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Nev. Rev. Stat.Nrs: Chapter 176 - Judgment and Execution

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.015 (2026)

Prompt hearing; court may commit defendant or continue or alter bail before hearing; statement by defendant; presentation of mitigating evidence; rights of victim; notice of hearing

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1973–2023 59citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 59 opinions since 1973, 9 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (3) (23 cases).

NRS 176.015  Prompt hearing; court may commit defendant or continue or alter bail before hearing; statement by defendant; presentation of mitigating evidence; rights of victim; notice of hearing.

      1.  Sentence must be imposed without unreasonable delay. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or continue or alter the bail.

      2.  Before imposing sentence, the court shall:

      (a) Afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant; and

      (b) Address the defendant personally and ask the defendant if:

             (1) The defendant wishes to make a statement in his or her own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment; and

             (2) The defendant is a veteran or a member of the military. If the defendant meets the qualifications of subsection 1 of NRS 176A.280, the court may, if appropriate, assign the defendant to:

                   (I) A program of treatment established pursuant to NRS 176A.280; or

                   (II) If a program of treatment established pursuant to NRS 176A.280 is not available for the defendant, a program of treatment established pursuant to NRS 176A.230 or 176A.250.

      3.  After hearing any statements presented pursuant to subsection 2 and before imposing sentence, the court shall afford the victim an opportunity to:

      (a) Appear personally, by counsel or by personal representative; and

      (b) Reasonably express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime on the victim and the need for restitution.

      4.  The prosecutor shall give reasonable notice of the hearing to impose sentence to:

      (a) The person against whom the crime was committed;

      (b) A person who was injured as a direct result of the commission of the crime;

      (c) The surviving spouse, parents or children of a person who was killed as a direct result of the commission of the crime; and

      (d) Any other relative or victim who requests in writing to be notified of the hearing.

Ê Any defect in notice or failure of such persons to appear are not grounds for an appeal or the granting of a writ of habeas corpus. All personal information, including, but not limited to, a current or former address, which pertains to a victim or relative and which is received by the prosecutor pursuant to this subsection is confidential.

      5.  For the purposes of this section:

      (a) “Member of the military” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 176A.043.

      (b) “Relative” of a person includes:

             (1) A spouse, parent, grandparent or stepparent;

             (2) A natural born child, stepchild or adopted child;

             (3) A grandchild, brother, sister, half brother or half sister; or

             (4) A parent of a spouse.

      (c) “Veteran” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 176A.090.

      (d) “Victim” includes:

             (1) A person, including a governmental entity, against whom a crime has been committed;

             (2) A person who has been injured or killed as a direct result of the commission of a crime; and

             (3) A relative of a person described in subparagraph (1) or (2).

      6.  This section does not restrict the authority of the court to consider any reliable and relevant evidence at the time of sentencing.

      (Added to NRS by 1967, 1432; A 1989, 1425; 1991, 90; 1995, 371; 1997, 3236; 2001, 889; 2009, 100; 2017, 3018; 2019, 4380)

     

The 20 cases that cite Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.015 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
REDLane v. State, 881 P.2d 1358 (Nev. 1994).
cites § 176.015 10×cited by 31 cases
Overruled by Leslie v. Warden: 2 citing opinions say overruled outright and 1 limits it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 176.015
“Fourth, Lane states that he was denied a fair penalty hearing because the district court admitted evidence which violated NRS 176.015 [1] , and which was unduly prejudicial.”
The case’s holding
Trial judges possess broad discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial.
Later courts cite it for
“questions of admissibility during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial are largely left to the discretion of the trial judge.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENBuschauer v. State, 804 P.2d 1046 (Nev. 1990).
cites § 176.015 9×subsections: (3) 7× (4)cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“1 Subsections (3)-(4) of NRS 176.015 provide in part: 3. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the victim an opportunity to: (a) Appear personally or by counsel; and (b) Reasonably express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime…”
The case’s holding
Due process requires that a defendant be given notice of and an opportunity to cross-examine an accuser when a victim-impact statement refers to specific prior bad acts.
Later courts cite it for
“this court will narrowly construe penal statutes where they are ambiguous.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENRandell v. State, 846 P.2d 278 (Nev. 1993).
cites § 176.015 5×subsections: (3) 4×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“2 Specifically, Randell contends that nothing in NRS 176.015 authorizes a victim to express a view as to the amount of prison time to which the defendant should be sentenced.”
The case’s holding
A victim may express an opinion regarding an appropriate sentence in a noncapital case because judges are capable of separating emotional testimony from relevant sentencing factors.
Later courts cite it for
“reasonably express any views concerning the crime” · 5 citing courts
4
GREENAparicio (henry) v. State, 496 P.3d 592 (Nev. 2021).
cites § 176.015 24×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 176.015
“: Article 1, Section 8A of the Nevada Constitution, also known as Marsy's Law, and NRS 176.015 both afford a victim the right to be heard at sentencing.”
The case’s holding
When an impact statement is objected to at sentencing, the court must determine if the author is a legal victim or, if not, find the statement to be relevant and reliable.
5
GREENMartinez v. State, 974 P.2d 133 (Nev. 1999).
cites § 176.015 6×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“See NRS 176.015. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s judgment of conviction, and we vacate that portion of the judgment directing that restitution be paid directly to Humana Insurance Company.”
The case’s holding
A defendant is entitled to challenge restitution sought by the state at sentencing (restitution is a sentencing determination).
Later courts cite it for
“is entitled to challenge restitution sought by the state and may obtain and present evidence to support that challenge.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENBetterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016).
cites § 176.015 1×cited by 163 cases
The case’s holding
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial protects an accused person from arrest or indictment through trial but does not apply once a defendant pleads guilty.
Later courts cite it for
“the guarantee protects the accused from arrest or indictment through trial, but does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.” · 14 citing courts
7
GREENO'NEILL v. State, 153 P.3d 38 (Nev. 2007).
cites § 176.015 3×subsections: (2)(b) 3×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“Allocution O’Neill contends that the district court denied his statutory right to allocution pursuant to NRS 176.015(2)(b). In this, he claims that the district court never offered him an opportunity to make a statement as required under NRS 176.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may deny an equivocal request for the right to self-representation (O'NEILL v. State).
Later courts cite it for
“a district court may deny .a defendant's request for self-representation where the request is untithely, court of appeals of nevada 4 oh 1947h the request is equivocal, the request is made solely for the purpose of delay, the defendant abuses his right by disrupting the judicial process, or the defendant is incompetent to waive his right to counsel.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENWood v. State, 892 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1995).
cites § 176.015 7×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“Appellant contends that the district court erred in allowing the minor’s mother to testify because she is not a “victim” as defined by NRS 176.015 1 and NRS 213.005. 2 Specifically, appellant *430 contends that the minor’s mother is not a “surviving parent” under NRS 213.”
Holding on this section
A sentencing court retains the discretion to consider any relevant and reliable evidence from a nonvictim because statutory provisions do not limit the admission of such evidence (NRS 176.015).
9
GREENChaparro (osbaldo) v. State, 497 P.3d 1187 (Nev. 2021).
cites § 176.015 3×subsections: (1) 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“NRS 176.015(1), his desire to appeal the conviction, and the risk of furthering the spread of a contagious disease with his right to be present at the hearing and the prospect of an indefinite delay.”
The case’s holding
A due process challenge to a criminal sentencing hearing conducted via videoconferencing during the COVID-19 pandemic is unsuccessful when the defendant can see, hear, and communicate with the court.
Later courts cite it for
“unusual, historic circumstances can require unusual, temporary accommodations.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENMeans v. State, 103 P.3d 25 (Nev. 2004).
cites § 176.015 1×subsections: (3)(a)cited by 311 cases
The case’s holding
A petitioner must prove the factual allegations underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“we review the district court's resolution of discovery disputes for an abuse of discretion.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENSmith v. State, 881 P.2d 649 (Nev. 1994).
cites § 176.015 5×subsections: (3)(b)cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“4 Smith claims that the district court erred in admitting McEachin’s testimony regarding Wendy and Kristy since it was outside the scope of the “victim impact statute,” NRS 176.015. 5 Smith’s *1106 reliance on NRS 176.”
The case’s holding
A depravity of mind aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague if the jury is not instructed that it requires torture, mutilation, or serious physical abuse beyond the act of killing.
Later courts cite it for
“the jury was not instructed that depravity of mind must include torture, mutilation or other serious and depraved physical abuse beyond the act of killing itself.” · 2 citing courts
12
YELLOWCastillo v. State, 874 P.2d 1252 (Nev. 1994).
cites § 176.015 4×subsections: (3)(b) 2×cited by 22 cases
Disapproved by Wood v. State on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 176.015
“NRS 176.015(3)(b) provides a victim the opportunity to appear personally or by counsel and reasonably express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the impact of the crime on the victim.”
The case’s holding
Statutory changes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the legislature clearly intends for them to apply retroactively (statutory changes are presumed to operate prospectively absent clear legislative intent).
Later courts cite it for
“if the judge relies upon prejudicial matters, such reliance constitutes an abuse of discretion that necessitates a resentencing hearing before a different judge.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENDieudonne v. State, 245 P.3d 1202 (Nev. 2011).
cites § 176.015 3×subsections: (3) 2× (3)(b)cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“NRS 176.015(3) grants certain victims of crime an opportunity to “[reasonably express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime on the victim and the need for restitution.”
The case’s holding
An error must be so unmistakable that it is apparent from a casual inspection of the record to constitute plain error.
14
GREENIgbinovia v. State, 895 P.2d 1304 (Nev. 1995).
cites § 176.015 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“005 when it enacted NRS 176.015, which allows for "victim-impact" testimony before a convicted criminal defendant is sentenced.”
The case’s holding
A police department is not a victim entitled to restitution for the cost of setting up a drug transaction under the sentencing statute.
Later courts cite it for
“passivity, where the harm or loss suffered is generally unexpected and occurs without the voluntary participation of the person suffering the harm or loss.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENHardison v. State, 763 P.2d 52 (Nev. 1988).
cites § 176.015 4×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“Specifically, relying on NRS 176.015(2), 2 he claims that the trial court had an affirmative duty to advise him of the possibility of giving an unsworn statement to the jury.”
The case’s holding
A judge must enter judgment according to a jury verdict after the jury has assessed a penalty of death.
Later courts cite it for
“after a jury has assessed a penalty of death, the judge has no discretion and must enter judgment according to the verdict of the jury.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENPrince v. State, 55 P.3d 947 (Nev. 2002).
cites § 176.015 4×subsections: (1) 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“Prince next filed a motion to dismiss, contending violations of his constitutional speedy trial and due process rights, his statutory rights under NRS 176.015, which prohibits unreasonable delays in sentencing, and his rights under the Agreement.”
The case’s holding
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply to sentencing hearings for defendants whose guilt has already been adjudicated.
17
GREENStubbs v. State, 972 P.2d 843 (Nev. 1998).
cites § 176.015 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“The mere introduction by a prosecutor of a victim witness to the court and submitting a few neutral preliminary questions to the witness should not have any substantive effect on a judge's decision. The State calling victims to present impact testimony does nothing more than…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor breaches a plea agreement by providing a disparaging assessment of the offense at sentencing if the agreement does not expressly reserve the right to argue the merits.
18
GREENMcNelton v. State, 900 P.2d 934 (Nev. 1995).
cites § 176.015 2×subsections: (2)cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“The legislature has established a state policy in NRS 176.015 in favor of admitting victim impact statements at sentencing hearings.”
The case’s holding
An aggravating circumstance is valid when a defendant commits murder while serving a sentence for another crime even if he is not currently in physical incarceration.
19
GREENStatz v. State, 944 P.2d 813 (Nev. 1997).
cites § 176.015 4×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“However, nothing in NRS 176.015 requires the participation of the prosecutor for introduction of a victim's testimony.”
The case’s holding
The state must explicitly reserve the right to present additional facts or arguments at sentencing if it intends to retain such rights within a plea agreement.
Later courts cite it for
“intends to retain the right to present facts and argument pertaining to sentencing, such a limited commitment should be made explicit” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENCunningham v. State, 575 P.2d 936 (Nev. 1978).
cites § 176.015 1×subsections: (2)cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 176.015
“” In light of the factual posture of this case, the sentencing of appellant without counsel violated both these mandates. Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.”
The case’s holding
Contentions unsupported by legal authority need not be considered on appeal (unsupported contentions) and the scope of voir dire falls within the sound discretion of the trial court (voir dire discretion).

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197319982023

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2016. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Nev.46D. Nev.6Nev.4SCOTUS2D. Utah1
By subsection
(1)5 cases
Chaparro (osbaldo) v. State, 497 P.3d 1187 (Nev. 2021).“NRS 176.015(1), his desire to appeal the conviction, and the risk of furthering the spread of a contagious disease with his right to be present at the hearing and the prospect of an indefinite delay.”
Prince v. State, 55 P.3d 947 (Nev. 2002).“Prince next filed a motion to dismiss, contending violations of his constitutional speedy trial and due process rights, his statutory rights under NRS 176.015, which prohibits unreasonable delays in sentencing, and his rights under the Agreement.”
Kaplan (Aaron) v. State, No. 72938 (Nev. May 31, 2019).
Kaplan (Aaron) v. State, No. 72938 (Nev. May 31, 2019).
Izadi (Arman) v. State, No. 63672 (Nev. June 11, 2014).
(2)4 cases
Hardison v. State, 763 P.2d 52 (Nev. 1988).“Specifically, relying on NRS 176.015(2), 2 he claims that the trial court had an affirmative duty to advise him of the possibility of giving an unsworn statement to the jury.”
Cunningham v. State, 575 P.2d 936 (Nev. 1978).“” In light of the factual posture of this case, the sentencing of appellant without counsel violated both these mandates. Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.”
McNelton v. State, 900 P.2d 934 (Nev. 1995).“The legislature has established a state policy in NRS 176.015 in favor of admitting victim impact statements at sentencing hearings.”
Reed (Joe) v. State, No. 65219 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2014).
(2)(b)2 cases
O'NEILL v. State, 153 P.3d 38 (Nev. 2007).“Allocution O’Neill contends that the district court denied his statutory right to allocution pursuant to NRS 176.015(2)(b). In this, he claims that the district court never offered him an opportunity to make a statement as required under NRS 176.”
Godoy v. LeGrand, No. 3:14-cv-00524 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2021).
(2)(b)(1)1 case
Warren (David) v. State, No. 60126 (Nev. July 23, 2013).
(3)23 cases
Buschauer v. State, 804 P.2d 1046 (Nev. 1990).“1 Subsections (3)-(4) of NRS 176.015 provide in part: 3. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the victim an opportunity to: (a) Appear personally or by counsel; and (b) Reasonably express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime…”
Randell v. State, 846 P.2d 278 (Nev. 1993).“2 Specifically, Randell contends that nothing in NRS 176.015 authorizes a victim to express a view as to the amount of prison time to which the defendant should be sentenced.”
Dieudonne v. State, 245 P.3d 1202 (Nev. 2011).“NRS 176.015(3) grants certain victims of crime an opportunity to “[reasonably express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime on the victim and the need for restitution.”
Wood v. State, 892 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1995).“Appellant contends that the district court erred in allowing the minor’s mother to testify because she is not a “victim” as defined by NRS 176.015 1 and NRS 213.005. 2 Specifically, appellant *430 contends that the minor’s mother is not a “surviving parent” under NRS 213.”
United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 23. More in the list view →
(3)(a)1 case
Means v. State, 103 P.3d 25 (Nev. 2004).
(3)(b)18 cases
Castillo v. State, 874 P.2d 1252 (Nev. 1994).“NRS 176.015(3)(b) provides a victim the opportunity to appear personally or by counsel and reasonably express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the impact of the crime on the victim.”
Dieudonne v. State, 245 P.3d 1202 (Nev. 2011).
Smith v. State, 881 P.2d 649 (Nev. 1994).“4 Smith claims that the district court erred in admitting McEachin’s testimony regarding Wendy and Kristy since it was outside the scope of the “victim impact statute,” NRS 176.015. 5 Smith’s *1106 reliance on NRS 176.”
Maxwell v. Baker, No. 3:19-cv-00201 (D. Nev. May 12, 2021).
Gallegos v. Baca, No. 3:15-cv-00254 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2021).
Showing the top 5 of 18. More in the list view →
(4)2 cases
Buschauer v. State, 804 P.2d 1046 (Nev. 1990).
Bork v. Gentry, No. 2:16-cv-01235 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2020).

Show all 59 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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