Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033

Sentence of imprisonment required or permitted by statute: Definite period for misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor; minimum and maximum term for felony unless definite term required by statute; restitution

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NRS 176.033  Sentence of imprisonment required or permitted by statute: Definite period for misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor; minimum and maximum term for felony unless definite term required by statute; restitution.  If a sentence of imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, the court shall:

      1.  If sentencing a person who has been found guilty of a misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor, sentence the person to imprisonment for a definite period of time within the maximum limit or the minimum and maximum limits prescribed by the applicable statute, taking due account of the gravity of the particular offense and of the character of the individual defendant.

      2.  If sentencing a person who has been found guilty of a felony, sentence the person to a minimum term and a maximum term of imprisonment, unless a definite term of imprisonment is required by statute.

      3.  If restitution is appropriate, set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense and for expenses related to extradition in accordance with NRS 179.225.

      (Added to NRS by 1967, 527; A 1973, 844; 1975, 652; 1977, 414; 1987, 395; 1989, 678; 1993, 934, 1512; 1995, 551, 1248; 2019, 4381)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 49 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1969–2026 · leading case: Igbinovia v. State
Igbinovia v. State (1995) nev · cites it 17× “The statutory basis in Nevada for ordering restitution as part of a sentence is NRS 176.033, which provides, in relevant part: Sentence of imprisonment required or permitted by statute: Definite period; restitution; modification of sentence.”
Erickson v. State (1991) nev · cites it 6× “DISCUSSION The restitution provision contained in NRS 176.033 authorizes courts, when sentencing defendants convicted of offenses for which imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, to “set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense.”
Hewitt v. State (1997) nev · cites it 5× “In addition, because we conclude that an insurance company is not a victim within the meaning of NRS 176.033, we reverse Hewitt’s order of restitution to the victim’s insurance company and remand with instructions to order restitution to the victim.”
WITTER (WILLIAM) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-DIRECT) (2019) nev · cites it 4× “NRS 176.033(1)(c) likewise requires the district court to set forth the "amount of restitution for each victim of the offense.”
Roe v. State (1996) nev · cites it 5× “005(2) which, at the time of sentencing, defined victim as “(a) A person against whom a crime has been committed; (b) A person who has been injured or killed as a direct result of the commission of a crime; or (c) A relative of a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).”
Grey v. State (2008) nev “31 See NRS 176.033; NRS 193.130; see also Villanueva v.”
Whitehead v. State (2012) nev · cites it 2× “105(1); see also NRS 176.033(l)(c). We conclude that a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada *261 statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a…”
Martinez v. State (1999) nev · cites it 2× “The district court *11 ordered appellant to pay restitution pursuant to NRS 176.033(l)(c), which provides that “[i]f a sentence of imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, the [sentencing] court shall: .”
NIED (TYLER) v. STATE (2022) nev · cites it 4× “Sufficiency of evidence NRS 176.033(3) authorizes a sentencing judge to "set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense" if restitution is "appropriate.”
Norwood v. State (1996) nev · cites it 2× “He asserts that the Washoe Medical Center is not a “victim” entitled to restitution under NRS 176.033(l)(b). We conclude that Norwood’s contention is not properly before this court.”
Washington v. State (1996) nev · cites it 3× “NRS 176.033 states, in pertinent part: 1.”
Botts v. State (1993) nev · cites it 2× “NRS 176.033(1) provides in part: 1. If a sentence of imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, the court shall: (b) If restitution is appropriate, set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(1) — 8 cases
Botts v. State (1993) nev “NRS 176.033(1) provides in part: 1. If a sentence of imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, the court shall: (b) If restitution is appropriate, set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense.”
Erickson v. State (1991) nev “DISCUSSION The restitution provision contained in NRS 176.033 authorizes courts, when sentencing defendants convicted of offenses for which imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, to “set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense.”
Washington v. State (1996) nev “NRS 176.033 states, in pertinent part: 1.”
Roe v. State (1996) nev “005(2) which, at the time of sentencing, defined victim as “(a) A person against whom a crime has been committed; (b) A person who has been injured or killed as a direct result of the commission of a crime; or (c) A relative of a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).”
Powell v. State (1997) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(1)(a) — 1 case
Colwell v. State (1996) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(1)(b) — 3 cases
Buffington v. State (1994) nev
Norwood v. State (1996) nev
Lavoll v. Howell (2022) nvd
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(1)(c) — 11 cases
WITTER (WILLIAM) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-DIRECT) (2019) nev “NRS 176.033(1)(c) likewise requires the district court to set forth the "amount of restitution for each victim of the offense.”
Kidder v. State (1997) nev
Slaatte v. State (2013) nev
Major v. State (2014) nev
Washington v. State (1996) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(2) — 4 cases
Hunt v. Warden (1995) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(3) — 8 cases
NIED (TYLER) v. STATE (2022) nev “Sufficiency of evidence NRS 176.033(3) authorizes a sentencing judge to "set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense" if restitution is "appropriate.”
Bolden v. State (2023) nev
Bolden v. State (2023) nevapp
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(l)(b) — 2 cases
Erickson v. State (1991) nev “DISCUSSION The restitution provision contained in NRS 176.033 authorizes courts, when sentencing defendants convicted of offenses for which imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, to “set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense.”
Norwood v. State (1996) nev “He asserts that the Washoe Medical Center is not a “victim” entitled to restitution under NRS 176.033(l)(b). We conclude that Norwood’s contention is not properly before this court.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.033(l)(c) — 4 cases
Whitehead v. State (2012) nev “105(1); see also NRS 176.033(l)(c). We conclude that a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada *261 statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a…”
Martinez v. State (1999) nev “The district court *11 ordered appellant to pay restitution pursuant to NRS 176.033(l)(c), which provides that “[i]f a sentence of imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, the [sentencing] court shall: .”
Roe v. State (1996) nev “005(2) which, at the time of sentencing, defined victim as “(a) A person against whom a crime has been committed; (b) A person who has been injured or killed as a direct result of the commission of a crime; or (c) A relative of a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).”
Washington v. State (1996) nev “NRS 176.033 states, in pertinent part: 1.”
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