NRS
104.3205 Special endorsement; blank endorsement; anomalous endorsement.
1. If an endorsement is made by the holder
of an instrument, whether payable to an identified person or payable to bearer,
and the endorsement identifies a person to whom it makes the instrument
payable, it is a “special endorsement.” When specially endorsed, an instrument
becomes payable to the identified person and may be negotiated only by the
endorsement of that person. The principles stated in NRS 104.3110 apply to special
endorsements.
2. If an endorsement is made by the holder
of an instrument and it is not a special endorsement, it is a “blank
endorsement.” When endorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer
and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially endorsed.
3. The holder may convert a blank
endorsement that consists only of a signature into a special endorsement by
writing, above the signature of the endorser, words identifying the person to
whom the instrument is made payable.
4. “Anomalous endorsement” means an
endorsement made by a person who is not the holder of the instrument. An
anomalous endorsement does not affect the manner in which the instrument may be
negotiated.
(Added to NRS by 1965,
823; A 1993,
1269)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
4
cases, 2012–2015 · leading case:
In re Phillips, 491 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
In re Phillips, 491 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
· cites it 7× “Nev.Rev.Stat. § 104.3205(1) (2011). Special endorsements are verbal acts (also known as statements of legal consequence) that negotiate a negotiable instrument.”
Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 (Nev. 2012).
· cites it 2× “2010); see also U.C.C. § 3-205 cmt. 2 (2004) (explaining that if ‘ ‘the holder of an instrument, intending to make a special [endorsement, writes the words ‘Pay to the order of without .”
In re Stanley, 514 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2012).
· cites it 3× “Nev.Rev. Stat. § 104.3205(2). This endorsement converted the Note from an order instrument — one payable to the order of Countrywide — to a bearer instrument, one which could legitimately be collected by whoever is in possession of it.”
Storlie v. Cam Mortg. Trust (Nev. 2015).
“"); NRS 104.3205(2) ("When endorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 104.3205(1) — 1 case
In re Phillips, 491 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
“Nev.Rev.Stat. § 104.3205(1) (2011). Special endorsements are verbal acts (also known as statements of legal consequence) that negotiate a negotiable instrument.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 104.3205(2) — 4 cases
Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 (Nev. 2012).
“2010); see also U.C.C. § 3-205 cmt. 2 (2004) (explaining that if ‘ ‘the holder of an instrument, intending to make a special [endorsement, writes the words ‘Pay to the order of without .”
In re Phillips, 491 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
“Nev.Rev.Stat. § 104.3205(1) (2011). Special endorsements are verbal acts (also known as statements of legal consequence) that negotiate a negotiable instrument.”
In re Stanley, 514 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2012).
“Nev.Rev. Stat. § 104.3205(2). This endorsement converted the Note from an order instrument — one payable to the order of Countrywide — to a bearer instrument, one which could legitimately be collected by whoever is in possession of it.”
Storlie v. Cam Mortg. Trust (Nev. 2015).
“"); NRS 104.3205(2) ("When endorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone .”
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