Kell v. State, 618 P.2d 350 (Nev. 1980). · Go Syfert
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Kell v. State, 618 P.2d 350 (Nev. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re I.S. (nev, 2024-03-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re I.S.
Nev. · 2024 · confidence medium
Id. at 700 , 309 P.3d at 1046 (citing State v. Barren, 128 Nev. 337, 341 , 279 P.3d 182, 184 (2012) ("[T]he juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute." (quoting Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93 , 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980)))).
examined Cited as authority (rule) BARBER (JAQUEZ) VS. STATE (3×)
Nev. · 2015 · confidence medium
Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667 , 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009). "[T]he juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute." SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93 , 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BARBER (JAQUEZ) VS. STATE
Nev. · 2015 · confidence medium
Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667 , 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009). "[T]he juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute." SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93 , 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in Re: Jamar M., a Minor
Nev. · 2013 · confidence medium
This contention lacks merit. "'[T]he juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute." State v. Barren, 128 Nev. „ 279 P.3d 182, 184 (2012) (quoting Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93 , 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Steven Daniel P.
Nev. · 2013 · confidence medium
In State v. Barren, this court held that “ ‘the juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute.’ ” 128 Nev. 337, 341 , 279 P.3d 182, 184 (2012) (quoting Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93 , 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980)); see also State v. Bill, 91 Nev. 275, 277 , 534 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1975) (“The Juvenile Court Act’s grant of exclusive and original jurisdiction is limited . . . .”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Barren
Nev. · 2012 · confidence medium
Conversely, “the juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute.” Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93 , 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980); see also State v. Bill, 91 Nev. 275, 277 , 534 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1975) (“The Juvenile Court Act’s grant of exclusive and original jurisdiction is limited . . . .”).
discussed Cited "see" T.R. v. State, Division of Child & Family Services (2×)
Nev. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 618 P.2d 350 (1980) (recognizing that the legislature provides jurisdiction for the juvenile justice system); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (discussing the policies underlying the rule of lenity).
discussed Cited "see" In Re TR (2×)
Nev. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791 , 618 P.2d 350 (1980) (recognizing that the legislature provides jurisdiction for the juvenile justice system); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (discussing the policies underlying the rule of lenity). [1] See NRS 62.193(1), (5). [2] Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245, 250 , 681 P.2d 44, 47 (1984); McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56 , 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). [3] See Rembert v. State, 104 Nev. 680, 681 , 766 P.2d 890, 891 (1988); Deeds v. State, 97 Nev. 216, 217 , 626 P.2d 271, 272 (1981). [4] State v. Diamond, 50 Nev. 433, …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
SCOTT DEAN KELL, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
11062.
Nevada Supreme Court.
Oct 29, 1980.
618 P.2d 350
William N. Dunseath, Public Defender, and Michael B. McDonald, Deputy Public Defender, Washoe County, for Appellant., Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General, Carson City; Calvin R. X. Dunlap, District Attorney, and EdwardB. Horn, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

Per Curiam:

Appellant Scott Dean Kell, a minor, was charged with murder in the district court. He moved the court for an order directing an investigation to determine whether he should be treated as a juvenile in the juvenile division of the district court. The district court, however, concluded that it lacked authority under the Juvenile Court Act, NRS 62.010 et seq., to transfer a case where the juvenile was charged with murder to the juvenile division of the court, and, accordingly, denied appellant’s motion. The case proceeded to trial. Kell was convicted of first degree murder. He appeals the conviction. We affirm.

We recognize, as did the district court, that there are ambiguities in the Juvenile Court Act which may suggest that the legislature intended to allow a juvenile charged with murder or attempted murder, NRS 62.040(l)(c)(l); 62.060(1), to make a showing of “exceptional circumstances” sufficient to warrant his transfer to the juvenile division. [1] However, the juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the[*793] jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute. See Levy & Zentner Co. v. Justice Court, 48 Nev. 425, 233 P. 40 (1925); Paul & Co. v. Beegan & Co., 1 Nev. 327 (1865). Although a statutory provision by which a juvenile charged with murder or attempted murder may have his case transferred to the juvenile division of the district court may well be desirable, in certain circumstances, see NRS 62.290, we may not imply ex nihilo a grant of jurisdiction to try such an offense as a delinquent act within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under the present provisions of NRS 62.040(1)(c). [2]

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

The legislative history of the act, Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee, April 21, 1977, indicates that the proponents of the bill thought that transfer of such cases would be possible on a showing of exceptional circumstances justifying juvenile treatment of the offender. There is a further indication of this intent in NRS 62.170(7), which provides:

During the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal charge of murder or attempted murder, a child may petition the juvenile division for temporary placement in a juvenile detention facility pending final disposition of the issue of jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.]
2

NRS 62.040 provides that the juvenile court “has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:.. .. (c) Concerning any child living or found within the county who has committed a delinquent act. A child commits a delinquent act if he: (1) Commits an act designated a crime under the law of the State of Nevada except murder or attempted murder . . .”