ counsel made no attempt to adduce any evidence supporting such latter allegation, although in describing a conversation had with the chairman of the board of the plaintiff company, the defendant Howard Deaver did testify without objection that “Harold [the chairman]…”
Sanitary & Improvement District No. 272 v. Marquardt (1989) neb · cites it 6× “Section 3-307(3) provides: "After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course.”
John Deere Co. v. Boelus State Bank (1989) neb · cites it 2× “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980) provides: (1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an instrument is admitted---- (2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a…”
Center Bank v. Mid-Continent Meats, Inc. (1975) neb “The answer does not specifically deny the signatures.”
Sanitary & Improvement District No. 32 v. Continental Western Corp. (1983) neb “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980) places the burden of pleading and proving defenses to a negotiable instrument upon the party attempting to avoid liability on the instrument.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-307(1) — 3 cases
Ashland State Bank v. Elkhorn Racquetball, Inc. (1994) neb “§ 3-307(2). Opstein stipulated that his signature appeared on the note.”
Lewis v. Opstein (1993) nebctapp
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-307(2) — 6 cases
Skiles v. Security State Bank (1992) nebctapp “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980). The case was tried to a jury, inter alia, on the issue of whether Evelyn and Orval Skiles had agreed to pledge the CD’s as security for Bradley Skiles’ debts.”
Bank of Valley v. Mattson (1983) neb “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980), which provides in pertinent part: “(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.”
Barelmann v. Fox (1992) neb “§ 3-307(2) (Reissue 1980), “[w]hen signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.”
Ashland State Bank v. Elkhorn Racquetball, Inc. (1994) neb “§ 3-307(2). Opstein stipulated that his signature appeared on the note.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-307(3) — 3 cases
Bank of Valley v. Mattson (1983) neb “§ 3-307 (Reissue 1980), which provides in pertinent part: “(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.”
Sanitary & Improvement District No. 272 v. Marquardt (1989) neb “Section 3-307(3) provides: "After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course.”
Lewis v. Opstein (1993) nebctapp
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-307(b) — 1 case
Lewis v. Opstein (1993) nebctapp
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