Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.190

To constitute crime there must be unity of act and intent

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NRS 193.190  To constitute crime there must be unity of act and intent.  In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.

      [1911 C&P § 6; RL § 6271; NCL § 9955]

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 32 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1969–2024 · leading case: Finger v. State
Finger v. State (2001) nev · cites it 4× “NRS 193.190 provides: In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.”
City of Las Vegas v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada (2002) nev · cites it 4× “The City argues that this court can save the statute from invalidity by imposing a reasonable person standard, or by reading it in context with NRS 193.190 [31] and NRS 194.010. [32] We reject the City's invitation to construe the statute in a manner that renders it…”
Dutchess Business Services, Inc. v. Nevada State Board of Pharmacy (2008) nev · cites it 2× “Dutchess and Legend argue specifically that (1) NRS 193.190 requires “a union of act and intention, or criminal negligence to constitute a crime’ ’; (2) in the absence of clear legislative intent, there is a strong presumption that a crime requires a culpable mental state; (3)…”
Zamarripa v. First Judicial District Court (1987) nev · cites it 2× “Zamarripa contends he did not have actual or constructive notice of the revocation and therefore did not form the requisite criminal intent required by NRS 193.190. The justice and district courts, however, found the violation of NRS 483.”
Jenkins v. State (1994) nev · cites it 2× “Jenkins asserts that the following statutory provisions are relevant to this issue: NRS 193.190 To constitute crime there must be unity of act and intent.”
Ford v. State (2011) nev “The instructions the jury received simply reprised the requirements for general intent under NRS 193.190 (there must be “a union, or joint operation of act and intention” for “every crime or public offense”) and NRS 201.”
Dunphy v. Sheehan (1976) nev · cites it 2× “650 requires, at their peril. Since that statute is enforced by criminal sanctions, they may know that any legitimate doubts about the statute's sweep must be resolved in their favor, and that, in any event, they are culpable only if they act in bad faith.”
Nay v. State (2007) nev · cites it 2× “2d 443, 449 (1999); NRS 193.190. [26] 116 Nev. 687 , 717, 7 P.”
McMichael v. State (1978) nev “) 3 NRS 193.190 provides in part: “In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention.”
Busefink v. State (2012) nev · cites it 2× “805 to incorporate a general intent requirement pursuant to NRS 193.190, which provides that “[i]n every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.”
Sheriff v. Burdg (2002) nev “However, we note that the general intent statute, NRS 193.190, does not alleviate the absence of an intent element in NRS 453.”
Labastida v. State (1999) nev “See NRS 193.190 (to constitute the crime charged there must be unity of act and intent).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.