Nebraska Revised Statutes

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (2026)

Judgments and orders; liens; release; subordination; procedure; time limitation on lien; security; attachment; priority

✓ current as of July 2026
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Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and sections 42-347 to 42-381, 43-290, 43-512 to 43-512.10, and 43-1401 to 43-1418:

(1)(a) Except as provided in subdivision (1)(b) of this section, all judgments and orders for payment of money shall be liens, as in other actions, upon real property and any personal property registered with any county office and may be enforced or collected by execution and the means authorized for collection of money judgments.

(b) A judgment or order for payment of child support or spousal support creates a lien upon the real or personal property of the judgment debtor which attaches when the payment is due and extinguishes when the payment is made.

(c) For purposes of this section, a current child support or spousal support order payment history from the Title IV-D Division of the Department of Health and Human Services or spousal support order payment history from the clerk of the district court setting forth evidence that all support payments are current, and have been made as ordered for the previous twelve-month period or the total length of time the order has been in effect, whichever is shorter, is prima facie evidence that such payments are in fact current and such evidence operates to release the lien described in subdivision (1)(b) of this section for purposes of transferring a specific parcel of real property;

(2) The judgment creditor may execute a partial or total release of the judgment or a document subordinating the lien of the judgment to any other lien, generally or on specific real or personal property.

Release of a judgment for child support or spousal support or subordination of a lien of a judgment for child support or spousal support may, if all such payments are current and not delinquent or in arrears, be released or subordinated by a release or subordination document executed by the judgment creditor, and such document shall be sufficient to remove or subordinate the lien. A properly executed, notarized release or subordination document explicitly reciting that all child support payments or spousal support payments are current is prima facie evidence that such payments are in fact current. For purposes of this section, any delinquency or arrearage of support payments shall be determined as provided in subsection (2) of section 42-358.02;

(3) If a judgment creditor refuses to execute a release of the judgment or subordination of a lien as provided in subdivision (2) of this section or the support payments are not current, the person desiring such release or subordination may file an application for the relief desired in the court which rendered the original judgment. A copy of the application and a notice of hearing shall be served on the judgment creditor either personally or by registered or certified mail no later than ten days before the date of hearing. If the court finds that the release or subordination is not requested for the purpose of avoiding payment and that the release or subordination will not unduly reduce the security, the court may issue an order releasing real or personal property from the judgment lien or issue an order subordinating the judgment lien. As a condition for such release or subordination, the court may require the posting of a bond with the clerk in an amount fixed by the court, guaranteeing payment of the judgment. If the court orders a release or subordination, the court may order a judgment creditor who, without a good faith reason, refused to execute a release or subordination to pay the judgment debtor's court costs and attorney's fees involved with the application brought under this subdivision. A showing that all support payments are current shall be evidence that the judgment creditor did not have a good faith reason to refuse to execute such release or subordination. For purposes of this section, a current certified copy of support order payment history from the Title IV-D Division of the Department of Health and Human Services setting forth evidence that all support payments are current is prima facie evidence that such payments are in fact current and is valid for thirty days after the date of certification;

(4) Full faith and credit shall be accorded to a lien arising by operation of law against real and personal property for amounts overdue relating to a support order owed by a judgment debtor or obligor who resides or owns property in this state when another state agency, party, or other entity seeking to enforce such lien complies with the procedural rules relating to the filing of the lien in this state. The state agency, party, or other entity seeking to enforce such lien shall send a certified copy of the support order with all modifications, the notice of lien prescribed by 42 U.S.C. 652(a)(11) and 42 U.S.C. 654(9)(E), and the appropriate fee to the clerk of the district court in the jurisdiction within this state in which the lien is sought. Upon receiving the appropriate documents and fee, the clerk of the district court shall accept the documents filed and such acceptance shall constitute entry of the foreign support order for purposes of this section only. Entry of a lien arising in another state pursuant to this section shall result in such lien being afforded the same treatment as liens arising in this state. The filing process required by this section shall not be construed as requiring an application, complaint, answer, and hearing as might be required for the filing or registration of foreign judgments under the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act or the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act;

(5) Support order judgments shall cease to be liens on real or registered personal property ten years from the date (a) the youngest child becomes of age or dies or (b) the most recent execution was issued to collect the judgment, whichever is later, and such lien shall not be reinstated;

(6) Alimony and property settlement award judgments, if not covered by subdivision (5) of this section, shall cease to be a lien on real or registered personal property ten years from the date (a) the judgment was entered, (b) the most recent payment was made, or (c) the most recent execution was issued to collect the judgment, whichever is latest, and such lien shall not be reinstated;

(7) The court may in any case, upon application or its own motion, after notice and hearing, order a person required to make payments to post sufficient security, bond, or other guarantee with the clerk to insure payment of both current and any delinquent amounts. Upon failure to comply with the order, the court may also appoint a receiver to take charge of the debtor's property to insure payment. Any bond, security, or other guarantee paid in cash may, when the court deems it appropriate, be applied either to current payments or to reduce any accumulated arrearage;

(8)(a) The lien of a mortgage or deed of trust which secures a loan, the proceeds of which are used to purchase real property, and (b) any lien given priority pursuant to a subordination document under this section shall attach prior to any lien authorized by this section. Any mortgage or deed of trust which secures the refinancing, renewal, or extension of a real property purchase money mortgage or deed of trust shall have the same lien priority with respect to any lien authorized by this section as the original real property purchase money mortgage or deed of trust to the extent that the amount of the loan refinanced, renewed, or extended does not exceed the amount used to pay the principal and interest on the existing real property purchase money mortgage or deed of trust, plus the costs of the refinancing, renewal, or extension; and

(9) Any lien authorized by this section against personal property registered with any county consisting of a motor vehicle or mobile home shall attach upon notation of the lien against the motor vehicle or mobile home certificate of title and shall have its priority established pursuant to the terms of section 60-164 or a subordination document executed under this section.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1974–2021 · leading case: State v. McColery, 301 Neb. 516 (Neb. 2018).
State v. McColery, 301 Neb. 516 (Neb. 2018). · cites it 28× “During the garnishment proceedings, the attorney asserted that appearance bond funds are not personal property "registered" with a "county **518 office," as required for a lien under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (Reissue 2016). The district court disagreed and found that the State…”
Grosvenor v. Grosvenor, 293 N.W.2d 96 (Neb. 1980). · cites it 16× “This is an appeal from an order in a marriage dissolution proceeding entered under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (4) (Reissue 1978), subordinating the lien of a previously entered monetary judgment, payable in installments, granted to the respondent wife in lieu of…”
Bowers v. Lens, 648 N.W.2d 294 (Neb. 2002). · cites it 4× “See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-371 (Cum.Supp.2000). We, therefore, conclude that the district court erred in limiting Bowers' ability to collect the alimony judgment from Scherbring to a periodic basis under these circumstances.”
Fox v. . Whitbeck, 835 N.W.2d 638 (Neb. 2013). · cites it 5× “Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (Cum. Supp. 2012), all orders and judgments for child support in the specified proceedings operate as statutory liens.”
Lacey v. Lacey, 337 N.W.2d 740 (Neb. 1983). · cites it 6× “This is an appeal from the trial court’s determination that the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (5) (Reissue 1978) are not applicable to monetary property settlement judgments.”
Brockman v. Brockman, 646 N.W.2d 594 (Neb. 2002). · cites it 4× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (6) (Cum. Supp. 2000) provides with reference to child support payments that “[t]he court may in any case, upon application or its own motion, after notice and hearing, order a person required to make payments to post sufficient security, bond, or other…”
Gallner v. Gallner, 595 N.W.2d 904 (Neb. 1999). · cites it 5× “court erred (1) in quashing her subpoena duces tecum, (2) in granting Michael’s amended application for an order declaring satisfaction of judgment and subordination of child support and alimony liens, (3) in subordinating child support and alimony liens to a refinance…”
Freis v. Harvey, 563 N.W.2d 363 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 34× “Pursuant to *680 the Administrative Procedure Act, George appealed to the district court, which found: “It is quite clear that this statute [ Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1996)] only applies to ‘liens’.”
McCook Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 503 N.W.2d 200 (Neb. 1993). · cites it 4× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1992).”
Henke v. Guerrero, 692 N.W.2d 762 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “” Based on the financial circumstances of the parties, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order the parties to pay their own fees and costs.”
Klinginsmith v. Wichmann, 567 N.W.2d 172 (Neb. 1997). · cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (5) (Reissue 1993) provides that a court may “order a person required to make payments to post sufficient security, bond, or other guarantee with the clerk to insure payment of both current and any delinquent amounts.”
Muller v. Muller, 524 N.W.2d 78 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 5× “On the date of the decree, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (5) *171 (Reissue 1988) (currently Reissue 1993) authorized the posting of security to insure the payment of child support.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371(1) — 5 cases
State v. McColery, 301 Neb. 516 (Neb. 2018). “During the garnishment proceedings, the attorney asserted that appearance bond funds are not personal property "registered" with a "county **518 office," as required for a lien under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (Reissue 2016). The district court disagreed and found that the State…”
McCook Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 503 N.W.2d 200 (Neb. 1993). “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1992).”
Freis v. Harvey, 563 N.W.2d 363 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997). “Pursuant to *680 the Administrative Procedure Act, George appealed to the district court, which found: “It is quite clear that this statute [ Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1996)] only applies to ‘liens’.”
In Re Melcher, 416 B.R. 666 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2009).
State v. McColery, 301 Neb. 516 (Neb. 2018).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371(2) — 1 case
Freis v. Harvey, 563 N.W.2d 363 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997). “Pursuant to *680 the Administrative Procedure Act, George appealed to the district court, which found: “It is quite clear that this statute [ Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1996)] only applies to ‘liens’.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371(4) — 3 cases
Grosvenor v. Grosvenor, 293 N.W.2d 96 (Neb. 1980). “This is an appeal from an order in a marriage dissolution proceeding entered under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (4) (Reissue 1978), subordinating the lien of a previously entered monetary judgment, payable in installments, granted to the respondent wife in lieu of…”
Gallner v. Gallner, 595 N.W.2d 904 (Neb. 1999). “court erred (1) in quashing her subpoena duces tecum, (2) in granting Michael’s amended application for an order declaring satisfaction of judgment and subordination of child support and alimony liens, (3) in subordinating child support and alimony liens to a refinance…”
McCook Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 503 N.W.2d 200 (Neb. 1993). “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1992).”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371(5) — 4 cases
Lacey v. Lacey, 337 N.W.2d 740 (Neb. 1983). “This is an appeal from the trial court’s determination that the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (5) (Reissue 1978) are not applicable to monetary property settlement judgments.”
Casselman v. Casselman, 284 N.W.2d 7 (Neb. 1979).
Fox v. Whitbeck, 783 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 2010).
Muller v. Muller, 524 N.W.2d 78 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994). “On the date of the decree, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (5) *171 (Reissue 1988) (currently Reissue 1993) authorized the posting of security to insure the payment of child support.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371(6) — 1 case
Brockman v. Brockman, 646 N.W.2d 594 (Neb. 2002). “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (6) (Cum. Supp. 2000) provides with reference to child support payments that “[t]he court may in any case, upon application or its own motion, after notice and hearing, order a person required to make payments to post sufficient security, bond, or other…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371(9) — 2 cases
State v. McColery, 301 Neb. 516 (Neb. 2018). “During the garnishment proceedings, the attorney asserted that appearance bond funds are not personal property "registered" with a "county **518 office," as required for a lien under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-371 (Reissue 2016). The district court disagreed and found that the State…”
State v. McColery, 301 Neb. 516 (Neb. 2018).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.