NRS
175.552 When required; procedure; evidence.
1. Except as otherwise provided in
subsection 2, in every case in which there is a finding that a defendant is
guilty or guilty but mentally ill of murder of the first degree, whether or not
the death penalty is sought, the court shall conduct a separate penalty
hearing. The separate penalty hearing must be conducted as follows:
(a) If the finding is made by a jury, the
separate penalty hearing must be conducted in the trial court before the trial
jury, as soon as practicable.
(b) If the finding is made upon a plea of guilty
or guilty but mentally ill or a trial without a jury and the death penalty is
sought, the separate penalty hearing must be conducted before a jury impaneled
for that purpose, as soon as practicable.
(c) If the finding is made upon a plea of guilty
or guilty but mentally ill or a trial without a jury and the death penalty is
not sought, the separate penalty hearing must be conducted as soon as
practicable before the judge who conducted the trial or who accepted the plea.
2. In a case in which the death penalty is
not sought or in which a court has made a finding that the defendant is
intellectually disabled and has stricken the notice of intent to seek the death
penalty pursuant to NRS 174.098, the
parties may by stipulation waive the separate penalty hearing required in
subsection 1. When stipulating to such a waiver, the parties may also include
an agreement to have the sentence, if any, imposed by the trial judge. Any
stipulation pursuant to this subsection must be in writing and signed by the
defendant, the defendant’s attorney, if any, and the prosecuting attorney.
3. During the hearing, evidence may be
presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the
offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems
relevant to the sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible.
Evidence may be offered to refute hearsay matters. No evidence which was
secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Nevada may be introduced. The State may introduce
evidence of additional aggravating circumstances as set forth in NRS 200.033, other than the aggravated
nature of the offense itself, only if it has been disclosed to the defendant
before the commencement of the penalty hearing.
4. In a case in which the death penalty is
not sought or in which a court has found the defendant to be intellectually
disabled and has stricken the notice of intent to seek the death penalty
pursuant to NRS 174.098, the jury or the
trial judge shall determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to life
with the possibility of parole or life without the possibility of parole.
(Added to NRS by 1977,
1543; A 1993,
322; 1995,
258, 2451;
2003,
767, 1460,
2082;
2007,
1412; 2013,
684)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
128
cases (
9 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case:
Valdez v. State, 196 P.3d 465 (Nev. 2008).
Valdez v. State, 196 P.3d 465 (Nev. 2008).
· cites it 6× “[14] Nor did the jury hear any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as outlined in NRS 175.552. Further, the jury was not instructed regarding the available sentences, and the district court and prosecutor's oral comments mentioning bifurcation were insufficient to instruct…”
Harte v. State, 13 P.3d 420 (Nev. 2000).
· cites it 18× “Evidence and argument on future dangerousness During the penalty phase, the district court admitted into evidence, over Harte's objection, a second excerpt of the letter sent by Harte to his former girlfriend in October 1998.”
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
· cites it 2× “2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 175.552 (Michie 2001); N.”
Rhyne v. State, 38 P.3d 163 (Nev. 2002).
· cites it 6× “[38] Constitutionality of the death penalty Finally, Rhyne contends that Nevada's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because NRS 175.552(3), in permitting the admission of "any evidence," fails to provide adequate guidance and improperly expands the scope of aggravating…”
Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987 (Nev. 2000).
· cites it 10× “" NRS 175.552(3). Statutes and this court's case law make clear the nature and use of the first two types of evidence.”
Lord v. State, 806 P.2d 548 (Nev. 1991).
· cites it 8× “Without citing any authority on point, the State argues that the right of confrontation should not apply at a capital penalty phase, given the breadth of hearsay evidence admissible during penalty phase under NRS 175.552. We disagree. Although not argued here, there are some…”
Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778 (Nev. 2006).
· cites it 6× “[16] *783 We have recognized that under NRS 175.552(3) hearsay is generally admissible [17] in a capital penalty hearing.”
Evans v. State, 28 P.3d 498 (Nev. 2001).
· cites it 4× “3d 987, 996 (2000) (quoting NRS 175.552(3)). [57] Id. at 746, 6 P.3d at 997 .”
Canape v. State, 859 P.2d 1023 (Nev. 1993).
· cites it 8× “NRS 175.552. Whether such additional evidence will be admitted is a determination reposited in the sound discretion of the trial judge.”
McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2004).
· cites it 4× “033 are so numerous and because NRS 175.552(3) permits unlimited aggravating evidence beyond the statutory aggravating circumstances.”
Collman v. State, 7 P.3d 426 (Nev. 2000).
· cites it 6× “See NRS 175.552. Often, in the penalty phase, the jury hears evidence concerning a defendant that was inadmissible during the guilt phaseevidence that the jury was forbidden from considering in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
State v. Second Jud. Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 11 P.3d 1209 (Nev. 2000).
· cites it 8× “NRS 175.552 is silent in regard to giving any notice of intent to seek death other than requiring disclosure of evidence of aggravating circumstances before the penalty hearing begins.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552(1) — 6 cases
Valdez v. State, 196 P.3d 465 (Nev. 2008).
“[14] Nor did the jury hear any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as outlined in NRS 175.552. Further, the jury was not instructed regarding the available sentences, and the district court and prosecutor's oral comments mentioning bifurcation were insufficient to instruct…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552(1)(a) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552(2) — 1 case
Collman v. State, 7 P.3d 426 (Nev. 2000).
“See NRS 175.552. Often, in the penalty phase, the jury hears evidence concerning a defendant that was inadmissible during the guilt phaseevidence that the jury was forbidden from considering in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552(3) — 59 cases
Harte v. State, 13 P.3d 420 (Nev. 2000).
“Evidence and argument on future dangerousness During the penalty phase, the district court admitted into evidence, over Harte's objection, a second excerpt of the letter sent by Harte to his former girlfriend in October 1998.”
Rhyne v. State, 38 P.3d 163 (Nev. 2002).
“[38] Constitutionality of the death penalty Finally, Rhyne contends that Nevada's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because NRS 175.552(3), in permitting the admission of "any evidence," fails to provide adequate guidance and improperly expands the scope of aggravating…”
Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987 (Nev. 2000).
“" NRS 175.552(3). Statutes and this court's case law make clear the nature and use of the first two types of evidence.”
Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778 (Nev. 2006).
“[16] *783 We have recognized that under NRS 175.552(3) hearsay is generally admissible [17] in a capital penalty hearing.”
Evans v. State, 28 P.3d 498 (Nev. 2001).
“3d 987, 996 (2000) (quoting NRS 175.552(3)). [57] Id. at 746, 6 P.3d at 997 .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552(l)(a) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552(l)(b) — 2 cases
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