NRS
178.562 Dismissal or discharge as bar to another prosecution.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 174.085, an order for the dismissal of
the action, as provided in NRS 178.554
and 178.556, is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
2. The discharge of a person accused upon
preliminary examination is a bar to another complaint against the person for
the same offense, but does not bar the finding of an indictment or filing of an
information.
(Added to NRS by 1967,
1456; A 1997,
2393)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
28
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1970–2023 · leading case:
Thompson v. State, 221 P.3d 708 (Nev. 2009).
Thompson v. State, 221 P.3d 708 (Nev. 2009).
· cites it 40× “NRS 178.562 Thompson argues that NRS 178.”
Warren v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., 427 P.3d 1033 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 15× “015(1)(a) ; those cases addressed only whether the State could initiate a new prosecution after the justice court dismissed a complaint, an issue that is governed by NRS 178.562, not whether the State could have appealed from the justice court decision.”
Martin v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 496 P.2d 754 (Nev. 1972).
· cites it 5× “” 3 NRS 178.562, subsection 2: “The discharge of a person accused upon preliminary examination shall be a bar to another complaint against him for the same offense, but shall not bar the finding of an indictment or filing of an information.”
Turpin v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 484 P.2d 1083 (Nev. 1971).
· cites it 5× “554 2 and NRS 178.562 3 forbid any further prosecution of the appellant once the state moved for a dismissal of the information and the requested dismissal was granted.”
Maes v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 468 P.2d 332 (Nev. 1970).
· cites it 2× “562(2) which provides that “the discharge of a person accused upon preliminary examination shall be a bar to another complaint against him for the same offense, but shall not bar the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information.” This statute contemplates a dismissal…”
McNair v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 514 P.2d 1175 (Nev. 1973).
· cites it 2× “2d 332 (1970), in which we said: "Although NRS 178.562(2) may not have been intended to bar a second criminal complaint in the circumstances before us, basic fairness does bar such a procedure.”
Koller v. State, 130 P.3d 653 (Nev. 2006).
“2d 48 (1998) (defendant filed a motion to dismiss a felony complaint for violations of NRS 178.562(2)); State v. Fain, 105 Nev. 567 , 779 P.”
Norman v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 558 P.2d 541 (Nev. 1976).
“Charges of robbery, battery with intent to commit robbery, and the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime against Norman and Zelenik were initially dismissed after a preliminary examination was held.”
Singleton v. Sheriff, 471 P.2d 247 (Nev. 1970).
· cites it 2× “Thereafter he filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon that identical ground and contended under the provisions of NRS 178.562 2 that he was being illegally restrained.”
State v. Austin, 482 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1971).
“2d 332 (1970), in which we said: “Although NRS 178.562(2) may not have been intended to bar a second criminal complaint in the circumstances before us, basic fairness does bar such a procedure.”
Warren, Jr. (joseph) Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2018 NV 77 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 24× “015(1)(a); those cases addressed only whether the State could initiate a new prosecution after the justice court dismissed a complaint, an issue that is governed by NRS 178.562, not whether the State could have appealed from the justice court decision.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.562(1): 7 cases
Thompson v. State, 221 P.3d 708 (Nev. 2009).
“NRS 178.562 Thompson argues that NRS 178.”
Turpin v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 484 P.2d 1083 (Nev. 1971).
“554 2 and NRS 178.562 3 forbid any further prosecution of the appellant once the state moved for a dismissal of the information and the requested dismissal was granted.”
Martin v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 496 P.2d 754 (Nev. 1972).
“” 3 NRS 178.562, subsection 2: “The discharge of a person accused upon preliminary examination shall be a bar to another complaint against him for the same offense, but shall not bar the finding of an indictment or filing of an information.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.562(2): 22 cases
Warren v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., 427 P.3d 1033 (Nev. 2018).
“015(1)(a) ; those cases addressed only whether the State could initiate a new prosecution after the justice court dismissed a complaint, an issue that is governed by NRS 178.562, not whether the State could have appealed from the justice court decision.”
Maes v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 468 P.2d 332 (Nev. 1970).
“562(2) which provides that “the discharge of a person accused upon preliminary examination shall be a bar to another complaint against him for the same offense, but shall not bar the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information.” This statute contemplates a dismissal…”
McNair v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 514 P.2d 1175 (Nev. 1973).
“2d 332 (1970), in which we said: "Although NRS 178.562(2) may not have been intended to bar a second criminal complaint in the circumstances before us, basic fairness does bar such a procedure.”
Koller v. State, 130 P.3d 653 (Nev. 2006).
“2d 48 (1998) (defendant filed a motion to dismiss a felony complaint for violations of NRS 178.562(2)); State v. Fain, 105 Nev. 567 , 779 P.”
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